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Abstract 
 
This research is an investigation into how the subjectivities of people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) are shaped by their illness and how this ultimately influences 
their conceptualization of entitlements and rights. It achieves this by analyzing the 
broader historical and modern contexts in which the Kenyan PLWHA’s sense of self is 
constructed, including the norms on which attitudes about AIDS and those who suffer 
from it are grounded. As part of this analysis, the research also probes the intricate 
power dynamics and systems of privileges and obligations that bind individuals to 
their wider social network, including the family, community, and the State. It then 
looks at the responses of PLWHAs interviewed for this research in order to examine 
awareness about human rights, which health entitlements they claim (and which they 
do not), from whom and why. What emerges is an insight into how members of this 
sizeable population locate themselves within their wider socio-economic matrices; 
how HIV infection often then dislocates them; how they imagine their resultant 
entitlements; the competing moral frameworks of reference on which they base such 
claims, and last, but not least, the language they use to articulate them. As this 
research contends, the human rights paradigm is not the sole, or even the dominant, 
framework of reference by which Kenyan PLWHAs or laypeople more generally 
imagine and articulate their grievances and entitlements. Further, how the PLWHAs 
at the heart of this research incorporate human rights norms and how they attempt 
to reconcile the tensions and contradictions in these competing frames of reference 
illuminates the way in which the HIV epidemic has shaped the human rights 
discourse. Moreover, it highlights the often-ignored role of laypeople as agents in the 
advancement- or not- of the broader human rights project. As the research 
concludes, proponents of human rights have much to do to promote its norms and 
cultivate support for it in the grassroots. They would do well to understand the 
complex processes by which laypeople’s notions of entitlement are constructed, and 
the pivotal role their varied subjectivities play. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
I. Introduction  
a) The Human Element 
When the idea for this research began to form, nearly a decade before its 
presentation, Kenya was just waking up to the magnitude of its HIV/AIDS problem. 
Questions were beginning to be asked about how a culturally and religiously 
conservative country had ended up with a significant portion of its population living 
with a largely sexually-transmitted illness1; how its people living with HIV/AIDS 
(PLWHAs), most of whom were women, should be treated by society; what duty, if 
any, the State had to take care of them; what rights, if any, PLWHAs were due; and 
how the State should address the wider public health emergency. It was, to say the 
least, an interesting  time to be asking these questions, for parallel dialogues were 
taking place on the political plane about the nature and role of the postcolonial State 
in the multi-party era; its duty to its citizens; the nature and scope of their human 
rights; the citizens’ complex dual-membership to both a national as well as an ethnic 
public; the place of the rule of law in this changing political landscape; and the role of 
overseas governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) which were increasingly 
mediating the State-citizen relationship.  
 
                                                 
1
 In 2012, there were an estimated 1.6 million PLWHAs in Kenya. About 1.4 million are adults aged 15 
years and over; an estimated 200,000 are children aged 0 to14 years. The HIV prevalence rate among 
15-49 year-olds was between 6.1%. The corresponding prevalence rate in 2001 was 8.4%. Kenya’s 
national HIV prevalence in 2006 was 5%, down from around 14% in the mid-1990s. (2012 stats from 
UNAIDS Kenya webpage, 2013, at http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/kenya/, 
accessed 12/12/13. Comparative 2001 statistics from UNAIDS, Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the 
Global AIDS Epidemic, 2010, 2010, at 
http://www.unaids.org/documents/20101123_GlobalReport_em.pdf, accessed 12/03/12, at 28). 
Women account for 59.1% of adults with HIV, and among 15-49 year-olds HIV prevalence among 
women is 8% and nearly half that (4.3%) among men. (National AIDS Control Council (NACC) and 
National AIDS and STI Control Programme (NASCOP), The Kenya AIDS Epidemic Update 2011, (Nairobi, 
Kenya: 2012) at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/knowyourresponse/countryprogressreports/2012countries/ce
_KE_Narrative_Report.pdf, accessed 12/12/13; at 6). In 2011, nearly  estimated 104,000 people 
became newly infected with HIV; 91,000 were adults. (NACC and NASCOP, at 8). In 2012, 57,000 
people are estimated to have died from AIDS-related causes, less than half the 120,000 estimated 
deaths in 2001. But the number of AIDS orphans (children aged between 0 and 17 years who have lost 
one or both parents to AIDS) had increased in 2012 to an estimated 1 million, up from an estimated 
820,000 in 2001. (UNAIDS Kenya webpage). 
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For a law student whose graduate and post-graduate studies already had a strong 
human rights flavour and whose extra-curricular activities and personal experiences 
had brought her into contact with PLWHAs, the issues that this research deals with 
were ripe for investigation.  
 
In the time it has taken to write this research, a number of key events, outlined later, 
have taken place. One of the most important is the adoption in August 2010 of a new 
constitution in Kenya. Among its innovations is an enforceable Bill of Rights that 
explicitly provides for individual health-related rights; or, more precisely, the right to 
“the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care 
services, including reproductive health care.”2 This provision is buttressed by various 
legal assurances from the State such as equality and non-discrimination3 and the 
adoption of measures, within the boundaries of resource availability, to ensure the 
progressive realization of this right.4 This introduces the prospect for the first time in 
Kenya of legal challenges against the State by individuals alleging that it has failed to 
meet its healthcare obligations. This is precisely the charge made by many of the 
PLWHAs interviewed for this research.  
 
Whether the new constitution can fulfil their expectations and those of other 
Kenyans remains to be seen, but in order to appreciate the hopes and expectations 
bound up with this legal instrument, one must first understand how rights have been 
employed as part of the legal and public political discourse in Kenya. That is, how 
rights relate to law, morality, community and the State and specifically, how they do 
this within the Kenyan context. Such an analysis should provide insights into how 
                                                 
2
 Art. 43(1)(a). Republic of Kenya, Laws of Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, 2010, Kenya Law 
Reports (www.kenyalaw.org), accessed 10/12/13, at 31. (Published by the National Council for Law 
Reporting, with the Authority of the Attorney General).   
3
 The first four subsections of Art. 27 state that: “(1) Every person is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law; (2) Equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms; (3) Women and men have the right to equal 
treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres; 
and  (4) The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, 
including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth...” (ibid, at 24).  
4
 Specifically, the new constitution requires the State to “take legislative, policy and other measures, 
including the setting of standards, to achieve the progressive realisation of the [socio-economic] rights 
guaranteed under Article 43.” (Art. 21(2). Ibid, at 20).  
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rights operate as individual claims and responsibilities, but also interrogate their role 
as a cohesive moral force which holds the human community together.  
 
Thus, investigating the issues at the core of this research necessarily covers a broad 
and varied landscape, which takes in law but also other fields, too, such as public 
health, medicine, sociology, anthropology and political science. This, therefore, is the 
interdisciplinary approach that this research adopts, and its rationale is three-fold: 
firstly, a central objective of this research is to explore how the complex experiences 
of PLWHAs have shaped their internalization- or not- of the language and norms of 
human rights, and how the human rights discourse manifests their individual and 
collective aspirations as well as their anxieties. This approach is thus the best, indeed, 
perhaps the only, way to capture the myriad and overlapping factors which converge 
to construct PLWHAs’ subjectivities and their notions of entitlement. Secondly, an 
interdisciplinary approach reflects the present-day reality that human rights are not 
the exclusive domain of law, with other fields now claiming a stake in the wider rights 
debate and offering human rights-based perspectives from their particular vantage 
points. Last but not least, an interdisciplinary approach also reflects the author’s 
varied experiences- as an academic in law as well as a campaigner on behalf of 
PLWHAs- experiences which not only inform her research interests but have also 
shaped the particular questions that this research pursues. It is vital, then, to find the 
most appropriate theoretical framework that accommodates the analysis of these 
myriad issues. 
 
b) The Theoretical Framework  
This research deals with a range of concepts, among them entitlements, rights, law, 
the State, citizenship, illness, sexuality, gender, stigmatisation, discrimination, dignity, 
duty, domination, community, and civil society.  
 
Postcolonial theory provides the overarching theoretical framework which connects 
them. The postcolonial framework “represents a response to a genuine need: the 
need to overcome a crisis in understanding produced by the inability of old categories 
 12 
 
to account for the world.”5  Its appeal as a framework for analysing the issues that 
this research is concerned with is clear: for what will become clear as this thesis 
unfolds is that these issues are manifestations of a postcolonial world.6  
 
It is an ideal framework for drawing out the complexities and nuances which go into 
the construction of Kenyan PLWHAs’ subjectivities. It helps us understand how in 
their comments about their health entitlements and their attribution of duty, wider 
notions are at play: notions about their conceptualization of the relationship between 
the individual and the State, and their affiliations to both an ethnic and a national 
public. Because the nature of these relationships is central to the issues this research 
deals with, the work of Mahmood Mamdani and his theory of the bifurcated State 
provides the predominant framework within which the relationship of the individual 
and the postcolonial State is analysed. Mamdani’s theory fits perfectly within the 
broader postcolonial framework: his discussions explore the formation of the colonial 
state and its creation of citizens and subjects. He analyzes the creation of a ‘universal’ 
African legal subject whose cultural differences were purposely muted in order that 
customary law may be applied uniformly to all Africans. And yet, as he compellingly 
posits, the colonial state’s propagation and perpetuation of a race-based citizen-
subject divide is sustained in the postcolony, albeit in a deracialized form. It is from 
this fundamental basis that this research builds so much of its analysis of PLWHA’s 
notions of identity and affiliation, entitlement and obligation. It provides a platform 
for the discussion of conceptualizations of the human rights project and its norms.     
 
The postcolonial framework also facilitates the examination of the gender and 
cultural norms which define the PLWHA experience. These norms have shaped the 
pattern of the largely sexually-transmitted HIV infection in Kenya, as well as the 
development and ramifications of the AIDS epidemic. In modern Kenya, practices and 
beliefs which put groups such as women and young girls especially at risk of HIV 
infection are being primarily challenged from the normative perspective of human 
rights. This creates a flashpoint between African moral frames of reference (although 
they are today infused with imported, though now indigenized, religious norms) and a 
                                                 
5
 Dirlik, Arif, The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism (Boulder, 
Colorado; Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1997), at 73. 
6
 ibid, at 76. 
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European/Western one. This sets the stage for an analysis of illness, sexuality, 
stigmatisation, discrimination, concepts of dignity, duty, domination and the location 
of the individual in the community. Postcolonial feminist theories are a particularly 
potent branch in the facilitation of this analysis. As Ratna Kapur asserts, they “provide 
a critical and necessary challenge to explanations of women’s subordination that 
have been furnished from liberal and Western positions, especially those that have 
come to occupy the international human rights arena in their understanding and 
articulation of concerns of third world women.”7 
 
The fact that this articulation is being done by or through the auspices of CSOs, 
provides yet another potent issue on which a postcolonial framework can provide 
crucial insights. For the interpolation of civil society actors into the citizen-State 
dialogue not only alters the terms in which it is conducted but also the dynamics 
between the parties. The CSO phenomenon, and the favoured framework of rights 
within which many of its members seek to mediate individual-State relations, are a 
feature of globalization. And yet their role requires closer scrutiny in order to gain a 
better appreciation of their agenda in creating the dominant narratives of 
development today. The appeal of a postcolonial analytical framework is clear here: it 
facilitates the examination of key ideas like globalization and global capitalism; the 
Eurocentricity of capitalism (both now and historically) as well as that of human 
rights; the role of the nation in development; and how the local connects with the 
global.8 As Sankaran Krishna puts it, “postcolonialism articulates a politics of 
resistance to the inequalities, exploitation of humans and the environment, and the 
diminution of political and ethical choices that come in the wake of globalization.”9  
 
A postcolonial analytical framework thus provides a more than adequate umbrella 
under which can shelter all the issues that this research deals with. But this research 
is also conscious of the criticisms that have been levelled against postcolonial 
analyses, and so strives to mitigate the risk of reducing all analyses to simplistic binary 
oppositions of dominion and subjection, of the European/Western/settler oppressors 
                                                 
7
 Kapur, Ratna, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism (London: GlassHouse, 2005), 
at 4. 
8
 Dirlik (n 5), at 76. 
9
 Krishna, Sankaran, Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-First 
Century (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), at 2. 
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and the African/Sub-Saharan/indigenous oppressed. This research draws out the 
nuances that such narratives might conceal: for instance, the appeal to many PLWHAs 
of re-imagined identities, the possibility of which a human rights framework holds; 
their self-determined oscillating allegiances to both a national (modern) and ethnic 
(traditional) public; their agency in claiming dignity and rejecting stigma for 
themselves, even as they deny the dignity of, and stigmatize others within the PLWHA 
community; and last but not least, the multiple moral frameworks of reference within 
which PLWHAs articulate their health entitlement claims. By spotlighting findings 
such as these, this research is able to apply the most appropriate analytical 
framework for its investigation while avoiding some of its shortcomings. With this in 
mind, we must now turn to the conceptualization of one of the key terms of 
reference in this research: rights.  
 
c) Conceptualizing Rights 
The Bill of Rights in Kenya’s new constitution can be seen as a symbol of the triumph 
of law as the source of rights in the modern age, and a triumph, too, of the text not 
only as the favoured receptacle that carries rights to the individual but grounds them 
in reality. The Kenyan government has crafted a much more robust Bill of Rights than 
the one of the independence-era- for it contains a detailed list of civil and political as 
well as cultural, social and economic rights (categories which are discussed later in 
this chapter as part of the literature review)-  and presented it in its refurbished 
constitution. In so doing, Kenya has taken its place alongside nearly all the other 
countries of the world in “[‘constitutionalizing’] the ideology of human rights.”10  
 
The definition of human rights used in this research is of “those claims which every 
human being is entitled to have and enjoy, as of right, by virtue of his or her 
humanity, without distinction on such grounds as sex, race, colour, religion, language, 
national origin, or social group.”11 It is a working definition, however, which does not 
specify the nature and content of such rights, as this research elucidates later in the 
                                                 
10
 Henkin, Loius, ‘Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect,’ in Power, Samantha, 
and Allison, Graham (eds.), Realizing Human Rights: Moving from Inspiration to Impact (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000), at 25. 
11
 An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed, ‘Introduction: Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African 
Contexts,’ in  An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed (ed.), Human Rights Under African Constitutions: Realizing 
the Promise for Ourselves (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), at 3.  
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literature review when it explores the debate around the content of a right to health. 
The term ‘rights’, meanwhile, is specifically ascribed in this research to formally 
recognized, often legally-enforceable claims, and is especially to be distinguished 
from the term ‘entitlement’, particularly when referring to claims made by the 
respondents interviewed for this research. This latter word is used in this respect to 
describe a claim to a privilege the basis for which may be varied (cultural, moral, legal 
or other norms) and/or unarticulated. 
 
The preliminary definition of ‘human rights’ provided above locates the individual in 
the international human rights legal system as the rights-holder, and the State is 
confirmed as the duty-bearer, obliged to provide for and protect the individual’s 
rights through the appropriate mechanisms and institutions at national level.12 So in 
the new Bill of Rights the Kenyan State not only finds a symbol of modernity, it also 
has a shortcut to bolstering its legitimacy before, as will be seen throughout this 
thesis, an increasingly sceptical local and global audience. This drama is being played 
out in a world where rights, and human rights in particular, have acquired incredible 
currency. As Douzinas asserts, “[h]uman rights have become the raison d’être of the 
state system as its main constituents are challenged by economic, social and cultural 
trends. It is no coincidence that human rights ‘triumphed’ at the point of maximum 
angst about life chances and malaise about the collapse of moral certitudes and 
political blueprints.”13 The international human rights regime, in the sense of the 
global movement for the protection, promotion and assertion of international 
responsibility for human rights at the national level14, thus underwrites the role of the 
State despite its diminution in the face of globalization. Further, the international law 
of human rights, in largely allocating no legal role for CSOs despite their growth in 
influence, a reality which this research confirms in this and subsequent chapters15, 
arguably suppresses their status. The State remains the pivotal framework for 
political, social and economic interaction.16  
 
                                                 
12
 ibid, at 2. 
13
 Douzinas, Costas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: Hart, 
2000), at 374. 
14
 Henkin (n 10), at 8. 
15
 An-Na’im (n 11), at 4-5. 
16
 ibid , at 4. 
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And the instruments by which the system of human rights law cements the State-
individual dynamic are important to our understanding of rights today: Douzinas 
writes of the decline of the concept of nature as the source of rights; unless they are 
recognized in domestic and international law, rights cannot be called upon for the 
protection of individuals.17 In other words, the Bill of Rights in Kenya’s constitution is 
a triumph of legal positivism and its proponents18, locating Kenya in the modern, 
rational age of law. As Ronald Dworkin asserted, “If the Government does not take 
rights seriously, then it doesn’t take law seriously either.”19 For the many who 
increasingly turn to the law when articulating their claims to entitlements, the law is  
confirmation of a political commitment to the moral principles on which those 
claimants base their demands.20 
 
Yet one of law’s ingrained conceits is its presupposition of subjects “who can identify 
and use it.”21 Stephen Hicks persuasively identifies a problem of perspective: the 
tendency in legal theory to accentuate the aspect of law that is external to the human 
being- law as a system of rules and norms- and de-emphasize its subjective aspect, 
thus dehumanizing it.22 He contends that law, like religion and morality, embodies the 
human being’s attempt to organize the conceptual space she shares with others and 
is a manifestation of how she negotiates and regulates her relationship with them.23 
And it is in this internalized sense that we first experience law, “before we experience 
law as citizens, in law suits or otherwise as conventionally understood.”24  
 
It is this interface between the internal aspect of the law and the external elements 
that this research finds more interesting, for here we might glimpse the real subject 
of law, one who, as Jacques Lacan argues in his theory of psychoanalysis and the law, 
has no ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ but who is constituted of all elements, from her psyche 
                                                 
17
 Douzinas (n 13), 10-11. 
18
 See Edmundson, William A., An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), at 62-3. 
19
 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), at 205 
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to her identity, language, society, law.25  How do they aggregate in a PLWHA to mould 
her understanding about her health entitlements and how does she articulate this in 
the interviews? How, if at all, does she imagine a right to health? This discussion 
surely precedes or occurs contemporaneously with that about the structural 
framework within a society which facilitates and/or hinders an individual’s realization 
of her right to health.    
 
To that end, this research pursues its investigation by eschewing the typical top-down 
analysis of human rights: though it refers to relevant domestic and international legal 
instruments, it avoids a textual examination of the right to health, a task that has 
been better undertaken on many occasions by others.26 This approach would be 
further limiting here because of the obvious gulf between the rhetoric of rights and 
the reality of their implementation in countries like Kenya, which is the focus of this 
research. Factors such as the (variable) acculturation of State institutions to human 
rights norms contribute to this.27 Moreover, even while this research examines 
various established concepts and theories in human rights, this exercise is driven by a 
desire to interrogate how, if at all, laypeople interact with its norms and concepts in 
reality; how, if at all, they incorporate them with their lived experiences; and how, if 
at all, they attempt to reconcile them with their pre-existing value systems. This 
bottom-up perspective, often missing in the existing literature, promises new 
avenues for exploring these ideas in practice. It is inspired in part by the approach of 
Rosalind Petchesky and Karen Judd and the International Reproductive Rights 
Research Action Group (IRRRAG) in their study of the strategies and processes by 
which ordinary women around the world seek to assert and realize their reproductive 
and sexual rights.28 
                                                 
25
 Caudill, David S., Lacan and the Subject of Law: Toward a Psychoanalytic Critical Legal Theory 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1997) 
26
 See, for instance, Leary, Virginia, ‘The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law,’ Health and 
Human  Rights: An International Journal, Vol.1, No. 1 (1994), pp.24-56; Toebes, Brigit, ‘The Right to 
Health,’ in Eide, Asbjørn; Krause, Catarina; and Rosas, Allan (eds.), Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook (2
nd
 Revised Ed., Dordrecht; Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001); 
Jayawickrama, Nihal, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and 
International Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)  
27
 Ghai, Yash, in William Twining (ed.), Human Rights, Southern Voices: Francis Deng, Abdullahi An-
Na’im, Yash Ghai and Upendra Baxi (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 
131 
28
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Unlike several of the women in Petchesky and Judd’s study, however, many PLWHAs 
interviewed for this research did not make claims in relation to their health needs on 
the basis of the normative framework of human rights. Instead, the claims they made 
appealed to moral values housed within alternative normative frameworks. Such 
invocation of morality may appear unfashionable in the modern human rights legal 
system.  Indeed, in the triumph of positive law Douzinas sees the “moral poverty of 
[liberal] jurisprudence” which subordinates the imaginary realm to positive law and 
its rules.29 Yet the evidence from the interviewees in this research suggests that away 
from jurisprudential matters and the legal experts for whom it retains currency, 
among laypeople, that is- people who are non-experts in human rights- Douzinas’ 
“imaginary domain” thrives. For when many of the respondents in this research made 
health claims it was not on the basis of formal legal obligations (of which few 
appeared aware) but moral obligations they ascribed to their spouses, families, 
relatives, CSOs or the State.  
 
And this disjoint between claims made on legal as opposed to moral grounds is one 
which many legal positivists seek to emphasize, even suggesting that it privileges the 
former over the latter.30 Although the notion of law as morally neutral is not a 
universal one31, the proponents of positivism are nevertheless driven in their views 
partly by a suspicion that moral judgements originating from customs, be they 
cultural or religious, are not always reliable foundations for “practical judgment.”32 
This argument exemplifies a broader, fundamental disconnect between ideas around 
rights as they are conceptualized by legal experts and practitioners- among whom my 
academic and professional background must cast me, with ramifications for the kind 
of research  I undertake here (more of which in Chapter 2)- and as they are 
conceptualized by laypeople.  
 
                                                 
29
 Douzinas (n 13), at 373-4. 
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 See Perreau-Saussine, Amanda, ‘Bentham and the Boot-strappers of Jurisprudence: The Moral 
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383, at 346 and 348. 
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As will be seen shortly in the literature review (and discussed in more detail in 
subsequent chapters) the moral frameworks within which many PLWHAs 
conceptualized their health claims and whose vocabulary they often employed to 
state those claims, were based on cultural norms. Additionally, in an environment less 
in thrall to secularism than the West, they drew on religion, particularly perhaps 
Christianity, which has strong historical links to theories of natural law.33 It is precisely 
from these ties that the age of the positivization of law, in its quest for rationality, 
sought to distance itself.34 But for such PLWHAs, the end of this process which 
heralded positivism and delinked nature and the divine has yet to be realized; God is 
not [yet] in “retreat... [removed] from earthly matters.”35  
 
Yet it may be the case that morality has not been removed from the 
conceptualization of rights at all, merely reborn in a different form, and perhaps one, 
as Michael J. Perry has argued, which is so successful that it has become the definition 
of rights, not merely a dimension of it. He asserts that “the morality of human rights 
has become the dominant morality of our time; indeed, unlike any morality before 
it... a truly global morality.”36 This argument embraces that of Douzinas, of the 
predominance- the morality, then- of positive law and its structures and mechanisms.  
 
But in aligning itself to secularity, it has been posited that this new morality has left a 
hole in its philosophical narrative, for when it asserts the inalienable rights and 
dignities of individuals, who, precisely, makes this assertion? Quoting Art Leff’s 
reiteration of Nietzsche, Perry writes:  
Napalming babies is bad.  
Starving the poor is wicked. Buying and selling each other is depraved. 
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol Pot- and 
General Custer too- have earned salvation. Those who acquiesced deserve to be 
damned. 
There is in the world such a thing as evil. 
[All together now:] Sez who? 
God help us.37 
 
                                                 
33
 Douzinas (n 13), at 53. 
34
 ibid , at 63. 
35
 ibid. 
36
 Perry, Michael, J., ‘Morality and Normativity,’ Legal Theory, Vol. 13, No.3-4 (2007), pp 211-255, at 
214. See also Henkin (n 10), at 3. 
37
 Leff, Arthur Allen, ‘Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law,’  Duke Law Journal  (1979), pp. 1229, at 1249, 
quoted in Perry (n 36), at 236. 
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The PLWHAs’ stance, therefore, arguably represents a lay-level rebuff to the “radical 
project of human rights [which accepts] modernity’s rejection of religious 
transcendence.”38 Their moral-based claims are an affirmation of Perry’s argument 
that in the real world fundamental moral questions and religious or metaphysical 
ones remain profoundly interlinked.39 To ignore this fact is to negate the views and 
considerations of this grassroots base, the very people in whose name a notion has 
been popularized, justifiably or otherwise, of the human rights enterprise as the 
preeminent moral framework.  
 
In the PLWHAs’ stance, too, is perhaps a notion that is inherently threatening to the 
high priests- the experts and practitioners- of the human rights project: if the moral 
character of rights can be said to precede their legal character40, if moral claims can 
be said  to transcend legislation or adjudication, which is arguably what Dworkin 
suggests although he speaks specifically in relation to rights against governments41, 
then the systems and structures, be they cultural or religious, which authenticate and 
prop up these moral claims can rightly challenge the claim of pre-eminence currently 
asserted by the human rights project and its practitioners. As this research argues, 
this forms an aspect of the contest playing out in Kenya today as the national and 
ethnic spheres negotiate their fluid boundaries. At stake is the allegiance of, and 
claim of authority over, the citizen-subject.   
 
But even the subject of the ethnic domain must in the modern human rights age 
stake a claim as a citizen of the national domain in order to enjoy the breadth of 
entitlements available to a citizen of Kenya. Thus the process of creating and 
recognizing a legal subject, law’s “sovereign plaything and its potential critic, the 
autonomous centre of the world as well as the dissident and rebel”42 is a deeply 
political and contentious exercise, with both symbolic and real ramifications, as this 
research explains shortly in the literature review and expounds upon in Chapter 4. 
There is vital currency in being identified as a- indeed, as the- subject of law. Douzinas 
makes the argument, repeated in Chapter 8, that “it is not so much that humans have 
                                                 
38
 Douzinas (n 13), at 107. 
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rights but that rights make human”43, and the legal subject is hewn out of positive law 
and its rules.44  
 
It will therefore be interesting to consider, as is done shortly in the literature review 
and in greater detail in the last chapter, some of the vocabulary and concepts which 
are commonly associated with the human rights project that arose within the context 
of the interviews for this research, and on the basis of which, therefore, one might 
begin to speculate about the ideas or conceptualizations of rights at play among the 
laypeople interviewed for this research. These include ideas about ‘dignity’, 
‘humanness’, ‘citizenship’, which appear to resonate with the wider lay public as it 
attempts to grasp something that is increasingly familiar yet still elusive and 
intangible. This is true not only among the relatively small number of PLWHAs 
interviewed for this research, but also the two-thousand-plus respondents who 
contributed to the Haki Index, a countrywide human rights perception survey 
published in 2006, whose findings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.45 
 
Does an increased familiarity with human rights-related concepts and vocabulary, 
however, mark it out as a cohesive moral force which binds together a community- a 
human rights community- across a range of levels from local to global? If one thinks 
of rights as an articulation of political interests, then community seems the natural 
condition in which to strive for and enjoy the fruits of such interests. As Perry argues, 
“few would deny that the social nature of human beings is such that a person is 
better off in virtue of being part of a network of loving family and friends and also in 
virtue of being a member of a safe, secure political community.”46 
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At the latter end of the local-through-global spectrum, the widely accepted notion of 
international responsibility for the protection of individual rights at the national level 
has already been mentioned.47 Henkin, for instance, points out the cross-national 
policies and actions of States, CSOs and the media, which together drive “[t]he 
various influences that induce compliance with human rights norms [which] are 
cumulative, and some of them add up to an underappreciated means of enforcing 
human rights, which has been characterized as ‘mobilizing shame’.”48 The power of 
this ‘mobilizing shame’ is exemplified, as the literature review assesses in more detail, 
by the global campaign for HIV/AIDS treatment and the recognition of PWLHAs’ 
rights, which influenced the re-conceptualization HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue at 
international, national and local levels. Such mobilization does reinforce the notion of 
shared community bound by the customs of human rights. Indeed, Douzinas points 
out that despite the human rights regime’s fetishization of the individual as the focus 
of human rights, “[i]ndividuals only have rights in community”, a privilege they enjoy 
among other individuals: fellow citizens.49  
 
But this idea begs a fundamental question: what are the parameters of this 
community?  For notice the slippage in international human rights law from universal 
human rights, inalienable and adhering to all human beings, “not by grace, or love, or 
charity, or compassion,” as Henkin puts it50, to a set of privileges to be enjoyed only 
by the very exclusive club of human beings designated as citizens.51 The first extends 
the embrace of community to us all; the other’s reach is narrower, depending on 
legal jurisdiction. Citizens enjoy political rights that others do not, and may make 
claims on the State on this basis. It marks the epitome of the modern subject’s 
humanity according to Douzinas52; “[w]e become human through citizenship and 
subjectivity is based on the gap, the difference between universal man and state 
citizen.”53 The international law of human rights, then, anticipates, even facilitates, 
this fractionalization of the ‘global human rights community’, for in reality the rights 
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of individual human beings can only be claimed against, and paradoxically protected 
by, the State in which they claim citizenship.54 The individual without a State is 
excluded from the ‘human’ family as defined by the system of international human 
rights law. And if this community of human rights were not narrow enough, even 
within the national legal jurisdiction it is often further divided, with various sub-
groups- PLWHAs are a good example- claiming specific rights that pertain to their 
particular lived experiences and concerns. Another layer is added in the postcolonial 
context of countries like Kenya: the State, the duty-holder in the human rights 
dynamic, forms only one locus of power in these settings, and not always the most 
influential at that. As explored shortly in Mamdani’s bifurcated State theory, which as 
seen earlier is a key pillar in this research’s framework of analysis, the citizen of the 
national public draws her rights, with their emphasis on the individual, from the 
State; meanwhile the subject of the ethnic realm draws hers, with their accent on 
community, from the exclusive tribe. And although this research argues and points to 
evidence from its own findings that there is much fluidity between these 
communities, there is nevertheless proof of “the culture of human rights [meeting] 
resistance from an older societal culture, a culture of gender inequalities and 
mistreatment of ‘others’.”55 Arguably, then while the human rights project may act as 
a glue which binds part/s of the human community together, it also has the potential 
to expose and even foster social and political conflict and disharmony where the 
norms it proposes apply selectively or conflict with pre-existing or more established 
ones.  
 
Despite all this, however, this research argues that the emergence of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic has introduced and accelerated awareness of certain human rights concepts 
to a wider public, playing a role in opening up the discourse to a normally excluded 
constituency: laypeople. Moreover, the findings appear to challenge any notion that 
laypeople, when they are not part of a broader organized, grassroots human rights 
movement, an underdeveloped phenomenon in Africa anyway, are merely passive 
subjects of human rights laws and norms without a role to play as active agents in the 
rights dynamic. For in those instances when they are aware of them, they are able 
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and willing to accept or reject these norms as part of the personal moral vocabulary 
by which they articulate their conditions or grievances, actively interpreting or 
reinterpreting them in accordance with their subjectivities and wider social, cultural 
and economic contexts. Indeed, the findings show clear instances of interviewees 
attempting to reconcile the received language and values of human rights with the 
more established and predominant moral frames of reference to which they are 
accountable, frameworks which are founded on cultural and/or religious norms.  
 
By spotlighting and analyzing the basis of the resulting accommodations and 
paradoxes, this research casts laypeople in an atypical role from those they 
commonly occupy in academic narratives and examinations of human rights. In such 
narratives, they are often at one extreme passive victims of rights violations, at the 
other vocal, politicized, rights-aware agitants for the recognition and protection of 
rights. Thus, this research sheds light on other more subtle, often undocumented 
ways in which laypeople might influence the direction and emphasis of the rights 
discourse. Furthermore, it uncovers both challenges to, and opportunities for, the 
promulgation and sustainability of the seemingly unstoppable global human rights 
enterprise.  
 
This research concludes that a greater understanding of how notions of entitlement 
and rights are constructed and human rights norms internalized, such as is attempted 
on a small scale here, contributes not only to the existing wealth of theoretical 
knowledge about rights but has practical implications for human rights advocates and 
promoters. Understanding the processes that the research highlights illuminates how 
one of their key target audience, laypeople, engages with the language and idea of 
rights when they articulate their needs and entitlement claims. This would aid the 
development of more effective strategies to shape what are, after all, mutable 
perceptions, and could contribute to a more successful propagation of these norms at 
the grassroots and the realization and protection of rights such as health in the long 
term. The research therefore strongly urges greater engagement by human rights 
organizations and practitioners with this constituency and a deeper commitment to 
an inquiry into the way in which the language, concepts and norms of rights are 
interpreted, internalized and articulated by laypeople in practice. 
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Having set out the overarching theoretical framework within which the discussions in 
this research take place, as well as its conceptualization of rights, the rest of this 
chapter will now proceed to provide a clearer outline of the scope of principal terms 
of reference that frame the research. This is done by integrating the discussion into a 
review of the significant literature which informs the research’s main arguments. The 
scope of the two concepts which straddle this research, health and human rights, 
come up first for analysis, with a look into how the literature delineates them and 
comparing and contrasting this with the meanings attached to them by the 
interviewees for this research. This exercise highlights a number of similar 
perspectives, such as that between some laypeople’s and public health theorists’ 
conceptions of health as broadly encompassing physical, mental and social aspects. It 
also addresses the contribution of dominant health paradigms to our understanding 
of the modern subject. Meanwhile, the terminology and fundamental concepts 
relating to human rights, touched upon at the beginning of this chapter, prove just as 
contentious. The chapter delves further into the disputed notions, dealt with in even 
more detail in later chapters, like dignity, citizenship and what it means to be human. 
A showcasing of interviewees’ responses here differentiate this part of the discussion 
of rights with the one at the beginning of this chapter; for the interviews again serve 
to illustrate that the debate about their meaning is not confined to theorists and 
academics. Last but not least, the chapter charts the conceptual and practical 
development of linkages between health and rights, and in particular the emergence 
of the so-called rights-based approaches (RBAs) in the development arena. The 
chapter then concludes with an outline of the thesis structure. 
 
II. Literature Review 
The literature for this research is drawn from a range of cross-cutting disciplines 
including law, public health, political science, anthropology and sociology. It includes 
several sources that provide useful critiques on some of the underlying events, 
systems and processes that the research identifies as pivotal in the formation of 
PLWHAs’ subjectivities and notions of entitlement. The main ones include literature 
which problematizes the global human rights enterprise and  some central norms, 
primarily the State-citizen relationship; postcolonial critiques, which spotlight the 
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dubious and enduring legacy of colonialism, especially its imprint on the post-
independence African State; feminist critiques, and their sub-species of African 
feminist critique, crucial to the examination of the specific social, cultural and 
economic context which has shaped the demographics of Kenya’s AIDS epidemic. The 
latter provide an especially vital perspective given that women constitute the greater 
portion of PLWHAs in Kenya and interviewees for this research. This literature also 
provides crucial insights into law’s attempts to address the concerns of marginalized 
constituencies, which mirror and inform the PLWHA struggle. Finally, the research 
draws from literature which critiques the values latently or overtly articulated by 
public health policies. These have significantly influenced how modern medical 
service users such as the PLWHA interviewees acquire prescribed knowledge and 
ideas that mould and transfigure their conceptions of themselves as patients and 
human beings, despite living in a society where traditional medicine and its 
supporting institutions and norms predominate. What the literature in its totality 
helps to underscore is a research topic whose essential terms and concepts are far 
from settled.       
 
a) (Elusive) Terms of Reference: Health and Human Rights 
The totemic 1946 World Health Organization (WHO) Constitution defined health as “a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity,” and was the first to assert that “the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being 
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.”56 
The right has been recognized in numerous international instruments since, including 
Art. 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) 57, and the phrase the ‘right to health’ or its variations is to be found in 
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various regional conventions and replicated or modified in the Bills of Rights of 
national constitutions such as Kenya’s, as noted earlier. The country itself acceded to 
the ICESCR on 1st May 1972.58  
 
This acknowledgement of the duality of mental and social aspects was reflected in the 
PLWHA interviewees’ responses about their health needs.59 Indeed, as human rights 
and public health literature acknowledge, health is an ideal lens through which to 
analyze not only the cross-cutting factors that determine vulnerability to HIV infection 
but also those that influence capacity to realize rights.60 Schweitzer, et al61 and Peter 
DeRoche and Kenneth Citron62 point out the transformative effect that HIV/AIDS has 
on a PLWHA’s psychological make-up and stress that addressing her psychosocial 
needs improves her health outcomes. Yet this element of their health needs, 
especially for those in poor countries, is, as Kelly, et al63 and Collins, et al64 underline, 
little investigated and scarcely provided for.  Meanwhile, in its overt reference to 
‘social well-being’, the WHO’s definition of health recognizes that power relations 
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determine health outcomes65; that health, in the words of Lynn Freedman, “is socially 
produced.”66 However, this aspect has been de-emphasized and the “biological 
individualism” at the heart of the predominant biomedical paradigm has become 
embedded.67 As will be seen, some of the human rights literature critiques this 
model, which is nevertheless a core aspect of training for health experts and 
professionals, with Alicia Ely Yamin68, Mark Finn and Srikant Sarangi69 and others 
condemning it for delinking ill-health from the social, cultural, economic and political 
environment in which it is created.70  The tendency in public health to downplay how 
these structural factors, as they are sometimes referred to71, predispose one to ill-
health, and to accentuate the impact of personal behaviour on individual health 
outcomes72 is often mirrored by HIV prevention policies. It may also help explain 
some interviewees’ notions about individual choice and free will being fundamental 
to ensuring health.73 Interviewee 16, for example, saw the requirements of health as 
entailing, “[d]rinking boiled water, stay away from people who are coughing, and 
from mosquitoes! Eating fruits and vegetables, which I get from the supermarkets 
and not just on the street, and I wash them very carefully, and I cook my food well 
and I don’t eat food that is too old.” Interviewee 11, who later said she had not heard 
about a right to healthcare, defined ‘healthcare’ as “keeping yourself healthy, so that 
even though you don’t get cured you get the right treatment at the right time, getting 
a balanced diet, keeping yourself smart.” Similarly, interviewee 41 explained that 
healthcare meant, “Being conscious of my general health. I have to monitor my own 
body, what to do if there’s anything wrong. Taking care myself, nutritionally, my 
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social life- I have to know what to do because that’s an important factor. So in 
totality, you have to take care of you body health.” Along the same lines, interviewee 
10 defined health as, “[T]aking care of yourself. Especially this business of associating 
with men anyhow, this is not supposed to be there.” 
 
The broad conception of health adopted by several PLWHAs also transcended access 
to curative healthcare goods and services and included the conditions that support 
and sustain health, such as proper nutrition, sanitation, drinking water.74 For 
instance, interviewee 7 listed her health needs as “food, that is, a balanced diet, 
shelter, proper sanitation, ventilation, urgent medical care.” Interviewee 5’s list 
consisted of “food, shelter, clothing, medication and counselling.”  For interviewee 
38, part of whose response is revisited in Chapter 5, her health needs comprised, 
“Food first! You need shelter, a place to sleep; money, because I am not working now 
but I have a child who needs food and school fees and clothing. I am not on ARVs but 
I need medicine because of the infections. I am trying to talk to these people to see if 
they can put me on ARVs.” Yet, as the latter chapters reveal, despite articulating the 
myriad socio-economic barriers they encountered in their attempts to meet these 
needs, and their insistence that overcoming them was often beyond their means, 
many interviewees nevertheless felt that they themselves bore the sole or primary 
responsibility for guaranteeing their health.  
 
The public health literature also reveals the role of  health practitioners in the 
construction of a self-aware, self-monitoring patient, familiar with the language and 
values of biomedicine; yet critics have highlighted the failure to acknowledge that the 
“power to choose and access to choice are unevenly distributed in a given societal 
context.”75 Finn and Sarangi view this approach as part of an overall agenda to 
downsize the role of State in accordance with neoliberal ideology.76 And yet there is 
perhaps an interesting paradox that a health model which envisions an ‘empowered’, 
self-governing patient, stridently independent from a minimalist State, should share 
the same neoliberal parentage as the human rights paradigm. This lineage, while it 
also conceives the subject as unfettered by the State, outlines a raft of civil, political, 
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and crucially, social, economic and cultural obligations it owes to the individual. In 
other words, the subject of the human rights model is inextricably yoked to a duty-
laden State. 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the concept of human rights is as hard to pin 
down as that of health, if not more so, as the lengthy discussion of a concept of rights 
earlier in this chapter illustrated. Upendra Baxi espouses the views of Henkin and 
Douzinas quoted there that the latter part of the twentieth century will be 
remembered as the ‘Age of Human Rights,’ with its global profusion of human rights-
related activity.77 He rejects the kind of narratives which would seek to “reduce the 
forbiddingly diverse range of human rights enunciations or totality of sentiments that 
give rise to them to some uniform narrative that seeks family resemblance in such 
ideas as ‘dignity,’ ‘well-being,’ or human  ‘flourishing.’" He continues: 
The expression ‘human rights’ shelters an incredibly diverse range of desire-in-
dominance politics and desire-in-insurrection politics. These forms of politics resist 
encapsulation in any formula. The best one may hope for is to let the contexts of 
domination and resistance articulate themselves as separate but equal perspectives 
on the meaning of ‘human rights.'78  
 
Indeed, this research highlights a number of flashpoints where these tensions are 
exposed and where rights are invoked by one or all protagonists, in recognition of 
their modern currency. And yet while Baxi is right that a definition of human rights 
cannot be contained within the popular notions associated with it, it is interesting to 
note how, as noted earlier in this chapter concepts associated with human rights, like 
‘dignity’, ‘humanness’ and ‘citizenship’ were detectable in PLWHAs’ responses. The 
first of these concepts, dignity, though now established as a mainstay of human 
rights, as Oscar Schachter underlines, remains undefined by the many instruments 
which entrench its status.79 Whether all societies have an inherent appreciation of 
the notion of dignity, as Makau Mutua80 argues, and thus arguably a human rights 
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culture, a contention Howard and Donnelly81 reject, compounds the difficulty in 
locating the role of this concept in human rights discourse. Howard and Donnelly 
argue that dignity is objective in nature, bestowed upon those deemed to conform 
with and uphold societal norms. Jonathan Mann82 and Mariana Chilton83 propose a 
more compelling theory of dignity as possessing a dual aspect: objective, and 
subjective. For them, the concept also embraces a notion of how one sees oneself. 
This theory seems to have been borne out by a number of female PLWHAs who 
expressed distress at the thought that their HIV infection would be (wrongly) 
interpreted by others as having resulted from the violation of society’s strict sexual 
codes. Their responses sometimes hinted at self-stigmatization and a belief that those 
PLWHAs, particularly women, who may become infected through counter-normative 
sexual behaviour did indeed deserve to be ostracized. This further highlights the 
complex effects of HIV/AIDS on a PLWHA’s subjectivity.  
 
Similarly, the seemingly straight-forward task of defining a human being, the subject 
of law, proves complicated, for the subject has meant many things to many cultures 
over the ages, as Douzinas84 illustrates. Delineating the character of the ideal human, 
who is the candidate for legal personhood, is highly political. It has, and continues to 
variously exclude, among others, non-whites, women, homosexuals, the poor and 
arguably- and crucially for PLWHAs- the infirm. Winfried Brugger explores and 
attempts to bridge the paradoxes of this process in his ‘image of the person’ 
concept.85 Beyond theory, however, as the illuminating research of Petchesky and 
Judd and the IRRRAG team proves, many traditionally-marginalized groups- in their 
case women- often approach the struggle for greater social and/or legal recognition 
in a subtler manner than is normally appreciated by human rights advocates, 
balancing their resistance to exclusion with an accommodation of it in order to retain 
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their valued place within the social matrix.86 Indeed, critical feminist analysis of the 
politics of establishing the legal subjecthood of women provides a useful parallel for 
the challenges faced by PLWHAs in their attempts to have their rights recognized, 
with the work of Arvonne Fraser87 and Alice Miller88 particularly insightful. 
 
Feminist critiques again provide useful avenues for exploring the crucial issue of 
citizenship: for establishing the individual as a subject of law is one thing; it is the 
possession of rights that transforms her into a citizen. Kenyan human rights advocate 
L. Muthoni Wanyeki, who argues that this is precisely what the new Constitution 
offers women, makes an analogy between membership to the State and membership 
to the family. Citizenship, which has been a gendered privilege thus far, carries “a 
right not just to be present, but to engage with that State- and engage in a manner 
akin to that with one’s own functional family. One can demand, expect- and 
contribute. Visitors to a home obviously also can engage- but rather more politely, 
without the same demands or expectations. And certainly without the obligation to 
contribute.”89 They have a right to decide how the accrued benefits of membership 
are utilized and apportioned, and the State should not be a “mafia or a protection 
racket,” for the profit a privileged few. 90  
 
In Kenya, this discussion inevitably occurs against the backdrop of colonialism, whose 
racially-bifurcated State divided subject Africans from citizen white settlers. A handful 
of accounts of Europeans attempting to articulate the myriad, sometimes conflicting 
objectives of the British colonial enterprise are highlighted in Chapter 4. These 
literatures provide fascinating insights into efforts to classify, explain, and perhaps 
excuse their supposed racial inferiors. The words of William Howitt91, Charles William 
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Hobley92, Charles Roden Buxton93 and others are windows into the prevailing notions 
of the age, on whose basis the denial of Africans’ rights was justified. As subjects, the 
indigenes were granted sufficient recognition in law to enable its (often violent) 
application to them; but they could not draw from the emerging colonial State the 
rights that would check its incursive powers and designate them as fully-fledged 
citizens. The machinery of the State was structured to facilitate this citizen-subject 
divide with, as Bruce Berman94 Mamdani95 Stephen Ndegwa96 and Peter Ekeh97 
(mentioned earlier in this chapter) clearly demonstrate, the artifice of the customary 
conceived entirely to serve the exigencies of the colonial enterprise.  
 
The discussions at the beginning of this chapter on a concept of rights underlined the 
varied notions attached to human rights. This research is particularly interested in the 
ideas interviewees’ appeared to link to or attach to this phrase, the processes by 
which such ideas were constructed and the role their subjectivities played in 
determining how they internalize these ideas. The State, civil society and others, 
including, as I have already acknowledged, I, the interviewer, are revealed as actively 
or passively engaging in the contest to mould these notions and PLWHAs’ responses 
may be seen, therefore, as manifestations of the successful inculcation- or not- of 
certain political ideas and the triumph of specific agenda.  
 
All interviewees were asked about their knowledge and understanding of the term 
human rights. None gave what might be regarded a ‘text book’ definition of it, which 
may be unsurprising and perhaps even inevitable. No specific parameters were set for 
this research regarding a meaning, and respondents’ definitions sometimes even 
exceeded the anticipation of the interviewer. The Haki Index, however, while noting 
correctly that there is no hard and fast definition, nor that there were any right or 
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wrong answers98  provided for its survey a working one, noting those responses which 
could be considered to fall outside it. This characterized human rights as 
“entitlements which are due to every human being by virtue simply of their being 
human and are founded on the notion of respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person.”99  
 
The Haki Index observed a generally substantial awareness of human rights among 
Kenyans, with only 4% of responses falling outside the survey’s operational definition; 
yet nearly a quarter of the survey respondents failed to provide any definition of the 
term.100 Among the PLWHAs interviewed for this research, many indicated familiarity 
with the phrase even without quite being able to define it: Interviewee 30 said he had 
heard of the phrase “but I have never understood what it means.” Interviewee 18 
said she had heard “about [human rights] but I don’t know what it means.” 
Interviewee 22 had also heard of it but as to its meaning, he had not “taken much 
notice.” Interviewee 45 said: “It is difficult to explain although I feel I know the 
meaning.”; and interviewee 35 noted: “I think it means… I don’t think I can explain 
very well…it’s like… I can’t explain!” For some, as will be seen in the next chapter, the 
problem was one of the language and vocabulary of rights. But even some vague 
responses, such as the one by interviewee 15 who defined rights as “talking about my 
rights,” may nevertheless point to useful ideas: this one, for instance, might suggest 
that the respondent associated rights with debate or public discussion, may perhaps 
even be articulating a claim to that space, dominated by professionals, where the 
exercise of “rights-talk” or “discursivity” takes place.101 In so doing, she seemed to 
anticipate Marie-Bénédicte Dembour’s assertion that “human rights exist only 
because they are talked about.”102 This may reflect the idea that acknowledging an 
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individual’s rights admits her onto the public arena, an analysis undertaken in more 
detail in Chapter 8. This has sometimes been a challenging proposition for PLWHAs, 
as some interviews revealed, often denied a voice because they may not be deemed 
exemplars of society’s highest ideals or the ideal subjects of human rights. 
 
Interestingly, those interviewees unable to offer a definition of rights that they 
considered correct or acceptable were often noticeably uneasy or embarrassed. 
Interviewee 2, for example, unable to name some examples of the human rights she 
had heard of or knew of said falteringly, “Maybe you’ll help me there…” Interviewee 
16, who admitted to political ambitions, said when she could not offer a definition of 
rights, “That’s a major question- and I’m aspiring to be an MP and I don’t know that 
one!” Such discomfort is perhaps inherent in the interviewing process, which, as the 
next chapter notes, arguably instils in a respondent the belief that her selection 
carries an expectation of knowledge. But there was an additional dimension arguably 
peculiar to the subject itself: as the final chapter explores, several respondents 
regarded human rights as pertinent to them as human beings and perhaps 
particularly as PLWHAs, such as interviewee 17, who though could not offer any 
examples of rights, highlighted this view saying, “My own definition is that, as a 
human, I need to know my rights.” Interviewee 32, although he defined rights 
tautologically as “the rights someone is supposed to know” echoes this view. He 
added, importantly, “[T]hey are his rights, he doesn’t have to beg for them.” The 
notion of rights as an issue of great contemporary importance arguably has a 
generational aspect. This may be illustrated by the process of interview 33, more of 
which in Chapter 2. In what may be called vicarious embarrassment at a perceived 
lack of human rights awareness, the respondent’s daughter, who voluntarily acted as 
her interpreter, was forced to concede that, despite much coaxing, her mother did 
not know any examples of human rights.103  
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In the last decade, there has been a rise in the public’s interest in- and arguably 
knowledge of104- human rights issues in Kenya, with concerted efforts to draw it into 
the wider debate. A huge nationwide civic education drive on the eve of the 
December 2002 national elections- about 18 months prior to the interviews for this 
research- helped raise grassroots political awareness and assertiveness about 
rights.105  Similarly, there were public consultations and debates in the run-up to the 
constitutional referendums in November 2005 and August 2010, which will have 
drawn renewed attention to issues of rights and the entitlements of citizens from 
their government. These referendums sandwiched the post-election violence of 
2007/8, which provided a fresh impetus for the latter referendum and spotlighted 
concerns about State abuse of power, persistent socio-economic inequalities and the 
unresolved multiple allegiances of the Kenyan citizen-subject.  
 
These political changes have compelled CSOs, so crucial in animating human rights 
issues in Kenya, to address concerns about lack of inclusion and local participation 
and ownership of output, as Celestine Nyamu-Musembi and Samuel Musyoki 
illustrated in a 2004 study, which also provides a critique of civil society practice and 
human rights in action.106 They highlighted positive changes in approach by human 
rights groups like the Kenya Human Rights Organization (KHRC), aimed at grounding 
rights in the community. These included a shift in emphasis from fixed-term to more 
long-term, responsive programming, greater willingness to traverse both its usual 
urban (Nairobi) base and civil and political rights agenda.107 KHRC’s co-founder and 
former head, Maina Kiai, accepted that human rights organizations like his had 
neglected socio-economic rights to a degree but pointed to projects the KHRC had 
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undertaken with overlapping civil and political and socio-economic elements, and 
cited general capacity problems in dealing with the latter concerns.108  
 
Baxi stresses that grassroots movements must be nurtured if human rights are to be 
institutionalized around the world, and denounces attempts to locate the source of 
human rights exclusively in the West as “sensible only within a meta-narrative 
tradition that in the past served the domineering ends of colonial/imperial power 
formations and that now serve these ends for the Euro-Atlantic community or the 
‘triadic states’ (the USA, the EC, and Japan).”109And yet human rights activists and 
organizations have been accused of failing to provide the direction that could help 
harness a more aware, perhaps more receptive, public into a mass movement to 
advance the adoption and protection of rights at local level. Nigerian human rights 
lawyer, Chidi Odinkalu, writing in 1999, was scathing in his criticism, arguing that their 
failure to embrace the grassroots in Africa was responsible for the poor permeation 
of rights language and norms here. “In the absence of a membership base,” he noted, 
“there is no constituency-driven obligation or framework for popularizing the 
language or objectives of the group beyond the community of inward-looking 
professionals or careerists who run it.”110 They had failed to maximize on the power 
of the language of rights and the ideas it brings to life.111 As this thesis argues, such 
ideas not only play a crucial role in shaping subjectivities but are also an effective 
organizing tool.112 Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki’s findings in Kenya five years later 
seem to support aspects of Odinkalu’s criticisms: their interviews with officials from 
key development agencies about the impact of rights-based approaches (RBAs, more 
of which shortly) on their policies and operations highlighted concerns about the 
exclusionary “working methods that have characterised the professionalised elitist 
practice of rights advocacy,” with one official owning that the human rights debate 
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had not yet become “a people’s debate.”113 This observation recalls a comment by an 
official at the Kenyan AIDS non-governmental organization (NGO) Women Fighting 
AIDS in Kenya (WOFAK), where the first interviews for this research were conducted. 
Asked by this author to characterize the knowledge of rights among his clients he 
commented that human rights “are not like the Bible; [they are] not something you’re 
brought up on from a very early age.”114 Moreover, Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki 
noted perceptions of official aloofness, dismissiveness of locals and their concerns 
and mistrust of locals in the management of finances, which were cited by some 
grassroots communities and which further hampered the former’s capacity to 
cultivate mass movements and make rights advocacy and practice more 
participatory.115  
 
And yet the intervening decade since Odinkalu’s observations has also seen increased 
steps to propagate such movements. This is evinced by the periodic emphasis on 
mass civic education described earlier by Musyoki, et al, but can also be detected at 
the beginning of the decade in the efforts of human rights organizations to transform 
themselves into membership organizations.116 The other compelling reason for 
qualifying Odinkalu’s thesis today, of course, is the documented success of grassroots 
movements dealing with specific human rights issues, particularly those on the health 
entitlements of PLWHAs, as Ely Yamin117 and London118 highlight. 
 
b) What Have Rights Got to do With It?: Health, HIV/AIDS and Rights-Based 
Approaches 
For well over a decade now, advocates and practitioners have been attempting to 
enunciate the linkages between health and human rights, and health, human rights 
and HIV/AIDS. Commentators and practitioners, such as the contributors to the 
Health and Human Rights: An International Journal, a vital resource for this research, 
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building on the pioneering work of Jonathan Mann and others, have sought to 
highlight and reaffirm these connections in theory and practice. The AIDS epidemic 
has unsurprisingly impacted on the discourse about the individual’s right to health 
for, unlike other diseases “it most starkly locates the body at the crossroads of 
gender, race, class, sexuality and geography,”119 amplifying the differences in health 
already wrought by these factors.120 The role of Mann121 and other campaigners in 
shaping and internationalizing the debate on access to treatment, which represented 
a new paradigm shift in late 1990s, will be outlined in Chapters 6 and 7.122 As noted 
by Helen Epstein123, Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside124 and other chroniclers and 
analysts of the African epidemic, the start was characterized by government inaction 
and public ignorance, fear and suspicion of HIV/AIDS and PLWHAs. These problems 
persist in varying degrees but governments like Kenya’s have been forced to become 
more responsive to issues such as stigma and discrimination and scarcity of 
antiretrovirals (ARVs) for PLWHAs, and have, indeed, made strides in each of these 
areas.  
 
As Tarantola125 and Heywood and Altman126 explain, a consensus about the 
interconnectedness of human rights and HIV/AIDS largely appears to have been 
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reached over a decade ago. In many ways, this achievement exemplifies the triumph 
of the age of globalization, the forces of which must be read into all discussions 
throughout this research on the popularization of the international human rights 
project generally, and especially into the movement to recognize and secure the 
rights of PWLHAs. The ideas encompassed by the term ‘globalization’ in this thesis 
correspond to those Sankaran Krishna describes as “the combined economic and 
socio-political cultural changes of the contemporary epoch...”127  Hakan Seckinelgin 
states that “the appearance of HIV/AIDS has been one of the most important 
determinants of the changing nature of globalization in which people’s need began to 
take precedence over the institutionalized politics of health.... AIDS activism 
constructed as a social movement for people has inspired approaches to many other 
diseases and changed the way people think about their relationship to health 
policies.”128 Many CSOs, and HIV/AIDS and human rights ones are especially good 
examples of these as will be seen in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, have also acquired 
dimensions that are manifestations of the globalization phenomenon; that is, the 
internationalization of their activities.129 Seckinelgin identifies the globalization of the 
AIDS debate, firstly in manner in which it became a fixture in the agendas of 
intergovernmental groups, and secondly in the multinational response to it.130 
 
The argument was popularized that in order to tackle the epidemic effectively the 
rights of sufferers had to be accounted for, contrary to the old strategies in which the 
individual right to health was often subordinated to public health requirements. 
HIV/AIDS, it was argued, absolutely illustrated the intersection of human rights and 
public health goals.131 The “risk-vulnerability” concept of the early 1990s highlighted 
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the underlying factors- social, economic, cultural- that influenced the patterns of 
infection and forced a rethink in strategy.132  
 
With health outcomes correlating with patterns of wealth both domestically and 
globally, issues of access to, and distribution of, resources were becoming a central- 
and divisive- part of the health and rights discourse. The challenges presented by 
HIV/AIDS, as Heywood and Altman underline, were increasingly framed in language 
that was a combination of rights, law and ethics.133 But the main platform that has 
been sought to promote and enforce human rights in the context of HIV/AIDS, the UN 
system, continues to present structural difficulties for campaigners: among other 
issues, there is still an aversion to addressing the socio-economic asymmetries that 
define the epidemic; a persistent imbalance of power among States; and a continued 
absence of enforcement mechanisms to promote adherence to human rights 
obligations, all of which will be revisited in the latter chapters of this research.134 The 
discrepancy between the promises of human rights rhetoric and the still limited 
possibility of their realization has a profound effect on an increasingly rights-aware 
audience: it helps create expectations which, when unmet by the appointed duty-
bearer, the State, feeds the perception not only of an ineffective entity but an 
illegitimate one. But crucially for the advancement of the human rights enterprise, 
this gulf feeds disillusionment about human rights as an effective alternative moral 
language and framework of reference by which to imagine and articulate grievances. 
This adds yet another layer of complexity to the constitution of individual notions of 
entitlement and obligation.  
 
Despite the increased application of rights to health policy and public health issues 
like HIV/AIDS, it has been contended that a coherent philosophical basis for the right 
to health remains elusive.135 Indeed, the scope of the right is so contentious that even 
the terminology used to express it is disputed. As Leary and others point out, the 
phrasing the ‘right to health’ “[s]uperficially… seems to presume that government or 
international organizations must guarantee a person’s right to good health- an absurd 
                                                 
132
 Tarantola (n 125), at 3. 
133
 Heywood and Altman (n 126), at 155 
134
 ibid, at 159. 
135
 Ruger (n 67). 
 42 
 
interpretation and not the one assumed in the context of human rights law.”136 The 
practical difficulties of this shorthand, revisited in the next chapter, meant that in 
order to invite PLWHAs to engage with questions about issues around the right to 
health without resorting to defining the right for them in advance (and so cancelling 
out an important element of this research), it was easier to refer to the more specific 
phraseology, the ‘right to healthcare’. This narrower terminology commonly defines 
“only the provision of medical services”137; its downsides will be addressed in Chapter 
2 but in the context of interview questions aimed at laypeople, it provided a more 
convenient entry into the subject than its more nebulous species.  
 
To be sure, there are references in this research to both a ‘right to healthcare’ and a 
‘right to health’, a fact which does not hinder the central task defined by the 
research. Indeed, the issue of terminology adds an extra dimension to the discussion 
which problematizes, as other commentators have done, the ability of the language 
of rights to adequately give expression to multiple and complex concepts.138 For 
regardless of the expression applied, the underlying elements that contribute to 
perceptions about entitlements- however they may be expressed- remain the same. 
A right to healthcare is applied here particularly in the exploration of interviewees’ 
responses about the problems of accessing medical care. A right to health connotes 
wider health factors such as nutrition, sanitation and water.139 In fact, this latter 
phrase is retained in the title of this research, in part as a convenient shorthand but 
significantly, too, because the interviews revealed that most PLWHAs viewed the 
issue of health more holistically, embracing a range of concepts and issues more akin 
to those associated with the broader-ranging ‘right to health’.  
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The preference of the phrase ‘right to health’ is also additionally important in the 
Kenyan context: it is the chosen wording in the new constitution, which, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, secures in the relevant Art. 43(1)(a) a right to “the 
highest attainable standard of health”, not healthcare, going on to explicitly include 
within its concept of ‘a right to health’ “the right to health care services, including 
reproductive health care.”140 Interestingly, however, it provides for rights to adequate 
housing, sanitation, food and water in separate subsequent sub-sections (Art. 
43(1)(b) to (d)), the very same content that a right to health on its own is often 
conceived as automatically encompassing. It could then be argued that the drafters of 
the new constitution did not take for granted that the concept of a ‘right to health’ 
inclusively covered the content often accorded to it, and instead viewed it narrowly 
(although the wording in Art. 43(1)(a) might suggest an non-exhaustive list of 
services, so that while their concept of ‘health’ expressly  includes healthcare 
services, including reproductive healthcare, it may comprise other services, too). 
Alternatively, their explicit allocation of separate rights to the further socio-economic 
goods often associated with health may have been god sense, a practical and sensible 
insurance which might in future give claimants an alternative basis on which to claim 
these goods should their arguments  that their provision is automatically implied in a 
right to health be rejected.  
 
Conceptual and ideological arguments notwithstanding, the last decade-and-a-half or 
so has seen widespread promotion by NGOs and international agencies of ‘rights-
based approaches’ to development and health.141 The role and impact of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) forms a key strand of the debate in this research because they 
have also been critical players in the HIV/AIDS narrative in Kenya and across the 
globe. Charles Taylor provides a neat analysis of the evolution of civil society in the 
West from the 17th through the 20th centuries, and this research adopts his definition 
of civil society as an entity that “stands in contrast to ‘the state’… a web of 
autonomous associations, independent of the state, which bound citizens together in 
matters of common concern, and by their mere existence or action could have an 
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effect on public policy.”142 But he warns against the over-simplification of the idea of 
civil society, underlining its multi-faceted nature and highlighting the fact that the 
perimeters separating State and non-State actors are not always clearly defined.143 
This complex view of civil society is reiterated by John L. and Jean Comaroff and other 
commentators in Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical 
Perspectives, who in their attempt to locate civil society in the African cultural, social 
and economic context find promise in the very intangibility of the concept. 144 
  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), about which the interviewees for this 
research were asked to comment, are a species of CSOs. The kind of NGOs which are 
involved in HIV/AIDS-related work are easily embraced in Sarah Michael’s definition 
of NGOs as “independent development actors existing apart from governments and 
corporations, operating on a non-profit of not-for-profit basis with an emphasis on 
voluntarism, and pursuing a mandate of providing development services, undertaking 
communal development work or advocating on development issues.”145 
 
Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor observe that the term NGO has “in common 
parlance at least, taken on the much more specific meaning of a rather 
institutionalized organization, with fixed headquarters and paid staff, working in 
advocacy and service-delivery mainly in the fields of developments, the environment, 
human rights, and humanitarian relief.”146 Though this may well describe the kinds of 
organizations that the interviewees may have had in mind when they responded to 
questions in the interview, as Glasius and Kaldor compellingly assert, the term NGO 
fails to capture the “richness and variety of organizations found in 45 civil society, 
including, in terms of structure, one-woman bedsit organizations and all-volunteer 
groups, or, in terms of activities, trade unions, churches and cultural organization.”147 
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Therefore, though this thesis often makes reference to NGOs here and elsewhere as 
the most visible representation of CSOs, the analysis it provides especially in Chapter 
7 is an interrogation of the phenomenon of CSOs more generally.  
 
A combination of factors fed the resurgence of CSOs, including: the end of the Cold 
War; their increased focus on socio-economic rights in the 1990s; changes in the 
delivery of aid which, amid the rhetoric of ‘partnership’, encouraged the application 
of rights to interrogate and enhance the accountability of recipient States; the 
emphasis on participation in development, and on raising public awareness about 
rights and boosting capacity to claim them; and the evisceration of the ideological 
baggage of the controversial, non-binding UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986), with its references to underlying global economic inequalities 
and clearly defined obligations for donor States, which sanitized the application of 
rights language in the modern development context and made its use more 
acceptable to them.148 
 
This oft-applied term or the similar-sounding ‘human rights approach’ is, again, 
imprecise and means a variety of things to its avowed adherents. As Nyamu-Musembi 
and Andrea Cornwall have pointed out in their critique, agencies or organizations’ 
political and other sensitivities may indeed be served by this vagueness and 
malleability.149 Their 2004 analysis of a number of key multilateral, bilateral and 
international organizations working in Kenya identified a general recognition of the 
benefits of applying a human rights framework to improve the efficacy of 
development practice. They critiqued the terms applied by various organizations in 
the rights and development dialogue, noting, for instance, the nuanced but crucial 
difference between a ‘rights-based approach’ and ‘human rights approach’: the latter 
places more explicit emphasis on human rights as universal and underwritten by 
international law; the former espouses looser notions about legal guarantees and 
more general human rights-inspired notions such as entitlement, fairness, justice, 
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equity and participation.150 There is, indeed, concern that the popularity of RBAs has 
and will be applied by organizations keen on “rights-washing”, which, like its 
environmental equivalent, ‘green-washing’, “gives political cover to groups whose 
overall impact on human rights is negative.”151 
 
Yet this may be inevitable in the current environment in which ever-increasing 
numbers of NGOs compete for finite funds, a reality which particularly characterizes 
the health sector, as Chapter 7 illustrates. A report from the NGO ActionAid noted:  
With the growing demands and complexities of advocacy and donor needs for 
accountability, [advocacy and rights] work has become more professionalised and, in 
some cases, taken on the language of business and government. As this has 
happened, important concepts have been toned down or co-opted, making them less 
challenging of the status quo and current relations of power. At times, terms become 
so loosely defined that people can easily use the same language while actually talking 
about fundamentally different notions.152 
 
To be sure, a rights framework provides new avenues for examining and altering “the 
way people perceive themselves vis-à-vis the government and other actors. [It] 
provides a mechanism for reanalyzing and renaming ‘problems’ as ‘violations,’ and, as 
such, something that need not and should not be tolerated.”153 Applied to health, it 
locates rights as both a site and a tool of struggle, and offers some instruction 
(though, as Ruger argues, not in a conceptually clear or coherent manner) on how the 
human rights paradigm conceives health and human beings: the latter are perceived 
as more than “mere containers of desires to be maximized in a utilitarian calculus.”154 
Meanwhile, the former is underlined as a special social good as opposed to a market 
commodity. As Ely Yamin and Ruger assert, a health system is not just a vehicle for 
the distribution of goods and services but a vital institution that offers integrated care 
on a par with other central social institutions.155 How a government fundamentally 
conceives health dictates the public health policies it adopts: London, writing with 
reference to South Africa’s transition from a political struggle against apartheid to a 
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broader struggle for human rights-based policies, raises a point about policy-level 
conceptions of public health as intrinsic rather than external to human rights, which 
has resonance beyond that particular context:  
The consequence for health is that, rather than acknowledging health as a right, 
policy-makers frame health policy decisions as service delivery issues, requiring 
technical inputs to reach the best ‘evidence-based’ decisions, a public health 
phenomenon gaining increasing popularity worldwide. In doing so, the state is 
relieved of its burden of having to answer to its constitutional obligations for 
progressive realization of socio-economic rights, and its public servants are able to 
retain their own identities as servants of a social good, keeping up the tradition of 
being part of a movement for social justice. Such reframing of health away from its 
nature as a socio-economic right strips health policy-making of its inherent elements 
of power and the contestation that goes with the recognition of power. For that 
reason, it absolutely does matter what is understood by a human rights 
framework.156  
 
She affirms the importance of evidence to a rights-based framework for health but 
stresses that health must be respected as a right rather than merely a service, a 
charitable act by the State or merely an enabling factor towards the wider goal of 
economic development.157 But RBAs have not always fitted seamlessly into the health 
discourse: there have been tensions, for instance, between some of their articulated 
goals, such as valuing and respecting the rights of individuals, and public health 
policies in which the wider population’s interests take precedence. An example is the 
debate about mandatory HIV testing (for which Elizabeth Pisani argues there is 
empirical evidence of effectiveness158) or quarantining those who may be infected 
with drug-resistant TB. Given the stigma and inflamed passions that often attend the 
AIDS debate, London argues, it will be important for proponents of RBAs to reaffirm 
the links between rights and health and prove the former a necessary precondition 
for the realization of the latter.159 To do so, Paul Farmer insists they must overcome 
two “orthodoxies”: firstly, the preoccupation in public health policy with cost-
effectiveness and sustainability (although he argues a right-based approach can 
actually enhance these objectives160), rather than with meeting the needs of those on 
the ground and addressing underlying issues such as poverty. Secondly, they must 
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challenge the emphasis, inspired by neo-liberal ideology, on civil and political rather 
than socio-economic rights161, and grapple with an unpalatable notion: that only large 
scale “redistributive transfers” of resources, ideally by public authorities, will 
effectively tackle fundamental health problems.162 Human rights organizations, he 
argues, must traverse the as-yet “unchartered territory” of framing specific health 
problems in explicit human rights terms to realize the desired outcomes.163 He asserts 
that, “if we believe in health and human rights, we will need to broaden, very 
considerably, our efforts to promote social and economic rights for the poor. This, I 
would argue, is the leading human rights issue now facing public health.”164  
 
If the discourse on the linkages between health and rights is to engage and carry 
those at the grassroots, then a crucial test will be the extent to which the language of 
rights has gained traction among laypeople like the PLWHAs interviewed for this 
research and the extent to which they use it to articulate their health (and other) 
entitlements. As will be reviewed in later chapters, while many interviewees were 
familiar with issues around stigmatization and discrimination which do indeed impact 
on their health outcomes, on the whole the responses suggested that many people 
still viewed their healthcare needs as needs rather than rights which may be legally 
enforceable. Most had not heard or thought of a link between health and human 
rights; fewer yet claimed to have heard specifically of a right to healthcare and the 
quality of responses in this part of the interviews varied widely, with only fewer still 
providing answers that can be regarded as coming within the conventional content 
associated with a right to health or healthcare. Only a couple of interviewees, for 
instance, spontaneously mentioned a right to healthcare (or treatment, as would be 
the Kiswahili translation (more of which in Chapter 2)) although one or two others did 
mention rights to medicine or to health determinants such as food or shelter. 
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Interviewee 42, for example, recalled the moment it occurred to her that rights might 
apply to the sick:  
“I haven’t thought about [the link between health and rights] but there was I time I 
had been lying in the ward and a lady was brought in. The nurses asked those who 
had brought her what their relationship was to her. That’s when I found out that 
human rights can also help an ill person… I didn’t find out where those people came 
from. So I see the connection because they speak out for us.”  
 
Another suggested a nexus based on a notion of corporate responsibility for care of 
the infirm, arguing that the two issues were connected because anyone could fall sick 
and “you’re supposed to be taken care of well if you’re sick.”165 Another respondent 
admitted he had not heard of a right to healthcare but reasoned that it might be 
linked to human rights because a multilateral organization which he associated with 
human rights had addressed an issue that was pertinent to health.166 
 
One of the principal features of the few responses on a right to healthcare was the 
futility of having, or being aware of, what might be merely a nominal right: arguably, 
part of the reason for the gap between respondents’ thorough articulation of their 
health needs and what appeared to be a generally limited sense of entitlement to the 
legal rights that might derive from them may be their low expectations that these 
rights would be realized. Tarek Meguid notes that “believing in human rights does not 
make them real in our communities.”167 As one interviewee opined, despite her 
conviction that everyone, regardless of their situation, should be provided with 
appropriate healthcare, finding out she had a right to it was useless to her unless it 
could be actualized.168 It was a view echoed by others, some of whom thought the 
government nevertheless capable of turning the right into a reality: These include 
interviewee 39, for whom the right meant that “basic needs like food should be 
affordable.” For him, the government could provide these needs “if they wanted to.” 
Interviewee 42, too, was similarly convinced. For her, a right to healthcare meant free 
medication for those who could not afford it and that the government could provide 
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it if they did not “misuse and steal funds.” Interviewee 45 also thought the 
government could afford to provide healthcare and the lifesaving drugs it entailed “if 
they are honest to the people.” Indeed, others proposed strategies for achieving 
this.169 In any event, thought one respondent, Interviewee 29, the enormity of the 
task of public healthcare provision could not be left up to the charity of other actors 
and required government action and legal guarantees: “Because who else can? Do 
you think you can? It is a big task and it should be done by the government because it 
runs the country. .. The way I see it, [families do not always assist.] There are others 
who will leave a person to die without offering any help. So it should be part of the 
law, not just voluntary, otherwise some people will not want to get involved.”   
 
The breadth of perceived duty-bearers cited by the PLWHAs, as Chapter 8 illustrates, 
and the vocabulary which they use to articulate their health entitlements exemplifies 
one of the principal contentions in this research that rights will have to compete with 
traditional custom and religion as the primary moral language, to use Baxi’s 
expression170, in which claims to entitlements are framed and expressed. The varied 
foundations of PLWHAs’ claims also illuminate, again, how individuals situate 
themselves in the wider social, economic and political grid and the role played by 
agency. As London observes, agency, which relates to issues of power and the lack of 
power, is a crucial determinant in the actualization of health rights.171 Individual 
perceptions about how power is configured, one’s capacity to manipulate its 
apparatus and operate within its structures come across strongly in the interviews. 
The last chapter shows that many respondents made healthcare claims on the 
government, often founded on the privileges of membership to a national public- 
citizenship. Further claims on the government were based on financial contributions 
made to the national coffers by taxpayers: interviewee 31 appeared concerned with 
the entitlements of taxpayers, when she argued that some of the revenues collected 
should be go towards health provisions as it would remove the strain from her and 
free her to meet her other responsibilities comfortably. She felt that one could not 
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have an adequate standard of healthcare in Kenya today without money and yet, “[A 
human right to healthcare] means that whether you have money or not you should 
be treated as a human being. But that’s not happening because when you’re told to 
cost-share and you don’t have, does that mean you remain sick?” However, this may 
exclude claims by the majority of the population which does not pay income tax 
either due to unemployment or employment in the informal sector.172 Interviewee 
14’s apparently strong sense of entitlement to healthcare, for instance, stemmed 
from her belief that if one had paid for it, one deserved it: “I think as a taxpayer I 
already provide. So from there, the central government, of course, has to organize so 
that healthcare is provided.” By this reasoning, healthcare is no longer a right but a 
commodity, access to which is predicated upon one’s ability to purchase it; by 
extension she is less a rights-holder than a consumer. However grim this may sound, 
it is the experience of many Kenyans today. To her, the government’s responsibility 
seemed limited to that of supplier, and it is a role she felt it could fulfil with better 
fiscal management.173 For another respondent, taxes could guarantee the provision 
of health needs but, as with several others, the government’s role was not obligatory, 
a view probably inspired by his wider pessimism about whether it could be legally 
compelled to act:  
The duty of the government would be to volunteer to help people get treatment and 
then, if it does that, to fulfil its promise. If they don’t volunteer, they cannot be 
compelled because they will not budget for it, and they have the power to do so. But 
the President’s motto has been that we should unite to fight this illness, so it seems 
they have committed themselves. So they should fulfil their promise. (Interviewee 
44)  
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As will be seen in Chapter 4, perceptions of the State as venal, avaricious, 
unresponsive to the electorate’s needs and somewhat external to, and beyond the 
control of, citizens have roots in the colonial era. As Berman174 and Ghai and 
McAuslan175 explain, colonial administrators were prepared to allow coercive, corrupt 
or unjust institutions and practices to evolve if they furthered- or at least did not 
impede- the paramount objectives of the colonial enterprise. Additionally, the 
PLWHAs are also witnesses to its well-advertised ineffectiveness in dealing with the 
AIDS epidemic. The cumulative effect of these largely negative views about the 
colonial and postcolonial State is captured by many of the responses: in querying the 
State’s inefficiency in addressing their health needs some interviewees appeared to 
question its legitimacy. Others, alluding to a culture of impunity, cited a State 
obligation to assist in meeting health needs but appeared to be suggesting that such 
entitlements impossible to secure through (enforceable) laws. Instead they resorted 
to appealing to the unpredictable, unguaranteed generosity of the State in the hope 
that it would act morally to alleviate their needs.  
 
Making the State accountable for its health rights obligations based on the more 
substantial grounds of domestic or international law, then, remains one of the key 
challenges facing advocates. As Ely Yamin notes, “To assert that health is an issue of 
rights is to assert that the state and other actors bear some responsibility in ensuring 
fair distributions of the social determinants of health as well as availability and access 
to care.”176 One of the strategies currently attracting much commentary, and which 
the new Kenyan Constitution is intended to enable, is judicial activism by individual or 
group claimants, which Gloppen177, Abramovich and Pautassi178 and Ely Yamin179 
explore. The juridical model is fast gaining popularity in South America and has been 
tested, too, in South Africa. And while London highlights the successes in the latter of 
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the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and stresses the possibilities of court actions 
allied to social mobilization180, others like Karin Lehmann181, Octavio Luiz Motta 
Ferraz182 and Charles Ngwena183 are less convinced. They critique its jurisprudential 
and procedural problems and the historical exclusion of marginalized groups from 
judicial processes, and raise doubts about the capacity of legal action to bring real 
and long-term benefits for litigants and the public at large, as will be seen in Chapter 
8.  
 
Proponents of judicial action in countries like Argentina have also sought to use it to 
highlight the role and obligations of non-State actors in healthcare provision. NGOs 
may be hugely influential in this capacity in Kenya, as Chapter 7 demonstrates, but 
despite this many respondents resisted the idea that such actors were (legally) 
obliged to assist in meeting PLWHAs’ healthcare needs, arguing instead that their 
endeavours were more rightly based on charity. Indeed, though there were questions 
about the practices of some local groups, the work of NGOs drew broadly favourable 
comments from interviewees, a reflection of their often commendable involvement 
in highlighting and alleviating the health concerns of PLWHAs. But the relationship 
between civil-society groups and those they ostensibly serve is much more nuanced 
and more problematic than many interviewees appeared to regard it. Nyamu-
Musembi and Cornwall, Sarah Michael184, Neera Chandhoke185 and Elizabeth 
Garland186 all question the capacity of locals to set the agenda and participate 
meaningfully in the policy-making and programming activities carried out by such 
groups, raising concerns that they often replicate and entrench existing power 
imbalances at national and global level. As Ely Yamin underlines, participation is itself 
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reliant upon transparency and accessibility of information187, yet the workings and 
structures of accountability of many extra-State actors remain hidden or inaccessible 
to locals.  
 
Moreover, the significant role played by powerful oversees donor agencies in setting 
national health priorities is particularly worth critiquing, as Jeremy Shiffman188, Ilona 
Kickbusch and Evelyne de Leeuw189 and Laurie Garrett190 assert: Shelley Jones and 
Bonny Norton’s account of former US President George W. Bush’s Presidential 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR’s) involvement in Uganda’s HIV prevention 
programming offers a reminder of the real and sometimes disastrous consequences 
of the unequal, highly dependent power relations between donor States and their 
recipient ‘partners’.191  
 
The perceived lack of agency vis-à-vis a range of State and non-State actors perhaps 
inevitably meant that many PLWHAs may be basing their health entitlement claims 
on relationships which they were better able to influence and whose levers of power 
were less remote: their kinship and close social links. For despite the rise of 
individuality, the dilution of kinship structures and the diminution of their cohesive 
functions and obligations during the colonial era192, they survive still in contemporary 
Kenyan society, animated by such ideas as ‘Harambee’ or voluntary pooling of 
collective resources.193 This notion was echoed by a number of respondents, some of 
whom appeared to presume a moral obligation for relatives, friends, and wider 
society to help those unable to meet their health needs. Interviewee 44, considering 
the nexus between health and human rights, asserted: 
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[People], whether they can afford treatment or not, still need it. If you have been 
asked to pay Ksh. 5,000 and you don’t have it, are you supposed to just sit and die 
without treatment? Of what benefit is that to the government? Isn’t it better you get 
treatment, then owe the hospital the money, get well and then go and organize a 
Harambee and pay off the debt? So there is a right for people there to be treated, 
even though they haven’t the money, when they get sick.  
 
For interviewee 24, even the government’s now-defunct cost-sharing system for ARV 
provisioning was “not a bad idea because given the money they have put aside for 
people, even if a poor person had a Harambee done for them they could [at least] 
afford to look after themselves.” There was often a sense of an unarticulated system 
of duties and privileges binding individuals within society which substitutes or co-
exists alongside the duties and rights that may bind individuals to the State. It is not 
surprising then that successive governments should attempt to co-opt and exploit the 
concept of Harambee. Ngau laments that Harambee “used to provide local mutual 
assistance and foster cultural values; today, those roles have been abandoned while 
only [its] material ends are appropriated. Furthermore, local people have taken less 
and less part in decision making, management, and control of projects. This 
perversion of Harambee194 [I term] departicipation and reflects disempowerment at 
the grass-roots level.”195 
 
c) Imagining Human Rights 
 
What, then, may the interviews be saying about the place of rights in the imagination 
of ordinary Kenyans? To be sure, the PLWHAs were eloquent about their multifaceted 
health needs- primarily nutrition and lack of financial resources, and psychosocial and 
medical needs- as Chapters 5 and 6, respectively, illustrate. To be sure, a few PLWHAs 
mentioned other health-related concerns relating to sanitation, shelter and water, all 
of which, as earlier noted, are now individually provided for in the Bill of Rights of 
Kenya’s new constitution alongside health, but the four requirements explored in 
detail in research are those which were most commonly identified by respondents. 
Moreover, these four particular health concerns tie together the cross-cutting social, 
economic, cultural and political themes of Kenya’s pre-colonial past, addressed in 
Chapter 3, and its more recent colonial and postcolonial history (Chapter 4). For it is 
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against such an expansive background that contemporary notions of entitlement and 
the relationship between the individual, her wider community and the State have 
developed. Three pivotal aspects of social organization in traditional Kenya in 
particular emerge, which continue to dictate the configuration of power today and 
shape individual identity, subjectivity and conception of rights and privileges: the 
systems of land ownership, kinship and patriarchy. The multilayered rights and duties 
entailed by African systems of land tenure were, and remain, skewed in favour of 
male progeny, as Akinyi Nzioki196, Perpetua Karanja197, Ikdahl, et al198, and others 
point out.199 Yet they also often guaranteed female members certain rights within the 
kinship group (which, paradoxically, as Chapter 6 explores through the work of 
Karanja and Patricia Kameri-Mbote200, modern land tenure reforms have threatened). 
Meanwhile, the function and lasting importance of the obligations and privileges of 
kinship delineated in the anthropological texts of Jomo Kenyatta201, Thomas Spear202 
and A.R. Radcliff-Brown203is underscored by the several PLWHAs who appeared to 
make claims to health entitlements from husbands, families or relatives. But 
patriarchy is the thread that runs through these first two socio-historical factors: the 
gender disparity it effects shapes ideas about women’s rights, their roles in society, so 
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often centred on their sexual and reproductive functions, as Regina Smith Oboler204 
and Kenyatta illustrate, and even impacts on historical research about women as Beth 
Maina Ahlberg205 and Ulrike von Mitzlaff206 explain. A picture emerges of a corporate 
ownership of female sexuality in particular and a restrictive social, cultural and 
economic space for women whose boundaries are rigidly patrolled in the name of 
their protection and that of society’s integrity and stability as a whole.  
 
As many responses indicated, all three elements and the norms they engender 
strongly influence how individuals- particularly women- in contemporary Kenyan 
society locate themselves within the wider social matrix, and their perceptions of 
themselves, their entitlements, rights and obligations. The convergence of issues 
around land, kinship and patriarchy are revealed again in Chapters 5 and 6: in the 
former, PLWHAs’ challenges in accessing nutrition and resources affect their capacity 
to attain and maintain their health, exacerbated, as Alex de Waal and Alan 
Whiteside207 and Gabriel Rugalema208 show, by the HIV/AIDS factor. Meanwhile, the 
marginalization of women in resource control and ownership, the general economy 
and other areas of public life, which Karanja, Kameri-Mbote and Nzomo209 consider, 
significantly increases their vulnerability to HIV infection, as Bayliss, et al210 show. The 
same issues and patterns crop up in Chapter 6’s analysis of PLWHAs’ psychosocial and 
medical needs; the latter, in particular, are severely curtailed by access to resources 
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although, as Mamdani asserts211 and the interviews revealed, the old systems and 
obligations of kinship, altered but not obliterated by the convulsions of colonization 
often aided PLWHAs in need. How gender and sexual norms, as revealed, for 
instance, in the Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys (KDHS), frame attitudes 
towards sex, HIV infection and PLWHAs, transfiguring PLWHAs’ subjectivities and 
impinging on their claims to rights, becomes especially clear in the analysis of their 
psychosocial needs. In the absence of biomedically-sanctioned psychological care, it is 
the acceptance and support of members of familial, social, religious and other 
networks that patients mostly seek, even when the values championed by these 
communities conflict with human rights norms. 
 
While this may have inspired certain inconsistencies, the PLWHAs’ responses 
nevertheless indicated an internalization of various ideas often associated with 
human rights, such as the entitlements of citizenship, the innate dignity of the human 
being and the obligations of the State. They also appeared to reflect certain advocacy 
messages about rights and health entitlements, especially those targeted at their 
particular group, underscoring the importance of such strategies. After all, 
perceptions and attitudes are changeable and advocacy not only helps inculcate 
human rights norms within the general population but also provides an impetus for 
their adoption across State institutions. In turn, this may create or boost expectations 
of (future) fulfilment of the obligations that these human rights entitlements imply, 
which in turn would reinforce the citizenry’s demands for action, and so on. The 
increasing expectation of provision of ARVs by the State, based on repeated campaign 
messages and the successful demands by fellow PLWHAs elsewhere, was cited by 
some respondents and is a good example.  
 
Furthermore, Turiano and Smith point to efforts by a range of health experts and 
stakeholders in Uruguay to inform the public about the right to health and its various 
aspects, with the intention to create a sustainable social movement to agitate for the 
fulfilment of this right.212 They emphasize, too, that building the capacity of 
grassroots groups to conduct their own rights-based assessments of government’s 
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health policies and its adherence to health rights obligations has been proven to 
transcend the rarefied circles of intellectuals and professionals and transfer 
ownership of health rights initiatives to communities.213 This, as Ruger might assert, is 
imperative if individuals are to “internalize the public moral norm that health is 
worthy of social recognition, investment and regulation to the point of successfully 
operationalizing such a right.”214  
 
In addition, the high numbers of people who seemed unaware of a right to health or 
healthcare should not be taken to suggest that PLWHAs, or indeed other laypeople, 
possess no notions of entitlements to these socio-economic goods or make no claims 
to them. As Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall rightly point out in particular reference to 
proponents of rights-based approaches but a charge arguably relevant beyond this 
group, little regard is often paid to the “range of strategies, tactics and institutions 
through which people frame and make rights claims outside of formal legal 
instruments and institutions.” Unless practitioners and advocates recognize this, they 
may not fully understand the dynamics and relationships that these strategies are 
attempting to balance and how they may be harnessed towards strengthening human 
rights understanding.215  
  
Yet, as earlier noted, the interviews also revealed a number of fundamental 
contradictions: for instance, recognition of the role, authority and legitimacy of the 
other key party in the human rights dynamic, the State, often seemed to exist 
contemporaneously with a rejection of the same. Indeed, one likely effect of 
successfully inculcating a notion of State responsibility for actualizing socio-economic 
rights is that (the highly probable) non-delivery reinforces public perceptions of its 
ineffectiveness, which may only reaffirm lingering doubts about its legitimacy. 
Another paradox lay in some PLWHAs’ apparent claims of espousal or acceptance of 
fundamental human rights norms like the dignity of all human beings while asserting 
a fervent belief that this could be justifiably denied to those deemed to have violated 
societal norms, particularly on sex. And yet practitioners and advocates must prepare 
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to engage with the agency of individuals and the indeterminate possibilities that 
emerge from opening up the human rights dialogue, as its values and notions about 
obligations and entitlements are evaluated, processed, assimilated or rejected and re-
articulated by laypeople with varied moral frames of reference and subjectivities. 
 
While the interviews appear to suggest fertile ground on which to cultivate human 
rights norms, however, some commentators are sceptical about the future of human 
rights in its current framework, and the debate on the relationship between morality 
and the modern human rights framework was seen earlier in this chapter. Where 
PLWHAs’ claims to health entitlements appeared to be founded on the moral 
responsibility owed to individuals, especially those in need, because of their special 
status as human beings, Baxi, for instance, has questioned whether notions of 
morality that are intertwined with human rights can survive the modern age, noting 
that, “[t]he prospects of recycling the moral languages of human rights appear rather 
bleak in our globalizing human condition in ways that they did not to the forerunners 
and founders of human rights, from Grotius to Gandhi.”216 He does not reject the 
importance of the human rights project as whole, arguing, in fact, that it is even more 
vital to places like Asia and Africa which, bereft of the centuries-old practice of most 
European societies, do not often operate in accordance with human rights values.217 
But Baxi has posited a bleak theory of a global market-driven human rights paradigm. 
This new “trade-related, market-friendly” paradigm prioritizes the “promotion and 
protection of the collective rights of global capital in ways that ‘justifies’ corporate 
well-being and dignity over that of human persons”, and threatens to supersede the 
paradigm laid out in the iconic UDHR.218 It is contingent upon a State that eschews 
any redistribution of resources in the way that Farmer and others contend is 
necessary to realize a right to health. In this new paradigm, Baxi continues, the 
malleability of the State, which is soft and hard in turns, only serves to facilitate the 
flow of global capital (soft), and to remove and enforce the removal of obstacles to 
this flow (hard).219 Over a decade after the publication of Baxi’s work, and in the 
throes of global economic convulsions in which falls in public spending are being 
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registered alongside individual unemployment and loss of earnings, this a sobering 
thought. Indeed, one may argue that modern health paradigms which promote the 
idea of the ‘empowered’ individual without accounting for the lack of free will or 
choice often produced by asymmetrical domestic and global power relations are 
more closely linked to Baxi’s gloomy model than they are to the UDHR. 
 
Ely Yamin and Baxi both stress that taking rights seriously necessitates taking 
suffering seriously.220 Indeed, the normalization of suffering, implied, for instance, by 
the unrelenting gap between the rhetoric and reality of rights which a number of 
interviewees rightly pointed out, is one of the ways in which Baxi’s market-driven 
paradigm of human rights arguably begins to take root.221 Such discrepancies must 
surely make even the noblest human rights ideals sound hollow, breed 
disillusionment in prospective adapters of human rights norms and hamper the 
overall goal of internalization. And yet Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki noted the 
comments of officials from the development organization CARE in Kenya, who opined 
that there was nevertheless an obligation to increase people’s knowledge of their 
entitlements as an aspect of a rights-based approach to development, even when the 
organization could not itself assist in actualizing those rights.222  
 
Whether human rights laws and norms are ultimately effective in helping PLWHAs 
articulate their health-related grievances and address them- or in alleviating 
suffering, as Baxi and Ely Yamin would have it- remains to be seen. Human rights 
theories and covenants appear to conceive the individual, her sense of entitlements 
and obligations and her relationship to the State, in particular, in a narrow, unrealistic 
manner drained of the complexities of her reality. Yet Lisa Forman maintains that 
while they often seem to address issues only abstractly, they may be the vehicle 
through which systemic shifts towards justice can be injected.223 Carol Smart 
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addressed similar questions about the law’s efficacy in the feminist struggle, arguing 
that, “[i]f we reject the idea of law as a simple tool of liberation or of oppression, and 
look at how it constitutes a kind of institutionalized and formalized site of power 
struggles- one that can provide resources for women, children and men, albeit 
differentially- then it is possible to acknowledge that it remains an important strategic 
element in political confrontations.”224 There are lessons here for the struggle for the 
health rights of PLWHAs and others: for allocation of resources for health and the 
entitlements of the infirm are nothing if not political struggles.  
 
The leveraging of the right to health by South African HIV/AIDS activists in the fight 
for access to treatment provides a good example of the potent confluence of human 
rights law and knowledge of rights. And although Smart rejects a return to a previous 
age when women had no rights, as indeed we must surely reject as regressive the 
failure to recognize the health entitlements of human beings, she is also cautious, 
warning, as Ferraz and others do in relation to juridical action for health rights, that 
recourse to the law has often proved more beneficial to one class, race or sex than to 
others.225 Furthermore, and in common with the discrimination of women, the 
current problems with access to healthcare are propped up by a host of structural 
factors, many of which may be beyond the reach of legislation.226 The successful 
rooting of human rights will depend on how their advocates and proponents 
negotiate these hurdles, package and sell rights to the wider public and manage the 
often-unfulfilled expectations they create. But the real test of success is arguably 
whether the language of rights becomes the reflexive vocabulary of laypeople who 
wish to articulate their entitlements. If the right to health can traverse the divide 
from a generally accepted norm among experts to an internalized norm among 
laypeople, then advocates may rightfully claim that it has truly been established.    
 
III. Thesis Structure 
 
                                                 
224
 Smart, Carol,  Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge: London, 1989), at 138. 
225
 ibid. She notes: “In resorting to law, especially law structured on patriarchal precedents, women 
risk invoking a power that will work against them rather than for them. We know, for example, that 
Sex and Discrimination  Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976 in the UK have been unsuccessful in 
changing the discrimination, against women and ethnic communities.” 
226
 See ibid., at 139. 
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Chapter 2 is an analysis of the research’s methodology. But it has two further aims: to 
demonstrate, firstly, how HIV/AIDS dominates the interviewer- respondent 
interaction and thus determines the information collected; secondly, how this phase 
of the fieldwork illustrated and entrenched many of the overall issues that the 
research deals with. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the sources on which 
the research relies, before moving on to a detailed analysis of the process and 
challenges of conducting the 49 PLWHA interviews which form the core of this 
research. To facilitate this, the section splits the process into three separate phases: 
pre-interview, interview and post-interview. The first of these stages explores this 
researcher’s decisions regarding the choice of interview structure and the personal 
interviewing style which would maximize the opportunity. It then addresses the in-
built challenges of attempting to gain access to often unseen subjects whose illness 
not only attracts public accusations of normative violation but also leads to 
ostracization. Finally it details the challenges of designing interview questions in two 
languages which could capture as precisely as possible the nuances of human rights 
terms and concepts in both English and Kiswahili. The next stage examines issues 
around interviewer-respondent interaction which arose while conducting the actual 
interviews. The final stage comprises general reflections about the interview process, 
particularly regarding the search for objectivity in a research about a subject as 
sensitive and emotive as AIDS. 
 
Chapter 3 then looks at the socio-historical context of the events and processes that 
the research covers. It starts by outlining common problems faced by the researcher 
who seeks to investigate pre- and early colonial African history, briefly examining how 
sources and channels of knowledge shape knowledge itself. The chapter then 
proceeds to analyze three mutually reinforcing features around which power and 
social relations were organized in pre-colonial Kenya: land, kinship and patriarchy. 
The chapter emphasizes the enduring importance of these customary features, 
whose supporting systems and structures persist, albeit in altered forms, despite the 
convulsions of colonialism and independence.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of the colonial experience on the principle issues 
addressed in this research. The broad subject of colonialism and its transformative 
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effects on Kenya and the general narrative of this period in the country’s history, 
though interesting, is not the main focus of this research. Nor indeed is the 
decolonization discourse, the independence struggle or the minutiae of political 
upheaval post-independence. These issues are briefly mentioned in this chapter 
where relevant but it begins with a brief analysis of the often conflicting objectives of 
the colonial project and the centrality of the subject of race. The postcolonial 
analytical framework is especially underlined in the second part of the chapter, which 
explores the influence of colonialism on the AIDS discourse, as well as its possible 
impact on notions of entitlement, looking at how issues like race, culture and the 
State-individual relationship have shaped modern debates about power, health, sex, 
rights and obligations. As the third section of the chapter shows, these recurrent 
themes also influenced the colonial administration’s somewhat contradictory 
construction of both the African legal subject and the customary sphere within which 
she was to be governed. This section also explores the construction of a new entity, 
the State, whose agents and their exercise of power was to leave an enduring 
impression on the African subjects of what the State was and what it was for. The 
chapter concludes with an examination of how post-independence this new entity 
created an alternative locus of power to the customary, the bifurcated State, and, in 
turn, the dual identity of the citizen-subject.   
 
Chapter 5 is the first of four consecutive empirical chapters and it deconstructs the 
PLWHAs’ responses about their nutritional and financial requirements. It also looks at 
their attribution of duty for the fulfilment of these needs to discover how they 
construct their notions of entitlement and obligation. The chapter starts by 
underlining the significance of food to a PLWHA’s health, and then the importance of 
a steady and reliable income source, illustrating the vicious circle that binds HIV/AIDS, 
inadequate nutrition, low food production and poverty. The two requirements of 
food and income converge in the issue next addressed by the chapter: the impact of 
unequal rights to land use and ownership. This section considers how historical and 
contemporary systems of land tenure entrench the social, economic and political 
marginalization, in particular that of women, perhaps the most vital constituency in 
the HIV narrative. As the final section of the chapter emphasizes, this inequality 
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deprives women of much-needed access to resources and increases their 
vulnerability to HIV infection.  
 
In Chapter 6, the empirical analysis is based on PLWHAs’ responses about their 
psychosocial and medical needs. It begins by looking at the former requirement, 
especially the effects of the financial stresses detailed in the previous chapter and the 
shame and stigma, including self-stigma, associated with the illness. Next, it 
addresses PLWHAs’ medical needs, highlighting gaps in both availability and 
accessibility of ARVs despite great strides in improving both aspects of treatment, and 
the crucial role played by private social networks and non-State actors in fulfilling 
these needs for PLWHAs. The chapter concludes by exploring the role of the more 
widely available and widely accessible, if sometimes controversial, traditional 
medicine in PLWHAs’ healthcare. It outlines the dominance of biomedicine in the 
AIDS discourse, as evinced by several PLWHAs’ perceptions of themselves as medical 
subjects and their overt rejection of traditional treatments. It concludes by illustrating 
how such statements can be interpreted as ciphers for the broader conflicts between 
the social, legal and moral frameworks to which these different medical paradigms 
belong.  
 
With access to treatment a dominant- if not the predominant- strand of the AIDS 
discourse, Chapter 7 uses interviewees’ responses to provide a practical context for 
an analysis of the altered dynamics of the traditional individual-State relationship, as 
effected by the proponents of access to antiretroviral therapy. These include the 
range of actors who constitute ‘civil society’, particularly NGOs, as well as overseas 
donors. The chapter begins with a background to the debate around access to 
treatment in Kenya, from the government’s slow and counterproductive initial 
response to the epidemic, to the mounting pressure exerted by campaigners for 
universal access to treatment and PLWHA rights in countries like Kenya, as well as 
rich, low-HIV prevalence ones. It then explores PLWHAs’ attitudes about the 
intervention of NGOs and overseas donors, interrogating how and on what basis 
recipients of ART may attribute responsibility for their healthcare on these actors, 
and how this in turn reconfigures their apportionment of responsibility to other 
actors, such as the State, who are more traditionally associated with the provision of 
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healthcare. The last part of chapter rationalizes the broad definition of the term ‘civil 
society’ adopted by this research and analyzes how the intervention of civil society is 
reshaping the dialogue between the State and the individual and reconfiguring the 
balance of power between them.  
 
Chapter 8, the last of the empirical chapters, provides a detailed analysis of PLWHAs’ 
responses in relation to rights and locates the broader human rights theories and 
debates. It starts by looking at the respondents’ general human rights awareness, 
comparing and contrasting it with a more widespread survey on similar issues 
conducted by the Kenya Human Rights Commission. The chapter then interrogates 
the three main themes which emerge from the PLWHAs’ responses about rights: 
humanness, dignity and citizenship. As the chapter illustrates, many interviewees 
often defined these fundamental human rights concepts from their unique 
perspective as PLWHAs, one which draws parallels with the rights struggles of other 
marginalized groups like women. The chapter then briefly identifies the importance 
of subjectivity to legal research. To this end, it examines the apparent contradictions 
and peculiarities of the legal subject, in whom theorists like Lacan saw no separation 
between inner aspects like identity and desire and outer ones like society and law. 
The chapter concludes by analyzing how the multiple subjectivities of PWLHAs and 
the competing moral frames of reference by which they live produce varying notions 
about health entitlements, the rights of the individual and the obligations of the State 
and other actors. It underlines the fact that while the human rights enterprise has 
made some strides in promoting its values, major challenges persist, primarily in the 
grassroots which remains largely unconverted.  
 
Finally, the conclusion draws together the key theses of the research, re-emphasizing 
the role of subjectivity, and the myriad elements of which it is constructed, appears 
to have on the formation of an individual’s notions of entitlement to health and other 
socio-economic goods. Further, it underscores how subjectivity may influence one’s 
sense of location in the broader socio-economic matrix, shaping individual 
assignment of obligations to fulfil such entitlements. But ultimately, as the research 
stresses, the nature, content and scope of these claims of entitlement, their moral 
basis and the language in which they seem to be articulated does not solely, or even 
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primarily, belong to human rights. Its normative system, as the conclusion points out, 
is only one moral framework, indeed, it appears, the least established, by which this 
research’s interviewees imagined and formulated their entitlement claims. Its 
advocates must not assume that human rights are generally taken for granted by 
laypeople. The conclusion stresses that campaigners will have to engage more deeply 
with laypeople and recognise and contend with the alternative normative paradigms 
by which those whom they aim to assist experience their lives. They must compete to 
promote and establish human rights values if they are to become the automatic 
language for laypeople to conceive of and express their grievances. As the conclusion 
affirms, only then can they hope to root human rights values in a real and lasting way 
among this pivotal constituency whose role and contribution to the wider success of 
the human rights enterprise is so often overlooked.   
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
While this chapter looks at the methodology used in this research, its analysis goes 
beyond this narrow if crucial remit and picks up on some critical themes introduced in 
the previous chapter, examining how they were reinforced during the process of 
conducting the research.  
 
The primary focus of the discussions in the chapter is the process of interviewing the 
49 PLWHAs whose responses are the foundation of this research. This aspect of the 
analysis separates the pre-interview, interview and post-interview phases. Thus 
organized, the chapter examines the challenges, limitations and opportunities, 
unexpected or otherwise, imposed by the subject matter. But the discussion of the 
interviewing process also illuminates a number of themes at the heart of the 
research. In particular, it enables a closer look at the role of HIV in the production of 
PLWHAs’ subjectivities and how the interviewer and interviewees played out roles 
informed largely by their knowledge and/or presumptions about the illness and those 
it affects. Additionally, the challenges of choosing the correct terms of reference and 
capturing and communicating, in two languages no less, the intended nuances sought 
by this research revealed much about the pivotal issues that this research is 
concerned with.  
 
Ultimately, by examining the interviewing process, this chapter is able to further the 
investigation of pivotal issues at the heart of this research: the construction of 
PLWHAs’ subjectivities and the struggle of the human rights language, its norms and 
its paradigm to become a reflexive frame of reference.  
 
I. General Sources 
This research focuses on how individual and collective PLWHAs’ notions of 
entitlement to healthcare and conceptualizations about rights are constructed, and 
the role of subjectivity in the internalization, or not, of the human rights norms which 
increasingly frame local and global discussions about the AIDS epidemic and 
treatment of PLWHAs. The 49 interviews conducted with Kenyan PLWHAs therefore 
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rightfully form the core of the research: they are pivotal to the analysis because they 
provide a window into the perceptions of Kenyan PLWHAs. Indeed, the very process 
of organizing and carrying out the interviews not only highlighted many of the 
fundamental issues that this research is substantively concerned with, but was itself 
arguably a live and protracted demonstration of how prevailing notions about AIDS 
intrude on the research in this area and sometimes mould or  reaffirm PLWHAs’ 
subjectivities. The process of conducting these interviews will thus be discussed in 
much detail shortly. 
 
Firstly, however, other crucial aspects of the research must be acknowledged. These 
include a semi-structured interview with Maina Kiai, co-founder and former director 
of the pioneering civil society human rights organization in Kenya, the Kenya Human 
Rights Commission (KHRC). At the time of the interview, on 26th May 2004, Kiai was 
the chairman of the new, statutorily-constituted national human rights institution, 
the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). His input provided a 
context for, and firsthand account of, the development of a key example of human 
activism in the country and enabled me to put direct questions to a key figure in this 
movement about the status of socio-economic rights in the government and civil 
society human rights agenda. Further, he was able to respond to follow-up questions 
on pertinent issues such as the role of the media and civic education in nurturing a 
public consciousness about rights, all of which came up organically in the course of 
the interview. Interviews were sought with persons at other key organizations, too, in 
particular the KHRC itself, as it remains a preeminent actor in human rights advocacy 
in the country. However, my contacts here were unable or unwilling to make the time 
to conduct an interview, referring me instead to the KHRC website, which I had access 
to anyway and which was unlikely to provide the personal insights which would have 
been more useful to this research. Indeed, this became the trend with other 
interviewees: while a number of NGOs and institutions were contacted in the hope of 
providing interviews or further contacts for interviewing, only those who responded 
and did so positively within the limited timeframe of the fieldwork were interviewed. 
As such, as will be seen later, in addition to Maina Kiai, the organization WOFAK, 7 of 
its clients, Mbagathi District Hospital (MDH) and 42 of its HIV patients were 
interviewed. 
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This primary research was supported by the wealth of secondary research, mainly 
desk-based and consisting of grey literature from a number of government agencies, 
NGOs and UN agencies active in the relevant fields.1 Further, archival research of the 
print and electronic media in Kenya illuminated aspects of the local public debate on 
HIV and human rights-related issues and the social, cultural and political context of 
this research, and provided references for some events cited by respondents. There 
were, however, some gaps: for instance, it was not always possible to access 
complete, up-to-date and consistent data on employment numbers, wages and 
income, or consumer price indices for particular periods from the institution charged 
with collecting and distributing it, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS).2 
This was because that data was not consistently uploaded or updated on their 
website, which was the most convenient way for the researcher to access it remotely.  
 
II. The PLWHA Interviews:  
a) General Points 
Before embarking on an analysis of the interview process itself, some general points 
must be made which have a bearing on the overall research.  
 
i. Qualitative, not Quantitative  
The qualitative nature of this research means that the interviews conducted for it 
were intended to inform and provide insights into discussions about PLWHAs’ notions 
of health-related entitlements and rights. As such, although this research often links 
them with related studies or findings elsewhere, using them to support or challenge, 
compare or contrast ideas therein, the interviewees’ comments stand on their own 
                                                 
1
 Some of these sources, however, particularly those that take the form of policy statements or 
documents, come with a health warning, as Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall note in their analysis of 
rights-based approaches across the development industry. For though they can provide useful insights 
into an organization’s approach on particular issues, “policy statements have different resonance in 
different parts of an organisation, and cannot in themselves be taken as evidence of a shift in approach 
or practice across the agency as a whole even when this is the declared intention of the policy.... [T]he 
presentational- even performative- uses of policies may exaggerate the gap between ideals and actual 
daily practice, especially when parallel agendas and processes co-exist within different parts of the 
organisation.” (Nyamu-Musembi, Celestine and Cornwall, Andrea, ‘What is the ‘Rights-Based 
Approach’ All About? Perspectives from International Development Agencies,’ IDS Working Paper 234 
(Institute of Development Studies (IDS): Brighton, Sussex, November, 2004), at 14)  
2
 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) website, at http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.html, accessed 
10/02/09. 
 71 
 
and in suggesting how interviews conceptualize and articulate health entitlements 
and rights they add a unique dimension to the analyses in this research as well as 
provide new avenues for thought. The research is always careful to qualify any 
conclusions it may draw based on interviewees’ comments, and seeks to clarify that 
the views expressed by PLWHAs in these interviews are not aimed at making 
generalizations which can be extrapolated to other Kenyan PLWHAs, let alone the 
wider population. The respondents’ comments can therefore only provide 
indications, albeit strong ones at times, about some of the ideas which exist on the 
issues they discuss.     
 
ii. Accommodating the Lapse of Time 
Because they were undertaken in 2004, it might be suggested that the interviews 
offer snapshots of (possibly prevailing) opinions from only a transitory period in 
Kenya’s contemporary history. From this viewpoint, the time lapse may limit the 
interviews’ value even as it suggests new, interesting avenues for investigation. A 
couple of points must be clarified in relation to this: firstly, there was a time lapse of 
about 9 years between the interviewing process and the presentation of the research, 
due to unprecedented delays caused by the researcher’s other academic and 
teaching obligations. Secondly, however, the interviews were transcribed, processed 
and analyzed immediately after they were conducted (in April and May 2004) in order 
to create a full and accurate record of the information therein. Thirdly, further 
analysis during the write-up enabled the interviewees’ responses to be located within 
the context of different phases in the country’s recent history. For instance, the 
period before 2004, the year the interviews were conducted, provides the context for 
the fight for ARV treatment which the interviewees were referencing, in particular 
the government’s efforts, or lack thereof, in relation to this. Meanwhile, the period in 
early 2004 during which the interviews took place provided a background to 
responses such as those relating to opinions about cost of ARV medication, and 
media reports about popular rights issues of the time. Further, the 5-year period 
between 2005 and 2010, bookends the well-publicized constitutional debates 
preceding the referenda of these two years. This period also encompasses the 
widespread ethnic violence that followed the December 2007 general elections and 
the promulgation of the new Kenyan constitution. And finally the research also 
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references additional data between this period and 2012, when the research was first 
presented, which particularly takes into account updates on HIV data and related 
findings, but also mentions the ongoing trials at the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
of key figures cited as perpetrators of the post-poll violence, two of whom are now 
the country’s president and vice-president, for crimes against humanity3.  
 
It is important to acknowledge these different phases in the cycle of the research, and 
how they have shaped the analysis in the years subsequent to the interviews. To be 
sure, there have been some significant developments, particularly around issues of 
HIV/AIDS and rights. For instance, the interviews were conducted only 5 years after 
the Kenyan government took the symbolic but important tentative first step of 
declaring HIV/AIDS a national disaster. And despite uneven and sub-optimal 
implementation, the State has since made significant headway in crucial areas such as 
greater access to ARVs, not least because of pressure from PLWHA advocacy groups. 
There has also been increased government and the general public awareness about 
the health and human rights issues affecting PLWHAs, as well as the structural factors 
which exacerbate vulnerability to HIV infection at national and global levels.  
 
Further, the Constitutional referenda of 2005 and 2010 entailed public debate and 
countrywide civic education exercises, and similarly the violent elections and 
aftermath of 2007/8 brought human rights issues particularly to the fore. Indeed, the 
ICC trials are a live and hotly-debated issue.4 As such, there may be greater public 
awareness about human rights issues as well as shifts in opinions about the role of 
the State in a multiethnic society where people have alternative political, social and 
moral allegiances. I have utilized more recent quantitative and qualitative data on 
                                                 
3
 See, for instance, The Sunday Nation, ‘Road to The Hague: ICC Debate- Uhuru and Ruto Dispel Fears 
of Power Vacuum as ICC ate Beckons’, 8
th
 September 2013. 
4
 See, for instance, International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘OTP Press Conference on Kenya, Prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo’s Statement, 1 April 2010,’ I.C.C. Press Release, 1
st
 April 2010, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/6B518FB1-C68F-405A-887C-19CEACF91C05.htm, accessed 12/08/10; Wa Ngugi, 
Kiriro, ‘Let’s Choose Peace Over Justice in ICC Case’, The Daily Nation, 22
nd
 February 2011; The Daily 
Nation, ‘Distant Dutch City Looms Large in Our Political and Electoral Future,’ 19
th
 February 2011; The 
Daily Nation, ‘Kenya Petitions UN Organ to Delay Trials’, 10
th
 February 2011; The Daily Nation, ‘Uhuru 
Says Hague Case “Political”’, 8
th
 February 2011; The Daily Nation,  ‘Imanyara Pushes for Another 
Attempt at Kenya Tribunal’, 5
th
 February 2011; wa Ngugi, Wanjiku, ‘This is Impunity, the Usual Kenyan 
style’, The Daily Nation, 7
th
 February 2011; Wanzala, Ouma, ‘Film on Poll Chaos to be Screened’, The 
Daily Nation, 7
th
 February 2011. 
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human rights and health-related issues, such as the aforementioned Haki Index and 
the KDHS reports, in an attempt to account for these developments.  
 
But this lag does not make the interviews themselves redundant or invalidate the 
opinions therein. Indeed, the subsequent developments allow speculation about the 
protean nature of notions about entitlements and rights and the effects of social, 
economic and political upheaval on the citizen-subject’s relationship with the State. 
 
Also, the interviews are inherently unique due to the special group of respondents 
they feature, that is, people living with HIV/AIDS, whose particular health concerns it 
is argued gives them a distinctive perspective on rights issues. Their contribution to 
the wider discourse on health and human rights is undiminished by (this) time.  
 
Last but not least, the responses often reflect entrenched beliefs, values and 
concerns and it is unlikely that these have shifted significantly, if at all, since the 
interviews were conducted. Moreover, many of them are also still contemporary in 
the general discourse on rights. 
 
iii. Whose Notions of Entitlements and Rights Are They Anyway? 
As will be seen in more detail later in this chapter when the sequencing of the 
interview questions is addressed in detail, in the first part of their interviews the 
respondents for this research were asked to comment on their health requirements, 
to whom they attributed the duty to meet these needs, and why. In the second they 
were asked more precise questions about their knowledge of rights generally, and 
depending on how the interview progressed they were also asked to comment on a 
right to healthcare more specifically. As such, it is important to address the extent to 
which by explicitly raising the issue of rights I, as the interviewer, arguably ushered 
the respondents into a social context dominated by the rights discourse in which they 
were led to confirm their familiarity with, and knowledge of, rights. This issue is 
perhaps given added importance by the fact of my background, outlined at the start 
of Chapter 1 and again at the end of this chapter, as a rights academic and more 
specifically as a PLWHA rights activist, which suggests a vested interest. It rightly 
raises the question of how many interviewees would otherwise have described their 
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experience of living with HIV/AIDS in terms of rights had they not been briefed that 
the interview was on health and rights (if not a right to health(care) more specifically, 
as was the case for the handful with whom the questioning got this far, as will be 
explained later in the chapter).  
 
The role of a researcher- any researcher- in defining the parameters of discussion 
within her research, its terms of reference, and so on, is indisputable. However, it is 
not the intention of this research to wrongly infer from interviewees’ responses 
knowledge of, or an adherence to, the human rights normative framework. Indeed, as 
this research stresses in Chapter 1 and throughout the thesis, the evidence from the 
interviews largely suggests that interviewees used different normative frames of 
reference when describing their experiences as PLWHAs. Moreover, it can be argued 
that it would be too simplistic to view interviewees as mere objects, entirely lacking 
in agency, during the interviewing process, despite the unequal power dynamics that 
may be at play between interviewer and interviewee. Thus any analysis of their role 
in this exchange must appreciate their ability to independently introduce and 
reinterpret the ideas discussed, and in so doing shape the dialogue.  
 
Indeed many interviewees did make voluntary, explicit references to terms or 
concepts commonly associated with human rights, and often did so unbidden by the 
interviewer. The most obvious ones were references to “stigma”, “discrimination” 
and “equality”, all of them now a familiar part of the HIV/AIDS lexicon, and all of 
them concepts in the human rights dialogue and popularized within this framework. 
They have become key components in the vocabulary which is commonly used to 
describe the experiences of PLWHAs, to the extent that it can be argued that a term 
like stigma, for instance, owes its popular usage in Kenya today solely because of its 
application in the HIV/AIDS discourse. These terms are often featured in media 
reports about these PLWHAs’ issues and it is not surprising to hear PLWHAs use them 
in the interviews. Further, it should not be surprising that PLWHAs may demonstrate 
a familiarity with rights-related terms and concepts which predates their contact with 
this researcher, given the likelihood, as some attested, that many in their number had 
previous contact with other interviewers as well PLWHA rights campaigners. The level 
of attention given to HIV/AIDS in Kenya and around the world in the late 1990s and 
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2000s means that the PLWHA constituency was a particular target of human rights 
discussions and activism. Some interviewees for this research even spoke of interview 
fatigue among some in their number. As such, the interviews conducted by this 
researcher will not have been the first time that some respondents will have thought 
of, described or heard their experience of HIV/AIDS described in terms of often 
associated with the human rights discourse.  
 
This explicit and voluntary usage of terms like ‘stigma’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘equality’ 
will be discussed particularly in  Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, where, as will be see, many 
PLWHAs employed these terms to describe aspects of their treatment in the 
workplace, in health institutions, at home, and so on. Indeed, it is primarily on the 
basis of such data that this research suggests a link may be made between PLWHAs’ 
experience of HIV/AIDS and their perceptions of and attitudes to their illness and 
their conceptualization of entitlements and rights. It argues that further inferences 
about how HIV/AIDS may affect PLWHAs’ notions of entitlements may be drawn from 
other data where interviewees appeared to suggest that their own perceptions of 
HIV/AIDS, which sometimes hinted at self-stigmatization, as well as their sensitivity to 
their families’ and friends’ attitudes to it, may affect the demands they felt they could 
make on them in relation to meeting their health needs. These discussions may be 
seen in Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 8. 
 
Thus  this research cannot ignore in its analysis the argument that the familiarity with 
or voluntary invocation by a number of PLWHAs’ of vocabulary and concepts often 
associated with the intersecting  human rights and HIV/AIDS discourses  suggests 
some pre-existing awareness of human rights among them. Explicitly connecting the 
use of these terms to the framework to which they belong in the analysis is by no 
means an argument that any interviewee who employs them conceptualizes her 
experience of HIV/AIDS solely- or even largely- in terms of rights, or that she 
exemplifies a coherent or consistent human rights analysis of her illness. Indeed, this 
research argues that it is other frameworks of reference which appear to dominate 
PLWHAs’ narratives of their AIDS experience.  
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And it is in recognition of this that  this research applies caution or restraint in any 
inferences it makes based on the data about interviewees’ internalization of human 
rights terms and norms, or the links between their illness and their conceptualization 
of entitlements. It maintains this restraint even as it notes that Kenya, as with every 
corner of the globe today, has not been untouched by the human rights project. The 
fingerprints that attest to this contact may indeed be discerned in some comments by 
PLWHAs, but even then this research disputes throughout the notion of the pre-
eminence of the human rights framework in the conceptualization and articulation of 
claims and entitlements by PLWHAs.  
 
The issue of access to medicine or treatment as a right is illustrative of this, as this 
chapter will explain in more detail later. For while medicine or treatment was one of 
the requirements most commonly raised by interviews at the start of their interviews, 
few went on to suggest it was a right, and among these some appeared to have 
drawn such connections on the spot, which, while not invalidating the interviewees’ 
beliefs, may raise concerns that such views were influenced by the process of the 
interview itself and the presence of the interviewer and the questions she was asking. 
 
But there were few such occurrences. As such, while the researcher must 
acknowledge explicitly raising the topic of rights, there are overwhelming reasons to 
believe that this does not diminish or invalidate the unique and important findings of 
this research.  
 
iv.  Of Deviations and Dual Objectives 
The validity of the interviews and their findings notwithstanding, this research must 
address an inherent tension in the methodological approach which stemmed from 
the scope of its ambitions. For in seeking to maximize the rare opportunity that 
conducting these interviews presented, the interviews attempted to combine two 
objectives: that of investigating PLWHAs’ subjectivities generally, and that of seeking 
more specific information about respondents’ knowledge relating to rights. In the 
pursuit of these twin objectives, the method of collecting information encounters a 
tension: to achieve the first objective, it must maximize the parameters and method 
of its inquiry in order to give respondents the widest possible space to expound on 
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issues like stigmatization, which are generated inter-subjectively through social 
interaction. In its contemporaneous pursuit of the second, however, it must impose 
some parameters in order to try and extract opinions about a very specific topic. 
 
It is these tensions that are manifested in the interview questions and method, in the 
interviewer’s concerns about deviations from the topic at hand, and in the selection 
of a semi-structured interviewing process. As will be seen shortly, the design of the 
interview questions attempts to encapsulate the two issues that the researcher is 
trying to learn by separating the questioning into two sections: the first deals with 
general questions about PLWHAs’ self-identified health requirements and so on, 
while the second asks specific questions about rights. The first part allows the 
interviewees the freedom that the accomplishment of its objectives demands; having 
set this standard, the second then has to focus the respondents’ attentions on more 
specific issues, employing techniques such as filters, and remaining alert to situations 
where the respondents might digress or evade the questions, concerns which by and 
large do not affect the first section of questions. This dual aim which the interviews 
seek to achieve, then, is the essence of the freedom-control dynamic displayed in the 
methodology. 
 
In spite of these tensions, it must be reiterated, the interviewer’s aim is always to 
learn from the interviewees, and the issues of vested interests noted earlier 
notwithstanding, this is precisely what this research achieves. Further, it is the 
argument here that the interviews not only produce valid results but that each 
section overwhelmingly succeeds in its task. Indeed, one of the main successes of this 
research, which comes from interpreting the combined findings of the two parts of 
the interviews, is the evidence that the while experts make automatic linkages 
between the health needs of PLWHAs and human rights obligations, many PLWHAs 
do not. This has important ramifications for the conceptualization of the rights as the 
preeminent framework for articulating and characterizing socio-economic 
deprivation. Moreover, there is much to credit in the idea that rare opportunities to 
conduct crucial fieldwork must be maximized, especially when the subjects in 
question are often driven into the shadows by the stigma of their illness, and when 
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the issues on which they are being asked to comment are those, like human rights, 
about which the opinions of laypeople are so rarely sought.  
 
These important points aside, however, this researcher concedes that there is a 
lesson to be leant in the methodological consequences of the enthusiasm she 
displayed here: for should another such interviewing opportunity present itself, it will 
be worth separating one’s objectives so that one does not seek to achieve in one 
sitting worthy aims which nevertheless have methodological implications. This avid 
researcher must, and does, acknowledge this valuable lesson.   
 
v. Interviewees’ Demographic Information  
Before analyzing the interviewing exercise, below is a table which provides a snapshot 
of the sociological profiles of the interviewees who eventually participated in the 
process. It contains information about their sex, age at the time of the interview, the 
year when the interviewee was diagnosed with HIV, the interviewee’s educational 
background, employment status at the time of the interview, the language(s) in which 
the interview was conducted and the organization or institution with which the 
interviewee was associated and under whose auspices the interview was conducted.
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Int.1 Sex Age2 Year 
Diag.3  
Education (No. of yrs 
completed) 
Employment 
status at the 
time of the 
interview 
Language 
in which 
interview 
was 
conducted 
Participating 
organization or 
institution 
where 
interview was 
conducted 
    Pri. Sec. Tert.    
Int. 1 F 31 1998 8 4 0 Unemployed English WOFAK4 
Int. 2 F 41 1996 7 4 ? (attended 
college) 
Unemployed English WOFAK 
Int. 3 M 44 1994 7 4 0 Unemployed English WOFAK 
Int. 4 F 34 1995 8 4 0 Self-
employed 
English WOFAK 
Int. 5 F 32 2002 8 4 ? (attended 
college) 
Unemployed English WOFAK 
Int. 6 M 33 2001 8 4 4 Employed English WOFAK 
Int. 7 F 24 2001 8 4 0 Unemployed Kiswahili WOFAK 
Int. 8 F 31 2004 8 4 0 Unemployed English MDH HIV 
Clinic5 
Int. 9 F 32 2000 8 4 2 Employed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
10 
F 45 2000 7 4 1 Employed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
11 
F 28 2003 8 4 4 Unemployed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
12 
F 44 1991 3 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
13 
M 32 2003 8 4 6 Student English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
14 
F 42 1999 7 6 3 Employed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
15 
F 28 1998 8 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
16 
F 30 1996 8 4 ? (attended 
university; 
studies 
uncomplet
ed) 
Self-
employed 
English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
17 
F 33 1999 7 4 ? (attended 
college) 
 English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
18 
F 40 1999 3 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
19 
F 44 2000 7 2 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH6 
Int. 
20 
F 38 1998 7 7 4 0 Unemployed 
(volunteer)8 
English MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
21 
M 32 2004 8 4 0 Unemployed English/Kis
wahili 
MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
22 
M 44 1997 ? 
(atten
ded) 
? 
(atten
ded) 
0 Employed Kiswahili/E
nglish 
MSF HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
23 
M 36 2004 7 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. M 38 2003 7 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
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24 
Int. 
25 
F 38 1996 7 4 0 Unemployed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
26 
M 36 2003 7 4 0 Self-
employed 
English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
27 
F ? (f)9 2003 ? (f) ? (f) ? (f) Employed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
28 
F 52 1987 7 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
29 
F 50 1992 2 0 0 Unemployed 
(volunteer) 
Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
30 
M 44 2000 7 4 0 Employed Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
31 
F 44 2002 7 6 4 Employed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
32 
M 36 2001 7 4 0 Self-
employed 
English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
33 
F 63 2002 4 0 0 Self-
employed 
Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
34 
M 50 2003 ? (f) ? (f) ? (f) Employed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
35 
F 32 2000 8 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
36 
F 41 1997 7 4 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
37 
F 40 1997 7 0 0 Unemployed Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
38 
F 31 2003 8 4 ? (attended 
college) 
Unemployed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
39 
M 41 2003 7 6 0 Unemployed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
40 
F 45 2003 7 2 0 Self-
employed 
Kiswahili MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
41 
F 35 1996 7 0 0 Unemployed 
(volunteer) 
Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
42 
F 32 2001 8 4 ? (attended 
college) 
Unemployed Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
43 
F 36 2003 5 0 0 Self-
employed 
Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
44 
M 39 1994 7 0 0 Self-
employed 
Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. 
45 
M 50 2001 7 6 ? (attended 
medical 
training 
school) 
Unemployed English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
46 
F ? (f) 2004 7 0 0 ? (f) English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
47 
F 31 2000 8 4 ? (attended 
college) 
Self-
employed 
English MDH HIV Clinic 
Int. 
48 
F 38 1997 7 4 Ongoing Student English MSF Belgium 
HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
Int. F 44 2003 7 1 0 Self- Kiswahili MSF Belgium 
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49 employed HIV Clinic, 
MDH 
 
1 Interview number 
2 Age at the time the interview was conducted. This was calculated by subtracting the interviewee's stated birth 
year from 2004 (the year the interviews were conducted), with the assumption, unless an interviewee provided a 
month and/or a date of birth, that the interviewee was born on the 1st of January of their stated birth year. 
3 Year interviewee was diagnosed with HIV 
4 WOFAK: Women Fighting AIDS in Kenya, Nairobi 
5 MDH HIV Clinic: Mbagathi District Hospital HIV Clinic, Nairobi 
6 MSF Belgium HIV Clinic, MDH: Médicins Sans Frontières HIV Clinic at MDH 
7 Disclosed 1998 as the year she "started living positively"; declining to disclose date when she learnt/was given a 
clinical HIV diagnosis. 
8 (Volunteer): Interviewee volunteered with an HIV organization, for which she received some remuneration or 
material return. The interviewee self-designated their volunteer work as their occupation.  
9 (f): Fault with audio-recording device, which meant the data here was not captured and was thus missing during 
the transcription process. 
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b) Pre-interview 
i. Interview Structure and Style 
Structured interviewing was initially selected as the format most suitable to allow 
PLWHAs to consider the very specific issues which part of this research tackles while 
allowing the interviewer to monitor the direction that the interviews took.5 Pre-
determined questions allow interviewees, for instance, to engage with the nuances of 
human rights and the ideas associated with them. However, I also was conscious that 
due to the sensitivity of some questions, particularly those relating to HIV/AIDS, I 
could influence the nature and order of questions but not necessarily the nature, 
depth or length of responses offered. And this, in any case, as mentioned earlier, may 
not be desirable in an exercise which seeks to investigate the subjectivities of 
respondents. This is indeed the approach I was inclined to adopt, a relaxed manner 
with the interviewee as long as the main question was addressed. As such, the 
resulting approach was a semi-structured approach, in light of the dual objectives of 
the interviews discussed earlier, which was able to accommodate those interviewees 
who might consider the interviewing process cathartic. For example, at the end of his 
session, interviewee 34, asked if he had anything to add, replied: “Personally, I feel 
that the interviews that one has, especially on one’s care, are very important because 
they assist not only the interviewer but also other people who might need to the 
know the problem others face... So I feel happy with this kind of interview, that there 
someone who is caring for others, not only for me but for the others in future.” This 
relaxed stance, it was considered, might bring balance to an interviewing technique 
criticized for subordinating the respondent and imposing an “unnatural” relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee.6 However, as mentioned earlier, whether the 
interviewing process can ever be a fair exchange or entirely meet interviewees’ 
expectations is questionable, and was highlighted by interviewee 48, who alluded to 
interview-fatigue among PLWHAs and expressed disappointment about how the end-
product of research was utilized. She appeared to have participated in other similar 
processes saying:  
                                                 
5
 Burgess, Robert G., In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research (London: Unwin Hyman, 1984), at 
101 
6
 ibid. See also Oakley, Ann, The Sociology of Housework (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) at 226 and 228 
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You know we’ve been interviewed by so many people and then we get discouraged. I 
don’t know if you realized that I was very reluctant because I just think we’re fed up 
with the so many interviews. They are not benefiting us. They are benefiting you 
because you’re the one who wants to get the information. Because you’re supposed 
to interview me and come back to me and tell me, ‘this is what is happening’. But 
what happens is that you people come, interview us and disappear. You only look for 
us when that need arises. I hope I haven’t been hard on you. 
 
As my findings remain unpublicized beyond my small academic team, her ‘interview-
and-disappear’ prediction appears accurate; however, I hope to correct this once the 
research is complete, and indeed feel duty-bound to do so. 
 
A looser approach to interviewing also enabled me to take advantage of unexpected 
opportunities for data collection. For instance, where interviewees deviated 
somewhat from the expected response particularly in relation to the human rights 
section of the questions, it was sometimes possible to glean a considerable amount of 
relevant but unsought information; a prime example of this will be seen in the next 
section when the design of the interview questions is analyzed. Such material 
contributed significantly to the general context. Further, this approach proved 
beneficial where it became necessary to adapt my framing of specific questions in 
order to help a respondent engage with the essential aspect of a question.7 It indeed 
suited the complex and multi-layered subject of this research and it is the style that 
Lee Harvey is arguably advocating when he warns that “[p]rescribing in advance how 
to collect data inhibits the research endeavour.”8 
 
In addition to the structured questions, I also decided to conduct my interviews face-
to-face. One clear benefit of this was that it allows the interviewer to rectify 
immediately any misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the questions. Moreover, 
this more personal approach lent itself best to the sensitive subject matter, allowing 
researcher and interviewee to form a bond, however short-lived, which may in turn 
                                                 
7
 For instance, when asking interviewees to consider the practical benefits of having a right to 
healthcare, I would try and get them to think of the question less abstractly: often I would rephrase it 
by saying, “If I came to you and told you, ‘Jane, you have right to healthcare,’ do you think there would 
be any practical benefits in this for you?”. This was partly to emphasize the desired individual 
perspective. Also, I was hoping to emphasize that what I was looking for was their response to a 
statement like that when there may be nothing more in the way of action or deeds to back it up. In this 
sense, one may argue that I was giving such a question a very specific interpretation but it was the one 
I wanted respondents to consider and I sometimes felt that this emphasis brought me closer to that 
objective. 
8
 Harvey, Lee, Critical Social Research (London : Unwin Hyman, 1990) at 8 
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encourage the latter to respond more fully and openly.9 Even some of the suggested 
disadvantages this method proved well-suited to interviews with PLWHAs, because 
while it may require more time and resources than, say, telephone or email 
interviewing, the addition to the process of what Judd, et al, call “interviewer effects” 
can be utilized positively.10 For example, they suggest that the rapport that may 
develop between interviewer and interviewee, which enhances data quality, may also 
induce the interviewee to submit responses which they perceive will fulfil the 
researcher’s expectations or personal characteristics, such as sex. However, this risk 
can be managed and indeed manipulated to work in the interviewer’s favour: for 
instance, although my interview questions never asked how an interviewee had 
contracted the HIV virus, some interviewees, almost all of them women, volunteered 
this information. In all these cases, the infection had happened through sexual 
contact with their partners, and in one through rape. It is unlikely that interviewees 
would have offered such information to a male researcher yet such information, 
despite being surplus to the interview’s requirements, offered a unique insight into 
the complex psychosocial effects of HIV/AIDS from the perspective of the infected 
person and provided the context for a key strand in my analysis. Other researchers 
have written about similar advantages especially in studies where sex or ethnicity is a 
key element.11 
 
This latter element, of especial interest in a multi-ethnic country like Kenya and 
analyzed more broadly throughout this research, deserves further comment in 
relation to the conduct of the interviews. The interviewers were not asked to disclose 
their ethnic identities because ethnicity has often been an inflammatory subject in 
Kenyan socio-political interactions and I was concerned that if an interviewee was 
explicitly asked to disclose this information she might at best wonder about the 
                                                 
9
 But as researchers such as Ann Oakley point out, however, that there is a fine balance to be struck 
between being “friendly but not too friendly.” For a successful interview “must have all the warmth of 
a personality exchange of a conversation with the clarity and guidelines of scientific research....[t]he 
contradiction at the heart of the textbook paradigm is that interviewing necessitates the manipulation 
of interviewees as objects of study/sources of data, but this can only be achieved via a certain amount 
of humane treatment. If the interviewee does not believe that he/she is being kindly and 
sympathetically treated by the interviewer, then he/she will not consent to be studied and will not 
come up with the desired information.” (Oakley, Ann, Housewife (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), at 
222 and 223 
10
 Judd, Charles M.; Smith, Eliot R.; and Kidder, Louise H., Research Methods in Social Relations 
(Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 1991), at 219 
11
 See, for instance, Burgess (n 5), at 104 
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relevance of this information in the context of an interview ostensibly about HIV and 
human rights, and at worst assume that the interviewer meant to draw certain, 
possibly negative, conclusions from this detail. An explicit question about ethnicity 
may also cause the interviewee to wonder about my own ethnic identity (she perhaps 
viewing such disclosure as reciprocal) and how, were it to be provided, its 
correspondence or difference with her own might influence the information she 
chose to provide, how she provided it, or my interpretation of the information she 
provided, as well as her opinion of me or indeed my opinion of her. All in all, I 
concluded that any inquiry into an interviewee’s ethnic identity would taint the 
interviewer-interviewee interaction and thus be counterproductive.  
 
It must be noted, though, that sometimes interviewees did bring up the issue of 
ethnicity unbidden, and when this happened and their comments were significant to 
the wider discussion with which this research deals, this was noted and the 
comments analyzed. It must also be mentioned, of course, that a speaker’s ethnic 
identity may become obvious to the listener based on her pronunciation of English or 
Kiswahili words. A more explicit revelation of an interviewee’s ethnic identity 
occurred in the case of one respondent (discussed later in this chapter in note 35) 
who, struggling with answering her questions in English or Kiswahili, resorted to her 
ethnic mother-tongue, which her daughter then translated. However, I was not 
conscious of such information having any personal bearing on the process of 
interviewing any respondents, and certainly not in the analysis of the information 
collected from them.   
 
 
ii. (In)Access and AIDS 
Conducting interviews with PLWHAs in Kenya posed certain in-built challenges; the 
issue of gaining access cannot therefore be dealt with cursorily, as some studies have 
tended to do.12 While the last few years have seen greater willingness by the 
                                                 
12
 ibid., at 38. Burgess gives an example of his own research experience in a school: “First… access is 
not a straightforward procedure. Indeed, in the school, different approaches had to be made to 
individuals at different levels in the organisation. Access, therefore, involved negotiation and 
renegotiation. Secondly, that access influenced the kind of investigation that could be done and the 
position that I could take. Finally, that access occurred throughout the research process and as such 
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government and the media to highlight the plight of PLWHAs, AIDS–related stigma13 
is still common, stemming largely from prevalent sexual and gender norms. Certain 
sexual behaviours, as well as intravenous drug use14, an emerging route of HIV 
transmission in Kenya, are frowned upon. Stigma is central to understanding how the 
psychosocial aspects of HIV/AIDS, the construction of subjectivities and the 
development of notions of entitlements intersect. Susan Sontag explored this theme, 
asserting that “the unsafe behaviour that produces AIDS is judged to be more than 
just weakness. It is indulgence, delinquency…”15 An individual’s HIV status, real or 
imagined, may lead to unfair treatment and thus stigma leads to discrimination. 
Many PLWHAs therefore prefer to keep their HIV status secret, making harder the 
task of identifying and interviewing them; indeed, several of my eventual 
interviewees articulated their ongoing concerns about stigma. One female 
respondent, interviewee 11, illustrated both her personal experience of stigma and 
discrimination as well as a lucid awareness of its source:  
For one, if you look at HIV-positive person, everyone looks at them like an immoral 
person. They’ve forgotten that they could be born with it, they could have tampered 
with some razorblade or sharp object, it could have been a rape, blood transfusion, 
but because the society is not educated about it, everyone perceives you as an 
immoral person. So you become an outcast…. When they see you, they say, “That 
one is immoral; she moves around with a lot of men.” You really need to have strong 
character to get out of that kind of a state and stay positive. Also, about HIV victims 
who don’t want to talk about it because of the kind of society we have- I have 
preached in so many places myself but I had heard people say, ‘oh, this is a Christian. 
She used to preach to us but it seems she was also immoral.’   
 
The question was therefore how to gain access to willing PLWHAs who were 
sufficiently confident to disclose their HIV status to a relative stranger, and who could 
also candidly relate what were likely to be painful or bitter experiences, as 
demonstrated by interviewee 11, cited above. The plan was to speak to between 
forty and fifty PLWHAs, a sample size large enough to offer the possibility of varied 
                                                                                                                                             
generated other problems involved in doing field research (that is, selecting interviewees and 
observing situations).” (at 45) 
13
 The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS, defines stigma as a “‘process of 
devaluation’ of people either living with or associated with HIV/AIDS.” (UNAIDS, UNAIDS Fact-sheet: 
Stigma and Discrimination, 2003, at http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/publications/fact-
sheets03/fs_stigma_discrimination_en_pdf.htm, accessed 25th November 2003) This issue is dealt 
with in greater detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
14
 ibid. 
15
 Sontag, Susan, AIDS and Its Metaphors (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), at 25. 
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and illuminating views on the relevant issues while still accommodating the limited 
time and resources at my disposal.  
 
Given the possible shortage of willing interviewees, the most expedient method was, 
and indeed proved to be, interviewing any and all those interviewees to whom my 
contacts introduced me and who agreed to participate in the study. This meant that 
interviewees of any background or characteristic might be included. However, as will 
be detailed shortly, the vast majority of interviews took place at a hospital which 
catered for many residents of the nearby informal settlement or slum, Kibera, Africa’s 
largest.16 This may account for the overwhelming proportion of respondents who 
alluded to a low-income background. There were no explicit questions on income or 
earnings, which, though useful, might have created more complications than they 
were worth.17 Respondents were instead asked whether they were currently 
employed, although many also referred generally to the (often dire) state of their 
finances.  
 
There were certain benefits, imposed arbitrarily by prevailing circumstances, in 
talking to respondents who had possibly experienced poverty, but any resulting 
advantages were nevertheless accidental. As is often the case, the location of my 
research broadly pivoted on the places or institutions I was best able to establish 
contacts and obtain permission to conduct my research.18 Fundamentally, given the 
requirement of PLWHAs and the fact that, despite assumptions, HIV infection cannot 
instantly and conclusively be diagnosed from sight, I had to target places where I was 
certain of finding PLWHAs who were aware of their HIV status. 
 
iii. Research and Ethics 
Hospitals and clinics were the most obvious places where PLWHAs might go for 
treatment; however, these institutions have acquired reputations for unwieldy 
                                                 
16
 See BBC, ‘Nairobi slum life: Escaping Kibera,’ 15
th
 October 2002, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2297279.stm , accessed 1st September 2010. 
17
 Among my concerns was that respondents would not always have had a ready answer to this, 
especially for those with unsteady sources of income; that they may be regard the matter as private; 
and that they may provide the answer which they feel is least likely to jeopardize the possible receipt 
of remuneration, which may be an expectation particularly among those who may have been through 
a similar process. See note 26 below.  
18
 Burgess (n 5), at 59 
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bureaucracies and tardiness in granting permissions for research. This is perhaps 
especially true of government establishments: in a preliminary inquiry about a typical 
process, a member of the administration staff MDH in Nairobi, where the vast 
majority of the interviews (42) were eventually conducted, was emphatic that proper 
procedures, beginning with permission from Kenya’s Ministry of Health to conduct 
the research, be followed for the sake of the hospital’s reputation as well as the 
protection of patients’ privacy.19 Thus there appeared to be at least three layers of 
access and consent: the Ministry of Health, MDH and the potential interviewees 
themselves.   
 
While delays in gaining approval for research can be criticized and need not be the 
consequence of thorough checks, such safeguards are imperative to protect already 
vulnerable interviewees. Indeed, there have been highly publicized incidents 
questioning the government’s ability to do this, especially when the institutions in 
questions are based overseas. One such case,  mentioned by at least one interviewee, 
involved allegations of irregularities surrounding research conducted by Oxford 
University on residents at Nairobi’s Nyumbani Children’s Home, an orphanage for 
AIDS orphans.20  
 
After my initial contact with the Ministry of Health, I was assured that this was the 
only permission required at ministerial level to conduct my research at MDH, 
although it is often the case that further permission may be required from the 
Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology. The Ministry of Health’s 
permission was obtained on 5th April 2004 following a number of abortive meetings 
with the official in charge, and was granted subject to conditions such as further 
internal checks by MDH’s Ethical Committee.21 However, I was given verbal 
permission by an MDH official to commence my interviews even before an Ethical 
Committee was assembled to review my proposal. Reasons for this were never given, 
and I was too grateful for anything that might expedite the process to complain. No 
                                                 
19
 Preliminary Inquiry with Mbagathi District Hospital Administration Officer, 3
rd
 March 2004 
20
 Okweba, Arthur, ‘Renowned Nairobi Orphanage in Suspect Study’, The Daily Nation, 18
th
 October 
2001. 
21
 There was a further condition about the consumption of the end product, that is, the thesis, to 
which both the Director of Medical Services in the Ministry of Health and the hospital were to have 
access. 
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Ethical Committee was ever convened during the five weeks that I was at the hospital 
and, to the best of my knowledge, none ever was. Moreover, I was determined that 
despite clearances from the Ministry of Health (written) and MDH (verbal), I would, 
out of respect to would-be interviewees, also impose my own ethical checks22: I 
introduced myself and the nature and purpose of my research to each prospective 
interviewee to ensure her decision on whether to proceed was an informed one.23 
Further, any interviews would be terminated at any point if the respondent so 
requested.24 Such assurances may have contributed to MDH’s administration’s lax 
approach towards convening an Ethical Committee to assess my research request but 
it is worrying that less scrupulous persons might gain similar access to vulnerable 
PLWHAs purely on the basis of verbal assurances. The original list of questions also 
included the interviewee’s name. In hindsight, this question should never have been 
included, to further safeguard the interviewees’ anonymity and privacy. I 
subsequently compensated for this shortcoming by ensuring that all interviews were 
allocated a numbering system which corresponds to the sequence of interviews, by 
which they are referred to in the thesis. This protects even those respondents who 
volunteered such information at the time but who might view such disclosure 
differently with the passage of time.  
 
Although most of the interviews were conducted at MDH, I had first opted for a 
different method of accessing PLWHAs.  Following consultations with members of 
PLWHAs’ support organizations at the International Conference on AIDS and STIs in 
Africa (ICASA) in Nairobi in September 2003, I became convinced that such 
organizations would be the best place to access possible interviewees. Not only were 
their clients more likely to be open about their HIV status, they were also likely to be 
familiar with the interview process and so, perhaps, more forthcoming with their 
opinions. I contacted a few of them and although in principle they did not object to 
the idea of interviewing their service-users- as long as the PLWHAs themselves 
consented- the actual process of arranging the interviews proved harder, with 
                                                 
22
 See Gray, Joni N.; Lyons Jr. Phillip M.; and Melton, Gary B., Ethical and Legal Issues in AIDS Research 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), at 34. 
23
 ibid., at 38-9. 
24
 Indeed, one would-be interviewee, having agreed to speak to me, declined to proceed after I had 
informed her that the interview would be audiotape recorded, a choice that is discussed later in the 
chapter. 
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organization representatives appearing reluctant to allow access to their clients as 
the reality of the process crystallized. Whether this unwillingness was based purely on 
the desire to protect clients’ privacy remained unclear. Care had been taken to 
explain the nature and purpose of my research in as much detail as possible to ensure 
that each organization knew that my work was a probe into the opinions and views of 
their clients and that membership in their particular support organization was 
incidental. As such, my research was neither an investigation into the workings of 
these organizations nor into the criteria for membership, if this was indeed the 
concern. (The latter, some MDH respondents would later claim, was sometimes 
based on ethnic identity (see Chapters 7 and 8).) In the end, I was able to arrange 
some interviews with one organization, WOFAK (who despite the name, has mixed-
sex clients), with whom I had established the best contact and who were the only 
ones willing to make the time to speak to me and to avail clients for interviewing. 
 
 
iv. ‘Gatekeepers’ 
The process of gaining access is multi-layered and multi-dimensional. It requires the 
researcher to balance her investigative agenda with the demands and concerns of her 
interviewees and, as in the case of this research, their “gatekeepers”, that is, “those 
individuals in an organisation that have the power to grant or withhold access to 
people or situations for the purposes of research.”25 Although these middlemen are 
crucial when conducting research into an area such as HIV/AIDS, where many 
interviewees prefer to remain hidden, that same reliance on their power to grant 
some initial access means they can unduly influence the research process, as will be 
seen shortly.  
 
The seven WOFAK interviewees were specifically chosen by my contact there, the 
Program Officer (who also insisted that they were ‘paid’26), which I did not consider 
                                                 
25
 Burgess (n 5), at 48. 
26
 He suggested a figure of Ksh. 200 (approx. GBP 1.30 or USD 2.60 at the time) as suitable and I 
agreed, as it was one which I my resources could accommodate. Subsequently, I offered this amount 
to all my interviewees at the end of the process, though some declined the offer. I did not advertise 
the reward when attempting to procure respondents: the figure would only be affordable given a small 
number of respondents and, further, I did not want to put off possible respondents who might decline 
to participate so as not to create the impression that they were either destitute (although they may, in 
fact, be) or that they were solely motivated by financial reward.    
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ideal.27 It had been hoped the interviewees would be randomly selected based on 
availability and willingness to participate. There were two principal concerns about 
pre-selection: firstly, it was unclear why or by what criteria the Program Officer had 
chosen these particular individuals. Secondly, I did not want him to select only those 
clients whom he thought would be better informed about the issues raised in the 
questionnaire, perhaps for the prestige of the organization. My concern here was that 
this may colour any discussion I may engage in about how, if at all, contact with NGOs 
like WOFAK might affect PLWHAs’ awareness of, and willingness to articulate, 
entitlements, and do so using a human rights framework. Indeed, explicit comments 
by respondents throughout the research suggested the influence of NGOs in 
promoting human rights vocabulary and ideas among PLWHAs. But the WOFAK 
clients did not appear more obviously rights-aware than subsequent interviewees.  
 
It was unclear if the respondents were briefed in advance, although their responses 
were varied and appeared natural and sufficiently untutored. However, I was 
cautious not to voice my doubts about this for the sake of maintaining cordiality and 
possibly negotiating a further increase in interviewees.28 However, opting not to voice 
anxiety on a matter that possibly concerned the nature and quality of information I 
might glean further illustrates the power a gatekeeper can exert on the research 
process as well as the data collected. This group of seven became my ‘test group’, as 
explored shortly, and based on the experience of interviewing them I was able to 
make some alterations to my interview questions and interviewing approach. 
 
In addition to interviewing WOFAK’s clients, I had also hoped for permission to 
observe any group sessions that the organization might host, having been informed 
that experts were sometimes invited to speak on a range of relevant topics. Previous 
subjects had included human rights and it would be interesting to observe the 
techniques that human rights professionals employed to make this information 
accessible and useful to non-experts but also to record how the clients reacted to it. 
However, permission was declined on the basis that a stranger’s presence, even a 
                                                 
27
 I attempted to allay any concerns he may have had by detailing the nature of my research and 
allowing him to review the questionnaire. This proved to no avail. 
28
 This strategy seems to have had some success as I was originally granted access to five interviewees, 
before two more were made available for interviews. 
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non-participating one (which I had suggested to enhance my anonymity) might be too 
intrusive and hence inhibit the clients from fully participating. These are reasonable 
considerations; I agreed that my research objectives must not supersede or obstruct 
a process aimed at assisting the clients. In addition, it has been noted that 
involvement by a researcher which hinders the naturalness of those being observed is 
sometimes counterproductive to the research itself.29  
 
Unable to secure more interviewees at WOFAK, I focused attention back to hospitals, 
particularly to MDH, where contact had already been established. The ethical issues 
pertaining to sensitive research at a government institution such as this is discussed 
later in this chapter. For now, it is important to note the role of the nurses and social 
workers at the MDH HIV clinic, who were crucial to gaining access to patients at this 
centre and at the Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) Belgium unit based at the hospital. 
Not only did they assist with the logistics of the research (the head nurse at the HIV 
clinic suggested and permitted the use of a vacant room, adjacent to the clinic, for 
the private conduct of the interviews) but their excellent rapport with the patients 
greatly facilitated the procurement of interviewees. They volunteered useful 
suggestions on how to approach would-be interviewees and their experience enabled 
them to anticipate and remove some of the barriers that might discourage patients 
from participating while also ensuring they were comfortable with, and not 
inconvenienced by, the process. 
 
For instance, the head nurse had grown concerned that my initial method of 
introducing myself to the patients assembled in the waiting area might put off 
potential interviewees, despite my efforts to be discreet by approaching one or two 
patients at a time. Indeed, there were those who sat in the adjacent- and sometimes 
merged- TB queue who were keen, when mistakenly approached, to emphasize that 
they were not part of the HIV queue and therefore, presumably, not infected with the 
virus. This is despite the high incidence of HIV prevalence among those with TB 
infection in Kenya30; the TB patients are likely to have been aware of the links 
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 Judd, et al (n 10), at 270. 
30
 Kenya ranks among the countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a high levels of HIV testing among 
people with TB, with 79% notified TB cases testing for HIV, up from 60% and 2006. 
(WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF, Towards Universal Access: Scaling Up Priority HIV/AIDS Interventions in the 
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between the two illnesses, which was by then common knowledge. Their vehement 
denial once again reflects concerns about the stigma surrounding AIDS. The head 
nurse rightly perceived that requesting the patients’ participation in the privacy of 
their clinic session might yield more interviewees and she suggested taking up the 
initial task of mentioning my research to the patients while she saw them for their 
check-up, during which she would encourage them speak to me afterwards. Further, 
she suggested casually introducing me to those who had arrived early for their clinic 
sessions (while the waiting area was still relatively empty) and requesting them to 
speak to me about my work before the clinic started, assuring them that their place in 
the queue would be secure until the interview was done. Indeed, some patients had 
previously declined to speak to me for this reason, though it was often easier to 
convince them to be interviewed before or while they awaited their clinic 
appointment rather than afterwards when many had other competing activities such 
as collecting prescriptions. The endorsement of a trusted person seemed to 
encourage many patients to participate. In fact, its failures were down to human 
error, with the nurse, for instance, sometimes forgetting to mention my project to 
her patients.  
 
The role of the MDH staff in the access hierarchy was further embedded by the 
informal relationships, alongside the formal, official ones, which existed between 
them and a number of the patients interviewed. One respondent, interviewee 36, for 
example, listed a particular social worker as one of those helping to provide for her 
health requirements, based on financial assistance she had occasionally sought and 
received from him, although this was likely not part of his official remit and would 
have had to come out of his own pocket. She said: Drugs it is MSF [that is providing 
me with them], the rest I beg for help. For example, to get to hospital, I might ask [the 
social worker] to help me with Ksh. 50.” Other respondents, such as interviewee 3, 
also compared favourably the quality of care offered by MDH nurses with others 
elsewhere: “If I am taken to Kenyatta [National Hospital] I fear I won’t last a week. 
The nurses there haven’t the courtesy to handle people. It is better I was taken to 
                                                                                                                                             
Health Sector, Progress Report 2009, 2009, at 
,http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2009/20090930_tuapr_2009_en.pdf, accessed 10/04/10, at 78) 
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Mbagathi where the nurses have respect.” I was thus able to benefit from the trusting 
relationship between staff and patients.    
 
With the MSF Belgium patients, my key contact was a social worker attached to the 
unit, who often initiated the process by introducing me rather vaguely to his clients 
thus: “This is one of our colleagues here and she is doing some research, so maybe 
you can talk to her.” It was not an accurate description of my role at MDH and I felt it 
necessary, for the sake of clarity and honesty, to inform potential interviewees of my 
independence from MDH- as well as filling in the details of my research. However 
despite such clarifications, many interviewees continued to believe that I was allied to 
the hospital or MSF team, or indeed the government31 or an NGO, as seemed the 
case with interviewee 35, who may have based her remark that I, too, had a role to 
play in providing for her healthcare needs on just such an assumption when she said, 
“It’s the responsibility of people like you! So I am very glad that I met you! You can 
help me! You and my husband combined can help me! Because I think that these 
organizations especially, more than even my husband, are the ones with the ability to 
help me. My husband can then help a little.” First impressions about the researcher’s 
identity and role may outlive any subsequent elucidation offered to an interviewee. 
Peter Blau, referring to his own experiences remarked, “The members of the 
organization know, of course, that management has given permission to conduct the 
study, and this creates another problem. The observer cannot escape an initial 
identification with management, since the assumption is that management must 
have a direct interest in the study.”32 
 
At any rate, the social workers’ endorsement guaranteed at least the chance to 
introduce myself and my work and in all but one case, they then went through with 
the interview process. This interaction with the social workers confirms Burgess’s 
statement that “[t]he points of contact which the researcher has within an institution, 
organisation or a group will influence the collection of data and the subsequent 
                                                 
31
 For instance, interviewee 30, when asked how she thought the government might help her meet her 
health needs alluded in her reply that I was somehow associated with the government machinery, or 
that I might wield some influence within government: “If you can put forward a report so that we may 
get help from them, that would be good.” 
32
 Quoted in Hammond, Phillip E. (ed.), Sociologists at Work (New York; London: Basic Books, 1964), 25 
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perspective that can be portrayed.”33 Although contact with MSF Belgium’s clients 
had not been planned my rapport with the staff attached to them provided access to 
this group of potential interviewees. It also provided an opportunity to register the 
views of PLWHAs who were actively engaged with an NGO and who may be able to 
draw more directly from personal experience when responding to questions 
regarding the role of these actors. Further, it allowed a glimpse into a parallel 
universe where MDH HIV clinic patients, located just a few yards away in the same 
compound, were having to partly subsidize their ARVs (the cost was officially lowered 
a number of times during and after my interviews, as discussed in Chapter 6), while 
those in the MSF programme received them free. Which of their other needs and 
requirements persisted despite a respite from the expenses of ART? Access to the 
MSF cohort provided an empirical opportunity to examine this. Altogether, of the 
forty-nine interviews conducted thirteen comprised of the MSF Belgium PLWHAs.  
 
v. Designing the Interview Questions  
 
Several issues arose during the creation of the interview questions for the PLWHAs’ 
interviews that highlighted the wider challenges involved in conducting research on a 
sensitive topic like HIV/AIDS, and which contribute significantly to the substantive 
discussion in this research about the construction of PLWHAs’ subjectivities and their 
perceptions about entitlements and rights. Further, as has been addressed at length 
earlier in this chapter, the dual objectives of the interviewing process meant there 
were inherent tensions at its heart which the design of the interview questions would 
have to contend with. Additionally, the interview questions design process drew 
attention to some of the difficulties associated with conducting research on human 
rights, where the standard terms of reference and their varied and contentious 
definitions may not be familiar to interviewees, a problem which, as is soon 
illustrated, is compounded when these terms require translation into an indigenous 
language. This suggests intrinsic problems within the human rights discipline, and 
obstacles to its rooting. 
 
Language and Meaning 
                                                 
33
 Burgess (n 5), at 45. 
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To broaden the pool of possible interviewees, the interview questions had to be 
designed in both English and Kiswahili, Kenya’s official languages. There are no figures 
available to suggest how many Kenyans are fluent in one or both of the languages, 
but the 74% of the population aged 15 years and over who are literate34 will have 
encountered either one or both languages during their formal education. No version 
was prepared in any of Kenya’s numerous indigenous languages; I calculated, 
correctly, the low risk of encountering a potential interviewee who could not 
communicate adequately in English or Kiswahili; indeed, there was only one such 
respondent.35 The pitfalls of conducting interviews through a translator, even where 
one could be readily secured, were revealed on the one unforeseen occasion when 
this happened. It involved interviewee 33 (mentioned also in Chapter 1), whose 
interview illustrated problems not only with language but with attitudes about rights 
(dealt with in Chapter 8). The respondent, who had reached Standard 4 in her primary 
school education, was 63 at the time of the interview, and her daughter had 
accompanied her on her clinic session and into the interview. The respondent had 
difficulties understanding many of my questions and her daughter volunteered to act 
as interpreter, translating the questions into her mother’s native Kikamba and 
relaying the answers to me in English or Kiswahili. Soon, however, it became obvious 
that some of the responses were the daughter’s rather than the interviewee’s, 
especially the imperative ones on human rights.36  
                                                 
34
 Figure provided by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (UNFPA, ‘Kenya’, 2007, at 
http://www.unfpa.org/profile/kenya.cfm, accessed 15/09/07. 
35
 She was interviewee 28, who when given the option of conducting the interview in either of these 
languages responded that she was most comfortable communicating in the indigenous language of 
Gikuyu. She was born in 1952 and formal primary school education up to  Standard Seven. A 
considerable number of years had therefore passed since she was last enrolled in school and she may 
only have encountered either English or Kiswahili on an informal basis since that time. Although Gikuyu 
also happens to be my own indigenous language, I had in the past experienced difficulty in translating 
some of the key terms used the questionnaire, especially “human rights”, without resorting to their 
English or Kiswahili translations or defining the term outright.  
36
 For instance, the daughter tried to translate the question about whether the respondent had heard 
of the term ‘human rights’; apparently unable to find a Kikamba equivalent for the phrase, she ended 
up having to use the Kiswahili term wholesale. As the daughter repeatedly tried to explain the question 
to her clearly uncomprehending mother, I could hear her trying to break down the term as she herself 
understood it: she used Kiswahili words like “serikali” (government) and “mahitaji” (needs). She 
seemed resolved not to concede that her mother could not understand the question. Their exchange 
continued, in which her daughter said “no” after certain responses from her mother (thus filtering the 
responses before they got to me), before she finally translated a response which I would say was 
almost certainly hers rather than the interviewee’s: “The government should help those in need like 
myself, in the same way as it has been doing by providing the medicine.” I followed this with a request 
for examples of  human rights the interviewee may have heard of or knew; although I was aware that 
the response would be very skewed and would most likely be the daughter’s rather than the 
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The practical application of the questionnaires was revelatory: for instance, the 
English version of the phrase ‘human rights’ appeared widely familiar, with even 
those with a stated preference for a Kiswahili interview often claiming to know it 
rather than its Kiswahili equivalent. Interviewee 37 is a good example, and like several 
others chose to conduct the interview in Kiswahili but referred to the words ‘human 
rights’ in English. When I initially mentioned the phrase in Kiswahili, she repeated the 
question and said, “You mean ‘human right’? She then proceeded with her response. 
Interviewee 42 also switched between Kiswahili and English when making the 
statement: “I know that ‘human rights’ is the right of human beings, the way a human 
being deserves to be treated, whoever they may be.” When speaking the words “the 
right of human beings” she reverted to her original Kiswahili, including when using 
the words ‘human’ and ‘right/s’ separately or in a different order; this indicates that it 
was well within her vocabulary capability to discuss the phrase ‘human rights’ in the 
Kiswahili language that she had initially chosen to conduct the interview. That she 
should break off into the English specifically to utter the phrase ‘human rights’ 
reinforces the notion, addressed shortly, that it is perhaps in the English that it has 
gained most popularity. 
 
Indeed, one respondent, interviewee 36, who preferred to take the interview in 
Kiswahili, appeared to perceive the Kiswahili translation as the realm of language 
purists, saying: “I have heard [of the phrase] but I don’t understand it. You know with 
Kiswahili, sometimes you hear certain terms and vocabulary like ‘haki za kibinadamu’ 
and if there is no one there to explain to meaning, you wouldn’t know what they 
mean.” The broad familiarity may be explained by the increased public debate about 
human rights and the popularization of its terminology; yet the particular familiarity 
with the English phrase may also be symptomatic of the exclusivity of the discourse, 
which does not adequately embrace those outside professional, mainly-NGO circles 
for whom this is often the operating language. And though political events and active 
civic education may have since somewhat altered this latter situation and the 
                                                                                                                                             
interviewee’s I thought there may be something to be learned regardless. Indeed, when the daughter 
translated the question to the interviewee, I heard words like “government” crop up again, as well as 
the sentence “taking care of your needs,” which I was able to make out later when I listened to the 
interview tape because it was a mixture of Kiswahili and Bantu words, similar to my native Kikuyu. 
 98 
 
Kiswahili phrase probably gained more currency, the interviews here offer evidence 
of how language, knowledge and social and political dislocation intersect. As Harvey 
notes, the core of critical social research is the  
idea that knowledge is structured by existing sets of social relations. The aim of a 
critical methodology is to provide knowledge which engages the prevailing social 
structures... Indeed, it is arguable that for a critical methodologist, knowledge is 
critique. … Knowledge is a dynamic process not a static entity. Knowledge is not a 
bucket into which grains of information are dropped in the hope that they somehow 
coalesce into some kind of explanation of the world. For critical methodologists, 
knowledge is a process of moving towards an understanding of the world of the 
knowledge which structures our perceptions of that world.37 
 
Further linguistic challenges arose in the translation of other key terms of reference, 
with ‘healthcare’ being a prime example. To be sure, the choice of the word, in 
English or Kiswahili, was conceptually problematic, for the reasons highlighted in the 
Introduction. While using the phrase the ‘right to healthcare’ may have been the 
simpler alternative, in practice it also presented a difficulty: among the WOFAK test 
group, for instance, interviewees 3 and 1, who in previous questions had mentioned 
certain aspects of healthcare in association with rights, seemed, however, unsure 
about placing healthcare in the context of human rights when later asked more 
specific questions on the matter. Both interviews were conducted in English: 
Interviewer: What are some of the Human Rights you’ve heard of or you know?  
Interviewee 3: Like, to have access to medicine is a human right. 
Later: 
Interviewer: It has also been stated by some people that there is a human right to 
healthcare- have you ever heard about a human right to healthcare? 
Interviewee 3:  There is, yeah. It’s like someone can be forced to go to hospital… I 
don’t know whether I am getting you.  
 ... 
Interviewer: Some people have stated there is a link between the issue of health 
generally and that of human rights. Have you thought much about this 
issue or have you not heard much about it? 
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 Harvey (n 8), at 2-4 
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Interviewee 1: Well, as a human, anyone can fall sick- anyone. So you’re supposed to 
be taken care of well if you’re sick so I think it is related to human 
rights. 
Later: 
Interviewer: It has also been stated by some people that there is a human right to 
healthcare- have you ever heard about a human right to healthcare?  
Interviewee 1: [Hesitation] Not really.   
 
One could draw several conclusions from this discrepancy: interviewee 3 may not 
have heard about a right to healthcare as he claimed. Alternatively, he may have 
heard about it but could not explain precisely what it entailed. He may also not have 
associated access to medicine with the wider issue of healthcare. It was likely, too, 
that both interviewees may not have understood the meaning of the word 
‘healthcare’. I had automatically, and erroneously, assumed that my interviewees 
would have a working- and roughly similar- definition of the word, despite the fact 
that none of them were likely to have English as a mother tongue, including those 
who preferred an English interview. It would be highly unlikely, of course, that any 
interviewees made the kind of academic distinctions between ‘health’ and 
‘healthcare’ explained in Chapter 1, which are themselves debatable. In fact, the only 
respondent in the test group to have intimated at a broad interpretation of the term, 
more akin to that applied to a right to health, was one who had admitted that she 
had only began to perceive a linkage between health and human rights as the 
question was being posed to her. She (interviewee 7) said, “I’ve not heard much 
about but just as you were saying it, I do think there is a connection between health 
and human rights. Because if you see something like slums, people have the right to 
live in a good shelter and in slums there is a lot of congestion, which allows diseases 
to breed. Like TB, diarrhoea.”  
 
Matters were compounded by the Kiswahili questionnaire: while there is a Kiswahili 
word for ‘health’ it would not have made a translation of the phrase the ‘right to 
health’ and the concepts it tries to capture any clearer or less absurd, as Leary points 
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out, to a layperson. But there is also no singular equivalent for ‘healthcare’.38 A choice 
had to be made on the translation which would best facilitate the inquiry. In effect, 
the twenty-two Kiswahili-speaking interviewees- that is, those advanced to this 
section of the interview- faced questions which had small but crucial differences to 
those interviewed in English, and it is difficult to gauge what the original question lost 
or gained in the process. The phrase I settled on was ‘haki ya kupata matibabu’ which 
translates back into the English as the ‘right to receive treatment’. If the phrase the 
‘right to health’ is vague and unspecific and the ‘right to healthcare’ more precise but 
also open to interpretation, the ‘right to receive treatment’ can be said to be even 
more definite yet even this, too, is ambiguous in its scope. The effects of this 
translation may be seen, for instance, in interviewee 41’s responses: while she would 
still have applied her own interpretation to the key terms, there were compelling 
signs that the more specific nature of the question had already narrowed down 
considerably the scope of such interpretation. In the following extract, I have also 
italicized the relevant terms within the responses and replaced ‘healthcare’ with 
‘receiving treatment’, which is how she would have received the question: 
Interviewer: In your opinion, what does the term ‘getting treatment’ mean to you? 
Interviewee: It means that when you’re ill and have opportunistic illnesses, we are 
taught that you must see a doctor because small illnesses can 
become huge problems.  
Interviewer: Have you ever heard about a human right to getting treatment? 
Interviewee: Yes. 
... 
Interviewer:  In your own words, what does a human right to getting treatment 
mean to you?  
Interviewee: It means if you’re ill you must get treatment, whatever illness it is. 
Even if it’s malaria. 
 
Such interviews illustrate the multiplicity of definitions and associations that 
accompany terms used widely across the field. They may be further proof that 
familiarity with the vocabulary of commonly applied by rights, though it may aid 
laypeople to re-conceive and re-articulate their entitlements, as later chapters 
explore, does not on its own mean that laypeople begin to frame such notions in this 
language. This relies on more fundamental transformations in how one views her 
wider relationships to others in the human rights dynamic and the attendant 
privileges and obligations. The interviews also underline the variation in information 
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 The Kamusi Project, The Internet Living Swahili Dictionary , Kamusi Project USA and Kamusi Project 
International, http://www.kamusi.org/?q=en  (accessed 06/03/12) 
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possessed by researcher and interviewee and the unevenness of their relationship, 
where the former may often be an expert on the subject and the latter a laypeople. 
The interviewer’s instinct is often to apply the lexicon of her milieu, which may 
provide the only terms of reference within which to frame the study. As with terms 
like ‘healthcare’ or ‘human rights’ the lack of adequate alternatives or equivalents 
compounds the problem and may result in having to define the term to the 
respondent first, which may be counterproductive to a study aimed precisely at 
discovering the extent of an interviewee’s knowledge of that topic.  
 
Such limitations in language which compel a researcher to impose her own terms and 
definitions could be interpreted as a subtle attempt to legitimize exactly that which 
she seeks to investigate. This in turn augments the researcher’s position and her field, 
and widens the investigator-respondent fissure not just within temporal space of 
their engagement but also in the spheres of power that the two occupy. Interviews 
such as those above also raise deeper questions about how language and knowledge 
interrelate and might shape the deeply subjective notions of entitlements and rights. 
Moreover, they provide a window into the social factors that determine the 
distribution of knowledge, as Chapter 6 explores in reference to biomedical 
knowledge.39 Many of these factors are also replicated in patterns of poverty and lack 
of access to socio-economic goods.   
 
A further area where translation into Kiswahili may have altered the meaning or tone 
of key terms was in the series of questions designed to gauge notions about 
entitlements. In the English interviews, the simple use of the word ‘should’ in a 
question sufficed to tease out information about respondents’ perception of agency 
vis-à-vis particular actors and the extent to which respondents felt they could 
influence their actions. Apparently innocuous terms like ‘should’ and ‘duty’ might 
turn into ‘compel’ (perhaps even ‘force’) and ‘job’, respectively, depending on 
interviewees’ interpretations when translated back into the English. This changes the 
meaning, asking Kiswahili language respondents to contend with what often proved 
to be a rather startling notion of forcing the government to take certain actions. This 
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 Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge  (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) 
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could also be responsible for some of the responses where interviewees felt strongly 
that NGOs, whose role was often perceived as merely voluntary, should not or could 
not be compelled to help. Yet even these distorted responses usefully revealed the 
depth of asymmetry in power that several respondents perceived in relation to the 
State or NGOs. 
 
Sequencing  
As a general rule, questions should be worded in as clear, simple, specific and neutral 
a manner as possible and ordered to suit their sometimes sensitive nature. It was a 
much more subtle process than anticipated and, once again, some of the challenges it 
posed go beyond a methodological analysis.  
 
The first set of questions was designed to be simple close-ended ones of fact to ease 
the respondent into the interview. They sought the interviewee’s age and sex profile 
and the year they had contracted the HIV virus. I had also included a question on 
whether the respondent had developed AIDS, which might be a good early indicator 
ARV use. However, this question often proved confusing to the WOFAK test-group, 
with several of the interviewees giving an “I don’t know” response.40 The question 
was thus discontinued as the information it sought could be accessed more explicitly 
later in the questionnaire. In addition, such a seemingly ambiguous question so early 
on disrupted the flow and prevented the interviewee from settling.  
 
The next set of questions was subjective and focused on interviewees’ health needs, 
including where they located the obligation for meeting these needs. It is during this 
sequence that many interviewees began to offer very detailed and articulate answers 
and they sounded noticeably more relaxed, as the audio-tape transcriptions revealed. 
These questions offered the most obvious opportunity for respondents to register 
any grievances about living with HIV/AIDS in Kenya and the best chance for the 
cathartic function discussed earlier, with the more detailed responses also proving 
the most helpful. For instance: 
Interviewer: Whose duty is it, in your view, to provide for your requirements? 
                                                 
40
 As interviewee 2 put it: “Well, that’s a technical question…I don’t know when you rank someone as 
having developed full-blown AIDS because you bank on CD 4 count and if it’s that one, there are 
people who are having CD4 count of 1 and they have resurfaced from that state. So, it’s confusing.” 
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Interviewee 3: First of all the government should provide- if the government 
provides me with employment, indirectly they have provided me 
with all these other needs. So that will cover most of the things. Like 
the ARVs nowadays, the government is supposed to give these 
because I hear that there are some donors giving out money. But the 
government still continues doing research- I don’t know how the 
research will really help. And they are using the money for ARVs for 
this. They are laying strategies… they do this in the big hotels! But 
this won’t help. Already people are hard-up. They know so-and-so is 
in need- the hospitals already have records, everywhere there 
records. Why do another research to get the records? 
 
Locating these questions at this point in the overall sequence proved generally 
successful and this was crucial because the next set of queries included some 
probative ones which throughout the interviews discomfited even the most 
uninhibited respondents; reticent respondents became even more minimalist in their 
responses afterwards.  
 
The first in this sequence of questions asked for respondents’ opinions regarding the 
cost of ART. A potentially broad topic for comment, I chose to introduce the question 
from the perspective of a relatively recent and momentous development which was 
widely reported in the media: the Kenyan government’s announcement in September 
2003 that subsidized ARVs would be introduced at government District Hospitals. This 
was intended to focus respondents’ minds on a specific event before leading onto 
further questions on pricing as well as the efficacy of the government’s policy. I opted 
for flexibility here, applying an unenforced filter for this part of the questioning so as 
not to curtail interviewees who responded that they had not, in fact, heard of the 
announcement.41  While filter questions have their merits, the rule on their use 
should not be absolute and should be weighed against the benefits of obtaining 
                                                 
41
 In a matter that goes back to the dual-objective tension discussed earlier in this chapter, I debated 
on whether, before introducing the substantive element of the question, it should be preceded by a 
filter one, which is designed to accommodate “don’t know” responses and remove the assumption 
made by many researchers about respondents possessing ready-made answers on various subjects. If I 
opted for this technique, I should ask interviewees whether they had heard of the government’s plans, 
with those who responded in the positive proceeding to the substantive part of the question, unlike 
those who responded in the negative, who, ideally, would never be asked about it. In fact Judd, et al, 
even suggest that the respondents who had claimed, as they might in this particular case, to have 
heard about the government’s policy, should have additional checks imposed to ensure the veracity of 
their responses, by asking them to explain a further detail about such a policy (Judd, et al (n 10), at 
242) Hence, one might end up with a two-pronged filter question in an effort to weed out opinions 
that were formed on the spot and which could not therefore be said to be an interviewee’s carefully 
considered or deeply-held view. 
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responses to certain questions. Indeed, some of the on-the-spot answers they are 
designed to eliminate were given and accepted, and had some interesting and useful 
information to offer, such as interviewee 7, quoted on pg 83, above. Interviewee 14 
also seemed to make up her mind on the spot when asked if she had heard of a right 
to healthcare, but proceeded to give coherent, consistent answers: 
Interviewee: I think every citizen has a right to healthcare.  
Interviewer: So you’ve heard about this right? 
Interviewee: I don’t know how I came to hear about it! I think I’m just aware! 
 
Another respondent, interviewee 25, who frequently interacted with NGOs said:  
I’ve never heard about this [right to healthcare] but although I’ve never heard about 
it, I know there is because they are about fighting for the rights for accessibility of 
drugs. If human rights can come in to fight for the drugs to be accessible, in District 
hospitals, I know they can succeed. They have a lot of strength to do it. 
 
Her response is also noteworthy for being one of a number in which the interviewee 
appeared to conceive of human rights as people or organizations, a discussion which 
is expounded on in Chapter 8. Interviewee 32 was unsure about what he may or may 
not have heard about a link between HIV and rights and when asked if he thought 
there should be one he said: “There should be.” Not only was it important to find out 
what PLWHAs thought about the government’s policy on ARVs, it was also crucial to 
offer them this chance to relate their own experiences, if any, of the implementation 
of this policy, as the subsequent substantive questions invited them to do. Even the 
responses of the MSF Belgium PLWHAs were useful, although a number of them had 
not heard about the government’s ARV roll-out plan. Their opinions on the ARV costs 
still borne by their non-MSF counterparts contributed to the debate because, though 
often formulated on the spot, they were always filtered through their own experience 
of free ARVs supplied by MSF Belgium. The questions therefore invited them to 
comment on an alternative reality which but for good luck- as it often turned out- 
they themselves might inhabit.  
 
As I had anticipated some problems, beyond the linguistic ones noted earlier, with 
responses to the human rights questions, they were positioned in what was, in effect, 
the second part of the questionnaire. Indeed, as seen in the Introduction, many 
interviewees found aspects of these queries especially taxing and it was noted that 
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several of them felt their inability to answer some of the questions, or, more 
accurately, that their “don’t know” responses were inadequate. I always introduced 
this section of the interview questions before plunging into the questions because, 
having thus far only examined the health requirements of PLWHAs, a discussion on 
human rights, a topic on which many respondents may not consider themselves 
experts or immediately link with HIV/AIDS, may appear unrelated and disjointed. As 
has been mentioned, this poses potential problems in that it arguably marshals 
interviewees’ towards the topic, subtly suggesting it as the ‘correct’ way of 
conceptualizing and analysing subsequent  questions. Yet a lack of cohesion within 
the interview questions risks irritating or confusing the respondent42, whose 
continues participation in the interview process I desired. Therefore, despite having 
informed interviewees at the beginning of the process that some of the questions 
would be human rights-related, I would remind them of this at this point by saying, 
“As I mentioned earlier, I would also like to ask you about your thoughts on the issue 
of human rights.” This served to flag up the slight change in content- an 
accommodation which, again, owed to the dual-objective tension- and also 
introduced a possibly challenging topic in a manner that reassured the respondent 
that it was her opinions on the issue that were being sought, whatever they may be, 
rather than answers which they might perceive as being either right or wrong.  
 
It is vital that no assumptions are made about nature and extent of knowledge that 
ordinary people may possess on the topic of human rights, although, as will be seen 
shortly, some presuppositions may persist, however unwittingly. To mitigate this the 
series began with very basic questions: whether respondents had heard of the term 
‘human rights’, what they understood these words to mean, examples of human 
rights they had heard about and from where they had heard about them. There were 
several ambiguous responses which were sometimes left at that if I apprehended a 
danger that pushing for precision might be counterproductive, causing the 
interviewee to withdraw or become less forthcoming with successive answers. 
However, some gentle prodding occasionally resulted in an answer. The example of 
interviewee 7 will be recalled from the Introduction: after saying she had heard of the 
phrase ‘human rights’ she initially hesitated when asked to define it saying, “This is a 
                                                 
42
 Judd, et al (n 10), at 245. 
 106 
 
difficult question and you know explaining it is very hard.” But following the 
reassurance that she did not have to provide a text book definition she volunteered, 
“It means treating someone like they are a human being. You treat them the way that 
you would like to be treated yourself.” Indeed, the notion that an answer is 
unsatisfactory may often be imposed by the respondent herself, leading to 
unfortunate self-censorship.  
 
This sequence of queries progressed to explicit questions about the possible nexus 
between human rights and HIV/AIDS about which, again, no assumptions were made, 
hence the filtering here of responses. This technique was employed and enforced 
here because for those interviewees who may admit to not having heard the term 
‘human rights’ it would be futile to pursue questions about whether the interviewee 
had considered any link between human rights and HIV/AIDS. The filter question 
read: “Recently, we have been hearing people talk about human rights in relation to 
HIV/AIDS. Have you thought much about this issue or have you not heard much about 
it?” This construction serves to minimize any embarrassment that a respondent might 
feel about a response in the negative by “explaining it away” and ensures that “not 
knowing enough to have an opinion [is] implicitly excused in the wording to 
encourage respondents to answer truthfully.”43 Although Judd, et al, recommend 
such a device especially where a response may be considered “socially undesirable”, 
and the audio-tapes confirm a distinct discomfort on the part of those respondents 
who had not contemplated any links between HIV/AIDS and human rights, it is 
unclear how much they viewed such an admission as being merely embarrassing 
rather than “socially undesirable”. However, it cannot be discounted that wording the 
filter question this way presented interviewees with an ‘acceptable’, ready-made, 
legitimate answer in itself and some did in fact respond by simply using the same 
words: “No, I haven’t heard about it”. 
 
The next set of questions listed various actors- local government officials, central 
government, local and foreign NGOs and others- and sought the interviewees’ 
perceptions as to whether they could and should assist in meeting respondents’ 
healthcare needs. Amongst the WOFAK test group, most of those who replied that 
                                                 
43
 ibid, at 248. 
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any of these actors could help them also voluntarily supplied examples of the ways in 
which they could do so, which prompted me to ask the same of subsequent 
interviewees who did not volunteer this information; this is a good example of how 
respondents can help shape and improve interview questions and shows the 
advantages of keeping the process of its creation as fluid and flexible as possible.  
 
For those who answered the previous human rights questions in the negative, this 
would be the last set of questions based on opinions and beliefs. For those who 
answered in the positive, these questions were followed by others that focused more 
specifically on the relationship between human rights and health. 
 
The sequence of questions on human rights and health(care) presented the greatest 
challenges. Firstly, filtering was applied again here, so that respondents who had not 
heard of or thought about the stated link between the two did not answer any 
further questions in this set. For those who responded in the positive, there followed 
questions about their source for this information, whether they thought there was 
indeed such a link and what it might be.  
 
Three points are worth mentioning here: firstly, I avoided saying that such a 
statement had been made by experts due to a genuine concern that this might 
persuade some interviewees to claim that not only had they heard of such an 
assertion but that they also concurred with ‘the experts’. Thus my query began: 
“Some people have stated that…”, and did not specify who these people were.  
 
Secondly, interviewees were asked to consider the stated link between health and 
rights prior to being asked whether they had heard of a ‘right to healthcare’. This was 
mainly because while it was important to learn whether at a basic level interviewees’ 
thought there was a nexus between the two subjects, I wanted to avoid using the 
contentious phrase ‘right to healthcare’. While the academic debate surrounding the 
attempt to delineate the scope of a right to health is ongoing, the questionnaire, by 
constructing simple and specific questions, must seek to minimize any confusion on 
the part of respondents, who may not have had the opportunity to consider such 
theoretical disputes.  
 108 
 
 
Thirdly, there was a worrying hesitation among the first couple of WOFAK 
respondents when it came to addressing queries in this section of questionnaire, 
which may have partly been the cause and symptom of the afore-mentioned 
presumption about a common definition or interpretation of the word ‘healthcare’. I 
became increasingly concerned that this may hinder subsequent interviewees from 
surviving the ‘right to healthcare’ filter and responding to the vital set of questions 
that followed.  Having noticed his increasing difficulty with the question, I made an 
on-the-spot decision to ask interviewee 3 of my test group to define the term 
‘healthcare’ first:  
Interviewer: In your own words, what does a human right to healthcare mean to 
you?  
Interviewee: (Hesitates.) According to the government your life is not yours! For 
example, if you were attempting to commit suicide.  
Interviewer: Maybe it’s easier to start like this- what does ‘healthcare’ mean to 
you?  
Interviewee: (after some hesitation) There is individual healthcare and there’s 
majority healthcare... (hesitates). At least each and every individual 
can get healthcare, medicine. 
Interviewer: Do you think that people have a right to this?  
Interviewee: Yes, they do. 
 
The additional questions in this case did perhaps distort his responses, and the 
reference to access to medicine as a right, in particular, could be viewed as leading 
despite an arguable inference that medicines came within his definition of 
‘healthcare’. Indeed, as the questioning progressed the respondent’s responses 
became more tentative. But I did not feel that this voided the interview as the 
objectives of the research were, again, much more broadly defined. Indeed, 
interviewees subsequent to those in the test group were asked to define the term 
‘healthcare’ before being asked whether they had heard of such a right.  
 
Some respondents did in fact appear, like the one above, not to have heard about 
such a right and simply joined the dots to come up with the perceived ‘correct’ 
response on the spot. Indeed, for interviewee 47, the decision to ask respondents to 
define the term ‘healthcare’ first before asking questions about such a right seemed 
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to have the desired, but also the feared, effect: it served to jog her mind about an 
answer but she also seemed to have decided about it on the spot44:  
Interviewer: In your opinion, what does the term ‘healthcare’ mean to you? 
Interviewee: It means being able to afford your medical needs. 
Interviewer: It has also been stated by some people that there is a human right to 
healthcare- have you ever heard about a human right to healthcare?  
Interviewee: Yes there’s a right to healthcare! Because if you think about the 
medical bill that you incur when you get sick, you automatically just 
get better! And like these medical cover companies, like AAR [a 
private healthcare company], they never cover us.  
 
To an extent, I partly hoped for this due to frustration about the lack of progress in 
this important part of the questionnaire. Indeed, I felt that such an outcome may be 
justified in some cases, as some respondents appeared to describe, in all but name, 
healthcare and a right to it. The approach may not have always been helpful and 
procuring a definition of healthcare first did not, in fact, seem to help ring any bells 
for some respondents. Nevertheless, their answers were useful in illustrating the 
varied definitions that PLWHAs attached to the term healthcare, as seen in the 
Introduction, information that would not otherwise have been acquired.  
 
Only those interviewees who responded that they had heard or thought about a link 
between health and human rights were then asked specific questions about the right 
to healthcare (definition, benefits, perceived beneficiaries and benefactors, etc). 
There were additional questions on respondents’ perceptions about any role for 
government in providing healthcare. Initially this question had been intended only for 
those interviewees who volunteered responses to this effect, to them to expound 
further on this pivotal issue. However, I deemed it sufficiently useful to invite all 
respondents who had progressed to this stage of the interviews to consider it 
because it may provide critical insights into individuals’ perceptions of their 
relationship with, and the functions of, the State. It was succeeded by an equally 
important query on perceptions about the affordability of such healthcare expenses.  
 
While asking all interviewees to consider the role of government in healthcare 
provision might be open to charges of implanting suggestive ideas into the minds of 
                                                 
44
 However, it must be said that despite the strong impression she gave of having immediately formed 
her responses, they are consistent with those she had given throughout the interview, reinforcing the 
earlier argument in favour of a flexible approach to on-the-spot responses.  
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those who had not previously appeared to hold such views, these were the last 
questions based on interviewees’ opinions or beliefs and their responses at this point 
could not affect the substantive aspects of their interviews. Additionally, this 
approach is in accordance with the guiding principle that the interviews should be 
used to collect as much information and as many diverse answers as possible from 
the narrow sample size. Restricting interviewees to commenting only on those ideas 
they already held and not inviting them to explore other perspectives when it was 
expedient and did not distort the rest of the interview, and might in fact enrich the 
analysis, would be to waste the interviewing opportunity.  
 
In Retrospect... 
The set of interview questions used for this research could have been improved by 
altering the sequencing of the key question ‘How or from whom did you hear about 
these human rights?’. Transcription of the audio-tapes revealed that I occasionally 
failed to pose it to some respondents, although they often inadvertently addressed it 
elsewhere. This momentary lapse was most likely a reaction to the sudden disruption 
in the interviews when several interviewees’ confidence appeared to diminish 
following the preceding question about examples of rights they had heard of. In 
hindsight, it would have been better to locate the crucial question earlier in the 
sequence, perhaps immediately after inquiring about respondents’ familiarity with 
the term ‘human rights’. This would have preserved the momentum that had often 
built by this stage and likely minimized the possibility of overlooking it. Moreover, this 
would have reflected the real information that the question was intended to glean: 
how interviewees had come by their knowledge of human rights in general rather 
than how they had heard about the examples of human rights they supplied.45  
 
The interview questions could also have been used to collect additional, vital data on 
the role of traditional medicines in Kenya’s healthcare system, an issue whose full 
importance revealed itself only during the post-fieldwork research process. Although 
the issue was addressed anyway, further reading underlined the widespread 
                                                 
45
 Again, I was only able to identify this as a recurrent problem during the transcription process, as it 
happened relatively few times and intermittently. I do not believe it affected the success of the 
interviews on this particular question as the responses fell within a particular and established range, as 
Chapter 8 shows.  
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relevance in Africa of traditional medicine for those with little or no access to formal 
healthcare. It would therefore have been beneficial to seek respondents’ views about 
it, including whether they had ever sought the services of alternative medical 
practitioners. Undoubtedly, similar challenges to those discussed earlier, such as 
setting out a definition and scope for the key terms of reference, would have applied 
to the inclusion of questions on traditional medicine. Further, inquiring into the 
subject may have proved even trickier as the ‘choice’ of traditional medicine, often 
the only available and accessible option, is sometimes perceived as emblematic of 
ignorance and backwardness, particularly amongst those in rural areas. In the event, I 
think the discussion undertaken in Chapter 6 was more than adequate but would 
have been greatly enhanced by interviewees’ explicit responses on the matter. 
 
c) The Interviewing Process 
 
i. Audio-taping 
Despite the lengthy transcription work required, the interviews were all audio-tape 
recorded to ensure that the information provided was captured as delivered and 
would be available for review if later required. Indeed, the concern that I would not 
always be able to simultaneously receive and process all the information provided by 
the respondents was well-founded and the recordings become useful for identifying 
inconsistencies in some interviewees’ answers.46 Moreover, as seen above, they also 
helped identify my own interviewing errors, some of which I was able to correct when 
I reviewed an interviewing session in advance of the next. A further crucial advantage 
in audio- or visual-recording is that they offer interviewers the chance to record 
elements of the interaction that may be otherwise missed, such as an interviewee’s 
change in demeanour, from, say, tension to ease or vice versa.47  
 
Audio-tape recording was largely successful but for two issues: firstly, some 
respondents initially expressed discomfort with this aspect of the process. After some 
                                                 
46
 For example, interviewee 13 said he saw a link between health and human rights he said and then 
claimed not to have heard of a right to healthcare. However, on listening to his interview later, I 
noticed that he had indeed explicitly mentioned a “right to healthcare” as one of the examples of 
rights he knew in an earlier question. He may have misunderstood the later question but I was unable 
to pick this up during the actual interview. 
47
 Thomson, Rachel, Researching Sexuality in the Light of AIDS: Historical and Methodological Issues 
(London: Tufnell Press, 1990), at 19. 
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assurances about confidentiality, and, indeed, the correction on more than one 
occasion that audio-recording did not (also) mean visual-recording in this case, all but 
one agreed to proceed. Secondly, faulty technology, revealed during transcription, 
meant the taping device sometimes skipped or did not clearly capture some sections 
of interviewees’ responses. However, this happened only on four occasions and the 
effect on the value of these interviews, specifically and generally, was negligible.  
 
ii. Ensuring the Interviewee’s Welfare 
It is imperative that respondents are comfortable during the interviewing process, 
and with PLWHA subjects there were additional aspects to this: firstly, the stigma 
surrounding HIV/AIDS means that many respondents’ self-image may be quite 
negative and they might feel that they are already on the defensive even before the 
interview itself has began. For some, this might be the first time they were speaking 
at any length about their illness and it is necessary to reassure them that any 
information divulged would be held confidentially by the researcher. Gray, et al, 
opine that confidentiality attached to the disclosure of HIV test results must apply to 
other personal information given during an interview focussing on the respondent’s 
HIV status, such as how one may have contracted the virus (see discussion below). 
They assert that in providing sensitive information the respondent cedes control over 
it and therefore divulging it, even when no harm occurs, would be an infringement of 
the respondent’s dignity.48 Interviewees’ concerns about privacy and confidentiality 
may be illustrated by the fact that of the 49 interviews conducted, only 9 gave their 
full names, with another 12 giving just one (the more anonymous Christian or ethnic) 
name.  
 
Secondly, and even more importantly, as PLWHAs, the respondents were suffering 
from what is often a debilitating illness. While most interviewees appeared physically 
fit others were visibly unwell but still agreed to be interviewed. What prompted this 
decision on their part is unclear and they were never asked out of respect and a 
reluctance to presume their state of health. However, the onus is on the interviewer 
                                                 
48
 Gray, et al (n 22), at 11. 
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to be continually vigilant of the respondents’ immediate well-being despite during the 
interview.49  
 
iii. Not Asked, but Told 
From the beginning, I was clear that interviewees would not be asked about how they 
had contracted the HIV virus. There were a number of reasons for this: firstly, not all 
may know the answer to this question. Secondly, this information was not deemed 
crucial. Although certain responses might illuminate some interviewees’ social, 
cultural and economic backgrounds, other less intrusive questions would have 
achieved the same purpose. Thirdly, and more importantly, even those who knew 
how they had contracted the virus may not want to share this information or they 
might feel compelled to lie: they might be suspicious that the interviewer may use 
this information to draw adverse conclusions about their morality, something that 
many interviewees later revealed they had often had to endure. The interviewer must 
try to anticipate which questions may thwart the smooth progress of an interview or 
even cause the interviewee to abandon it altogether.50  
 
In the event, some interviewees, mainly women, did volunteer this information in the 
course of the interview, perhaps in order to dispel any questions, suspicions or 
assumptions they thought I might have about their moral choices and to ensure that I 
was aware of their ‘innocence’ in the matter. This revealed a crucial aspect of their 
subjectivity which, it is argued in this research, may influence how some PLWHAs 
constructed their sense of entitlement to healthcare and other socio-economic 
goods. As such, seemingly neutral and non-judgemental questions as to fact elicited 
long and occasionally unnecessary but revelatory responses. Interviewee 30 is a good 
example:   
Interviewer: When did you find out that you were HIV positive? 
Interviewee:  I used to be married. I lived with my husband but I could tell he was 
not trustworthy… Later, I noticed he was getting ill. Every time I 
suggested we should go to hospital, he would abuse me and say it 
was not necessary. He continued getting ill. His relatives started to 
claim that I was bewitching him. In hospital he was admitted, he was 
very ill. At that time, I had not noticed any symptoms myself. So I 
                                                 
49
 To persist with the process in the face a respondent’s visibly deteriorating state would be unethical. 
Indeed, I decided to abandon one of my interviews when the respondent, a lady who had agreed to be 
interviewed, lapsed into a lengthy bout of coughing. 
50
 Judd, et al (n 10), at 247. 
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followed up the doctor and asked him, ‘how come my husband has 
been here 3 days and yet he has not improved?’. The doctor asked 
me what my husband had told me and I said he had not said anything 
to me. We came back home and I was given some medicine to be 
giving to him according to instructions. ….But I started not feeling 
well and I went to hospital. [W]hen the doctors at the hospital told 
me that my husband had HIV, I told them that I too wanted to be 
tested. I was and it was discovered that I, too, was HIV positive… This 
was in 2000.  
 
Later, she revealed in an unrelated question how she contracted the virus but also 
tellingly indicated that she shared in the common view that associates HIV/AIDS with 
promiscuity, even though she too seemed to have been a victim such views:  
Interviewer: What do you think about [the government’s initiation of an ARV cost-
sharing scheme]?  
Interviewee: Even I agree that we should pay something small. Because if you 
provide humans with something for free, some people will start 
treating this illness as if it is a joke, a game. If you hear about the way 
some people contract this illness, they put themselves in risky 
situations. For example, I can swear that from the moment I got 
married, I have never been with anyone else other than my husband.  
When I think about it I am so bitter, so bitter. Even in my area my 
family, my brothers, they support me because they know I am not 
the kind of person who moves around with men. Some people may 
laugh at you and ask how else then you got the disease but these are 
the prostitutes who carry out their business in secret. 
 
iv. Language and Accents 
The way I used language proved instrumental to removing or creating barriers 
between me and the respondents. Ability to converse in Kiswahili, particularly for 
those who chose to be interviewed in this language- indeed, the presentation of this 
option to all respondents- meant they were aware that we had a local language in 
common. I could also understand their terms of reference as well as the colloquial 
words or slang they used. With English interviewees, I tried to keep to simple terms 
where possible and found from the first few interviews that I rarely read the out 
verbatim some of the questions in precisely the way they had been framed in the 
questionnaire.  
 
I also found that I naturally reverted to my Kenyan accent, many characteristics of 
which had naturally become muted during my lengthy stay in the UK, and significantly 
blunted the foreign influences in my speech. Although the acquired twang may in fact 
occur naturally, there is often a perception of pretentiousness in Kenyan society 
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about Kenyan-born nationals who have travelled and/or lived abroad and who then 
adopt a foreign (normally British or American) accent, especially when they speak 
English. But even more reasonable is a presumption that anyone who has been, 
resides or studies abroad must have access to the kind of financial resources that are 
available only to a minority of Kenyans. I was very aware that this latter issue might 
alienate some of my interviewees, many of whom, as earlier noted, appeared to 
come from very poor backgrounds. It was important that such assumptions were not 
allowed to affect responses or, indeed, respondents’ willingness to participate, and 
every effort was consciously or subconsciously made to counter the notion that I was 
outsider. One cannot underestimate the role that one’s demeanour, language and 
overall presentation affects the personal dynamic that forms between interviewer 
and interviewee. 
 
v. Relating the Personal 
Although I sometimes gave examples of my personal experience of AIDS in the family, 
I had planned not to disclose such information in order not to detract from the 
respondents and their stories. Yet I found that I set aside this rule during my very first 
interviewing opportunity with the WOFAK respondents, whom I initially met as group 
to introduce myself and explain the purpose of my research before I conducted the 
one-to-one interviews. I may have felt compelled to do so to help shed the 
impression of an ‘outsider’ and instil a sense of solidarity with people from whom I 
hoped to coax some deeply personal information. I used a similar approach during a 
group discussion at MDH. I would also occasionally mention it, haphazardly, during 
some individual interviews where I thought it might be useful. For example, I wanted 
interviewee 29, who had said only the government could help meet the healthcare 
needs of PLWHAs, to consider if other actors that might play a role: 
Interviewer: Do you think other people can? For example, we had a relative who 
was HIV+ and we used to raise money to take her to hospital so we 
helped her in that small way to get treatment, so it may not just be 
the government. What do you think about this? 
Interviewee: The way I see, with your family, it is not always like that with families. 
There are others who will leave a person to die without offering any 
help. So it should be part of the law, not just voluntary otherwise 
some people will not want to get involved. 
 
d) Post-interview Reflections: The (un)Objective Researcher 
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My involvement in AIDS advocacy was one reason behind my choice of research 
subject. Having co-founded and run a youth AIDS awareness network over a decade 
ago, I sometimes adopted public positions regarding the affordability of ARVs and 
was critical about the slow or counterproductive responses of governments like 
Kenya’s and other actors. Researchers with prior self-declared public agenda have 
sometimes been accused of lacking objectivity when they attempt to conduct 
research into these areas of interest: witness, for instance, the criticisms levelled 
against the reputed feminist Oakley’s research on housework.51 She has argued that 
“in most cases, the goal of finding out about people through interviewing is best 
achieved when the relationship of the interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchical 
and when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own personal identity in the 
relationship.”52 She criticizes the fundamentals of the interviewing process itself, 
questioning the masculine perspective from which are drawn textbook notions of 
what constitutes “proper” interviewing methods.53 These ideas enforce the notion of 
interviewing as a perfunctory, question-and-answer process of data-collection.54 I 
confess to approaching my task with many such ideas in mind but also that the actual 
interviewing process disabused me of the notion that adhering to these textbook 
‘rules’ was practicable or effective.  
 
My research was also significantly influenced by the human rights focus of my 
university studies. Indeed, I was often conscious of the need sometimes to negate the 
knowledge I had acquired as a student- for instance when setting the questionnaire- 
to avoid making certain presumptions about respondents’ knowledge. This was not 
entirely successful: for example, my expectations that interviewees would 
automatically attach to government the obligations for meeting their healthcare 
needs turned out to be exaggerated; interviewees’ conceptions of the dynamics of 
obligations and privileges were more nuanced than the simplistic human rights 
theories of my education would have it.  
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 Harvey (n 8), at 224, noting Oakley (n 9) 
52
 Oakley (n 9), at 229 
53
 ibid., at 226 
54
 ibid., at 225 
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A further related issue flagged up by the interviews was how laypeople perceived 
their needs within the broader context of entitlements and/or human rights claims. 
The anticipation, as a human rights student, that respondents might see or begin to 
see the possible human rights implications of their highly articulate responses about 
their medical needs influenced my attempts to simplify and clarify the questionnaire. 
a researcher’s academic or professional background inevitably influences the process 
of gathering information but this may somewhat vitiate the objectivity intended by 
such an exercise. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a researcher to claim total 
objectivity in her work: neutrality, Oakley and others argue, is futile; “participation 
demands alignment.”55 
 
Consciously or subconsciously, then, the interview questions when wielded by one 
with an interest in the subject matter may become not just a means to gather 
information but as tool to pass on knowledge to interviewees. Thus it is unsurprising 
that some respondents, such as interviewee 16, requested I provide more 
information about human rights at the end of the formal interview. “I am so grateful 
to have met you,” she said, “and now you’re going to tell me about my rights! And 
please give me material about it as planning to be a preacher-cum-MP!”56 Again, 
Oakley is critical of the notion that “properly-socialized respondents do not engage in 
asking questions back,” and that the ‘proper’ response of the interviewer would be to 
parry- in many ways evade- interviewees’ queries to avoid bias.57 Indeed, this 
remained a concern, and I would wait till the end of the interviews to answer any 
such questions in order not to influence or render redundant the remaining ones. 
However simply I may have responded to these requests, in agreeing to do so I was 
actively staking a claim, alongside other actors such as the State, human rights 
activists and so on, and engaging in a deeply political act: attempting to shape the 
respondents’ opinions- and their subjectivity- about a live, contentious issue and 
inculcate in them my own notions of it. The old AIDS advocate in me was keen that 
they should be made aware of what they were entitled to as PLWHAs, the 
                                                 
55
 See ibid., at 237 
56
 I had similar requests from a handful of other respondents. For instance, when asked to define 
‘human rights’, interviewee 43 responded: “I may have heard of the words but I have forgotten. You’ll 
have to tell me.” Interviewee 35 said she had heard about human rights from the radio but, unable to 
offer a definition, asked me to tell her more about it. 
57
 Oakley (n 9), at 224 and 225 
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discrepancy between their healthcare entitlements in theory and in practice 
notwithstanding, and that having expressed an interest in the subject they should not 
leave the interview uninformed about it.   
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Chapter 3: Land, Kinship and Patriarchy: Producing 
Subjectivity and Power in Pre-colonial Kenya 
 
The experience of living with HIV/AIDS was a vital element in the construction of 
PLWHAs’ subjectivities, as Chapter 2 highlighted. But it is only one of many. 
Moreover, attitudes towards AIDS and PLWHAs are themselves formed within the 
very particular social, cultural, economic and political environment in which they 
exist.  
 
This chapter begins to map that complex and dynamic environment by looking at 
Kenya’s pre-colonial period, and provides a vital prelude to the discussion in Chapter 
4 on colonialism, the salient event in Kenya’s recent history.1 It illustrates how the 
values and attitudes of this period may shape not only contemporary subjectivities 
and notions of entitlement but also the patterns of risk to a very 21st Century 
epidemic: HIV/AIDS. Further, the examination of pre-colonial social and political 
organization explains how traditional conceptions and bonds of privileges and 
obligations influence modern perceptions about the relationship between the 
individual, her community and customary and State institutions.  
 
These discussions are framed within three themes that this chapter identifies as 
central to social organization and the stratification of power in pre-colonial Kenya: 
land ownership, kinship and patriarchy. It is argued here that the rules, duties and 
rights which pertained to these systems not may only have a fundamental bearing on 
how the subjectivities of modern PLWHAs and Kenyans have developed but influence 
how the interviewees situate themselves in the wider social, economic and political 
grid, thus shaping their notions of entitlement. And crucially for the rights discourse, 
this chapter underlines the fact that these enduring customary systems and 
structures operate within conceptual and normative frameworks that are often at 
odds with fundamental human rights values. As such, one begins to see in this 
chapter the foundations of the paradoxes about rights and entitlements explored in 
latter empirical chapters, and the groundwork for, among other things, the 
                                                 
1
 The British declared Kenya a colony in 1895 which it remained until independence in 1963. 
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postcolonial analysis of the relationship between the individual and the State 
developed in the following chapter.  
 
Such analyses must, however, be prefaced by an acknowledgement that Kenyan 
cultures are not homogenous; nevertheless, there are broad similarities in the way in 
which traditional power was organized to facilitate and sustain particular models of 
resource ownership and transfer, kinship and patriarchy. Each of these aspects has a 
dual role in the discussions to come: firstly, because each was a key component in the 
organization of power, each represents a key site for the contestation of that power 
to this day. Each has therefore been crucial in shaping the kind of individual and State 
that has emerged, and, as a result, the way the human rights debate has evolved in 
Kenya. Secondly, the three elements shed light on the distribution and control of 
resources in Kenya, which is germane to the realization of socio-economic rights. 
They reveal how patterns of wealth and poverty and disparity, key determinants of 
health, are produced. 
 
Firstly, though, it is necessary to comment briefly on the challenges for a researcher 
in obtaining a clear and accurate account of Africa’s pre-colonial history. In particular, 
how this issue, too, is central to the question of how identities and subjectivities are 
constructed, particularly in a postcolonial context where indigenous African historians 
challenged the long-standing exclusion of indigenous populations from describing 
their own histories and experiences unmediated by external observers and experts.  
 
I. Recording Pre-colonial History and Constructing Identities 
Many African societies have oral traditions which predate colonialism by four or five 
centuries, as well as archaeological and linguistic sources that provide8 a picture of 
Africa’s more ancient past.2 Despite its importance in revealing and transmitting 
information over generations, oral traditions have various limitations as a record of 
history which vitiates their reliability even more than the written. Charles Ambler 
decries, for instance, the restricted perspective of the past that popular histories, 
especially those of dominant groups, offer. He highlights a tendency to edit out the 
                                                 
2
 Spear, Thomas,  Kenya’s Past: An Introduction to Historical Method in Africa (London: Longman Group 
Ltd, 1981) at xix 
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conflicts and discrepancies that characterize the inevitable intercourse between 
groups, and to “reduce complicated processes of movement and social formation to a 
few clean lines on a map.”3 Such versions lack the very texture that illuminates the 
complex process of transformation that this chapter deals with.  Yet oral traditions 
are integral to manufacturing the shared myths around which communities often 
cohere and from which they draw distinct identities. One of many black African 
historians to emerge in the more permissive postcolonial era, breaking the monotony 
of the study of Africa and Africans by a uniformly white contingent of anthropologists, 
historians and other Africanist scholars4, was Gideon S. Were, whose studies focussed 
on Western Kenya. Questioned on the legitimacy of oral traditions as sources of 
history he is quoted as stating: 
Tradition was not simply something sentimental or theoretical, or merely dead 
dogma but, rather, a relevant and practical aspect of the life of the community which 
was handed down from generation to generation and which was, therefore, a living 
embodiment of the past and present… It is this factor which gives the traditions 
authority and relevance as a historical source, in contradiction to ordinary fables or 
plain mythology.5 
 
These protean traditional myths are important in helping a community accommodate 
new events in its historical narrative while side-stepping any inconvenient 
inconsistencies. Spear writes that “[t]he remembered past is seen as a reflection in 
the present of an idealized heritage in such a way as to support the maintenance of 
current institutions and values as a timeless historical heritage.”6 While this supports 
some anthropologists’ contention that oral traditional myths were more reliable as 
accounts of a community’s present rather than its past, in this context this is still an 
essential purpose: they mirrored a community’s (idealized) image of itself, as well as 
the image it wanted to project to outsiders.7 This flexibility of ‘memory’, as it were, 
                                                 
3
 Ambler, Charles,  Kenya’s Communities in the Age of Imperialism: The Central Region in the late 
Nineteenth Century (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1988)  at 9 
4
 As Mahmood Mamdani writes, “What is called African Studies was in reality a study of natives by 
settler intellectuals.” (Mamdani, Mahmood, When Does a Settler Become a Native: Reflections of the 
Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa, University of Cape Town Inaugural Lecture, 
13 May 1998, at http://hrp.bard.edu/resource_pdfs/mamdani.settler.pdf (accessed June 23 2009) 
5
 Ochieng’, William R., (ed.), Historical Studies and Social Change in Western Kenya: Essays in Memory 
of Professor Gideon S. Were (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 2002) at xii 
6
 Spear (n 2), at 47 
7
 Spear mentions Malinowski as a proponent of the view that oral traditions say more about the 
contemporary political interests of a group, as such accounts are skewed to accommodate change. He 
also references Claude Levi-Strauss, who stressed on the symbolic role of traditional myths as 
indicators of “universal patterns of human thought that transcend specific cultures and historical 
traditions.” (ibid) 
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did not begin with the attempt to make sense of the colonial experience.8 As will be 
seen in the next chapter, it is a quality that postcolonial States have exploited to self- 
mythologize and self-legitimize and to engender a national consciousness. All these 
points should be kept in mind as various sources are applied.  
 
 
II. Themes in Pre-colonial Patterns of Power 
 
a) Land: Access and Control 
The issue of land ownership in former African colonies is complex and nuanced. In 
Kenya, as with most agricultural-based economies, land is the main commodity in 
production. An earlier draft of Kenya’s new constitution recognized it as the country’s 
“primary resource and the basis of livelihood for the people.”9 The diverse 
agricultural sector still contributes a considerable 25% of Kenya’s gross domestic 
product.10 It provides, directly or indirectly, 80% of employment, more so for the 
nearly 60% of the rural population.11 There is a well-documented link between land 
ownership and individual and household income, as the discussion in Chapter 5 will 
underline, and hence between access and control of this key resource and the ability 
to afford nutrition, healthcare and the other necessities mentioned by PLWHAs. This 
                                                 
8
 Makau Mutua states, “[t]he oral tradition common to most of Africa had its own imprecision even 
before its interruption by the forces of colonialism.” (Mutua, Makau, Human Rights: A Political and 
Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002) at 74-5) 
9
 Chapter VII, “Land and Property”, Art. 77(1) of the Harmonized Draft Constitution, published 
November 17 2009, read: “Land is Kenya’s primary resource and the basis of livelihood for the people, 
and shall be held, used and managed in a manner which is equitable, efficient, productive and 
sustainable.” (Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (CECR), Harmonized Draft Constitution of 
Kenya, 17
th
 November, 2009, a copy of which is published on the website of The Local Democracy, 
Peace and Human Security, University of the Western Cape, at 
http://www.ldphs.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-instrument/constitution, accessed 
12/03/10). This provision did not survive into the final draft in this form though the Art. 60(1) of the 
new constitution does reiterate the same guiding principles. (Chapter Five, ‘Land and Environment’, at 
41-2. Republic of Kenya, Laws of Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, 2010, Kenya Law Reports 
(www.kenyalaw.org), accessed 10/12/13. (Published by the National Council for Law Reporting, with 
the Authority of the Attorney General)  
10
 Figure from the World Bank, ‘Kenya Country Brief’, 2010, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/KENYAEXTN/0,,menuPK:35652
0~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:356509,00.html, accessed 10/02/10 
11
 Statistics for  the agricultural sector’s contribution to national GDP and employment, from a paper 
by Karanja, Mercy, ‘Water Management in Kenya’, International Federation of Agricultural Producers 
(IFAP), at www.ifap.org/issues/waterspeech_mk.pdf., accessed 02/03/05. Statistics for  rural 
population from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ‘FAOStat’, 2005, at 
http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/form?collection=Population.LTS&Domain=Population&servlet=1&hasbul
k=0&version=ext&language=EN, accessed 02/03/05 
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reaffirms the correlation between Kenya’s endemic socio-economic inequalities and 
the patterns of ownership of, or access to, land.  
 
Further, land, or unequal access to it, has been a long-standing source of conflict in 
Kenya, most recently following the 2007 elections (which left 1,133 people dead and 
approximately 350,000 internally displaced), an issue fuelled in part by the common 
practice of land grabbing by the ruling elite.12 Over the years, land became a key asset 
in the patronage system that still underpins many political relations in Kenya13, 
accentuating its incendiary potential, as discussions around it during the 
constitutional reform process of the last decade illustrate.14 It evokes powerful 
emotions and gaining ownership of it has become something of an obsession with 
most Kenyans.15  
 
At a more subtle level, land continues to define ethnic groups as much as, say, their 
customs and practices, and quite literally puts them on the map, as records of pre-
colonial Kenya demonstrate. It irresistibly anchors the notion of community, and 
citizenship was traditionally founded on access to land, binding members in the real 
sense of a shared physical space and in the metaphysical of common goals and 
interests.16 Stephen Ndegwa quotes with approval Kivutha Kibwana’s observation 
that “individuals had a community share in or the rights to benefit from land.... 
Members’ entitlement to land was based on the fact that the individual belonged to a 
                                                 
12
 See Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), Republic of Kenya Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, 2008, at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.
pdf, accessed 10/03/10, from which these figures are drawn (at 305 and 362). See also Southall, Roger, 
‘The Ndungu Report: Land & Graft in Kenya,’ Review of African Political Economy, 103, March 2005, 
pp.142-51; Anderson, David and Lochery, Emma, ‘Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 2008: 
Predictable and Preventable?’ Journal of East African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2008), pp. 328-343; 
Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (CECR), Final Report of the Committee of Experts on 
Constitutional Review, 11
th
 October 2010 (Nairobi), at 25. 
13
 See Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O., Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in 
Kenya (Nairobi: Acts Press, 1991), at 147. 
14
 CECR, Final Report of the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (n 12), at 9. 
15
 See Karanja, Perpetua W., ‘Women’s Land Ownership Rights in Kenya,’ Third World Legal Studies 109 
(1991),  pp. 109-136, at 111 
16
 Angelique Haugerud notes: “Access to rural land is one means by which rural residents, as well as 
seasonal and longer-term migrants, maintain local and descent group affiliations.” (Haugerud, 
Angelique, ‘Land Tenure and Agrarian Change in Kenya,’ Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, Vol. 59, No. 1 (1989), pp. 61-90, at 62) 
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particular group.”17 In most cases the entire group was involved in the collective 
defence of its territorial integrity.18  
 
Akinyi Nzioki asserts that this link between land and identity is founded on the 
former’s durability and permanence.19 Its importance is underlined by the efforts of 
various ethnic groups to cement in their historical narrative their spiritual association 
with it.20 This is the case despite the fact that the groups themselves are less the 
monolithic units they purport to be and more artificial constructs of colonial politics.21 
However, there are more doubts beyond the obvious ones about such an account of 
divine rights, as linguistic archaeological evidence rebuts many claims to such 
continuous ownership.22  
 
Whether a group used land for cultivation, grazing or hunting and gathering, 
controlling territory was crucial to its success and survival.23 Elsewhere, Jomo 
Kenyatta, later Kenya’s first president, emphasizes the social, political, economic and 
spiritual importance of land to the Gikuyu.24 As groups expanded and migrated from 
their traditional territories they often interacted for trade and other purposes. And 
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 Ndegwa, Stephen N., ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in 
Kenyan Politics,’ American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No.3 (1997), pp 599-617, at 608 
18
 Kenyatta, Jomo, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu (London: Mercury Books, 1961) at 
21 
19
 Nzioki, Akinyi, ‘The Effects of Land Tenure on Women’s Access and Control of Land in Kenya,’ in 
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im (ed.), Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa, (London: Zed Books 
Ltd, 2002) at 223 
20
 See Shipton, Parker, and Goheen, Mitzi, 'Understanding African Land-Holding: Power, Wealth, and 
Meaning,' Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 62, No. 3 (1992), pp. 307-325, at 
309. See also Mkangi, George C., The Social Cost of Small Families and Land Reform: A Case Study of 
the Wataita of Kenya (Oxford: Pergamon, 1983 ) at 28 
21
 Ndegwa (n 17), at 600-1 
22
 For example, Spear writes that the land currently occupied by the Gikuyu had been occupied by 
other peoples before their arrival (Spear (n 2), at 59- 60). Indeed, it would appear that some versions 
of the Gikuyu legend of creation do, in fact, accommodate the notion that not all the land occupied by 
the Gikuyu came directly from God. But even these accounts find ways of conveniently ‘doing away’ 
with those from whom the Gikuyu acquired these additional lands, presumably to pre-empt any future 
claims (Kenyatta (n 18), at 21). Spear’s version of the Gikuyu’s interaction with the Gumba suggests it 
was less amicable than Kenyatta’s (Spear (n 2), at 54) Their fate, like that of others, may have been 
assimilation or marginalization, explained away by supernatural “disappearance” in the creation 
legend of Kenyatta’s childhood. 
23
 Spear writes, for example, of the Iloogolala, a pastoralist tribe hounded out of their traditional lands 
and forced into assimilation by their conquerors, thereby “disappearing”. (Spear (n 2), at 64). Terrence 
J. McCabe also  writes that the expansion of the Turkana in northern Kenya also involved a similar 
process of assimilating those they encountered and even their “extermination”. (McCabe, Terrence J., 
Cattle Bring Us to Our Enemies: Turkana Ecology, Politics and Raiding in a Disequilibrium System (Ann 
Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2004), at 98) 
24
 Kenyatta (n 18), at 21 
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although disputes over land might lead to conflict25, land could also be a valuable 
commodity in trade, lubricating such interaction.26 
  
It is difficult to apply a Western framework of property ownership to the mainly 
unwritten, multilayered, customary laws of land tenure in pre-colonial Kenya.27 
Indeed, the differences between the British and Kenyan conceptualization of land 
ownership and use were exploited to justify the alienation of Africans from their land 
at the start of the colonial project, with colonial officials asserting that “since Africans 
owned land only in terms of occupational rights, it followed that unoccupied land 
reverted to the territorial sovereign.”28 The narrow Western definition of ownership 
is unsuited to the range of rights to land in operation, namely: “tenure (land holding 
rights), ‘usufruct’ (rights to use land), ‘freehold’ (holding exclusive rights but 
transferable), and ‘ownership’ (cash valued land with title for individual or group.”29 
Customary land rights carried different and intersecting- though sometimes 
competing- obligations and entitlements but the notion of communal of land 
ownership has been fiercely rejected.30 Karanja asserts that only insofar as customary 
land tenure guaranteed access to land for all and did not vest title to individuals (as 
was the case in the West) could such a land tenure system like the Gikuyu’s be said to 
be communal; only lands with particular cultural functions like shrines, salt licks and 
grazing lands were in fact held communally.31 A strong social adhesive was thus 
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 The Maasai, for example, were pastoralist and engaged in battle with other pastoralists like the 
Turkana and Pokot during the early 19
th
 century, as the pressure for fertile land increased. (Spear (n 2), 
at 64)  
26
 For instance, the Okiek, a hunter-gatherer group, were able to sell land to the Agikuyu, who, having 
adopted cultivation, were in need of ever more farming territory. (ibid, at 61). As seen in n 22, above, 
however, such a method of land accretion is then conveniently airbrushed our of the Gikuyu story of 
origin.  
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 See, for instance, Okoth-Ogendo (n 13), at 17. See also Nzioki (n 19), at 225; Shipton and Goheen (n 
20), at 307-8; Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands, Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land 
Policy (Nairobi: Government Printer, August 2009), at 6 and 7 
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 Okoth-Ogendo (n 13), at 11 
29
 Nzioki (n 19), at 225. See also Karanja, P. W. (n 15), at 124-5 
30
 Kenyatta writes of the Gikuyu land tenure system: “[communal ownership of land] presupposes that 
the land belonged to every Dick and Harry in the community. This could not be the case for… the land 
did not belong to the community as such, but to some individual founders of the various families who 
had the full rights of ownership and the control of the land.” (Kenyatta (n 18), at 30).  Mkangi writes of 
similar ideas contained within the land tenure system of the Wataita, in which the community was the 
de jure owner of the land, with de facto ownership devolving downwards. It was in the context of 
social relationships that a man came to ‘own’, through his status or social position (by virtue of first 
occupancy, purchase, conquest or inheritance). (Mkangi (n 20), at 29 and 31.) See also Nzioki (n 19), at 
226  and Shipton and Goheen (n 20), at 311-12 
31
 See Karanja, P. W. (n 15), at 112 and 113 
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required to allow group members with only limited claims, and, by inference, power, 
to feel that they had sufficient vested interests in it to defend it. To be sure, their 
lesser but by no means unimportant claims to the land- to cultivate it, reside on it- 
must somehow be guaranteed if this sense of common interest was to be invoked. 
Consequently, the key to understanding the enduring notion of a shared interest in 
the land and its value and the other assets it now underpins, despite the uneven 
rights it encompasses, lay in understanding the nature of kinship ties, which radiated 
outwards from the family to the tribe, and their privileges and obligations. It is this 
sense of shared interest within the ethnic group that ruling elites have sought to 
exploit at key moments in Kenya’s postcolonial history.  
 
Kinship is one of the common aspects of the systems of tenure in Kenya, with 
members of the same ancestry usually involved in holding land in common32, and the 
relative abundance of the resource before colonialism undoubtedly further facilitated 
inter-family or inter-clan harmony.33 However, the kinship emphasis on collective 
over individual welfare did not always prevent the inevitable competition associated 
with the exploitation of any finite resource.34 Such tensions were soon exposed and 
compounded by the imposed shortage caused by the wholesale alienation of land by 
white settlers during the colonial era.35 The issue of access to land would become a 
key grievance in the struggle for independence. Today’s ruling elite, most of which 
consolidated their positions and acquired their enormous land-based wealth in the 
post-independence period, now face increasing scrutiny and criticism.36   
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 Spear (n 2), at xxii. See also Maxon, Robert, ‘Agriculture,’ in  Ochieng’, William R. , (ed.), Themes in 
Kenyan History (Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya, 1990) at 29 
33
 ibid., at 24 
34
 One such struggle occurred amongst some Maasai sub-groups in the early 19
th
 century, as each 
attempted to expand territorially. The victors increased their stock of herds and land while the losers 
had to serve them while they waited to accumulate enough property in order to reassert themselves. 
(Spear (n 2), at 64) 
35
 Nzioki (n 19), at 218 
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 Mr Uhuru Kenyatta, Jomo Kenyatta’s son and currently the Kenyan president, gave the coastal 
peoples vast tracts of land several years ago, which his family had acquired after independence, amidst 
questions about how such wealth had been attained. A journalist with The Daily Nation wrote, 
“Neither the Kenyatta family nor Parliament can be called socialist. The Kenyattas cannot qualify not so 
much because they are so rich but more because the way they acquired their wealth raises eyebrows. 
Moreover, the Kanu chairman has never uttered a single word advocating a national redistribution of 
wealth. And Uhuru Kenyatta belongs to that same Parliament which always seeks to perfect a 
legislative machine for popular robbery.” (The Daily Nation, ‘Fifth Columnist: On Kimunya, Socialism 
and Land Grabbing’, 15
th
 May 2005). The coastal region has “the largest single concentration of 
landless indigenous people living as squatters.” (Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on 
National Land Policy (n 27), at 43) 
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Patriarchy, explored later in this chapter, is the other common element in traditional 
Kenyan systems of tenure. Generally, women only enjoyed access to land through 
their association with their husbands or male relatives. This asymmetry in privileges, 
it has been pointed out, should not belie women’s special status as the conduits by 
which property passed down the lineage to sons, ensuring that they benefitted in 
their capacity as wives.37 Patrilineal succession was rationalized as preserving wealth 
within the kin group. Women were expected to marry and leave the family unit of 
their birth to join another. But the male right to succession carried a duty to provide 
for other family members.38 Customary land tenure systems emphasized inclusion 
rather than exclusion of kin but Karanja rightly critiques this generalization for 
obscuring the manner by which each sex gained access and the gender roles which 
entrenched notions about what privileges could be enjoyed. Men were recognized as 
‘owners’ through the manual work they undertook in clearing the bush for use, while 
women’s roles entailed cultivating it after it had been acquired.39 And despite having 
total control over the limited parcels they were allowed access to as unmarried, 
single or divorced women, and the right to determine what to do with any food 
surpluses produced, their land rights remained unequal to men’s rights.40 These 
restrictions on women’s control of land is reflected in the language used to conduct 
the dialogue on land rights:  
[T]he terms "use" and "control" of land, when applied to women's dealings with land, 
define their usufructuary interests and relate exclusively to subsistence production 
and the supply of labour. Market production, the power to make decisions on how 
much land is to be allocated to what use and the power to alienate, the main 
hallmarks of ownership, all remain outside the realms of women's control. Without 
further qualification, the terms "use" and "control" of land then become 
questionable epithets in defining women's rights to land because they exclude the 
need for acquisition of title and the benefits that flow from ownership exclusively.41 
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 Karanja, P. W. (n 15), at116-7 
38
 Kameri-Mbote distinguishes the responsibilities that come with ‘succession’ and ‘inheritance’: the 
former “denotes the passage not only of the property of the deceased but also the obligations to 
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The correlation between land ownership or control and the distribution of power 
along kinship, gender or other lines, is historical. Kenyatta underlines the 
overwhelming social and economic dependence of the poor on the (Gikuyu) 
landowners from whom they might acquire limited rights.42 This power imbalance 
was expertly exploited by the traditional chiefs whom the colonial administration co-
opted into its service, and who remained a tool of State suppression at local level long 
into independence.43 As will be seen in Chapter 4, many of those with traditionally 
limited access to resources, particularly young men, saw in the social reshuffling of 
the colonial period an opportunity to establish power bases for themselves outside 
the old, restrictive structures, thereby undermining them.44 
 
Indeed, the latter colonial era saw the beginning of major transformations in the 
systems of land tenure in Kenya involving land ownership by the State and the 
individualization of land title.45 As Chapter 5 explores in detail, individual land titling is 
particularly pertinent to an analysis of the pattern of HIV infection in Kenya and the 
capacity to realize socio-economic rights.  Some groups, such as the historically 
pastoralist Maasai, were less equipped than the farming Gikuyu and Luo to take 
advantage of the new system.46 Nor did the demands of State bureaucracy that land 
litigation entailed favour the uneducated and jobless.47 As will be seen, today’s 
multiple, incoherent, often incompatible systems of land tenure48 restrict the rights of 
millions, particularly women, to own or access land; meanwhile, “the best arable land 
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 There is even specific vocabulary to denote the landowner or the titleholder (moramati), whose 
superior status was often upheld in land rights disputes brought before elders’ councils,  and the 
individual with cultivation and building rights (mothami) or one who merely had cultivation rights 
(mohoi), which further embeds and legitimizes this cleavage. The latter owed certain strict obligations 
to the landowner, including helping him do certain chores on the property, and they could be evicted 
from the property and their rights to the land withdrawn if they failed in these obligations. The 
landowner was thus in a position to deprive his tenants of their economic livelihoods. (Kenyatta (n 18), 
at 34-5) 
43
 Ndegwa, Stephen, ‘Citizenship Amid Economic and Political Change in Kenya’, Africa Today, Vol. 45, 
No. 3/4 (1998), pp 351-368, at 354  
44
 Bayart, Jean-François, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London; New York: Longman, 
1993) at 112-3 
45
Ikdahl I., Hellum A., Kaarhus R., Benjaminsen T.A. and Kameri-Mbote P., ‘Human Rights, Formalisation 
and Women’s Land Rights in Southern and Eastern Africa’, Studies in Women’s Law No. 57 (July 2005), 
at 85. The Swynnerton Plan (published in 1954) was ostensibly aimed at creating employment, 
boosting productivity and income through the introduction of title deeds which farmers could use to 
access credit and buy farming equipment. (Nzioki (n 19), at 236.) See also Haugerud (n 16), at 63) 
46
 Ndegwa, ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics’ (n 
17) , at 608 
47
 Haugerud (n 16), at 82 
48
 Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy (n 27), at ix and 1  
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is concentrated in the hands of rich civil servants, business men, foreigners and multi-
national corporations.”49 Problems related to uneven ownership of and access to land 
are among the issues that the new Constitution hopes to address.50    
 
b) Kinship 
The second of the dominant themes of pre-colonial life in Kenya which still greatly 
impact many individuals’ notions of selfhood is that of kinship. In Kenya, social 
organization was founded upon age-grade (which, with rituals such as circumcision, 
marked the entry into adulthood51), cemented by geographical location and kinship 
networks.52 Kinship bound family or clan groups together by blood or marriage. 
However, the concept of kinship adopted here reflects not only its essential if 
restrictive meaning of a set of relationships founded on sexual reproduction but 
includes, too, a vital socio-cultural element by which power and obligations and 
privileges were distributed. The term is used to denote “a working system linking 
human beings together in an orderly arrangement of interactions, by which particular 
customs are seen as functioning parts of the social machinery.”53 The interrelation 
between the two aspects of kinship, the extent to which one is necessarily predicated 
on the other and other theories of kinship have been dealt with eloquently and in 
greater detail by other writers.54 Indeed, others have questioned the existence of 
kinship, arguing that it is a flexible concept whose meaning depends on the 
observer’s chosen definition.55 Their work can only be acknowledged here as an 
analysis of their theories is not the primary purpose of this research.  
 
                                                 
49
 Karanja, P. W. (n 15), at 134. Karanja notes the ownership by the pineapple export company, Del-
Monte, of millions of acres of land in Thika, near Nairobi, which has resulted in a “very large squatter 
population” around the pineapple plantation, arising out of the displacement of great numbers in 
Kiambu and Murang’a Districts. (at 134-5)  
50
 Art. 60(1)(f) vows as one of its principles of land use and management to enforce  the “elimination of 
gender discrimination in law, customs and practices related to land and property in land.” (Chapter V, 
‘Land and Environment’, Republic of Kenya, Laws of Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (n 9)  
51
 See, for instance, Kenyatta (n 18), at 115 
52
 Spear (n 2), at 75 
53
  Radcliffe-Brown , A.R., ‘Introduction,’ in Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., and Forde, Daryll, (eds.), African 
Systems of Kinship and Marriage (London: OUP, 1960) at 3 
54
 See, for instance, Morgan, Lewis H., Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family: 
Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge, No 17. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1870). 
See, too, Schneider, David M., A Critique of the Study of Kinship (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press: 1984) and Needham, Rodney (ed.), Rethinking Kinship and Marriage (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1971) 
55
 See generally Schneider (n 54)  
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For the narrower task at hand, while blood or marriage were the common ties within 
a kinship group, the concept was adaptable to changes in affiliations so that it might 
include individuals born outside the group.56 And herein lay a salient point about 
kinship and other social bonds: in defining the behaviour patterns of their members 
these networks also provided a framework for the obligations and privileges which 
governed their relationships. This is especially pertinent to a discussion on individual 
perceptions about entitlement to resources belonging to one’s family or kinship 
group in order to meet healthcare needs. Later chapters reveal that many PLWHAs 
appeared to claim entitlements to help from their families or relatives based on 
obligations they felt still governed their respective relationships, although others 
were doubtful if or to what extent they could rely on these ties. Historically, too, 
there were voluntary self-help groups consisting of members of the same age-group, 
sex or inter-village clans, formed to assist each with such tasks as cultivation or 
building; these were the roots of the Harambee concept, that is, the “collective and 
cooperative participation of a community in an attempt to fill perceived needs 
through utilization of its own resources.”57 In the modern context, a more diffuse 
network might be involved. For instance, interviewee 18 spoke of “...elders who 
support those in need and .... nuns [who also] raise money for those who are ill in 
their homes and they take them to hospital. So in the villages, people have formed 
their own groups to look after the poor.”  
 
Makau Mutua views the existence of kinship and other social obligations as 
irrefutable proof of an African “fingerprint” embedded in modern human rights 
ideals, disproving claims that such ideas are counter-intuitive to African traditions. In 
a discussion developed in the last chapter, he writes: 
As Josiah Cobbah correctly explains, the naming of individuals within the kinship 
structure ‘defines and institutionalizes’ the family member’s required role. These 
roles, which to the Western outsider may appear to be only of morally persuasive 
value, are ‘essentially rights which each kinship member customarily possesses, and 
                                                 
56
 Spears writes: “Kinship did not merely define one’s circle of associates. It was also defined by them it 
acted as a passive idiom to describe social relations…. Kinship, then, defined patterns of behaviour 
more accurately than it did groups of blood kin. This flexibility of idiom allowed individuals constantly 
to redefine themselves and to change and adapt their social allegiances through time.” (Spear n 2), at 
76). Kenyatta also underlines the fluid, opportunistic nature of notions of kinship. (Kenyatta (n 18), at 
14) 
57
 Ngau, Peter M., ‘Tensions in Empowerment: The Experience of the "Harambee" (Self-Help) 
Movement in Kenya,’ Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Apr., 1987), pp. 523-
538, at 524 
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duties which each kinship member has toward his kin.’ Expressed differently, ‘the 
right of one kinship member is the duty of the other and the duty of the other kinship 
member is the right of another.’58 
 
Other writers, too, apply modern rights analogies to these traditional African 
relations. Radcliffe-Brown expounds on the jural element in these social interactions, 
providing a useful perspective on the foundation of notions of entitlement within the 
kinship set-up.59 Though transplanting such contemporary concepts and their 
meanings to another era can be problematic it is not deleterious to the core task 
here, that is, exploring the role of kinship ties in the construction of notions of 
obligation and entitlement. For instance, Radcliffe-Brown refers to claims which one 
member of the unit might make obliging another to perform certain actions as 
‘positive duties’; ‘negative’ ones were selected deeds proscribed among certain 
members of the kinship network. Similarly, he differentiates ‘personal rights’, which 
governed the relationships between, say, husbands and wives and parents and 
children, from rights “against the world”, used especially in regards to property, 
which in many African societies included “possessive rights” of husbands over their 
wives and children.60 The choice of rights language thus helps to illuminate the nature 
of these bonds; “[r]eferences to duties or rights are simply different ways of referring 
to a social relation and the rules of behaviour connected therewith.”61  
 
The terminology commonly used in kinship research also provides insights into the 
nature obligations arising from these bonds. For instance, Lewis H. Morgan’s oft-
quoted work in the 19th century, introduced the idea of the classificatory system of 
kinship, where terms which referred to lineal relatives were are also applied to some 
collateral relatives.62 In some communities where such a system exists, one’s father’s 
brother may be accorded the term “father” or one’s mother’s sister referred to as 
“mother”, and so on.63 Radcliffe-Brown quotes with approval Sir Henry Maine’s view 
that, “the effect of the system is in general to bring within your mental grasp a much 
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 Cobbah, Josiah, ‘African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective,’ 9 Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol.9, No. 3 (1987), pp. 309-331, quoted in Mutua (n 8), at 83 
59
 Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (eds.) (n 53). See generally Radcliffe-Brown’s introductory chapter. 
60
 ibid, at 11-2 
61
 ibid, at 11 
62
 See, for instance, White, Leslie A., ‘What is a Classificatory Kinship Term?’, Southwestern Journal of 
Anthropology, Vol. 14, No.4 (Winter, 1958), pp. 378-385 
63
 See also the Gikuyu kinship system, in which the older or younger brothers of one’s father, are 
referred to as “elder father” or “younger father”, respectively. (Kenyatta, (n 18), at 14) 
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greater number of your kindred than is possible under the system to which [the 
British] are accustomed”, adding that the classification system is also “used as a 
method of dividing relatives into categories which determine social relations as 
exhibited in conduct.”64  
 
Whether narrowly or broadly constituted, kinship ties locked their members into an 
often complex, well-honed (although not always uncontested) set of norms and 
conventions, duties and privileges, and the effects on social structures of colonialism 
and its aftermath is crucial to understanding how human rights concepts are 
absorbed and internalized at grassroots level. One of the central notions that 
underpins human rights theory, for instance, is the individual-State relationship of 
duties and rights. Traditional social organizations, too, had sophisticated, entrenched 
systems of obligations and norms in which individuals were part of an ethnic public 
whose relations were moderated by powerful customary institutions whose 
authority, though reduced, remains today particularly in the rural sphere. In such a 
context the State may not be perceived as providing the sole- or even the primary- 
institutional framework, raising issues about conflict and co-existence, which will be 
analyzed in Chapters 4 and 8.  What is noteworthy for now are the perceptions about 
obligations and entitlements that these multiple allegiances nurture in Kenyans, 
which are far from the simple rights-holding individual/duty-bearing State dynamic 
that the human rights equation posits.       
 
The overall picture, therefore, is one of sprawling social networks and connections, 
each branching out to link household to clan to the wider ethnic group. Being able to 
locate one’s place in the network was thus essential65; for while there were certain 
duties involved, there were also entitlements and every link was a potential source of 
support for the individual who could claim it in need.66 An individual’s social 
connections themselves became a vital currency and a source of power.67 
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 Radcliffe-Brown, in Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (eds.) (n 53), at 8-9 
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 Kenyatta (n 18), at 2 
66
 Spear (n 2), at 76 
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 As Spears writes: “Among societies where everyone had rights to land so that no one could control 
productive resources and where no centralized political institutions existed, power was a function of 
one’s influence over people. The more extensive one’s personal networks, the more people one could 
mobilize in a dispute, and the larger one’s village, the greater prestige and power one enjoyed in 
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c) Patriarchy and Gender Disparity 
Patriarchy, whose literal meaning, as Patricia Kameri-Mbote points out, is the rule of 
the fathers,68 underpins much of social, political and economic life in Kenya. It 
enabled wealth, power and status to be held primarily by the males in the community 
and to be passed down patrilineally. It also bound women’s identity and selfhood to 
their male relations, making them virtual chattels first of their fathers, then their 
husbands. This has consequences on women’s perceptions about the nature of ‘the 
individual’ at the heart of human rights theory, but may also impact on their views 
about the scope of their entitlements. For example, one PLWHA interviewed for this 
research based her dependence on NGOs for her ARVs in part on the absence of 
spousal support: “If [MSF] weren’t here I don’t know how else I could get the drugs.... I 
don’t have a husband; I used to be married in Kangundo [in Eastern province] but when my 
husband died my in-laws deserted me.” (Interviewee 19)   
 
It would be impossible to map individual subjectivities and notions of entitlements 
and rights in historical and modern Kenya without looking at this system and the 
resulting gender disparity. The problem is acknowledged in the new Constitution, 
which underlines the significance of redressing gender inequality and inequity69, but 
as Maria Nzomo and Kameri-Mbote argued in their recommendations for the Draft 
Constitution of 2003, nothing short of social engineering will be required to transform 
this ideal into a reality.70 Yet this theme is pertinent to the AIDS epidemic, with 
disproportionately high number of females, especially young ones, infected.71  
                                                                                                                                             
widely respected in informal councils, while those who failed were largely ignored.” (Spear (n 2)). See 
also Mkangi (n 20), at 31. He notes that “a man without social relationships was a man without land.” 
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One of the most enduring self-identity constructs is that which defines the notions of 
‘masculinity’ and the ‘femininity’ and gender roles in African society. The discussion in 
this part of the chapter is based on some of the common themes among Kenya’s 
diverse ethnic groups. Firstly, however, a methodological point must be underlined: 
there is often a marked imbalance between researching and recording the social, 
economic and political lives of men and those of women in pre-colonial Kenya. This 
somewhat affects the quantity and quality of sources available on gender roles and 
women in general during this period, as writers such as Beth Maina Ahlberg and 
Ulrike von Mitzlaff note.72 The predetermined importance of males in pre-colonial 
societies was guaranteed by patriarchy and their roles within them viewed as 
superior to those of females. Additionally, many accounts show that unlike women, 
men were conceived as individuals with clearly defined and separate identities. 
Women’s roles were only to be appreciated within the context of their families or 
communities and their identities were immutably tied to those of their male 
associates; it is a discussion that will be further developed here and in Chapters 5 and 
8.  
 
It must be noted, too, that most, if not all, African societies adopted rigid positions on 
gender and sexuality, with little or no recognition of alternative sexualities.73 
                                                                                                                                             
http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/knowyourresponse/countryprogressreports/2012countries/ce
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Trickster Verlag ; Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1994) at 10 and 11). Although von 
Mitzlaff’s research deals specifically with the Tanzanian Maa-speaking Parakuyo community, it is 
referred to here because the author draws on the work of others who have written extensively on 
their counterpart Kenyan Maasai communities.    
73
 See Oliver Phillips, ‘(Dis)Continuities of Custom in Zimbabwe and South Africa: The Implications for 
Gendered and Sexual Rights,’ Health and Human  Rights: An International Journal, Vol. 7, No.2 (2004), 
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(Kenyatta (n 18), at 162). Further, he states, “any form of sexual intercourse other that the natural 
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even to have sexual intercourse with a woman in any position except the regular one, face to face.” (at 
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Individuals were either male or female and their prescribed sexuality necessarily 
hetero, and it was on this premise that their identities and roles within society were 
set. This rigidity persists today74: it restricts an open debate on homosexuality and the 
prevention of HIV transmission through sex between men difficult, if not impossible, 
despite anecdotal evidence of both phenomena.75  Certain practices such as 
sanctioned sexual relationships with young girls and widely-condemned practices 
such as female circumcision, common in many societies, raise interesting questions 
about how modern attitudes towards sexuality were formed. For now, however, 
these must be viewed from the perspective of traditional societies, for whom they 
bore little or no controversy.  
 
Women’s main function in traditional Kenyan societies centred on their reproductive 
capability. Children had great material value, extending the kinship chain and 
augmenting group status. This was also potentially the greatest source of women’s 
power as Maina Ahlberg and Oboler emphasize.76  There was also higher ritual status 
accorded to fathers in households with a male first-born. A girl-child is also a valuable 
asset for the extension in kinship ties and bridal wealth she brought with marriage, 
                                                                                                                                             
161). Of the Parakuyo Maasai, Von Mitzlaff writes: “Homosexuality, as the term is defined for our 
society, is not the custom with the Parakuyo. I do not know, however, whether and to what extent 
adolescent Parakuyo might have sex with members of the same sex.”(Von Mitzlaff (n 72), at 
128, footnote 1)  
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 Oboler, Regina Smith, Women Power and Economic Change: The Nandi of Kenya (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1985) at 27 and 67 
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the latter which facilitated her brothers’ marriages. Thus her perceived significance is 
still attached to her male family members.  
 
There were also disparities in the value judgements associated with masculinity and 
femininity: the former was idealized while ‘female’ traits were invariably regarded as 
inferior or undesirable, although not necessarily negative, as Oboler illustrates.77 She 
reveals that femininity was not regarded as a completely different set of traits but 
rather more a “lack of the positive traits whose full measure defines real 
masculinity.”78 In a telling bias of its own, while the Nandi have a word for masculinity 
they lack one for femininity. Masculinity was therefore the designated reference 
point and femininity akin to an absence of character, or, as Oboler writes, it was 
simply assumed that women, among whom masculine values are also desirable, 
would fail to give them their full expression due to their innate inferiority.79  
 
And yet although ‘masculine’ characteristics were viewed positively by both sexes, 
the display by a woman of some of these traits may not be well-received. An assertive 
Nandi woman might be pejoratively known by a word that translates to “manly 
woman”, signalling a potential conflict with expectations of respectfulness and 
subservience towards her husband.80 Women appear to be in a no-win situation: 
disparaged for their apparently natural inability to be like their men but, similarly, 
branded as disrespectful and socially divisive if they failed to accept this condition of 
permanent disadvantage and adopted some masculine traits. As Sylvia Tamale 
observes, “[i]n Africa, it does not matter whether a woman is a successful politician, 
possesses three Ph.D.s and runs the most successful business in town; if she has 
never married and/or is childless, she is perceived to be  lacking in a fundamental 
way.”81 The focus was not on legitimising or imbuing value in female characteristics, 
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 ibid., at 62-3 
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or even challenging the dubious basis of these character assignments. This would 
change over time, especially with the injection into the discourse of notions of 
equality and rights. But, as Chapter 5 shows, equity and equality for women in 
relation to access to and control over resources, the key to attaining real autonomy, 
remains elusive; the consequences for the spread of HIV have been far-reaching. 
 
The inculcation of the norms and roles traits outlined above formed the backbone of 
traditional education for young boys and girls with the ultimate goal of instructing 
individuals about their position within the social structure and their obligations to 
others within the community. These lessons, which started early in childhood and 
continued well into adulthood, could not be taken for granted.82 A significant part of 
the learning process involved the imitation of elders as well as play-acting.83 One 
crucial aspect of it was the inculcation of norms on sexuality and family life. For many 
groups the age-grading system provided the framework for this developmental 
process, which was punctuated by events such as initiation and marriage. The 
centrality of sex education in an individual’s development is clear from the elaborate 
rules and rituals that accompanied it. Yet it would appear that a number of 
communities, while attaching great value to sexual purity before marriage, were also 
careful to provide compromises for youngsters who wished to experiment with their 
sexuality, as was- and is- natural at this age.84  
 
Some communities, such as the Maasai, even made provisions for sexual relationships 
outside marital bonds: relations between women and men of their husband’s age-set 
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 Kenyatta (n 18), at 106; Odwar Agak, John, and  Odwar Agak, Hellen Atieno, ‘Indigenous Education 
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were all considered legitimate, and this may still be the case among some.85 This 
indicates that the process that precipitated the eventual abandonment of these more 
relaxed attitudes to sex and sexuality began and proliferated with the Christian and 
Victorian moral values introduced during colonialism. The effect of this change, of 
course, was not the end of centuries of cultural norms on sexual activity outside 
marriage, but that such practices gradually became socially unacceptable and were 
effectively driven underground. As von Mitzlaff writes, “women converted to the 
Christian religion, for example, have tried to forbid their daughters from premarital 
sexual activities. Some mothers also deny that their daughters have sexual activities 
before circumcision.”86 The effect of Christianity to sexual relations in Kenya was and 
remains profound: indeed, the myth of sex as a taboo subject in African societies 
appears to be a more recent development than is widely believed. The denunciation 
of sexual interaction outside these strictly-defined parameters and reclassification of 
previously acceptable behaviour as counter-normative has had a devastating effect 
on how individuals and communities approach sexually transmitted illnesses such as 
HIV/AIDS and those who contract them, as later chapters will demonstrate. The 
intersection of such taboos and ongoing traditional practices such as widow-
inheritance among the Luo or even the afore-mentioned wife-sharing among the 
Maasai age-set mates creates barriers for the kind of open and honest debate about 
sex that is vital to curbing HIV infection.  
 
Despite the concessions made by certain communities on sexual matters, there was, 
as mentioned earlier, an undoubted value placed by many on sexual purity, that is, 
the avoidance of full penetrative sex or sex outside the socially-prescribed 
parameters, at least during initiation and/or marriage.87 But here again there was 
greater emphasis on chastity in girls than boys, the latter for whom there was no 
method of verification.88  
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by several ceremonial privileges. Premarital pregnancy and especially the birth of a child outside 
marriage was disapproved of, to the extent that such a child was supposed to be killed as soon as it 
was born. (Oboler (n 76), at 94-5). 
88
 It must be noted that a perforated hymen is not in itself conclusive of penetrative sexual intercourse 
in women. Oboler, though noting some legitimate sexual acts between courting couples does not 
mention any expectations of virginity for men among the Nandi, except to say that a warrior who 
impregnated a girl received a severe beating from his age-mates and may be fined for his 
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All the above demonstrates the corporate value attached to sexuality, but especially 
to female sexuality. The public notification and celebration of a girl’s virginity 
underlines the difference between the two. This has two significant implications: 
firstly, the fact that sex and sexuality were of public interest in traditional and, 
arguably to a considerable extent, modern- Kenyan societies exposes a fundamental 
difference between attitudes here and in the West. This is important because not 
only do Western notions on sexuality disproportionately dominate the global 
discourse due to the sphere’s cultural, economic and political reach89 but so do their 
political and philosophical ideas about individual rights, in which sex and sexuality is 
regarded as falling within the private sphere. The tension between these two 
perspectives is critical: on the one hand, persistent cultural norms emphasize and 
promote (heterosexual) marriage and procreation as the principal avenue for 
furthering the lineage and family, the primary social and economic unit. The body, 
through which this collective goal is to be achieved, cannot be a private domain. Its 
expected yield- children- has a public utility, and so, too, does its functions. And yet 
the individual at the heart of human rights must be autonomous, and fundamental to 
this is the ownership of one’s body.90 The sexual domain perhaps embodies best that 
autonomy and many commentators on sexual rights strongly argue that they cannot 
be delinked from other rights.91 Highlighting the convergence of the development 
discourse and sexuality, they argue that where an individual’s right to control her own 
sexuality is constrained so are other rights.92 Further, recognizing the right of women 
                                                                                                                                             
transgressions. (ibid) But arguably this is punishment for impregnating the girl rather than engaging in 
full sexual intercourse. The Gikuyu, too, tested girls rigorously to ensure they were virgins at initiation 
and again at marriage, where the results of such an exercise were publicized to both the girl’s parents 
and those of her prospective husband. (Kenyatta (n 18), at 136 and 173) 
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 See, for instance Lewis, Jill and Gordon, Gill, ‘Terms of Contact and Touching Change: Investigating 
Pleasure in an HIV Epidemic,’ in Cornwall, Andrea; Correa, Sonia; and Jolly, Susie (eds.), Development 
with a Body: Sexuality, Human Rights and Development (London, New York: Zed Books, 2008).  
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 See Veil, Simone,‘ A Personal Perspective on Human Rights and Health,’ Health and Human  Rights: 
An International Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1997), pp.  91-94. She argues that public health objectives, 
which have traditionally prioritized society over the individual, must be reassessed so that they 
consider and protect “the rights relevant to the sphere of private life. To move in that direction, the 
human rights of women must be taken into account.” (at 93). See also Oliver Phillips on attempts in 
colonial Zimbabwe to curb the sexual autonomy of married women through legislation. (Phillips (n 73), 
at 88-9) 
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 See generally Cornwall, Correa and Jolly (eds.) (n 89)  
92
 See Correa, Sonia, and Jolly, Susie, ‘Development’s Encounter with Sexuality: Essentialism and 
Beyond,’ in Cornwall, Correa and Jolly (eds.), ibid 
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as individuals means recognizing their presence and role in the public space, from 
which they have traditionally been excluded.93 As Tamale notes:  
The public sphere represents men and is the locus of socially valued activities such as 
politics and business, while the private is representative of domestic activities 
centred around the family. The former represents society, while the latter represents 
culture. Women are confined to (read trapped in) the domestic arena-a space where 
men rule over them as heads of the family-while men spend most of their time in the 
public realm.94 
 
Indeed, the emphasis in history of women’s subordination has been used to galvanize 
their confinement in the private domain.95  
 
The education of generations of girls by their mothers, aunts and grandmothers can 
be seen in this light, with its emphasis on domesticity- marriage and motherhood- as 
the epitome of fulfilled womanhood.96 The cumulative effects of such instruction 
were present in this research in a number of interviewees’ responses. Further, some 
highlighted the persistence within their belief system of the notion that compliance 
and a subdued sexuality were emblems of good womanhood. It was an ideal which a 
number of PLWHAs either aspired to or felt they embodied as part of their 
subjectivity. A PLWHA must navigate all these conflicts with the added factor of social 
stigma attached to HIV/AIDS, because of which she may be censured for presumed 
sexual deviancy. And even while she may desire to embrace a human rights frame of 
reference with its positive messages of individual and sexual autonomy, of the 
validation of her self-worth and dignity, she must contend with the social and cultural 
context in which she experiences her daily life and whose values have been long 
ingrained. These conflicts will be explored further in latter chapters.    
 
Secondly, the contrasting attitudes towards male and female sexuality, in which the 
former were granted greater independence in the legislation of their sexual affairs, 
exemplify the collective ownership of women’s sexuality. Its preservation, or lack 
thereof, is viewed as having consequences on the wider society. The notions of 
‘honour’ and ‘respect’ attached to a sexually pure female who at initiation and/or 
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 Fraser, Arvonne S., ‘Becoming Human: The Origins and Developments of Women’s Human Rights,’ 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1999) pp. 853-906, at 859 
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 Tamale (n 81), at 52 
95
 Fraser (n 93), at 860 
96
 Tamale (n 81), at 51-2 
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marriage bore none of the outward signs of illicit interference, imputable to her 
parents and her family, underscore this. This illustrates the entrenchment of the 
female body and sexuality into the society’s idea of its own identity. Society’s purity 
appears to be invested more in its women; sexual impurity in men, conveniently 
harder to prove, does not seem to implicate similarly their wider community. If no 
such proof, positive or negative, can be found on the male body, then none can be 
imputed to the community.  
 
Nevertheless an aspect of male sexuality can be said to attract a similar kind of 
corporate investment: his virility. His ability to father children or even take on more 
than one wife or sexual partner, are signs of his- and therefore his kin and 
community’s- vitality.97 This creates social pressure on men to assert their sexuality- 
to ‘be men’- by engaging in behaviours that may be reckless or aggressive and which 
carry serious sexual health consequences for them and their sexual partners. It is in 
this context that violence against women and the spread of HIV infections to wives or 
long term partners by men who use commercial sex workers or have multiple sexual 
partners can be seen.98  
 
Several female PLWHAs interviewees for this research expressed a sense of grievance 
at this discrepancy in societal norms which promote a restrictive ideal of female 
sexuality, urging them to be faithful to their spouses while condoning sexual 
promiscuity in men despite the cost in lives to wives or female partners: 
If you hear about the way some people contract this illness, they put themselves in 
risky situations. For example, I can swear that from the moment I got married, I have 
never been with anyone else other than my husband.  When I think about it I am so 
bitter.... Even in my area my family, my brothers, they support me because they 
know I am not the kind of person who moves around with men. Some people may 
laugh at you, asking how else then you got the disease, but these are the prostitutes 
who carry out their business in secret. Here the nurses tell us it is good to tell other 
people about this disease and preach about it. But when I go to my District hospital 
and I see people there I think that no matter how much you tell people, they will 
never listen. You see a man taking someone’s young daughter, the next time you see 
her she is in hospital and she is ill.  You ask, what is wrong with such a person? 
(Interviewee 30) 
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 Kenyatta (n 18), at 178-9.  Indeed, impotence or barrenness in either party were grounds for 
annulment of marriage. (at 184) 
98
 UNAIDS urban data in Kenya estimates that about 62% of PLWHAs are in long-term relationships and 
that about 44% of new HIV infections through heterosexual transmission occur within marriage. 
(UNAIDS, Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 2010 (n 75), at 30) 
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Interviewee 5 emphasized the prevalent dichotomy between ‘good’, faithful, married 
women and ‘bad’, licentious, presumably unmarried ones: 
It’s not the way people put it that those who are infected are harlots, prostitutes and 
so on. It’s not like that. Some of us, since we were born, maybe you have only had 
two boyfriends, maybe even one, in all your life. Some of us, since you got married, 
you settled, but this thing just got into your house. 
 
Interviewee 10 distinguished ‘good’ women/wives from ‘bad’ men/husbands: 
...[S]ome people... if they hear you are HIV-positive you’re just someone who was a 
loose person, and it is not that way. Especially us women, you are married lady, 
you’re with your children. It is these men we are married to that go look for this thing 
and bring it to you. We women we are very, very, very, very innocent. Very innocent.   
  
In these responses, reviewed in later chapters, wives stridently assert their chastity 
(even though one of them can hardly bring herself to blame her husband explicitly, 
perhaps out of embarrassment, loyalty or deference: “this thing (HIV/AIDS) got into 
your house”), for there is still great currency for women in upholding- or seeming to 
uphold- these norms. While there are certain privileges to be enjoyed by those who 
adhere to society’s sexual rules and so exemplify the best of the community, serious 
repercussions await those who operate outside its strictures and attempt to carve out 
of the collective interest in sexual affairs a private, independent space.  
 
The notion of errant male sexuality and a chaste female one is one that a number of 
female respondents appeared to subscribe to. And while such notions are still 
popular today, they are not uncontested. The issue of how to tackle HIV incidence 
within married couples is much-debated.99 Some human rights experts such as 
Nzomo and Kameri-Mbote have proposed legal recognition of “mandatory but 
guaranteed testing [for] HIV/AIDS before solemnizing marriage,” as part of a wider 
agenda to give women greater sexual and reproductive autonomy.100 But others 
oppose involuntary testing as violation of individual rights and a potent tool for 
discrimination of PLWHAs.101 Yet others note the potential conflict between respect 
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 See, for instance, BBC, ‘Should HIV testing be mandatory?’ 30
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for PLWHAs’ rights- rejecting policies that may aggravate stigma and discrimination- 
and what may ultimately be practical and possibly successful prevention strategies. 
Elizabeth Pisani decries “the predictable, knee-jack comments about a violation of 
ethics, about protecting people’s right not to know if they were infected, and their 
right not to tell anyone else if they did know,” and talks of challenging the “sacred 
cow of ‘only voluntary confidential testing’”, especially in light of the increasing 
potential for counselling and treatment now found in many countries, including 
Kenya.102  Other commentators suggest alternative approaches to bridge these 
dilemmas, such as increasing availability and accessibility of VCTs or conducting 
routine testing, a policy endorsed by the WHO.103   
 
All of the above sets up a debate on the role of gender and sexual norms within a 
human rights framework which formally recognizes only autonomous individuals 
whose social goods are to be accessed through the State, which in Kenya’s case, 
retains many of the patriarchal impulses that motivated pre-colonial societies and 
which the colonial State little intervened to alter.104 One detrimental manifestation of 
this, explored in detail in Chapter 5, has been the government’s failure to address the 
problem of gender inequity regarding access to land. Women are disadvantaged by 
State-sponsored individual-titling policies which combine with culture, customary 
laws of tenure, and other factors including capitalism and the prevailing global social 
inequalities to institutionalize male control of this key resource.105 Another of these 
factors, colonialism, which altered but in other ways entrenched the patterns of 
traditional power distribution discussed here, is reviewed next.  
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Chapter 4: The Colonial Legacy 
 
Chapter 4 continues to map the complex environment in which PLWHAs’ 
subjectivities and notions about entitlements and notions about rights are hewn. 
Building on the discussions in Chapter 3, it introduces into the landscape the 
experience of seven decades of colonization. It examines how this event, with its 
multiple and sometimes contradictory aims, contributed to these key issues. In 
particular, this chapter analyzes continuities in the colonial and AIDS discourses, 
illustrating the persistent dominance of the themes of race and power in shaping 
individual and collective subjectivities. Significantly, the colonial period saw the 
introduction of the State, thus parachuting into the existing hierarchy of power a new 
entity to rival the customary. Crucially, the introduction of the State also heralded the 
haphazard construction the African legal subject and the attempt to delineate her 
rights. Here lie the roots of the binaries at the heart of Mahmood Mamdani’s 
bifurcated State theory: civil and customary, citizen and subject. The issues they raise 
frame this research. As this chapter shows, from the outset there was a clear racial 
demarcation between the legal and political identity of the native and settler: the 
former was a subject only, confined to the customary realm, while the latter alone 
occupied the civil domain, a citizen with rights from the State. As Mamdani argues, 
the boundary, though now deracialized, persists. Yet, as several interviewees’ 
responses for this research illustrate, the modern Kenyan is arguably less a citizen or 
subject and more a citizen and subject. This chapter contends that this dual 
membership of a national and ethnic public, and perceptions about the roles, 
legitimacy and values of State and customary authorities significantly influence how 
individual PLWHAs identify themselves in reference to other actors. Consequently, 
the complexities and contradictions inherent in this duality not only help define 
individual subjectivity but arguably their notions about health-related entitlements. 
 
Before we explore these discussions, however, it is worth making a preliminary point 
about the characters of the citizen and subject, whom Mamdani employs in his 
analysis of the development of subjecthood, law and rights in the colonial and 
postcolonial periods. It may be possible to argue that Mamdani uses the 
 145 
 
citizen/subject dichotomies as ‘ideal types’, theoretical tools developed by Max 
Weber.1 Understood as such, the citizen and subject do not, indeed can never hope 
to fully encapsulate the varied reality of the social, cultural, political and economic 
lives of the white settlers and indigenous Africans. Arguably then, in deploying these 
characters, Mamdani may have been distilling into the ‘citizen type’ and the ‘subject 
type’ the general aspects of their  complex lived experiences, with particular 
emphasis on the more extreme aspects, in order to highlight what separated the two 
groups and as such aid his analysis of the divergent fates of the citizen and subject. 
The consequence of this, of course, would be to mute the shades of grey that would 
define such a co-existence in reality. 
 
To be sure, there is a basis in this argument, for even the colonial-era citizens and 
subjects, whose separation was so rigidly policed, inevitably encountered each other 
in the shared spaces which developed in order to facilitate various colonial objectives. 
One such objective was the servicing of the settler economy, which necessitated 
African labour and thus interaction between citizens and subjects. Mamdani explores 
this, for instance, in relation to South African migrant workers.2 Nevertheless, as will 
be seen shortly, one insuperable concrete reality persists which transcends even 
these interactions: the fundamental racial divide that defined and separated citizen 
from subject. As Mamdani writes, the term ‘native’, evolved as “a blanket racial 
category…. The point was to cast the net wide enough to catch within its fold every 
person with any trace of African ancestry. The objective was to arrive at a racial 
definition, not a cultural one.”3 For the citizens and subjects of the colonial period the 
greys are subsumed in the fact of their ineluctable racial identity.  
 
For the deracialized postcolonial citizen-subject, however, this essential separation is 
negated. The urban/ rural boundary that divides the two is more fluid, thus arguably 
presenting greater scope for arguing that the citizens and subjects Mamdani 
describes in postcolonial context are more identifiably ‘ideal types’. The accentuation 
of the extremes of their social, cultural political and economic lives becomes more 
                                                 
1
 See, for instance Watkins, J.W.N., ‘Ideal Types and Historical Explanation’ The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, No. 9 (1952), pp. 22-43 
2
 Mamdani, Mahmood, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) at 218 
3
 ibid, at 111 
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necessary to this phase of his analysis of the citizen and subject narrative, and he 
arguably has this in mind, in order to highlight their cleavage and facilitate his theory 
of the persistence of this duality in the postcolony. Indeed, it this fluidity, the shades 
of grey within the postcolonial citizen-subject dichotomy, which the interviews for 
this thesis appear to reaffirm, as will be seen later. The above notwithstanding, 
Mamdani’s theory remains fundamental to this research, and it provides an ideal 
conceptual tool for analyzing the development of the differentiated legal statuses of 
white settlers and indigenous Africans which evolved in colonial era and continued 
after independence, with crucial ramifications for the development not just of 
concept of the citizen(-subject) and the State, but also the rights and duties which 
bound them. This is what underpins the significance of Mamdani’s thesis to this 
research.  
 
I. Colonialism, the State and the Subject 
The colonial enterprise embraced various, sometimes inconsistent, objectives, 
reflected in the shifting attitudes of the administrators of the Crown Colony of Kenya 
towards the indigenous population. These included ‘civilizing’ and evangelizing the 
black Africans, as well as commercially exploiting the new colony. The term 
‘civilization’ is problematic and its definition elusive yet it is fundamental to the 
discussion here because it became the key criteria in deciding the legal status of 
indigenous peoples. Were they to be regarded as subjects within the law of the 
colony as well as equal citizens with rights and privileges equal to their settler 
counterparts? But, as will be seen, this catch-all term also resonates in contemporary 
debates about the objectives and processes of international development and the 
universalization of the human rights project, adherence to which is widely recognized 
as a criteria for international legitimacy among post-independence nations and an 
indicator of their ‘maturity’.4  
 
The term ‘civilization’ informed popular notions about Africa and Africans during the 
Scramble for Africa in 1884. It defines a certain standard of advancement in human 
                                                 
4
 Indeed, Makau Mutua  suggests that the mostly-successful efforts by European powers to broaden 
the reach of human rights standards and related Eurocentric ideas may be yet another ‘civilizing’ 
project in all but name (Mutua, Makau, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 2002) at 32, and elsewhere.  
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society.5 As with all value-laden terms, those who introduce, define, endorse and 
popularize their use invariably ascribe to themselves its positive aspects and to others 
its antitheses. So, too, with ‘civilization’: the white Europeans, who began to settle in 
Kenya at the close of the 19th Century, predictably had more of it than the black 
population. This ideology of European/white superiority continued to frame the 
paternalistic policies and laws of the colonial State throughout the period.6 And it 
endures in the psyches of many; this was perhaps best-illustrated by PLWHAs’ 
responses regarding overseas development aid, some of which appeared to attribute 
an almost mythical status to foreign actors, as if their offers of assistance symbolized 
a higher, ‘civilized’ quality.7  This will be explored in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7 
when the role of donors and NGOs in financing ARV projects for PLWHAs is discussed.   
 
The definition of civilization adopted by Europeans was an amalgamation of many 
ideas: it contained religious and moral components rooted firmly in Christian 
monotheism. The inculcation of Christianity and eradication of what were seen as the 
inferior morals of Africans everywhere therefore became an integral part of the 
colonial agenda, as pro-colonists such as Matthew Carey, writing in the first half of 
the 19th Century, demonstrate.8 African customs and practices such as female 
circumcision were a constant source of tension, with African writers such as Kenyatta 
condemning the patronising attitude of the British, whom, he argued, took a narrow 
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 Oxford English Dictionary Online, www.dictionary.oed.com, accessed on 28/08/06.  
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 Bruce Berman writes that as part of the “omnipotent” image that the influential Provincial 
Administration strived to project, the institution also used its extensive discretionary powers to 
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7
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The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London; New York: Longman, 1993) at 61 
8
 Writing in favour of the establishment of a colony for freed slaves in Liberia 1832, Carey asserts that 
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labour in the cultivation of the soil…” (Carey, Matthew, Letters on the Colonization Society, with a View 
of its Probable Results… Addressed to the Hon. C.F. Mercer (Philadelphia: 1832 )at iv). Liberia is a very 
specific case, given the history of many of its inhabitants as freed slaves from Europe and the 
Americas. One of Carey’s main contentions in favour of the colony, for example, was that its 
establishment helped curb the “nefarious” slave trade and offered the blacks the kind of opportunities 
they did not actually enjoy as slaves in the United States. However, many of his views on the issue of 
civilization are typical of other colonization debates: “The best criterion, however, by which to judge 
[the advances made by the freed slaves in colony of Liberia] is the progress they have made…Of the 
improvements in morals, and manners and habits…”  
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view of the offending customs without considering their wider social significance.9 
Despite subsequent willingness to allow controlled expression of cultural uniqueness 
for pragmatic reasons, the caveat of European-defined morality remained.10 Africans 
were obliged to accept the colonizing mission as an effort to save them from 
themselves, their backwardness and their past.11  
 
Ultimately, however, the most fundamental element of the colonial definition of 
‘civilization’ was the crude one of race. In this sense the question of whether the 
newly-colonized indigenes could ever gain admittance into the social, political, 
economic and legal space on an equal footing with white settlers was pre-
determined.12 The result was a split State- Mamdani’s ‘bifurcated State’-, a product of 
the deliberate processes and considered rationale deployed by the colonizers. The 
population itself was split into different administrative and legal spheres. Mamdani 
writes: 
In the main... the colonial state was a double-sided affair. Its one side, the 
state that governed a racially defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of 
law and an associated regime of rights. Its other side, the state that ruled over 
subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively driven 
justice.13 
 
Mamdani, Mbembe and others successfully argue that these schisms both in the 
State and the subject have been substantially replicated in post-independence African 
countries such as Kenya, producing two publics instead of one. A number of 
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 Kenyatta, Jomo, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu (London: Mercury Books, 1961) at 
135 
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 As Mahmood Mamdani writes, “The standard formulation … required that customary law [in 
countries like Kenya or Malawi] be applicable if ‘not repugnant to justice and morality.’” (Mamdani (n 
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comments made by interviewees intimate at just the kind of split publics that Peter 
Ekeh and Stephen Ndegwa explore, as will be seen later.  
 
Before addressing the impact of the colonial discourse on the AIDS debate and the 
configuration of the State and citizen-subject, it is worth highlighting a couple of 
points about the notions of race and culture which so influenced the colonial 
government. Firstly, critiques of popular ideas about Africans and African-ness did not 
emanate solely from Africans themselves. Despite the wide subscription to views like 
Carey’s above, some Europeans had questioned the hypocrisy that underlay 
presumptions of European cultural and moral superiority.14 Prevailing views on the 
treatment of indigenous populations, whether they should simply be regarded as 
mere objects upon whom certain acts, often violent, were performed for their alleged 
betterment, proved problematic in some quarters.15 Such objectification was difficult 
to reconcile with the perceived triumph of the abolition of slave trade which the 
British themselves claimed. Indeed, this development overlapped with European 
colonial ambitions, meaning that there had been an ongoing dialogue about the 
exploitation and maltreatment of non-white races long before Kenya became a 
colony.16 
 
Secondly, the abolition movement, in effectively attributing qualities of ‘humanness’ 
to black slaves, exposed yet another incongruity in the attempt to define the term 
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 A good example of this is William Howitt’s Colonization and Christianity: a Popular History of the 
Treatment of the Natives by the Europeans in all their Colonies (London: 1838): He writes, “We have 
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the 19
th
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task of “civilizing” them. AAS’s stated objectives are: “to develop the material sources of Africa…; and 
to promote the Christian civilization of the African races; by which means the society believes that the 
annihilation of the slave trade will ultimately be accomplished.” (African-Aid Society, First Report of the 
African-Aid Society, July, 1860, to March 31, 1862 (London: African Aid Society, 1862), at 2-3.  
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'human’: for human value in the slave or  indigene was often limited to her potential 
rather than her existing state of being.17  Because her value is predicated on a future 
state which she may or may not achieve, depending on the opinion of her colonial 
arbiters, any rights she might possess by virtue of her humanness are either limited or 
a receding horizon.18 This feeds into questions about the legal subjectivity of black 
Africans in new colonies like Kenya, whether they, too, had any rights, or whether 
there was at least a space within the legal terrain of the new colonial State in which 
they might, in future, be recognized as citizens rather than mere subjects of the law. 
These issues will be addressed later in the chapter. For now, it is worth assessing the 
lasting effects of the colonization narrative on the HIV/AIDS debate that is the 
backdrop for this research. 
 
II. Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the Political Economy of 
AIDS 
 
The globalization of the campaign for free or affordable ARVs and the rights of 
PLWHAs, explored in detail Chapters 6 and 7, has been one of the most effective of 
recent years: the effects of the social and economic disparities across the world, 
embodied by the vastly differing outcomes for PLWHAs in the poorest (especially 
African) and richest countries, has resonated with many around the world. One of the 
critical issues was the international patents system, TRIPS (or the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), that covers, among others, life-
saving pharmaceutical products (as will be explored in Chapter 6). The pernicious 
effects of its strict application drew analogies with the racist policies of South Africa’s 
                                                 
17
 See AAS’s statements, mentioned above, which emphasize the Christianization and civilization of 
Africans, suggesting the view of indigenous as somehow ‘unfinished’ and their value not fully realized 
without this intervention. Mbembe quotes Albert Sarraut, who spoke of natives as simply being “that 
‘unformed clay of primitive multitudes’ from which colonization’s task was to ‘shape the face of a new 
humanity’.” (Mbembe (n 12), at 28). Various authors have written on the objectification of the African 
and development of the notion or stereotype of the ‘African’. The medical and scientific fields 
significantly aided this process, constantly producing knowledge geared towards understanding the 
nature of the ‘otherness’ of the African. See, for example, Vaughn, Megan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial 
Power and African Illness (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991; and Butchart, 
Alexander, The Anatomy of Power: European Constructions of the African Body (London; New York: Zed 
Books, 1998) 
18
 Charles William Hobley, for instance, estimated that it would take one to two centuries of “patient 
work on the African native” before he could be trusted to play a significant part in his own 
development. (Hobley, Charles William, Kenya: From Chartered Company to Crown Colony: 30 years of 
Exploration and Administration in British East Africa (London, 1970), at 195 
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apartheid regime, with “[pharmaceutical] companies act[ing] to maintain the rules of 
a system that denies the value of black lives in favor of minority privilege. The result 
in Africa has been murder by patent.”19   
 
It was a dichotomy that was perfectly suited to campaigning, fitting as it did with well-
established though rather crude narratives about the global economic system and 
modern humanitarian crises familiar to global audiences.20 In these narratives, on the 
one hand, were often extremely poor Africans unable to meet their basic needs. On 
the other were a well-endowed amalgam of donors, development agencies and NGOs 
from the industrialized world, compelled to (well-publicized) action in large part by 
effective advocacy campaigns by individuals and civil society groups among their own 
constituents.21  
 
However, there are disturbing parallels between the moral and narrative framework 
into which the contemporary HIV/AIDS crisis has been slotted and that which over a 
century ago had been used to legitimize the colonial enterprise. There are significant 
differences of context, of course: among them, firstly, the millions of dead and 
suffering gave unquestionable moral force to the anti-AIDS movement; by contrast, 
the policies of racism and economic exploitation that underlay the colonial enterprise 
exemplified its inherent moral bankruptcy. Secondly, post-independence Africans, 
despite the curtailment of rights that many endure, enjoy greater collective and 
                                                 
19
 Booker, Salih and Minter, William, ‘Global Apartheid,’ The Nation, 21
st
 June 2001 
(http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010709/booker/single (accessed 15/07/09). They  define global 
apartheid as “an international system of minority rule whose attributes include: differential access to 
basic human rights; wealth and power structured by race and place; structural racism, embedded in 
global economic processes, political institutions and cultural assumptions; and the international 
practice of double standards that assume inferior rights to be appropriate for certain ‘others,’ defined 
by location, origin, race or gender”. 
20
 As Dennis Altman notes, “The common rhetoric around inequality in access to healthcare tends to 
reflect a rather simplistic analysis of imperialism, in which ‘developing’ countries are seen as powerless 
in [the] face of the dominant capitalist order.” (Altman, Dennis, ‘Globalization, Political Economy and 
HIV/AIDS,’ in Jeffrey Weeks, Janet Holland, Matthew Waites (eds.), Sexualities and Society: A Reader 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003) at 191) 
21
 Indeed, Baxi explains the complexities of this process using a market analogy: “The raw material for 
human rights investment and consumer markets is provided by here-and-now human misery and 
suffering. However morally deplorable, it is a social fact that the overall human capacity to develop a 
fellowship of human suffering is awesomely limited… [The ]human rights markets, no matter whether 
investor [e.g., governmental, corporate, community] or consumer [e.g., NGOs or funding agencies], are 
confronted with the problem of ‘compassion fatigue’. This is a moral problem, to be sure, but it is also 
a material problem….” (Baxi, Upendra, ‘Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights,’ 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol.8, No. 2 (1998), pp.125-169, at 159) 
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individual agency and are therefore able to shape significantly their trajectories. So 
while the access to treatment and PLWHA rights movements in Africa are rightfully 
linked to external, globalized economic issues, a substantial role is also foreseen for 
Africans in their solution; the accomplishments of home-grown activists and NGOs 
seem testament to this. The reality and scope of such autonomy may be arguable but 
post-independence Africans are undoubtedly less directly susceptible to the whims of 
overseas imperial powers, certainly when it comes to the application of the corporal 
violence, through brute force or bonded labour, that was a leitmotif of colonialism.  
 
But the discourse of dominance, exemplified by the colonial/indigene dynamic, has 
been less easy to shift even with issues as morally compelling as healthcare and 
HIV/AIDS, and is arguably reinforced with every humanitarian or public health crisis. 
The popular identities persist: the suffering black African, often perceived as author 
or catalyst of her own misfortune, is seen as helpless and in need of assistance; and 
the white European saviour compelled to ride to her rescue. Once again, intervention 
is the latter’s duty and despite the former’s resistance, it must be undertaken for her 
own good, even when the remedy may be detrimental: witness the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s22 or the pro-abstinence policy 
of US President George W. Bush’s Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), more of which in Chapter 7.  And despite a noted lack of transparency and 
local accountability in the processes of foreign-based development actors, 
“[p]rescriptions of good governance are discriminatorily-and viciously-addressed only 
to states and communities outside the core Euro-Atlantic states,” a sceptical Baxi 
notes.23 Indeed, Celestine Nyamu-Musembi and Andrea Cornwall argue that 
overseas-based aid agencies, among the most vociferous advocates of the de rigueur 
rights-based approaches to development today, often underplay the highly politicized 
history of the colonial era because their own relationships to their beneficiary States 
are framed by this problematic history.24 
                                                 
22
 See, for instance, Mohindra, K.S., ‘Healthy Public Policy in Poor Countries: Tackling Macro-economic 
Policies,’ Health Promotion International, Vol. 22, No.2 (2007), pp. 163-169. See also Nzomo, Maria, 
‘The Political Economy of the African Crisis: Gender Impacts and Responses,’ International Journal, Vol. 
51, No.1 (1995-1996), pp. 78-102, at 82-3. 
23
 Baxi (n 21), at 167 
24
 Nyamu-Musembi, Celestine and Cornwall, Andrea, ‘What is the ‘Rights-Based Approach’ All About? 
Perspectives from International Development Agencies,’ IDS Working Paper 234 (Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS): Brighton, Sussex, November, 2004), at 7 
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John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff analyze the ideological fervour of the influential 
civil society organizations (CSOs): the ‘Idée’ of ‘civil society’ (discussed in Chapter 7), 
they argue, embraces terms that “have a highly charged history in a continent still 
struggling to extricate itself from a century of European rule; from a cultural 
imperialism styled, literally, as a civilizing mission, whose telos lingers on in the 
paternalism of both the ‘charity business in Africa’ and the ideologically saturated 
“development” industry.”25 L. Muthoni Wanyeki, writing shortly after the 2005 G8 
meeting at Gleneagles, Scotland, echoed the imperative to locate these movements 
within Africa’s recent history: 
‘[D]o-gooding’….is the only way in which [British aid organisations] are able to frame 
the discussion. History has gone out of the window. Yet the impoverishment of Africa 
is not ahistorical – it is the result of a political-economic positioning in the world that 
dates back beyond colonisation to slavery. …The question then is how the debate 
around the G8 summit could have become such an ahistorical debate? What lies 
behind our push for the deals on aid, debt and trade is an immense awareness of our 
history. We may not talk about it. But we live with its continued presence every day. 
… What lies behind their push is a desire to forget, ignore – or worse, deny – history. 
And thus it is possible for the debates to proceed with nary an African in sight.26   
 
Yet more issues surface which have resonance with the colonial experiences of many 
black Africans: the sensitive debate about the origin of the disease itself, believed by 
many to be central Africa, Joseph Conrad’s very Heart of Darkness, but a debate in 
which many of those in the health sector would rather not engage. James Chin writes 
of his attempts to broach the issue: “I believe that ‘mainstream’ AIDS organizations 
generally accept Africa as the most likely origin of HIV, but they are all acutely aware 
of the international sensitivity this issue causes, especially among Africans. When and 
if asked about the origin HIV, these organizations state that the origin of HIV is 
irrelevant to the problems at hand…”, that is, the prevention of infection and 
treatment and care of the infected.27  
 
                                                 
25
 Comaroff, John L. and Comaroff, Jean, ‘Introduction,’ in Comaroff, John L. and  Comaroff  Jean, 
(eds.), Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), at 2 
26
 Wanyeki, L. Muthoni, ‘Poor Africa, Darling of the West,’ The East African, 11
th
 July 2005. Wanyeki 
was then-Executive Director of the African Women's Development and Communication Network 
(FEMNET) 
27
 Chin, James, The AIDS Pandemic: The Collision of Epidemiology with Political Correctness (Oxford; 
Seattle: Radcliffe Publishing, 2007) at 27 
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Moreover, the HIV epidemic thrust onto centre-stage a controversial subject in 
colonial discourse: Western notions about African sexuality. To 19th Century 
Europeans, Africans were possessed of a rampant sexuality, which, alongside their 
‘unsanitary’ customs and practices, was proof of an innate barbarity which further 
justified the European ‘civilizing’ mission.28 The plight of Saartjie Bartmann, a 
Hottentot woman paraded around Europe as a freak of nature because of her 
physical features, uncommon in a European context, is a good example. Even her 
remains were a curiosity, “her genital matter fingered by inquisitive European men 
who believed that her pickled organs held secrets that would reveal the mysteries of 
the ‘dark continent’ of African female sexuality.”29  
 
Some prominent Africans saw similar patterns of thought emerging in the way sub-
Saharan Africa’s HIV/AIDS epidemic was being characterized. In 2001, South African 
president Thabo Mbeki, who, as will be seen in Chapter 6, was rightly criticized for his 
response to the epidemic there, denounced those he said were “convinced that we 
are but natural born promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world. They 
proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our 
unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust.”30 Widely-reported sexual and cultural 
practices which have been blamed for fuelling the spread of the infection encourage 
the views that Mbeki denounces. An example is ‘dry sex’, the use of powders, papers, 
dry leaves, etc, to dry out and tighten the vagina prior to sex, apparently to heighten  
male sexual pleasure. Although more prevalent in central and southern Africa, it has 
been documented among commercial sex workers in Kenya and the economic 
imperative that often spurs it revealed.31 
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 Seckinelgin, Hakan, ‘Time to Stop and Think: HIV/AIDS, Global Civil Society, and People’s Politics,’ in 
Glasius, Marlies, Kaldor, Mary and Anheier Helmut, (eds.), Global Civil Society 2002, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 113.  See also, Vaughn, op. cit., and Butchart, op. cit., and UNAIDS, HIV-
Related Stigma, Discrimination and Human Rights Violations: Case Studies of Successful Programmes, 
UNAIDS Best Practice Collection, 2005, http://data.unaids.org/publications/irc-pub06/JC999-
HumRightsViol_en.pdf, accessed 10/03/10, at 8 
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 Holmes, Rachel, African Queen: The Real Life of the Hottentot Venus (New York, NY: Random House, 
2007) at 112  
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 Quoted in Epstein, Helen, The Invisible Cure: Africa, The West and the Fight Against AIDS (New York, 
NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), at 150 
31
 A study in Meru in Eastern Province found that 36.1% of the 147 female sex workers interviewed 
participated in the practice because it often attracted a greater fee, with many personally initiating it 
and performing it without a condom although the vast majority of them recognized that it exposed 
them to greater risk of HIV infection. (Schwandt, Michael, et al, ‘Anal and Dry Sex in Commercial Sex 
Work, and Relation to Risk for Sexually Transmitted Infection and HIV in Meru, Kenya’, Sexually 
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Other practices considered risky, such as wife-inheritance and female circumcision, 
are more ingrained in cultural rituals among some communities, and the latter in 
particular, attracted strident British colonial opposition and equally vociferous 
support from the likes of Jomo Kenyatta.32 Even today, opponents of these practices 
are accused of cultural chauvinism and condemned as brainwashed African lackeys of 
the former imperial masters. While one Kenyan female MP publicly criticized in 2005 
the forced ‘female genital mutilation’ of some schoolgirls in Kenya’s north-west, a few 
months earlier some of her male counterparts, sensitive to how the issue might play 
out among their constituents, eventually fought successfully to have a proposal to 
abolish the practice excised from the then-circulating Sexual Offences Bill.33  
 
The above are only a few of the issues that converge in the AIDS debate, which, as 
Barnett and Whiteside point out, “mixes sex, death, fear and disease in ways that can 
be interpreted to suit the prejudices and agendas of those controlling particular 
narratives in any specific time or place.”34 Colonial notions about African sexuality 
have shaped the epidemic in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa in two ironic ways: firstly 
religious leaders and self-proclaimed guardians of African culture have cast 
themselves in opposite roles to those that Mbeki, above, appoints for them albeit 
with disapproval. Like the condom-burners in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park they see 
themselves as the true and modern custodians of moral standards and the West, with 
its liberal sexual attitudes, as morally depraved. They exercise the formidable power 
of production and authentication of African identity (which amounts to power to 
certify candidates for the crucial, alternative site for citizenship and rights that is the 
customary). They reject as ‘unAfrican’ methods of HIV prevention which do not 
prioritize abstinence, seeing them as a Western attempt to subvert African moral 
probity. Unfortunately, this has created fertile ground for the rejection and 
stigmatization of PLWHAs, their infection perceived as manifestations of their moral 
depravity and therefore, according to some, deserved.  
                                                                                                                                             
Transmitted Infections, 21
st
 June 2006, at http://sti.bmj.com/cgi/rapidpdf/sti.2006.019794v1, accessed 
21/05/08), at 7) 
32
 Kenyatta (n 9),at 131-134 
33
 Beth Mugo, MP, ‘FGM is Barbaric and Retrogressive,’ Letter, The Daily Nation, 25
th
 July 2005 
34
 Barnett, Tony and Whiteside, Alan, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), at 71 
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Secondly, the Victorian attitudes towards sex and disease, largely promulgated by the 
missionaries who operated most of the early biomedical health facilities, shadow 
modern attitudes about sexually transmitted illnesses and hamper efforts to bring the 
epidemic out of the shadows in which thrives. This point bears emphasizing: Vaughn 
observes that some Europeans interpreted as signs of lack of shame, uncontrolled 
and dangerous sexuality, and savage innocence Africans’ readiness to present 
themselves for treatment for sexually transmitted illnesses.35 Arguably, the success 
with which notions of shame became coupled with sex and sexuality is one of the 
colonial period’s most enduring legacies: they have helped fuel the very AIDS 
epidemic in Africa at which many in the West throw up their arms in frustration. The 
secrecy and stigmatization which shame encourages leads many to resist HIV testing 
and the possibility of treatment.36  
 
Colonial ideas about African sexuality were only one element of the broader attempt 
to define and delineate the African subject. These efforts would find form, to 
devastating and lasting effect, in the language and processes of law.  
 
III. Colonization and the Construction of (Legal) Subjectivities 
The process of creating indigenous legal subjects was continuous and often 
contradictory: the former because the distinguishing elements persist37, and the 
latter because, as Mbembe notes, the colonial State in its exercise of power retained 
its capacity to treat indigenous people both as objects and subjects of the law, a gap 
that he argues was never bridged. As a component of indirect rule, British law was 
deemed “too ‘advanced’ for the level of evolution reached by the Africans of 
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 Vaughn (n 17), at 150 
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 Only 37% of 15-to-49-year-olds in Kenya know their HIV status. (WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF, Towards 
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Kenya…”38 Thus, a plural system of law operated, which, as will be seen in later 
discussions, continued post-independence. White settlers alone comprised the 
citizens- the civil society- of the colonial State. In this realm, they enjoyed the rights 
and freedoms of modern civil law, including the limitation of State power.39 The 
colonial administration clothed this differential treatment in familiar paternalistic 
language. Mbembe writes: 
“As for the native, docilely caught up in the family guardianship, he or she can only 
think of his/her enfranchisement at his/her own risk and peril. For a native (or a 
protégé) cannot be a subject of law. Consigned unilaterally to a sort of minority 
without foreseeable end, he/she cannot be a subject of politics, a citizen. Since the 
notion of citizen overlaps with that of nationality, the colonized being excluded from 
the vote, is not being simply consigned to the fringes of the nation, but is virtually a 
stranger in his/her own home, the idea of political or civil equality- that is, of an 
equivalence among all the inhabitants of the colony- is not the bond among those 
living in the colony.”40 
 
The indigene would be governed through customary law, in a social and political 
sphere administered by the Native Authority; here she would be allowed to become a 
legal subject.  
 
Customary authority in the rural areas was based in the local State.41 The colonial 
Native Authority, created to control the often violently resistant indigenous peoples42 
and to better exploit the agricultural and human resources in the new colony, 
comprised the offices of remodelled chieftaincy, Native Tribunals and Local Native 
Councils; the first two were particularly instrumental in the formulation of customary 
law.43 Their creation received legal assent through a succession of Native Authority 
ordinances from 1902 onwards.44 The themes explored in the previous chapter, which 
bonded Africans to their ancestral land, kinship group and the patriarchal system, 
were employed by the colonial administration to emphasize their difference from the 
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 Berman (n 16), at 214 
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 Mamdani (n 2), at 109 
40
 Mbembe (n 12), at 35. He describes the relationship of the native to the colonial State as one in 
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 About a third of the British Protectorate’s budget for the first nine years after its creation in June 
1895 was sank into military campaigns geared towards subjugating indigenous peoples either through 
force or diplomatic means (Berman (n 6), at 52) 
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white settler community and therefore justify the differential legal treatment. But 
although advertised as replications of traditional power structures to legitimize them 
to the Africans, their character, role and modus operandi was a hybrid of both the 
new and old, with the former increasingly supplanting the latter. The character and 
processes of these weak, co-opted chieftaincies and native authorities were 
considerably arbitrary, as the colonizers consciously sought, unsuccessfully, to “drag 
[them] into the muddle of amoral civic public politics....”45 As will be seen later, an 
emergent African bourgeois class, whom the colonizers determinedly tried to subvert 
in the tried-and-tested British policy of ‘divide and rule’, exploited and thrived in this 
flux.46   
 
Two contradictory philosophies, both instrumental in the construction of 
subjectivities, provided the rationale for the creation of the Native Authorities: on the 
one hand, all indigenous peoples, because they are of one race, are lumped together 
to facilitate a uniform policy of exclusion.47 The overarching idea is the reaffirmation 
of tradition as the source of legitimacy48; longstanding cultural differences are 
suppressed, submerged under a collective label of ‘the native’ and presented as 
nullified. As Mamdani puts it, the policy “grounded racial exclusion in a cultural 
inclusion.”49 Various actors were involved in this deliberate process of manufacturing 
new native identities.50 Yet on the other hand, even while highlighting the 
homogeneity of the indigenous population, the Native Authorities and customary 
laws were allowed to be as distinct and variant as the specific ethnic groups to whom 
they applied. Mamdani again: “Customary law was defined in the plural, as the law of 
the tribe, and not in the singular, as a law for all natives. Thus there was not one 
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customary law for all natives, but roughly as many sets of customary laws as there 
were said to be tribes.”51 
 
These deliberate policies underline the centrality of individual and collective 
subjectivity to (re)imagining notions of obligation, entitlement and rights. The right to 
shape subjectivity is part and parcel of power struggles. They also emphasize the fact 
that subjectivity is mutable and manipulable; as later chapters demonstrate, it is a 
characteristic that PLWHA rights advocates have exploited in their efforts to 
transform PLWHAs’- and by extension public- perceptions of HIV sufferers as 
undesirable members of society whose apparent violation of sexual norms may 
negate their claims to entitlements or rights.   
 
The role and processes of the Native Authority and its State overseer, the Provincial 
Administration (PA), in constructing the customary sphere and exercising State power 
at the grassroots is germane to this research for two connected reasons: firstly, it 
offers crucial insights into the inculcation and evolution among indigenous Africans of 
notions about the State. The PA’s operations projected certain characteristics of the 
central State and its relationship with the individual, and many of these often 
negative attributes are still associated with the State today, as several PLWHAs’ 
responses demonstrate shortly.  This analysis is all the more important because it 
provides a framework for understanding post-independence power relations and 
attitudes towards the idea of a citizen-subject with allegiances to the dual power-
bases of the centrally-ran State and local, traditional authority. This is pivotal in 
gaining an appreciation for how messages about rights, duties and entitlements were 
internalized by indigenous Africans throughout the colonial and post-independence 
period. Secondly, it provides a glimpse into the cooption of Africans into the 
machinery of the State and the gradual breakdown of the traditional social structures 
described in the previous chapter.  
 
Managing and containing the indigene involved not only the demarcation of the real 
space she occupied but the construction, too, of the legal and imaginary space of the 
customary. This latter process was one of the main arenas for colonial and 
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postcolonial Kenya power contests. Key actors included the chiefs who, along with 
the central State, which retained the right to expunge laws that it deemed 
“repugnant to justice and morality”, competed for the right to define what was 
customary.52 The colonial administration hoped that the co-operation of the 
traditional African institution of the chieftaincy would ease wider community 
resistance.53 Yet the chieftaincy had been massively transformed in the colonial era: 
its military and economic authority had dwindled, with the colonial State dominating 
the former and the reconfiguration of market relations effecting the loss of the 
latter.54 To this extent, even as it based its claims for legitimacy in the familiar, the 
customary, the new chieftaincy was effectively “almost wholly [a] creation of the 
colonial state.”55  
 
A potent new power underwritten by the might of the colonial State, it had the sole 
responsibility of moulding custom, the very foundation of this native sphere, a role 
previously shared with other traditional institutions such as councils of elders. As 
Mamdani observes, “[c]ustomary law thus consolidated the non-customary power of 
colonial chiefs.”56 All these changes to the chieftaincy, as will be seen shortly, altered 
the relationship between traditional institutions and their subjects and bred distrust 
of institutions of authority.57 Many local administration officials took advantage of 
their new-found powers to amass personal wealth. It was noted that “the first 
generation of chiefs [used] their positions to acquire mostly the traditional forms of 
wealth in wives, livestock, and land, although by the 1920s the richest aspired to 
automobiles, European-style clothing and houses.”58 Chiefs also exploited their key 
role as arbiters of custom to authenticate those customary rights which augmented 
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their positions, particularly over those of low social standing.59 And as long as the 
flow of labour and production was not impeded and social control of the native 
population maintained, the colonial administration largely turned a blind eye.60 
Indeed, Mamdani writes of a shift in emphasis from “the search for good laws… to 
one for effective authorities.”61 The chieftaincy was therefore legitimately viewed as 
an extension of colonial power; under these circumstances, imposing custom was 
synonymous with imposing State power. A similar policy of prioritizing administrative 
over conflict resolution functions was exercised by the new-fangled Native 
Tribunals.62 Ghai and McAuslan argue that this created tensions in the legal system 
that survived the end of colonialism.63 This rightly roots the weak popular support for 
postcolonial legal and other State institutions in the colonial era, accentuating their 
competitive relationship with ethnic or customary institutions. 
 
Individually or collectively, the various arms of the Native Authority significantly 
influenced the early impressions of indigenous Africans about this new creation, the 
State. The exercise of power by local officials within or without their officially-
prescribed limits would have sent certain signals to indigenous subjects. One was of 
the power of the State: indeed the PA, the authority most closely linked to the central 
State and therefore its most visible cipher in the native territories, was expected to 
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 Mamdani (n 2), at 122. Nevertheless, Berman states that these lucrative positions were not without 
their disadvantages: the new and sometimes contradictory roles of the colonial chief, as agents of 
control for the colonial State and representative of his people, placed immense personal and social 
pressure on some of them. Alcoholism and apathy were a common occurrence, with the chiefs’ tenure 
dependent on an Administration that was inclined to interpret some of the difficulties borne out of the 
newly-conceived roles of the colonial chief as incompetence on their part. (Berman (n 6), at 210) 
60
 Berman, loc. cit. at note 52. Mamdani also gives some examples of the kind of rules that chiefs 
enforced as custom, which appear to be primarily geared towards easing the administration task of the 
colonial forces and helping sustain the economy. These include the payment of taxes and school fees 
and the maintenance of agricultural land. (Mamdani (n 2), at 123) 
61
 Mamdani (n 2), at 121. Indeed, Mamdani quotes Sir Frederick Lugard’s attempts at rationalizing this 
withdrawal into legal administration: he admits the real practical motive of the policy: “The separation 
of judicial and administrative power would be unnatural to the primitive African since they are 
combined in his own rulers.” He adds: “In a country recently brought under administration, and in 
times of political difficulty, occasions may arise when the strictly legal aspect may give way to 
expediency.” (at 125) 
62
 Native tribunals were a marriage of largely indigenous officials and procedures and the typical 
powers of sanction of a colonial system. (Ghai, Y.P. and McAuslan, J.P.W.B., Public Law and Political 
Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal Framework of Government from Colonial Times to the Present, 
(Nairobi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1970) at 147) The extensive discretionary powers granted 
to the PA in the 1930 Native Tribunal Ordinance meant that they could continue to shape the emerging 
tribunals to fit the requirements of the colonial administration as they saw them. (Berman (n 6), at 
214) 
63
 Ghai and McAuslan (n 62), at 153 
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project its “key myths…: permanence, omnipotence and infallibility.”64 Through the 
co-opted Native Authority, the colonial State had achieved such an overwhelming 
administrative control of the native populations by the time WWII began as to 
encompass the minutiae of their lives. Matters previously addressed within formal 
and informal traditional structures were diverted to the control of the remote 
colonial administration, further undermining traditional authority and social cohesion 
while alienating people from the institutions that governed them.65  
 
Secondly, the PA reflected the State’s paternalism, presenting it as guardian and 
protector of the indigenous population.  But as Mbembe observes in quoting Albert 
Sarraut, this is yet another opportunity to display the power of the colonial State and 
exercise “‘the right of the stronger to aid the weaker.’ Colonial conquest, [Sarraut] 
specified, ‘is not the right, but the fact of one who is stronger; the true right of the 
stronger is the generous right that he assumes to help, assist and protect the weaker, 
to be his guide and guardian.’”66 This protector image persists to this day. Asked if 
they thought the government should assist them in meeting their healthcare needs, 
some PLWHAs in this research even equated the government-citizen relationship to 
that of parent and child. Interviewee 14, for instance, declared that “[t]he 
government is our mother.” 
 
To be sure, there were indeed tensions between the PA and the central colonial 
State, rooted in the former’s wide discretionary powers and the contradictory 
objectives of the broader colonial enterprise.67 But the general message which 
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 Berman (n 6), at 204. There was no end to the practical tools made available to administrators to 
assist them in gaining a better ‘understanding’ of their indigenous subjects, for certain stereotypes of 
Africans generally, and others of particular tribes, were actively circulated: Kikuyus were regarded as 
intelligent and diligent but also “unstable and untrustworthy”; the Luo were “straightforward and 
stolid”; the Kamba “loyal and good-natured”; the Maasai were “the aloof ‘noble savage’”; the Giriama 
“backward and apathetic.”(at 206) The literary output from the members of white colonial society also 
reflects the widespread subscription to, and reproduction of these stereotypes: Christopher Wilson 
describes Africans as generally “lazy” and, without a hint of irony, prone to using brute force as the 
basis their power. Kikuyus are, once again, treacherous but now also prone to drinking. (Wilson, 
Christopher, Before the White Man in Kenya: Abridged Edition of “Before the Dawn in Kenya.” (London: 
McCorquodale, 1953) 
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 Mamdani (n 2), at 119 and 123. See Kenyatta for the types of disputes among the Gikuyu that would 
be addressed in traditional forums. (Kenyatta (n 9), at 214-230) 
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 Mbembe, loc. cit. at note 37. Upendra Baxi remarks, too, on the employment of the malleable 
language of rights by colonizing States to justify the politics of domination. (Baxi, op.cit., at 135) 
67
 The State’s and settlers’ need for cheap African labour to drive colonial production, explained 
earlier, and the especially brutal manner in which such labour was extracted, as well as harsh tax 
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filtered through to many Africans at the local level where they interfaced with State 
institutions would have been shorn of the subtleties of any power contests between 
the PA and the central State. The impression would have been that the rules applied 
by the local authorities emanated from or were backed by a powerful, remote source, 
the mystique being yet another exercise of power.  
 
But despite promoting a caring image, Ann Beck notes the low prioritization by the 
colonial State of genuine development and improvement of indigenous welfare. She 
remarks upon its reluctance to allocate funds even to public health services for 
Africans, especially during the war years, which, except where they may serve a 
political purpose68, were not seen as “necessarily revenue producing.”69 Further, in 
the fulfilment of that civilization remit of the colonial enterprise, the State and other 
institutions like the church provided vocational training and a “literary” Western 
education. The starting point of this exercise, however, as Kenyatta notes, was always 
imperialistic and paternalistic, rejecting traditional modes of education and their 
philosophical objectives.70 And despite growing demand from Africans for these 
services because of the opportunities they opened up in the new labour market, the 
State’s leadership role here was ultimately driven by its own demands and those of 
the settler community.71 Indeed, the emerging educated class of young ‘detribalised’ 
African men was later identified as posing a serious challenge to the State-endorsed 
local authorities and wider State control, and education criticised as the tool by which 
                                                                                                                                             
policies targeted at indigenous peoples, directed at neutralizing the considerable competition in labour 
and production that African peasant farmers, was condemned by the PA. (Berman (n 6), at 59) The PA 
saw the State’s response as potential catalysts for unrest amongst the native populations. They 
advocated the protection of some African economic enterprise, which was an integral part of the 
rewards aspect of their administrative system.  
68
 Beck, Ann, Medicine, Tradition, and Development in Kenya and Tanzania, 1920-1970 (Massachusetts: 
Crossroads Press, 1981), at 17 
69
 ibid, at 10. She adds that “it did not help to point out that a part of the money spent on medicine 
was retrieved through “invisible returns by better labor productivity as the result of better health.” 
70
 Kenyatta (n 9), at 126 
71
 Berman (n 6), at 225. Africans like Oginga Odinga, a central figure in the independence movement 
spoke of the deliberately divisive aim of educating Africans, as it “created a category of educated men 
who were easily tamed because they had lost their moorings within African society… ” (Odinga, 
Oginga, Not Yet Uhuru: An Autobiography, (London: Heinemann, 1967) at 68). This is an interesting 
comment from a man who benefitted from the system and who would become a key member of 
Kenya’s ruling elite and father of an enduring political dynasty, especially in light of Ekeh’s assertion 
that its Western-acquired education was the basis on which the African bourgeois class sought- and 
managed- to convince lay Africans that it could and should take over the reins of power from the white 
colonial government. (Ekeh (n 7), at 102). Like Odinga, he declares the educated African even more 
susceptible than the uneducated ones to colonial ideologies of legitimation. (at 100) 
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this menace had been unleashed.72 Some commentators also noted the negative 
effect that a more politically-aware class of African was having on the running of the 
settler economy.73 
 
Thirdly, the corruption and arbitrariness with which Local Authority branches applied 
their rules and dispensed their duties became yet another characteristic associated 
with the State, despite the State’s ostensible claims of being bound by the rule of 
law.74 Okoth-Ogendo notes, for instance, that Local Native Councils, “although 
controlled and manipulated by colonial administrations... left a permanent imprint on 
African political behaviour in that they were the first to institutionalize ethnicity as a 
criterion for political leadership and affiliation.”75 Native Tribunals, too, operated with 
limited supervision from, or rights of appeal to, centrally-ran judicial organs, for 
example, and the native experience of the State-sanctioned machineries of justice 
was thus often negative.76 A report on Native Tribunals found certain procedures 
direct contraventions of basic legal principles, such as the imposition of non-
indigenous penal sanctions for the violation of native criminal laws previously settled 
through compensation.77 The use of favours and patronage to oil the local 
administrative machinery was widespread and encouraged unmitigated corruption.78 
While patronage had long been used to secure loyalty and co-operation in traditional 
African society, there was a significant difference in the use of bribery and corrupt 
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 Berman (n 6), at 239-40 
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 A. J. Schwelm, advocating for more emigration of Englishmen to the colonies, wrote, “… [T]hanks to 
modern educational methods it quickly becomes clear to the natives that, so far as they are concerned, 
this type of colonisation [in which colonisers employ cheap labour to do the bulk of the manual work] 
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(Schwelm, A. J., Some Thoughts on Colonization: An Address Delivered at the Royal Empire Society, 
(London: Barker, 1932) at 9-10  
74
 Mamdani (n 2), at 125 
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 Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O., Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya 
(Nairobi: Acts Press, 1991), at 161. 
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 Ghai and McAuslan quote a statement by Sir Barclay Nihill at the Africa Bureau Conference on Kenya 
and Britain in May 1956 in which he said, “‘I am not sure that the average African [in Kenya] has quite 
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 Ghai and McAuslan, loc. cit., at note 60. Ghai and McAuslan detail the failed efforts to reform the 
Native Tribunals, which were scuttled by successful demands from administrative officials for leeway in 
the exercise of their administrative duties.  
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 See variously Mamdani (n 2), and Berman (n 6). Also Ghai and McAuslan (n 62), at 152-3 
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practises by agents of the colonial government to augment their official income and 
strengthen their local powerbases. For the traditional structures which regulated 
patronage and which tied it to a broader system of duties and responsibilities within 
the clan or kinship group had been significantly decimated. Such a system rendered 
these practices an acceptable, perhaps even a necessary service to social cohesion. 
The colonial offices, however, had no wider obligations or social function beyond the 
private enrichment of the local agents and those within their “semi-official politico-
administrative apparatus.”79 Most African States, including Kenya, maintained this 
characteristic after decolonization and today “[l]ocal and state governments remain 
exclusionary in their norms and practices, and the rights and privileges they confer on 
the people.”80  
 
A fourth defining characteristic of the State, which is closely allied to the application 
of arbitrary, oppressive methods by its agents in the customary sphere, is the use of 
coercion. This significantly differentiated the encounter of State power between the 
citizens in the civil sphere and subjects in customary. Mamdani writes: 
Customary law was never concerned with the problem of limiting state power, 
only with enforcing it. Liberal theory emphasized the double-sided character 
of the law, that while it came from the state it also restrained power. Power 
was said to be grounded in consent. State command was presumed to be rule 
bound, not arbitrary. This was the meaning of the claim that civil society was 
framed by the rule of law. None of these claims, however, sounded sensible 
where power sought to secure order through conquest, not consent.81 
 
Mbembe further separates the violence applied by the State into three types: firstly, 
that used in its conquest of territory; secondly, that required to transform the original 
violence into a legitimizing, effective authority; finally, that necessary to maintain and 
spread this authority.82 And yet alongside this brutal reality is the fantasy sold by the 
colonial State not only of a free African subject, her autonomy enabled and 
guaranteed in the safety of the customary realm, but of a State that respected, 
encouraged and preserved that freedom.83  
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 Berman (n 6), at 212 
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 Adejumobi, Said, ‘Citizenship, Rights, and the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa,’ Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.1 (2001), pp. 148-170, at 160 
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 Mamdani (n 2), at 125 
82
 Mbembe (n 12), at 25 
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 It is a fantasy that finds appeal amongst some supporters of the colonial enterprise. Christopher 
Wilson, writing in 1952 at a time when the post-war clamour for the greater recognition of the rights 
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In reality, only the white, rights-bearing settler population in the civil sphere could 
make any real claim to be citizens: for while the perception of State power as 
rampant and selective in its magnanimity and malevolence took root in the 
customary realm, those in the civil realm experienced a form of State power that was 
bound and restrained by their civil laws. This bred feelings of resentment and 
mistrust about State officials, and doubts about the moral legitimacy of the State 
itself. The fact that the PA condoned methods which were so oppressive to so many 
meant that the character of the State as an avaricious entity beneficial only to a 
privileged few crystallized. Indeed, many PLWHAs’ responses reflected such feelings 
about the conduct of the State both at the national and local levels. Their views 
regarding the central government’s efforts to tackle the AIDS epidemic and related 
issues will be addressed in more detail in later chapters, and illustrate the enduring 
negative perceptions about State conduct. But many of them are similarly scathing 
about the local government officials, who represent the otherwise remote centralized 
State, such as the various agents like that colonial remnant, the PA.84 It is therefore 
instructive to analyze opinions about village elders, chiefs, District Officers (D.O.s) and 
other local administrative officials, henceforth LAOs, who today embody the State at 
grassroots level. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
of Africans- and colonial State repression- was at its peak says: “Some Africans are prepared wilfully to 
distort the picture of the past, with the object of influencing others towards a reaction against present 
conditions. These are the people who talk of the ‘bondage’ of British rule and shout for ‘freedom’ for 
Africans. They know that the African has never been so free as he is now under British Administration.” 
(Wilson (n 64), at 2) 
84
 There were controversial proposals in the Harmonized Draft Constitution of Kenya, 2009, to dissolve 
the PA in a new system of devolved government that would be established under the new constitution. 
(See Seventh Schedule (Article 312) Transitional and Consequential Provisions, Provincial 
Administration, 10(1), Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (CECR), Harmonized Draft 
Constitution of Kenya, 17
th
 November, 2009, on the website of The Local Democracy, Peace and 
Human Security, University of the Western Cape, at http://www.ldphs.org.za/resources/local-
government-database/by-instrument/constitution, accessed 12/03/10; at 189). The office seems to 
have survived the constitutional process, however, although but is scheduled for massive restructuring 
under devolved government. (Sixth Schedule, Art. 262, Transitional and Consequential Provisions, 
Provincial Administration, at 186. Republic of Kenya, Laws of Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, 
2010, Kenya Law Reports (www.kenyalaw.org), accessed 10/12/13. (Published by the National Council 
for Law Reporting, with the Authority of the Attorney General). The Draft Constitution also envisaged 
roles for many of the offices currently under the umbrella of the PA: “[C]hiefs, the assistant chiefs and 
village elders may continue as such under the county governments as may be determined by each 
county government.” (Art 312, 10(3)). A restructured office of paramount chief, better paid and with 
more responsibilities, also seems on the cards under the new Constitution. (See The Daily Nation, 
‘Scheme to Give Kenya Chiefs More Powers Unveiled,’ 9
th
 September 2010) 
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Although interviewees for this research had very particular health needs, an area 
which does not immediately appear to be within the purview of the PA, the modern 
PA’s main functions are broad and open to interpretation. They include: “[p]romotion 
of statehood and nationhood; development coordination in the field; maintenance of 
law and order; dissemination and interpretation of Government policies; peace 
building and conflict resolution in the field; monitoring and appraising of performance 
of Government departments/officers in the field; publication of all Government 
documents; championing campaigns against drug and substance abuse; and 
coordination of state functions.”85 Moreover, the unprecedented involvement with 
the minutiae of people’s lives persists at the lower administrative levels, so that the 
State in guise of the PA may become intimately familiar with details such as an 
individual’s HIV-status, as will be seen, and other health matters, as well as more 
typical affairs like land or family disputes. So responses about how, if at all, LAOs 
might assist PLWHAs with their health problems are also linked to broader 
perceptions about the general functions of the State and its obligations to citizens.  
 
Indeed some PLWHAs saw a clear path connecting LAOs to the central State and 
executive power. For instance, interviewee 44 saw LAOs as “the first people on the 
ground in the path that that leads to the president. So if there is any assistance, it 
should pass through them. And truly, if it is my right to be assisted, then they should 
be compelled to help me.” Interviewee 18 spoke of  
…village elders and chairmen who are in charge of the welfare of a village. They 
should be involved so that chief can liaise with them. These village elders are the 
ones who should know how many sick people there are and take that information to 
the chief, the chief should then take it to the D.O. and the D.O. to his boss, so that we 
can find ways of helping those who are at home.  
 
This notion was emphasized in a memorandum by members of the government, sent 
to the Committee of Experts on the Constitutional Review in response to the 2009 
Draft Constitutions’ proposals to scrap the PA.86 There was also some awareness 
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 See the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security website, at 
http://www.provincialadministration.go.ke/detail.php?op=3002, accessed 12/03/10. 
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 The government, criticising the proposals in the Harmonized Draft Constitution of Kenya, 2009, 
portrayed the PA as the umbilical cord which links the executive power of the State to the grassroots. 
The Head of Public Service, Francis Muthaura, noted that the PA "plays a pivotal role in the running 
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among some PLWHAs of the importance of these local administrative offices: for 
instance, although she did not think they were assisting her, suggesting a nepotistic 
slant in the exercise of their duties, interviewee 8 nevertheless thought that:  
The chief should know how many people in my home area have [the disease], 
how many are sick, and how are they supposed to be supported, through 
these NGOs… so you see the chiefs are very important but they are careless. 
They are the ones supposed to be talking to the D.O.s about how many people 
are sick and need to be attended to.  
 
Many PLWHAs recognized the proximity of these officials to themselves and other 
people on the ground, and arguably the colonial exercise of implanting a 
consciousness about this new entity, the State, in everyday social and political life at 
the grassroots was successful.87 These authorities have managed to adopt or maintain 
the traditional propinquity of customary authorities to the community, as responses 
to the question of where LAOs could and should assist with the health needs of 
PLWHAs revealed. For instance, interviewee 18 remarked that, “They should [help] 
because they are the ones who are closest to us.” Interviewee 37 agreed: “Yes, 
because they are the ones who live with people in the villages and they know who 
has a problem.” So, too, did interviewee 48, who thought, “They should [help] 
because they are the people who mingle with us in our daily activities.” For 
interviewee 48, “They are the people nearest to me and they can help from above.” 
 
This seeding of consciousness about the State and membership national public 
becomes ever more important given the ethnic-based systems of authority that 
compete with the modern State for the allegiance of the citizen-subject, as will be 
seen presently. Yet the LAOs’ privileged reach is simultaneously hamstrung by the 
negative attributes that people have come to associate with the State, negating its 
legitimacy; these, too, were articulated by several respondents, who generally 
                                                                                                                                             
identified flaws in the system: “dictatorial, corrupt and illiterate officers from the Assistant Chiefs to 
Provincial Commissioners.” (The Daily Nation, ‘Government Strongly Defends Provincial 
Administration,’ 15
th
 December 2009) 
87
 Indeed, a number PLWHAs demonstrated a willingness to engage with LAOs and seek assistance 
from them on a range of social and economic issues, although the results appeared invariably 
unsatisfactory. For instance, interviewee 36 decried the lack of initiative she saw in LAOs and 
wondered how they would be able to assist her when they had been inconsequential insofar as her 
other needs (lack of school fees and rent) were concerned. Interviewee 40, another who was weary of 
“a lot of corruption in this country,” had a case pending at the local chief, a school-fees waiver request 
for an orphan (her nephew) under her care. She noted she was awaiting the outcome of this before 
she made up her mind about LAOs. 
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perceived LAOs as unwilling or unable to assist with their health needs despite the 
clear role they could play. Interviewee 15 said point-blank: “I don’t see this 
happening,” an opinion repeated elsewhere.88 For some the issue was one of 
insufficient resourcing by the remote central State. Interviewee 3 declared: “In our 
country Kenya, presently, those are the harder people in the society [to engage]. 
Surely, they don’t even have the resources to talk about all these things.” This was 
echoed by interviewee 22 who said that LAOs “can’t help if there is nothing they are 
receiving so that they can give back to people.” This enhances a perception of the 
State as unconcerned and unresponsive to local concerns, drawing subjects ever 
closer into the primordial realm of Ekeh’s analysis; this discussion is taken up shortly 
and revisited in Chapter 8.89 But others suggested that LAOs were plagued by a 
residual colonial-era problem which had resulted from the arbitrary, sometimes 
unsupervised exercise of State authority in the customary sphere: corruption. For 
instance, interviewee 39 insisted: “Those are people who if given money they’ll just 
eat.... Maybe they should [help], that’s if they allocate the funds to help those with 
HIV instead of pocketing it for their own needs.” For interviewee 42, those 
unconnected to power had little access to State help:  
Not in Kenya! I don’t think [they can help]. But you know how our country has been. 
People are not caring. Those fellows only take care of themselves. And even if you 
give aid to those poor people, it will not reach us. Never. They look after themselves. 
Say, even if these drugs were offered, if they went through the chief, he might try to 
sell them and get something for himself. So you see, they don’t mind the welfare of 
those who are not able to reach those drugs...  [T]hey are the people who are 
supposed to be in the frontline to assist. But I don’t think they do it.  
 
Interviewee 48 concurred:  
No, no, no, no! I have never had trust in those people. You’ve seen that the money 
has just gone to the constituency (this with ref to an announcement that government 
would channel its AIDS support funds through parliamentary constituencies.) I am 
from Embakassi where David Mwenje is our MP. Things are stand-still. I even went to 
a meeting there sometime and told them I wished the donors would even come and 
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 “So far, no [they do not help], especially where I come from [in] Nyanza District (Western Kenya). 
Out of experience, I know they don’t. They think that they have their own burdens and don’t want to 
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accessed 02/03/10).  However, as highlighted in Chapter 4, these have been plagued by reports of 
financial mismanagement and corruption by State officials. 
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take the money back to their countries other than giving it to Kenyans who know 
what is going on and cannot help their people. 
 
Indeed, local authorities or the Ministry for Local Government have often been 
consistently cited as one of the worst offenders in Transparency International Kenya’s 
index of the country’s most corrupt organizations; a 2008 survey placed the PA in 
sixth position.90 It revealed that 76 % of respondents seeking assistance from the 
organization encountered a bribery demand91; 5% paid up92, without which there was 
a 42% chance, the second-highest among the organizations, of being denied service 
or incurring a penalty, whether or not it was deserved.93 Each respondent who 
interacted with the PA reportedly paid an average of three bribes to the 
organization94, with the average bribe valued at Ksh.81695, approximately GBP 6.30 
per exchange rates at the time the surveys were conducted96, a considerable sum 
considering that over half of respondents declared a monthly household income of 
less than Ksh.10,00097,  approximately GBP 77.90.  
 
One respondent, interviewee 16, related the challenges of trying to get involved in 
local meetings about PLWHAs’ welfare.  
I had gone to the D.O. about a month ago. They keep telling they’re having 
meetings.... So I ask if I can attend and they say ‘no’ and because they have the 
money, they just want to ‘eat’ the money. So I am wondering how they can sit there 
and discuss PLWHAs and they are [HIV-] negative and don’t know how we feel or 
what we want. Yet we want to participate. They tell me to leave my contact details 
with them but you just hit a wall. 
 
Others raised concerns about confidentiality, specific to PLWHAs. For instance, 
interviewee 30 said:  
[LAOs] are people who help only in spreading the word that so-and-so is ill. And you 
will not get help from them. I went back home recently and heard that a few things 
had been brought for HIV patients: blankets, food and so on, especially those who 
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 Transparency International Kenya, The Kenya Bribery Index 2008, 2008, at 
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/KenyaBriberyIndex08.pdf, accessed 10/10/09, at 16. The survey 
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have been left with orphans. Their names were registered. But I do not want to 
register with them in my District because I believe they will just use that information 
and spread it around. 
 
Interviewee 19 agreed: You know sometimes you keep silent, you don’t want to 
expose yourself to people. Now, if you tell the chiefs, you will be exposed, won’t you? 
You know if you have these things [the disease], they take it badly.” For interviewee 
11, some officials were unconcerned about individual needs: “I don’t think they care 
much and they give appointments they don’t keep...And then on top of that he goes 
and spreads the rumours in the whole village.” These gave a sinister tone to the 
State’s proximity to the individual, a situation which LAOs’ access at local level 
facilitated. This presents a dilemma for PLWHAs who may want to seek help if it were 
indeed available but fear exposure. As interviewee 41 said, “I can’t say [whether they 
can help] because I have never asked or disclosed my status to them.”  
 
A few, however, thought that LAOs were ideally-placed to address myths about 
HIV/AIDS, which fuel stigma against PLWHAs, precisely because of their nearness and 
access to individuals on the ground, suggesting chiefs’ barazas or forums as an ideal 
setting. Interviewee 38 felt that LAOs should be involved in “talking about AIDS. In 
fact, during their barazas they should tell people, ‘even if you’ve seen a lady, you 
should think twice.’” However, she was doubtful whether they can offer to most the 
kind of help that most really needed, that of the material variety: “Because many are 
sick, your burden is your burden,” she concluded.  Interviewee 14 voiced similar 
opinions:  “They should [help] at community level because they can sensitize the 
people around, they can help those who are ignorant access help and because there 
are so many people who don’t know what to do with themselves, may be they can be 
helped at that level.” This may fall within a core PA function, disseminating and 
interpreting government policy, at which interviewee 16 suggested they were already 
failing. She said:  
[They can help by] making awareness campaigns, because I don’t think they have 
raised enough awareness campaigns about HIV/AIDS..., mostly young people.... With 
all this money in circulation, why are they buying big cars and growing fat, yet we are 
only getting thinner and thinner and dying? We should just put that money where it’s 
supposed to be. If it’s about buying ARVs, we should buy ARVs, if it’s food 
supplements, the same. If it’s cheap drugs from India, they should give them to us.  
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And even interviewee 11, despite her fears about confidentiality, noted above, felt 
“they should help- they can even be gathering people in their locality and talk about 
the issue.”  
 
Interviewee 6, who had, underlined the status of LAOs at community-level, but 
identifying a familiar rural-urban difference in attitudes, was sceptical about whether 
they had the sufficient sensitivity and information to deal the epidemic’s 
complexities. He explained:  
I was at home up-country and it was very interesting. The rumour had already gone 
round the village that I was suffering from AIDS. ... But even after my closest friend 
died of AIDS, no one could stand at the funeral and say this man died of AIDS. It is the 
chief, who should speak out about this, if the villagers find it difficult. ... People must 
learn to accept the disease... I went back and told the sub-chief I wanted to register a 
community-based organization in my own village in Vihiga (western Kenya). He had 
heard about the disease but he was shocked. He said that he’d heard that this 
disease affects people mentally and so I must be mentally ill! I told him there was 
nothing wrong with me and I only went because in that short period that I was at 
home, imagine about 5 people, my age-mates, died. 2 ladies, 3 men- just like a joke. 
But even now when you go and speak to the father and ask him ‘what killed your 
son?’ He cannot tell you that it’s the virus. You need maybe a chief or even a church 
elder to tell people otherwise they won’t believe. And may be the sooner we accept 
it, the sooner we can get help, like counselling- chiefs can counsel- they are good 
men. You know when they come and pay you a visit in your house, you know you feel 
great. They can come and comfort those who are sick and boost morale. And also 
because you know they are leaders, they don’t just come like that- they’ll have a gift, 
may be a little money or food. It is a boost. 
 
In a similar vein, others, like interviewee 12 felt that LAOs lacked the necessary 
compassion and understanding: “You know issues like this… if you take them to 
people like chiefs, let me tell you when people hear you have this disease, they spite 
you, even if you used to get along very well, you see suddenly they want nothing to 
do with you.”  
 
Interviewee 6 may have perhaps encountered some of the illiterate officials whom 
even the government acknowledges exist98, and for which one respondent blamed 
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the recruitment process.99 Comments regarding unsuitable, if educated, government 
officials recall one of Ekeh’s central arguments about the legitimation of the 
postcolonial African State. He contends that education acquired currency in the 
colonial era as a ticket to, and symbol of, a European life of luxury. The expectations 
of the emergent educated African bourgeois class were no longer confined to the 
manual labour intended for the ‘natives’, a notion encouraged by the colonizers. After 
independence, many Africans continued to expect that an education entitled them to 
rule and validated their claims to the socio-economic benefits of the postcolonial 
State.100 Notwithstanding, the African bourgeoisie of the colonial era, which 
comprised the ruling elite in post-independent Kenya and elsewhere on the 
continent, still had a legitimacy deficit.101 Two main fissures ran through the 
postcolonial political terrain it inherited: one was the ethnic division within the 
bourgeoisie class itself, also stoked by the colonial powers; the other was the 
unhealed rift with the customary authorities.102 This influenced perceptions about 
State’s legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Kenyans, and their notions about whether 
they can make claims of entitlements from it, or if it would deliver on its obligations. 
 
One respondent interestingly suggested that only the intercession of the remote- but 
more powerful- central State can compel those at local level to act, for despite their 
proximity to him LAOs make no effort to recognize his need or offer assistance, a 
notion reminiscent of the colonial-era perception of the local State as selective in the 
execution of its duties:  
A person like the chief or D.O. cannot help me. Only the government can help me.... 
[LAOs] should be compelled to help because the D.O. is the one who is closest to 
people. So if the government can force these ones to give help to a person who is 
HIV-positive then they can do something. But I myself cannot just come out and go to 
the D.O. and ask him to help me in this or that way- he can’t. (Interviewee 23) 
 
Arguably, for him the proximity of local government also removes the anonymity that 
the individual might otherwise enjoy, making the PLWHA wary of discriminatory 
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action. Similarly, other individuals who lack political or economic (often the same 
thing in Kenya) or social connections may also perceive themselves as vulnerable to 
selective State inaction, or, worse, negative State attention. By the same token, 
however, the closer gaze of the State via its local agents benefits those it would select 
for patronage, expediting their ascent and mainlining them to the even greater prizes 
at the centre of government.    
 
What the responses above highlight are the lingering effects of the practice of 
Statecraft at the grassroots, particularly of its more dubious aspects, and its influence 
in moulding contemporary perceptions about the role of the wider State, its 
effectiveness in meeting its obligations to the individual and, allied to this, its 
legitimacy. Yet the same questionable practices during the colonial era also allowed 
enterprising and opportunistic elements to establish themselves, heralding new 
power relations in the customary sphere and catalyzing the dissolution of many 
aspects of the traditional systems. This process, through which the African petite 
bourgeoisie class was created, was important in two ways: the first was political: it 
was central to the anti-colonial movement of the post-war years. In fact, Ekeh views 
the African independence struggle as a contest between this class and their fellow 
European bourgeois counterparts about the legitimacy to rule.103 Berman exposes the 
predictable outcome of the paradox at the heart of the colonial endeavour, the active 
production of (relatively) ‘civilized’ Africans who nevertheless could only enjoy the 
limited rights of the customary. For despite encouraging peasant commodity 
production in the effort to nurture an even broader network of African collaborators, 
it would have been impossible for the PA to allow the fullest opportunities for African 
accumulation of wealth through agricultural production while requiring these same 
people to ensure satisfactory production levels for European estate owners.104 
 
The second was socio-economic and was transformative in a number of crucial ways: 
the growth of the African petite bourgeoisie had been driven primarily by the 
introduction of wage labour in the colonial economy. It was an opportunity for those 
in lower positions in the traditional hierarchies to bypass the rigid rules and processes 
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by which wealth, and therefore social advancement was acquired. Unsurprisingly, it 
was largely “young, unmarried propertyless men” who sought wage labour in the 
early part of the colonial era.105 Internal migration became prevalent in the colonial 
era as men shifted to urban centres and cash crop farms in search of better incomes 
to cover the tax costs that were a feature of the new capitalist economy.106 Their 
newfound wealth allowed them to dislodge older generations, long the gate-keepers 
to such institutions as marriage, which, as seen before, were central to prestige and 
social mobility.107  
 
Linked to this was the gradual but critical admission of women into the wage 
economy, which gave them access, albeit limited, to a society beyond the highly 
controlled one of the traditional in which their identity, as discussed previously, was 
welded to that of their fathers or husbands. This gave some women a measure of 
social and economic autonomy, offering some freedom from cultural constraints. 
Opportunities in the growing urban centres also removed them from the immediate 
gaze and scrutiny of traditional power. They could thus begin to re-imagine their 
identities as women, their relationships with, and duties to the collective108, explore 
links with communities beyond the kinship unit and begin to articulate certain 
demands as individuals against the colonial and postcolonial States. But the system of 
patriarchy persisted, merely extending to the new sphere and the new economy, and 
the exclusion of women in the formal economies and politics is another enduring 
characteristic of the postcolony.109  
 
Colonial policies and practices also accelerated and entrenched the separation 
between the private sphere of home and family and the public one of work. As 
Tamale notes, “[w]here domestic work had coexisted with commercial work in pre-
colonial satellite households, a new form of domesticity, existing outside production, 
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took over.”110 Ultimately, therefore, women’s capacity to become a key component 
of this new class and further exploit the labour opportunities that held the key to 
social, economic and political transformation, was- and remains- severely curtailed. 
 
Significantly, too, with customary institutions severely undermined and the colonial 
cash economy absorbing individuals from mixed social and economic levels, it 
became easier for such persons to shake off the various kinship duties that defined 
these ties. Mamdani remarks on the more individualized notion of rights now 
adopted by relatively successful peasants.111 The economic and legal atomization of 
society often occurred simultaneously, as Martin Chanock’s study of Malawi and 
Zambia reveals.112 This is a significant development in the construction of individual 
subjectivity during colonial and postcolonial eras, and is part of the process of 
separating individual identity from that of the collective. Its impact on notions of 
entitlement can arguably be discerned in PLWHAs’ consciousness about the onerous 
financial pressures their illness placed on their families and friends, as is evident in 
coming chapters. Many felt that they, rather than any institutional actors, were 
primarily responsible for fulfilling their own health needs. It suggests that one of the 
outcomes of individualization has been the propagation of ideas about the 
individual’s responsibility for her own welfare and less reliability on traditional 
mechanisms of assistance or cooperation, even as the human rights enterprise urges 
her to defer these matters to the institution of the State.  
 
This is not the only contradiction facing the individual in the postcolony.   
 
 
IV. The Bifurcated State 
The end of colonialism ostensibly bestowed the rights of citizenship upon all black 
Africans. However, in Mamdani’s bifurcate State paradigm, which is the framework 
and platform for discussions here, the post-independent African State is as 
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fragmented as the colonial one despite its deracialization, a process which took place 
in earnest at the close of colonial rule in Kenya with processes such as the 
restructuring of agrarian systems and laws.113  At the heart of this fracture is the legal 
colonial hangover of pluralism. Legal pluralism means the operation of “tiered and 
interactive normative systems... within a system either within or without the formal 
state legal system.”114 There are two species of legal pluralism: juristic or diffuse. In 
the former, the State’s official legal system, though predominant, recognizes other 
types of systems, such as customary laws, and attempts to lay down the values they 
will apply; in the latter, the State neither originates nor controls the rules or 
processes by which a group may control the social behaviour of its members.115  
 
In Kenya, where customary courts were rebranded African courts, as with many 
African countries without a unified legal system, initial narrowly-defined efforts 
focused on amalgamating the courts system rather than the substantive law.116 Today 
there are no such customary courts and decision-making rather problematically takes 
place across a range of levels, from family to clan to village.117 The constitutions of 
the three East African countries presently regard customary laws on an equal footing 
with modern laws118, and although they apply only to civil matters, these encompass 
crucial areas:  marriage, divorce and succession. These have significant consequences 
for the pattern of HIV infection and the attainment of health, as well as the socio-
economic situation, particularly of women. On the issue of succession, for instance, 
Kameri-Mbote notes that a system of legal pluralism operates in Kenya that combines 
both juristic and diffuse pluralism.  
 
But the precise content of customary law remains elusive. The task of restating the 
law in written form did not mean its codification.119 This left much of its 
interpretation to local officials and tended to flesh out procedural rather than 
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substantive aspects.120 Indeed, disparities often exist between customary law as 
defined by courts and as it operates on the ground; in the absence of these 
institutions’ intervention it is the latter interpretation that governs daily life.121 And 
despite the benefits of flexibility in the law the potential dangers of ambiguous or 
unknowable laws are clear, not least the lack of clear guidance for those subjected to 
its norms. For the law is susceptible to manipulation from the gatekeepers of its 
knowledge, a status that serves to galvanize their power. Further, customary legal 
systems may entrench inequalities, for, as in the colonial era, “the “hallmark of 
African customary law is the dominance of older male members over property and 
lives of women and their juniors.”122 However, it must not be assumed that civil law is 
always to be preferred over its traditional counterpart. As explained in the next 
chapter, the application of customary rather than modern statutory laws sometimes 
results in more equitable outcomes for some marginalized groups: customary 
systems have been more willing to enforce traditional obligations such as women’s 
inheritance rights.123 
 
But crucially for the discussion on rights, legal plurality challenges the fundamental 
notion of equality before the law.124 Modern constitutions confer rights, and thus 
citizenship, to those in the civil sphere. Meanwhile, where the traditional edifices of 
social regulation remain- in the customary realm- subjects must contend with the 
impulse of traditional legal systems to enforce custom rather than secure rights.125 
Thus is power reproduced and reinforced within this sphere. After independence and 
only until very recently the typical Kenyan remained a subject, benefiting from but 
unable to exercise the political rights of citizenship.126   
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Modern constitutions and legal systems often recognize and attempt to address the 
normative conflicts that sometimes arise between civil and customary laws, especially 
where customs may be repugnant to human rights principles. For instance, the new 
Constitution includes the provision in Art. 2(4) that “[a]ny law, including customary 
law, that is inconsistent with this Constitution is void to the extent of the 
inconsistency and any act or omission in contravention of this Constitution is 
invalid.”127 Yet customary laws and, it is argued throughout this research, their moral 
framework, are often deeply entrenched: Kameri-Mbote, pointing out the false 
presumption of redundancy of custom in matters of succession and inheritance, 
notes occasions when customary legal norms have prevailed over statutory laws.128 
There is evidence from Kenyan marriage and divorce case law that Africans do not 
consider themselves as disentangled from traditional laws even when they have 
undertaken marriages under modern statutory laws.129 
 
This is the essence of the rupture in Mamdani’s postcolonial State: the simultaneous 
and sometimes conflicting exercise of power by the central State and residual 
traditional institutions within the same social, legal and political space. But the 
postcolonial divide differs in two important ways from its predecessor: firstly, where 
the colonial-era civil and customary spheres were rigidly, insurmountably, 
demarcated by race, the new fault line is primarily rural/urban. The structures and 
symbols of power of the central State are based in urban centres while those of 
traditional authorities are invariably found in rural areas. Citizens and subjects are 
therefore nowhere as confined to their spheres as before and they may indeed 
consciously seek or assert membership in both realms to access social, economic, 
political or emotional goods. Membership to one or the other realm is more fluid and 
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while criteria such as economic mobility and formal education and skills may apply 
and regulate entry and movement between the spheres to a certain extent, such 
membership is not the unattainable, receding horizon it was in the colonial period.130 
What this suggests is not so much a dichotomy between citizen and subject, but more 
likely a dual-identity: citizen-subject. Ndegwa notes that this duality has been a 
feature of the manner in which citizenship developed in Kenya.131 It may be discerned 
in responses by PLWHAs who referred to returning to the rural areas of their birth as 
‘going back home’ even if they might live primarily in urban areas. One, a Nairobian, it 
will be recalled, referred to “my own village in Vihiga [Western Kenya].”132 His fellow 
Nairobian spoke of “those [PLWHAs] who are at home, in the rural areas…. There, 
people just take Panadol and sit there.”133 Another from Kisii town, said “I was able to 
go back to work, where I asked someone there, who knew my family back home, to 
tell my family that I wasn’t feeling well.”134 As Ndegwa puts it: 
...[P]eople experience a convergence of demands from both of their 
citizenships, rather than some people experiencing a republican form, others 
the liberal form. Thus, individuals experience liberal citizenship demands at 
the national level which they may or may not find consistent with (or 
advantageous to) civic-republican demands within ethnic communities.135 
 
Secondly, and linked to this, the colonial State enforced a physical separation of the 
realms as both a means and end to the desired social and political partition. This is 
almost impossible in the postcolonial environment for the reasons given above. And 
while the rural/urban split continues to be a guide as to the location of the frontiers 
demarcating the spheres, more nuanced elements are involved which are no less real 
for their intangibility. Interviewees’ responses often suggested an innate awareness 
of their location, intimating at the normative, psychological and ideational beacons 
that mark the barriers and reflect differing notions about identity and values. 
Interviewee 38’s opinions about Panadol ‘treatments’, above, are a case in point; 
interviewee 5, too, spoke of the rural/urban disparities in attitudes about AIDS:  
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But in the country, people have a big problem. I can tell you that for those 
people accepting has been hard for them. They don’t know what is going on, 
apart from that when you have this disease it’s a bad disease and it’s going to 
kill you.   
 
Other interviewees spoke of the rural areas as conducive to misconceptions and 
superstitions about the epidemic. Interviewee 18, for instance, said, “Firstly, this 
rubbish in the villages is one of the things that is responsible for spreading diseases. If 
you’re already sick, your illness doubled by this rubbish.” Interviewee 8 noted similar 
misinformation in the rural areas:  
At home [rural areas] people have this disease but they don’t know. They are even 
afraid of going to the VCTs. So even if you tell someone you have it, they’ll run away 
from you. They’ll start rumour mongering. But here in town people are free. You see 
if you come here in the clinic people are free. Someone can talk to you- they are very 
free. But at home people are still malingering.  
 
Interviewee 25 advocated education here, saying, “We should be taught about 
preventive measures because many are getting infected in the villages because of 
ignorance or lack of good information.” 
 
Respondents applied this inherent knowledge of the differences between the spheres 
in choices about whether, where and when to disclose information about their 
seropositivity, showing an acute awareness about how such information might be 
received and its possible effect on their social status in either sphere. To do this they 
had to be sensitive to differences in the prevailing moral frames of reference in either 
realm and be able to shift between them when necessary. In this sense, individuals 
demonstrated a capacity to cultivate multiple identities to aid the navigation of these 
two spaces.136 This is not uncommon and, as will be seen in the last chapter, a 
multiplicity of sometimes conflicting values can be held within the same person, 
rendering simultaneous membership of both spheres possible. PLWHAs’ responses in 
this regard point towards the catalytic role of non-State actors in changing attitudes 
about HIV/AIDS and shaping and reconstructing PLWHAs’ subjectivities, expounded 
on in the latter chapters of this research. The postcolonial citizen-subject who can 
attain the tools to navigate between the civic and customary spaces, who can 
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understand and respect- or appear to respect- the norms and prevalent power 
dynamics and hierarchies in each sphere and adapt accordingly can access the 
valuable benefits of membership- citizenship- in that respective sphere. Ndegwa 
compellingly argues that in Kenya today ethnic citizenship, with the hallmarks of 
“identity, authority and legitimacy for members of an ethnic group,” exists and 
deserves to be viewed alongside national citizenship.137 But perhaps part of the 
reason it has not been more integrated into the wider analysis about rights and 
entitlements is that those who shape the debate, the African middle- and educated- 
classes, have historically dismissed the pull of ethnic citizenship, ignoring the role this 
membership has in their own lives.138 
 
The above highlights the tensions at play in PLWHAs’ responses about healthcare 
entitlements throughout, for these issues are essentially about their perceived 
relationships with the State, their families and the wider community. It adds layers of 
complexity to any discussions about rights because the State is not the sole- perhaps 
not even the primary- entity in which an individual seeks and/or claims citizenship 
and so asserts entitlement claims against. Yet human rights theories and covenants 
yolk the two in a relationship of rights and duties. Only recently with the growth of 
powerful extra-State actors in the economic and development sphere has a debate 
began about their role in the human rights dynamic. As has been noted, while many 
PLWHAs do indeed identify government as duty-bound to provide for health needs, 
with several appearing to base their entitlement claims on their membership of the 
national community- their Kenyan citizenship- many more cite their husbands, 
families, NGOs and faith-based organizations as (the) duty-holders.  
 
The postcolonial State in Kenya, and those in the ruling classes in particular, have 
failed to embrace large swathes of the traditionally marginalized in the numerous 
power struggles that have characterized national politics and starved the entire 
system of rights. Emergent forms of hegemony have followed traditional matrices of 
exclusion, which were amplified under colonialism: for example, ethnicity and 
                                                 
137
 ibid, at 601 
138
 ibid, at 608 
 183 
 
gender.139 Women, for instance (though they should not be treated as a monolithic 
entity140) have been keen to participate in national political processes and historically 
form the majority of voters at national elections; yet they are often relegated to the 
role of pawns in male-dominated political games.141 And because they comprise the 
largest number of PLWHAs in Kenya, it is unsurprising that their exclusion from, or 
limited integration in, the national public should lead them to seek membership- 
citizenship- in alternative non-State associations. Such inequalities have been further 
magnified by the unprecedented political, economic and military resources available 
to dominant forces to secure their positions.142   
 
Where then does colonialism leave the institution of the nation-State and the notion 
of a national consciousness? Mutua has argued that the notion of a national identity 
in Kenya and other African countries was only temporarily and superficially evoked by 
the independence movement, and that the creation of consciousness has had to take 
place concurrently with the creation of the nation itself.143 Postcolonial nation-
building opened up a potent arena for the manufacture of history and validation of 
power, with the creation of symbols of nationhood, golden calves for an embryonic 
national community, reflecting the struggles for political power and resources.144 
Members of more dominant ethnic groups may be more predisposed to identifying 
with, and investing in, such a community. Ndegwa notes that it is less threatening for 
bigger ethnic groups to transfer their allegiance to the national State because they 
are at least guaranteed participation in the political community, that is, the 
enjoyment of their citizenship rights.145 In Kenya, those whose position could be 
bolstered by advocating for national unity (the ruling political party) did so, while the 
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others promoted alternative associations- the ethnic group- as the key site for the 
enjoyment of citizenship. The latter extended and embedded their preferences in 
their policies about access to land- on which, it will be recalled, citizenship was 
traditionally based- which they sought to restrict only to those with membership to 
specific ethnic groups within each region.146  
 
And yet it is on this construct of a nation-State, however fragile, with its hybrid 
African and European fingerprints147, that Mamdani asserts the rights of the citizen 
are based; by contrast the subject in the customary sphere must draw her rights from 
the tribe.148 But Ndegwa contends that contrary to the surfeit of rights envisioned by 
Mamdani, Kenya’s civil sphere enjoyed only limited rights after independence.149 As 
for the subject in the ethnic realm her privileges depend on the fulfilment of her 
obligations to this socio-economic unit which, as the coming chapters exemplify, may 
significantly impact on her livelihood- and health. Her failure to participate actively in 
this primordial community and to conform to its norms may result in the withdrawal 
of its privileges. Indeed, such is its pull- and negative impact on public life, as some 
PLWHAs complained- that its members may censure those in their number who in the 
performance of their duties in the civil sphere appear to exercise impartiality to 
others outside the group, negating what advantage this would have given their own 
members. 150   
 
One may also consider how Kenya’s human rights movement has, since the 1990s, 
mined a new space for participation and citizenship that may directly challenge the 
authority of the State even though each entrenches the other in its functions. In this 
new space, human rights norms become the adhesive around which members 
cohere, allowing them to re-imagine the individual-State relationship and notions of 
duties and entitlements. The attraction of the idea of universal human rights is 
obvious especially to marginalized groups like PLWHAs: if rights adhere to all peoples 
regardless of gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, etc, then ostensibly these 
shared norms equalize membership and unite these disparate elements. They may 
                                                 
146
 ibid, at 608 
147
 Bayart (n 7), at 33 
148
 Mamdani (n 2), at 292 
149
 Ndegwa, ‘Citizenship Amid Economic and Political Change in Kenya’ (n 126), at 353-4 
150
 Ekeh (n 7), at 110 
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also transcend the spheres, embracing the discontented of the civil realm and the 
constrained of the ethnic.  
 
And yet the reality of rights is rather different from the rhetoric. The challenges of 
actualizing rights and the disillusionment that this engenders is an issue raised by 
some PLWHAs. The State’s failure to deliver on the promises of rights only feeds 
perceptions about its illegitimacy. The result may be a retreat from the national 
public into the customary or primordial one, particularly in times of hardships such as 
the AIDS epidemic. These clearly identify a role for the individual as part of a 
community and still hold out the promise of certain rights in exchange for the 
fulfilment of certain obligations. And, most importantly, their foundations are more 
established than those of the emergent communities of the nation-State or human 
rights.  
 
What of the individual? Even in the postcolony, her subjectivity and frame of 
reference is still considerably informed by institutions and norms with roots in the 
pre-colonial past of her forebears. However, colonialism has significantly altered their 
structure and content and the context in which she engages with them. She exists 
between the individualism of the new social, economic, legal and political 
environment that is the legacy of colonialism, and the resilient collective identity that 
is privileged by the customary. She experiences the pull of its authority and that of 
the relatively new institution of the State. All of these factors affect her perceptions 
about her health entitlements. The addition of the acronym ‘PLWHA’ to her identity 
further skews this, adding a unique complexion to her notion of selfhood and rights, 
as the next few chapters now illuminate. 
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Chapter 5: Needs and Requirements I: Nutrition and 
Resources 
 
With the preceding chapters having mapped the dynamic social, economic, cultural 
and political context within which PLWHAs’ subjectivities and notions of entitlement 
are produced, Chapter 5 begins the process of examining how they are reflected in 
interviewees’ responses about their self-identified health needs.  
 
The first of the empirical chapters, it focuses on two key requirements, nutrition and 
income. These are addressed concurrently here as most respondents identified lack 
of money as the main barrier to accessing adequate nutrition. These two 
requirements are linked in another fundamental way: in Kenya’s agriculture-based 
economy, access to land may not only guarantee food security1  but also a cash 
income. Thus, it often determines patterns of wealth and therefore patterns of risk to 
HIV infection, and the capacity to meet healthcare and other socio-economic needs. 
Paul Hunt underlines this nexus noting that, “[g]ood health is central to creating and 
sustaining the capabilities that poor people need to escape from poverty.”2  
 
This chapter therefore investigates the underlying challenges PLWHAs face in meeting 
the aforementioned needs, as well as how and to whom they assign responsibility for 
meeting them. It argues that PLWHAs’ desire for economic autonomy, revealed in 
interviews for this research, highlights altered perceptions about the reliability of the 
ancient kinship and other social networks addressed in Chapter 3 and their matrices 
of privileges and obligations. The impact of land tenure systems on women in 
particular is analyzed in detail, as women’s access to Kenya’s chief mode of 
                                                 
1
 Food insecurity is said to exist when: “…people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and 
nutritious food for normal growth and development and an active and healthy life. It may be caused by 
the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution, or inadequate use 
of food at the household level. Food insecurity, poor conditions of health and sanitation, 
and inappropriate care and feeding practices are the major causes of poor nutritional status. Food 
insecurity may be chronic, seasonal or transitory. ” (Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and 
Mapping System (FIVIMS), ‘Knowledge and Learning,’ 2010, at 
http://www.fivims.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=23&Itemid=39, 
accessed 27/12/10.) 
2
 Hunt, Paul, ‘The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health,’ Health and Human  Rights: An 
International Journal, Vol.7,  No. 1 (2003) pp. 1-27, at 6  
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production is largely dependent on their relationships with men, limiting their 
autonomy and space for agency.  
 
Examining nutrition and resources thus proves an effective lens through which to 
review how the themes addressed in previous chapters shape PLWHAs’ conceptions 
about entitlements and rights. A crucial aspect to emerge from the interviews 
featured in this chapter is how AIDS, and PLWHAs’ perceptions of public attitudes 
about AIDS, effects a sense of dislocation for many sufferers. As is argued here, this 
appears to cause many to reassess their place in the wider socio-economic 
configuration and recalibrate their notions of entitlement to socio-economic goods 
such as healthcare. 
 
I. Food and HIV/AIDS 
Nearly all those interviewed for this research listed a good diet as one of their key 
requirements. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the Bill of Rights in Kenya’s new 
constitution reinforces the importance food to the survival of all Kenyans by formally 
elevating it to a right owed by the Kenyan State to all Kenyans.3  Many interviewees’ 
responses reflected a widespread absorption of the message that proper nutrition 
was an imperative complement to their ART regimen4, with several elaborating on 
the specific dietary requirements. For instance, interviewee 15 spoke of “Eating 
properly, that is, eating fruits and vegetables and fish”, while interviewee 45 
mentioned “a high-protein diet.” Interviewee 43 said she required “A good balanced 
meal with 3 types of fruit with 3 varieties of colours. … I know there are those who 
oppose the use of ARVs and want to use only the fruits and good diet but if your CD 4 
count is low, the drugs help a lot. They are still learning more about the nutritional 
                                                 
3
 Art 43(1)(c) declares that it is every person’s right “to be free from hunger, and to have adequate 
food of acceptable quality.” (Republic of Kenya, Laws of Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, 2010, 
Kenya Law Reports (www.kenyalaw.org), accessed 10/12/13, (Published by the National Council for 
Law Reporting, with the Authority of the Attorney General) at 31). 
4
 The World Food Programme (WFP) underlines this point, noting  on its website: “Good nutrition is 
vital for the health and survival of all people, but it is particularly important for people with HIV and 
AIDS. HIV and associated diseases weaken the immune system and increase the body’s need for 
energy. Food can provide the first line of defence in warding off the detrimental effects of HIV and 
AIDS and help people recover from illness.” (WFP, ‘HIV and Nutrition,’ 2007, at 
http://www.wfp.org/food_aid/food_for_hiv/nutrition.asp?section=12&sub_section=2, at accessed 
19/04/07)  
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benefits and they tell us as they find out.” 5 This information was sourced directly 
from health officials: for example, interviewee 8 said that she had learnt a lot on the 
issue from the counselling offered at the hospital: “You know through counselling, 
they have taught us how to take care of ourselves, which food is nutritious…. Now I 
know how to take care of myself, what foods to eat, to weigh myself, which I never 
used to take seriously.” It also came from posters and other media in health 
institutions such as those where the interviews were conducted. Respondents 
commonly used phrases such as “eating well” or “a balanced diet.” One, interviewee 
37, spoke of the need for “[m]edicines, and a good balanced diet is very important 
otherwise you cannot build up your CD4 count.” Lack of food has been cited as the 
most likely factor behind the non-adherence of ARV therapy.6 To one interviewee not 
yet on ARVs food was the most important requirement: “Food first!”, she declared.7 
Another, already receiving ARVs, noted an ironic side-effect of the drugs:  
Well, I try to get the drugs, food and the money, but the one main problem is the 
money because you have to divide [it] between all your other needs. It’s funny 
because these drugs give you such a huge appetite! So you have to eat- you might 
even feel like stealing when you don’t have the money to buy food! (Interviewee 40)8 
 
Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside observe that HIV-infected adults and children face 
energy requirements of 10% above normal to sustain physical activity and growth.9 
The WHO emphasizes the importance of a good diet in managing HIV/AIDS, 
illustrating the circular relationship between the illness and diet: 
People with HIV who are also suffering from hunger and/or nutritional deficits are 
more likely to fall ill with opportunistic infections and less likely to be able to recover 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, the WHO makes clear that there is no evidence to support the view that a good diet alone, in 
the absence of drugs, would halt the progress of HIV into AIDS. (UNAIDS, ‘Fact Sheet,’ 2005, at 
http://data.unaids.org/Publications/Fact-
Sheets03/who_fs_%20aids_treatment_nutrition_30mar05_en.htm, accessed 15/04/07). The WFP 
makes the same point: “Good nutrition is not a substitute for life-extending drug therapies. But 
nutritious food, in combination with safe water, good hygiene and care, can help people with HIV stay 
healthier longer, adhere to drug therapies and lead a better quality of life.” (WFP, ‘HIV and Nutrition,’ 
(n 4)  
6
 The WFP quotes a study by Marston, B., and de Cock, K. M. (‘Multivitamins, Nutrition, and Anti-
retroviral Therapy for HIV Disease in Africa,’ New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 351, No. 1 (2004), 
pp. 78-80), as evidence of this. (WFP, ‘HIV and Nutrition,’ (n 4) 
7
 Interviewee 38 
8
 The WHO says: “HIV progressively damages the immune system, which can make a person 
susceptible to a range of opportunistic infections and lead to conditions such as weight loss, fever and 
diarrhoea. These HIV-related conditions can lower food intake by reducing appetite and interfering 
with the body's ability to absorb food. HIV also alters metabolism which can often lead to increased 
energy and nutrient requirements for people with HIV infection.” (UNAIDS, ‘Fact Sheet,’(n 5)  
9
 Barnett ,Tony and Whiteside, Alan, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization 
(Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) at 239 
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from them. In addition, people who are sick with HIV-related illnesses are also less 
able to work normally, to earn income or to produce food, which can lead to 
nutritional deficits both for themselves and for their dependants.10  
 
However, despite respondents’ awareness of the need for a good diet, many felt their 
current nutritional intake fell below recommended standards with the cost involved 
restricting access. Interviewee 35 put it plainly: “[I require] good food, but even if I 
am aware I must take food, if there is none then there is nothing I can do about it.” 
Examples of typical responses included: “I am getting food but not to the standard 
required because I am short of money.” (Interviewee 21); “I try to get food but it isn’t 
always a balanced diet.” (Interviewee 4). One respondent, having listed his needs as 
“drugs and food”, continued: “…[A]ll these things require money. But I have no job- 
the illness took me out of my job. So these needs of food and so on, I don’t yet know 
how I’ll get them but I have started being treated.” (Interviewee 23). Interviewee 30 
said: “I need a good diet- fruits like mangoes and pineapples- and since I started 
taking the ARVs, I have had a very good appetite so it is actually possible for me to eat 
well. It’s just that I don’t often get the food, that is, I don’t get the money to buy the 
food. ...The cost is immense- daily, it can come to Ksh 500 [approximately GBP £3.35], 
if you count all those things. But you have to limit it [your expenditure] so that even 
tomorrow, you may also have something.” The problem appears to have worsened in 
the years since the interviews were conducted because of increases in the price of 
staples such as maize11 as well as food shortages caused by the recent severe 
                                                 
10
 UNAIDS, ‘Fact Sheet,’ (n 5) 
11
 A 2010 survey of 1,200 Kenyan adults reported that cheaper food was the main New Year’s priority 
for 19% of interviewees, second only to a new constitution, which topped the wish list for 22% of 
interviewees. (Reported in The Daily Nation, ‘New Law, Cheaper Food and Jobs, Top of 2010 List: 
Survey,’2
nd
 January 2010). The WFP says that 3.8 million Kenyans, about a tenth of the entire 
population, are currently dependent on food aid after the long rains failed in 2009. The organization 
adds that maize prices in September 2009 were up to 130% above normal.  (There were no figures 
available from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) for maize prices for September 2009 but 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) puts the price for a 2kg bag of maize grains in December 2009 at Ksh. 
35.69. There are statistical difficulties when trying to get a complete picture of how this compares to 
wages during this period as, once again, there were no up-to-date statistics for the wage structure in 
Kenya. The most recent figures available online from the KNBS are from 2007 and give the average 
monthly wages for a range of blue-collar jobs in urban centres such as Nairobi, where all my interviews 
took place, as between Ksh. 6,447 and 8,171. (KNBS, ‘Gazetted Monthly Basic Minimum Wages in 
Urban Areas (Excluding Housing Allowance)’, 2007, at 
http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.html?SQMSESSID=101561fb04e4511cde553e35a3da421e, accessed 
01/02/10). Other figures from the KNBS give the projected real average earnings for 2005 as 
Ksh.182,742 p.a., that is Ksh. 15,228 per month. (KNBS, ‘Kenya: Facts and Figures, 2006,’ (n 11) 2006, at 
http://www.knbs.or.ke/downloads/pdf/Kenyafacts2006.pdf?SQMSESSID=101561fb04e4511cde553e3
5a3da421e, accessed 21/02/10). See a summary at WFP, ‘Kenya Country Report,’ 
http://www.wfp.org/countries/kenya, accessed 01/02/10. 
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drought. The WFP summarizes the barriers to achieving food security in Kenya as 
“poverty, high demographic growth, arid and semi-arid lands in the north and east, 
droughts and HIV/AIDS.”12 According to the organization, an estimated 31% of 
Kenyans are undernourished.13 Moreover, there are often pre-existing problems of 
malnutrition among the poor.14  
 
Under these circumstances, the interviewees provided in their responses the range of 
strategies they employed to meet their nutritional needs, including assistance from 
family and other social ties, discussed in more detail shortly. PLWHAs also mentioned 
the part played by the numerous community-based organizations (CBOs, more of 
which in coming chapters) with which some had come into contact. WOFAK, for 
example, provided some members with food. Interviewee 1 said: “At the moment, I 
volunteer in WOFAK that is where at least when I cook for the orphans I get food.” In 
a follow-up question, when another WOFAK member (interviewee 6) was asked 
whether he was able to get his other stated needs- food and shelter- he replied: 
“Well, WOFAK is doing wonderful things. WOFAK has programme that gives people 
some food- they may not give you the whole thing, but if they give to supplement on 
the little that you have in your house, it is good. Who gives you food in this country 
every week? Nobody! Even your own parents when you go (upcountry) they tell you 
‘it is finished- you have to buy some now.’  But I really appreciate the work of WOFAK 
because a friend of mine also told me she goes there sometime they give her 2 
packets of unga (flour) and one packet of sugar.”  But one respondent argued that the 
organization providing her free ARVs should feed her, too, as it previously had done.15 
                                                 
12
 See WFP, ‘Kenya Country Report,’ (n 11) 
13
 At ibid. The WFP defines undernourishment as “the status of people whose food intake does not 
include enough calories (energy) to meet minimum physiological needs [and] is a measure of a 
country's ability to gain access to food.” (WFP, ‘Glossary’, 2010, http://www.wfp.org/hunger/glossary,  
accessed 08/02/10. 
14
 Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 239 
15
  She said: “I get the medicine from MSF and they too used to give us food too. But they no longer do 
so. I don’t quite understand why but it really used to help me a lot. Especially when I was ill, my social 
worker would bring food, or even cook for me. They would bring the food to our homes for us to cook 
but if you were weak they would make it for you. But from December 2003, they stopped and I have 
suffered a lot as a result. Now I just beg, for Ksh10 [approximately GBP 0.07] here, Ksh. 5 there.” 
(Interviewee 36). A shortage in funding had reportedly led to the halt. 
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This view was echoed elsewhere, with interviewee 37 suggesting an even broader 
range of demands.16 
 
Such responses reflect the pre-eminence of campaigns for greater access to ARVs. 
Indeed, some, like the “3 by 5” initiative, launched by the WHO and UNAIDS with the 
aspiration of providing ART to 3million PLWHAs in developing countries by the end of 
2005,  did not appear to factor into their campaign proper nutrition.17 While the 
number of Kenyans accessing ART has risen impressively (over 336,000 in 2009, or 
over 70% of adults in need, more of which in Chapter 6), only 30,000 of these 
received nutritional support.18 This reflects a narrow definition of the real health 
requirements of HIV/AIDS, as the WFP and others acknowledge. A Kenyan PLWHA is 
quoted by the WFP in a statement that is almost identical to the one made by 
interviewee 37 above: "If you give us ARVs, please give us food, just food."19  
 
One respondent for this research even considered ART without a proper diet 
pointless:  
I get both of them [my requirements] but with difficulty,” he said. “PLWHAs may not 
have the balanced diet because of poverty. You can give them the drugs but they 
cannot get the food they need. If you don’t take the balanced diet you’re just wasting 
the drugs. You may not even survive. So those 2 things must go together. So I’ve 
come to realize that not only drugs can help you. (Interviewee 45)  
 
From this one might surmise that among some PLWHAs increased availability of and 
access to ART from State and non-State actors has engendered a sense of entitlement 
to food, its obvious complement. One may speculate about whether the respondents 
above would have voiced similar demands if the ART was itself not freely provided or 
subsidized. Is this the proverbial inch given, mile taken? Does guaranteed provision of 
one requirement automatically lead to the expectation of more, and is this 
necessarily a bad thing? It is argued here and at greater length in the coming chapters 
that as State and extra-State health providers have increased their activities in 
                                                 
16
 “I think it is the duty of those who provide medicine for me, MSF, to provide even the food and 
everything for me because I am not able to.” 
17
 For more on the “3 by 5” initiative, see WHO, ‘The 3 by 5 Initiative’, 2007, at 
https://www.who.int/3by5/en/, accessed 19/04/07 
18
 National AIDS Control Council (NACC), UNGASS 2010: United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) on HIV and AIDS 2010: Country Report- Kenya, 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2010/kenya_2010_country_progress_report_en.pdf, accessed 
10/04/10, at 16  
19
 WFP, ‘HIV and Nutrition,’ (n 4) 
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catering to poverty-stricken PLWHAs there have been campaigns from activists for 
more to be done. It is through such processes that a sense of entitlement appears to 
have evolved among some PLWHAs. But caution must be applied not to interpret 
these acts as purely charitable or the claims made particularly upon wealthy donors 
and NGOs as without basis, as indeed some interviewees reviewed in Chapter 7 did. 
PLWHAs’ demands must be analyzed in the context of the legal or moral obligations 
of such entities and the asymmetrical global and local power relations between the 
key actors in the ART/AIDS debate.  
 
There will be a broader discussion of ARVs and campaigns for access to drugs in the 
next two chapters. For now, it is important to address the crucial the link between 
HIV/AIDS and food production and to demonstrate how the latter factor affects and is 
affected by the epidemic. Alex De Waal and Alan Whiteside, writing in 2003, 
suggested in their New Variant Famine hypothesis that HIV/AIDS was to blame for the 
wave of famines facing southern Africa, and considered the odds for recovery poor.20 
They identified four new factors related to the epidemic, which exacerbate pre-
existing problems like drought, poverty, financial mismanagement and the increasing 
wealth gap between rich and poor. In addition to the malnutrition-HIV/AIDS link 
noted earlier, their catalogue included “household level labour shortages... 
attributable to adult morbidity and mortality, [as well as] the rise in numbers of 
dependants; loss of assets and skills [resulting] from increased adult mortality; [and 
large] burden of care ...  for sick adults and children orphaned by AIDS....”21  
 
The illness mostly affects adults at their most productive.22 This essentially removes 
from the food-production equation the very people charged with ensuring food 
security and proper nutrition. The consequences are devastating for agro-based 
economies, primarily the incapacitation of actual and potential agricultural sector 
workers. The country is particularly susceptible to low-productivity caused by AIDS-
related illnesses due to the minimal levels of mechanization within the production 
process. Earlier estimates of deaths within the sector put the figure at 7 million since 
                                                 
20
 de Waal, Alex and Whiteside, Alan, ‘New variant famine: AIDS and food crisis in southern Africa,’ The 
Lancet, Vol. 362, No. 9391 (2003), pp. 1234-1237 
21
 ibid, at 1234. See also Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 245-6. 
22
 See Rugalema, Gabriel, ‘HIV/AIDS and Adult Mortality in Rural Tanzania,’ East African Geographical 
Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1998), pp. 25-38, at 26 
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1985 in 25 of the most hard-hit countries in Africa, Kenya being one.23 Here, a report 
estimated that 3.9 million agricultural labourers may have been lost to HIV/AIDS 
between 1985 and 2000, further suggesting a loss of 16.8 million more between 2000 
and 2020.24 Though these figures would most likely now require a considerable 
downward revision- itself a separate, contentious issue, addressed in Chapter 6- all 
sectors have undeniably been significantly affected by the epidemic.25 As stated 
earlier, the cost of morbidity and mortality involves not only loss of labour but loss of 
expertise in the sector. At one point, Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture, for instance, 
estimated that 58% of deaths of its staff are AIDS-related; a gap in expertise has also 
been noted among the ever-increasing AIDS orphan-headed agricultural households, 
of whom only 7% were said to possess sufficient know-how for agricultural 
production.26 
 
Rural areas, in which the vast majority of Kenyans- over three-quarters- live, are 
worst affected.27 In a view echoed by several interviewees, Barnett and Whiteside 
observe that the often subtle effects of the epidemic on rural life remain largely 
unaddressed. They highlight, for instance, the long-term loss of farmland following 
deaths from AIDS; disputes over property rights and inheritance; and the 
deterioration of rural infrastructure due to loss of manpower and skills.28 For this 
                                                 
23
 Food and Agriculture Organization, (FAO) ‘AIDS: A Threat to Rural Africa: Fact Sheet’, 2007, at 
http://www.fao.org/FOCUS/E/aids/aids6-e.htm, accessed 19/09/07.  
24
 FAO, HIV/AIDS, Agriculture and Food Security in Mainland and Small Island Countries of Africa, report 
of the Twenty-Second Regional Conference for Africa , Cairo, Egypt, 4-8 February 2002, at 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/004/Y6059E.HTM, accessed 17/09/07 
25
 See UNAIDS, ‘Results of Recent Population-based Surveys,’ 6 July 2007, at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/MediaCentre/PressMaterials/FeatureStory/20070705_population_based_s
urveys.asp, accessed 21/09/07. The most recent HIV prevalence surveys, from which various 
projections are generated, are now population-based rather founded on the blood tests of pregnant 
women visiting pre-natal health care centres. This new survey model is considered a more accurate 
reflection of the incidence of HIV/AIDS, and has seen the HIV prevalence rates in most countries 
reduced dramatically. In Kenya, for example, the HIV prevalence figures for 2001, published in the 
Report on the Global Epidemic in 2002 was 15%. A 2003 population-based survey put the figure at less 
than half of this, 6.7%. (UNAIDS, ‘Comparative Statistics,’ 2007, at 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/InformationNote/2007/070705_comparativestats_hhsurvey_en.pdf, 
accessed 10/02/10)   
26
 Both from FAO, ‘AIDS: A Threat to Rural Africa: Fact Sheet’, (n 23) 
27
 The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) State of the World Population Report for 2009 
estimates that 22% of Kenyans are urban dwellers, which amounts to 78% rural dwellers. (UNFPA, 
State of World Population, 2009: Facing a Changing World: Women, Population and Climate, 2009, at 
http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2009/state_of_world_pop
ulation_2009.pdf, accessed 05/02/10) 
28
 Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), from 244.  See also UNAIDS, ‘A Review of Household and Community 
Responses to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Rural Areas of sub-Saharan Africa,’ UNAIDS, A Review of 
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reason, there will also be a detailed analysis later in the chapter of the role of the 
system of land tenure in influencing levels of food production and determining the 
pattern of beneficiaries from this resource. 
 
At a household level, illness or death of adults, particularly of a mother, considerably 
diminishes the nutritional capacity, especially in least well-off households.29 And 
significant numbers of mature women are removed from the equation because 
disproportionate numbers of them are infected at a younger age.30 There are well-
documented long-term implications for undernourished children, including “perennial 
underachievement, [with] children of underachievers... also likely to be 
underachievers.”31 Families may also lose their breadwinners, who may be unable to 
work on the farms they depend upon for subsistence or a cash income. Seropositive 
farm labourers who rely on their wages not only to purchase food but other 
necessities such as shelter, healthcare and so on, find themselves unable to pay for 
these basic needs. There are further effects: an ill HIV-positive adult from an 
agriculture-reliant family means that others within the family unit, who are often the 
sole or primary source of care, must look after the sufferer or orphaned children, 
drawing them away from their farm tasks.32 The net result is a reduced income at a 
time when it is especially needed33; and even death, too, often further depletes the 
household’s resources.34 Poverty, exacerbating and exacerbated by ill-health and 
                                                                                                                                             
Household and Community Responses to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Rural Areas of Africa, UNAIDS 
Best Practice Collection, 2009, at  http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pub01/JC390-
Household_en.pdf, accessed 15/07/09, at 13) 
29
 There is evidence of this from Tanzania and Uganda: “Research in Tanzania showed that per capita 
food consumption decreased 15 percent in the poorest households when an adult died. A study carried 
out in Uganda showed that food insecurity and malnutrition were foremost among the immediate 
problems faced by female-headed AIDS-affected households.” (FAO, HIV/AIDS, Agriculture and Food 
Security in Mainland and Small Island Countries of Africa, (n 24)) 
30
 de Waal and Whiteside (n 20), at 1235 
31
 Rugalema,  Gabriel, 'Coping or Struggling? A Journey into the Impact of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa,’ 
Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 86 (2000), pp. 537-545, at 542 
32
 See Barnett and Whiteside for a summary of the effects that the illness or death of an individual has 
on her household and the wider community, which include the loss not only of a source of income 
earner or care giver but also as an educator within the family, the loss of her leadership, service in, and 
support to the community of which she is a member. (Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 199). See also de 
Waal and Whiteside (n 20), at 1236; Rugalema, 'Coping or Struggling? A Journey into the Impact of 
HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa,’ (n 31), at 539.  
33
 See also FAO, HIV/AIDS, Agriculture and Food Security in Mainland and Small Island Countries of 
Africa, (n 24) 
34
 As Whiteside writes, quoting a 1997 World Bank study of Kagera in Zimbabwe, death is an expensive 
business, which, unlike aspects health expenses which the State may subsidize, falls completely on 
households: “In Kagera households medical expenditures were higher when AIDS was the cause of 
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hunger, may become entrenched and prove intractable in the long run.35 There were 
signs of that “hunger-poverty trap” in the interview samples seen earlier. PLWHAs 
make various attempts to try and cope at family and community levels with the 
stresses on nutrition and income. Many households look to relatives for help. For 
instance, interviewee 27 revealed that, “My sister [helps me] especially with the diet. 
The medication I buy myself but if I don’t have money she helps me.” Similarly, 
interviewee 27 said that, “If I was at work, it should be me paying for my expenses. 
But because I’m not, I depend on my family.” For interviewee 26, “When I got sick I 
lost my job. Then I had to go back and live with my parents who paid for my 
education. So they are the ones catering for my bills and for my food but they have 
very heavy burdens…” Interviewee 6 speculated on how extended families might be 
integrated into helping PLWHAs meet their dietary needs:“Now, I may also tell you 
about extended families- that is where they come in. You know, it’s very difficult for 
someone to give you Ksh 1,000 (approximately £7.70) but they can do shopping for 
you worth Ksh 2,000 (approximately £15.40). So my sister can get me some things to 
eat, and so can my brother. So about food, for me it’s ok.”  
 
While some PLWHAs, as earlier quotes illustrate, try to address the diminished 
capacity to meet their nutritional requirements by cutting back on some meals or 
reducing their intake, others seek less expensive sources of nutrition or substitute 
their usual diet with locally found foods.36 Interviewee 16 remarked: “It all comes 
down to money because without money I cannot buy my nutrition. For example, I 
have now been forced to become a vegetarian. Fruits and vegetables are becoming 
cheaper now but I still need money to buy them.” Support groups for PLWHAs also try 
to inform their clients on sources of affordable, nutritional food. One respondent, 
interviewee 29, had been trained and now volunteered as a community-based worker 
                                                                                                                                             
death. But ‘strikingly for all groups except men with AIDS, medical expenses were overshadowed by 
funeral expenses. On average, households spent nearly 50 percent more on funerals than they did for 
medical care.” (Whiteside, Alan, ‘Poverty and HIV/AIDS in Africa,’ Third World  Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 2 
(2002), pp 313–332, at  322)  
35
 The FAO reiterates Barnett and Whiteside’s earlier-noted views, calling hunger a barrier to “the 
health and productivity of individuals and their efforts to escape poverty. It acts as a brake on the 
potential economic and social development of whole societies. It is no coincidence that more rapid 
advances have been made in poverty reduction as opposed to hunger alleviation.” (FAO, ‘The State of 
Food Insecurity in the World, 2006,’ http://www.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0750e/a0750e01.pdf, 
accessed 19/04/07) 
36
 UNAIDS, ‘A Review of Household and Community Responses to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Rural 
Areas of sub-Saharan Africa,’ (n 28), at 19.   
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for a reproductive health organization. When asked whether she felt that the needs 
of PLWHAs were being adequately met she replied:  
…[S]ome are in slums and they have nothing even to eat. For example, we get help 
from organizations such as Pathfinders who show us cheap ways to get a balanced 
diet. They tell us about how you can make meals from vegetables, how you can find 
fish cheaply. So you see, we learn. We learn that even if you must eat some meat as 
part of your diet, it doesn’t have to cost too much.  
 
The impact of HIV/AIDS on food security at the basic household level has serious 
repercussions when replicated at the national level. As has been noted, “[t]he 
epidemic undermines three of the main determinants of economic growth: physical, 
human and social capital, and thus has a major impact on development.”37 Although 
this should underline the importance of monitoring the epidemic’s effects on rural, 
agri-based economies like Kenya’s, a joint FAO/UNAIDS study argued that this specific 
impact of the illness was often overlooked as recently as turn of the millennium.38   
 
And just as the decline in incomes from agriculture is influenced by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, it becomes a catalyst for visible social and economic shifts that have serious 
repercussions for the spread of HIV. One of these, rural-to-urban migration, may 
predate the epidemic but it has been accelerated by the deterioration of agricultural 
earnings.39 Better employment prospects for the formally educated and highly skilled 
as well as a thriving informal sector for those with minimal or no education drive the 
move.40 Most of the migrants are young; thus, a significant population of poverty-
stricken elderly is left behind in the rural areas, with neither the children on whom 
they would traditionally rely nor the donors to whom their plight is not often 
                                                 
37
 FAO, HIV/AIDS, Agriculture and Food Security in Mainland and Small Island Countries of Africa, (n 24) 
38
 FAO/UNAIDS, Sustainable Agricultural/Rural Development and Vulnerability to the AIDS Epidemic,  
UNAIDS Best Practice Collection, December, 1999, at http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACK239.pdf, 
accessed 21/09/07, at 8 
39
 Kalipeni, Ezekiel, et al, ‘Mapping the AIDS Pandemic in Eastern and Southern Africa: A Critical 
Overview,’ in Kalipeni, Ezekiel; Craddock, Susan; Oppong, Joseph. R.; and Ghosh, Jayati (eds.), HIV and 
AIDS in Africa: Beyond Epidemiology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004) at 60. In their article Kalipeni, 
et al, include statistics from the World Bank from 1999, which put the decline of the agricultural 
contribution to Kenya’s GDP since 1980 to 29%, down from 32%. As noted, this figure, according to the 
World Bank, is now 25%.  
40
 The 1998/99 Integrated Labour Force Survey (ILFS) found that “[o]f the three sectors of the 
economy, small-scale farming and pastoralist activities engaged 42.1 per cent of workers. Informal 
sector and formal or modern sector absorbed 31.6 per cent and 26.3 per cent of the total workforce.” 
(KNBS, ‘Kenya: Facts and Figures, 2006,’ (n 11)). More recent employment figures from KNBS on 
“modern establishments” in both urban and rural areas show the informal sector to Kenya’s biggest 
employer, with 7,475,600 employees in 2007 out of a total 9,450,300. (KNBS, ‘Gazetted Monthly Basic 
Minimum Wages in Urban Areas (Excluding Housing Allowance)’, (n 11))  
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considered ‘sexy’.41 Many of the migrants are also men, resulting in an increase in 
rural female-headed households.42 The evidence indicates that despite the 
remittances they often receive to bolster their finances these de facto female-headed 
households are invariably poorer than their male-led counterparts.43 This has notable 
repercussions for HIV/AIDS because many of those who are ill return to their 
impoverished rural communities to live out the remainder of their lives, placing on 
them the burden of care with its crippling food, medical, funeral and other 
expenses.44 This is aggravated by the tendency of many single urban migrants to start 
new families while there, not only resulting in less remittances but also an eventual 
loss through morbidity and mortality for two or even more families.45 And crucially 
for the spread of HIV, this migration often sees a change in sexual practices, with 
even married individuals engaging in sexual behaviours that their new freedom and 
circumstances now facilitate.46 The previously-quoted FAO/UNAIDS study, although 
warning that this is not an automatic consequence of rural-urban migration (with 
Dakar, Senegal presented as a case in point) nevertheless noted: 
Migration is usually accompanied by a disruption of family life (separation 
from family and sociocultural norms, isolation and loneliness, and a sense of 
anonymity that offers more sexual freedom), which partly promotes the demand for 
and supply of sexual services, and more generally, makes migrants more vulnerable 
to adopting high risk sexual behaviour. Migration does not only render the migrants 
                                                 
41
 Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 230 
42
 Wa Githinji, Mwangi, Ten Millionaires and Ten Million Beggars: A Study of Income Distribution and 
Development in Kenya (Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2000) at 53. Here, the idea of headship is 
taken to mean “a combination of authority and well as economic contribution. However, it has been 
noted that the application of this concept is complicated especially because it is often self-asserted by 
survey respondents and could be driven by considerable subjectivity and biases that are not well 
understood. For example, there is often a lack of symmetry, in that female headship tends to be 
identified where there are no adult males present, whereas male heads generally co-reside with adult 
women and/or other males. Divorced, separated, widowed or never-married women may hold de jure 
(legal) headship of a household. But, de facto headships arise in situations where men are absent from 
the household for at least 50 percent of the time, but where they may continue to participate in 
household decision-making.” (CBS, et al, Geographic Dimension of Well-Being in Kenya: Who and 
Where are the Poor? A Constituency Level Profile Volume II, 2006, at 
http://www.knbs.or.ke/surveys/poverty/pdf/KenyaPovAtlasIIfinal2cl.pdf,  accessed 12/01/10, at 53   
43
 wa Githinji, (n 42), at 53 
44
 FAO/UNAIDS, Sustainable Agricultural/Rural Development and Vulnerability to the AIDS Epidemic, (n 
38)  
45
 wa Githinji, (n 42), at 53 
46
 Whiteside writes about why a truck driver, for instance, away from home for long periods, may vary 
his sexual behaviour: “He might have sex with a commercial sex worker because he is bored, he feels 
his job is dangerous and he deserves some compensation, he is frequently away from his wife and 
family, he experiences peer pressure from his fellow drivers to engage in this activity and he has the 
necessary money.” (Whiteside (n 34), at  317) 
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vulnerable to HIV/AIDS but their families as well, as households that resort to 
migration do so because of dire need.
47 
 
Indeed, interviewee 8 for this research hinted that the sexual indiscretions of her 
husband, who was then working in the city, had been responsible for her HIV 
infection. She felt that as her husband he had a duty to provide for her health needs. 
With an additional follow-up question deemed necessary to tease out some of her 
answers, she went on to detail how he was failing in this task:  
Interviewer: Why do you say he is irresponsible, if I may ask?  
Interviewee: By the time I was sick he ran away and left me hanging. So the in-
laws took over. He left me to die. He has money, he works, yet he 
left. He didn’t even ask where to take me to hospital so I was down. 
So these people took me to the hospital. At least now I’m happy- I’m 
alive. 
Interviewer: Why [do you think it your husband’s duty to provide for your needs]?  
Interviewee: Because we’re together. When I came from my home I was not 
having that disease. I gave birth the first time and the kid was ok- it 
did not have that disease. We got it because this is someone who is a 
drunkard, out of carelessness.  
 
Her response suggests a sense of self and a basis of claims to health entitlements in 
common with interviewee 19 in Chapter 3; both were given in a context where 
women were traditionally dependent on their male relatives for their material 
wellbeing, a fact which remains true for many due to the persistently inequitable 
distribution of resources, as will be seen shortly.  
 
Interviewee 8’s relationship to her husband may have been the cause of her deadly 
illness but it was also the licence on which she claimed assistance from him and her 
affinal kin. She exhibited unease about the extent of her claims on the latter, an 
opinion most likely influenced by her perceptions of the onerous nature of the 
requirements of her illness. She said,  
If you have a husband like I do, for someone to take you on as a responsibility is very 
hard. It’s just because of sympathy, a goodly heart, that they have taken the 
responsibility to get me to where I am now. Because even right now my husband 
doesn’t want me to be with him, he is still here in Nairobi but I came all the way from 
home [for my clinic appointment] and I am going straight back because I don’t want 
any interference. You know if you have this disease you want to be settled in your 
mind. You don’t want quarrels and everything.  
 
                                                 
47
 FAO/UNAIDS, Sustainable Agricultural/Rural Development and Vulnerability to the AIDS Epidemic, (n 
38), at 8. See also Kalipeni, et al, (n 39), at 60,  in reference to South African miners. 
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As has already been established, a married woman was traditionally deemed to 
‘belong’ to her husband’s family upon marriage, automatically obliging them to meet 
most of her needs. This would negate the kind of reluctance the respondent 
demonstrated. Her attitude may thus reflect shifting notions about the nature of 
kinship and other traditional social bonds, much altered in the colonial and 
postcolonial era but which have become even more strained for families 
encountering resource-demanding problems such as HIV/AIDS.48  
 
Further, one might argue that the interviewee’s response reflects a construction of a 
notion of entitlement based on her identity as a PLWHA: for it is questionable 
whether she would have been similarly reluctant to seek her in-laws’ help if her 
illness was similarly resource-demanding but other than HIV/AIDS. Her view appears 
to be that their offer of assistance was no longer based on their traditional 
obligations as in-laws or relatives but on “sympathy, a goodly heart”; she appears to 
perceive this as a charitable act on their part rendering it as easy to withdraw as it is 
to offer. It may thus be argued that the interviewee has recalibrated her ideas of 
what she was entitled to from them and their obligations towards her because her 
requirements were specifically AIDS-related; in other words because she was a 
PLWHA. Arguably she thought her claim less deserving or a dereliction of her in-laws’ 
familial or social duties more understandable- maybe even justifiable- because she 
was afflicted not just by a resource-consuming illness but also an often shameful, 
stigmatizing one.  
 
And yet it is an inconvenient time for many PLWHAs to have their certainties about 
the reliability or durability of age-old kinship duties shaken, for the HIV/AIDS crisis has 
made these networks absolutely crucial to the sustenance of many. But the epidemic 
exerts countless pressures on these same bonds, and “prime-age adult mortality”, for 
instance, particularly accelerates their dissolution.49 The death of an adult female is 
an especially effective catalyst for the decimation and destabilization of the core 
family unit.50 There are additional pressures due to the demands of caring for 
                                                 
48
 Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 247 
49
 See Rugalema, ‘HIV/AIDS and Adult Mortality in Rural Tanzania,’ (n 22), at 27 
50
 Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 247. See also Rugalema, 'Coping or Struggling? A Journey into the 
Impact of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa,’ (n 31), at 540.  Also Whiteside (n 34), who quotes a study of 
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HIV/AIDS-stricken children and the orphans of deceased PLWHAs.51 All these 
concerns played on many PLWHAs’ minds as they considered what assistance they 
were entitled to claim from their kinship and other social networks.52 One 
respondent, interviewee 16, underlined her dependency on her immediate family for 
her material and emotional needs, but she was also clear-eyed about its toll on them 
and expressed concerns about whether such generosity could be sustained: 
We need a lot of love and this, even from our own family members, is sometimes 
difficult to come by because they don’t want to understand. They feel that you put 
yourself in these boots and it’s up to you to know how you’re going to survive. Others 
might feel that if you were not in this mess, we wouldn’t be this broke. For example, I 
have gotten sick 3 times where I have had to be admitted and my family spent 
KSh500,000 (approx. GB£3,355) altogether. And it’s not so easy. I think that’s why 
some people go all secretive and they just die without telling anyone [that they are 
ill] because they feel they are going to be a burden. 
 
Another, interviewee 11, was similar uneasy about her reliance on her parents: 
I used to earn Ksh. 10,000 (approximately GB£ 67) a month.  I have rent to pay, food 
to buy, transport costs and then add to that hospital and medical bills and plus 
proper food. Now this becomes a problem- I may not afford, unless I come and stay 
with my parents or my brother, which is not possible because now he has gotten 
married. And so has my sister. So I go back to my parents, who can’t turn me out. 
They are educated and Christians, they didn’t reprimand me because I have the virus. 
They knew I didn’t get it rightfully. I was just raped and I explained to them and they 
knew all about it. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
215 households in Manicaland, Zimbabwe, from 2000, where “’[s]ixty five percent of households 
where the deceased adult female used to live before her death were reported to be no longer in 
existence in both the urban and rural sites.’ This lends weight to the supposition that often the worst 
impact is invisible because it is among those who are not counted.” (at  321) 
51
 Figures from UNAIDS, ‘Kenya’, 2010, at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/kenya.asp, accessed 10/02/10. 
52
 One respondent, interviewee 16, underlined her dependency on her immediate family for her 
material and emotional needs, but she was also clear-eyed about its toll on them and expressed 
concerns about whether such generosity could be sustained: “We need a lot of love and this, even 
from our own family members, is sometimes difficult to come by because they don’t want to 
understand. They feel that you put yourself in these boots and it’s up to you to know how you’re going 
to survive. Others might feel that if you were not in this mess, we wouldn’t be this broke. For example, 
I have gotten sick 3 times where I have had to be admitted and my family spent KSh500,000 (approx. 
GB£3,355) altogether. And it’s not so easy. I think that’s why some people go all secretive and they just 
die without telling anyone [that they are ill] because they feel they are going to be a burden.” 
(Interview 16). Another, interviewee 11, was similar uneasy about her reliance on her parents:“I used 
to earn Ksh. 10,000 (approximately GB£ 67) a month.  I have rent to pay, food to buy, transport costs 
and then add to that hospital and medical bills and plus proper food. Now this becomes a problem- I 
may not afford, unless I come and stay with my parents or my brother, which is not possible because 
now he has gotten married. And so has my sister. So I go back to my parents, who can’t turn me out. 
They are educated and Christians, they didn’t reprimand me because I have the virus. They knew I 
didn’t get it rightfully. I was just raped and I explained to them and they knew all about it.”(Interviewee 
11) 
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Interviewee 11’s response here offers interesting insights into the subjectivity of a 
PLWHA and has also been discussed in Chapter 2; she echoed the concerns of 
interviewee 8, earlier, on the financial pressures that her illness was placing on her 
family. But her comments also suggested that she believed it was partly due to the 
tragic means by which she became infected that she continued to receive her 
parents’ sympathy and assistance. By stating that she had not become infected 
“rightfully”, a word which she herself used in her English-conducted interview, she 
appeared to be endorsing the position that there are those who are blameworthy and 
so less entitled to assistance. This reflects popular perceptions seemingly shared, at 
least to some extent, by the respondent herself, which associate HIV infection with 
deliberate risky behaviour and sexual licentiousness. It is linked to ideas about stigma 
and sexuality, especially female sexual autonomy. It contributes to the discussion 
here by suggesting how a PLWHA’s subjectivity is constructed, how as a PLWHA she 
measures her sense of her own value to her family, community, country, her self-
worth, her dignity, and consequently what she is entitled to and from whom. Many of 
these discussions will be revisited in coming chapters.  
 
II. Income and HIV/AIDS 
Many PLWHAs explicitly mentioned income or employment as separate health needs, 
underlining the fact that meeting the myriad health demands of HIV/AIDS relies on 
access to economic resources, and highlighting Barnett and Whiteside’s point that “as 
with their chance of being infected, the impact of the disease will depend on their 
circumstances and the resources they can command.”53 Their contention was 
repeated in various interviews: Interviewee 30 stated that “[t]he main problem is 
money because it limits all the others.” For interviewee 43, “Money is the big 
problem because it governs all others. I get my drugs free from MSF but the lack of 
money influences all the other things.” Interviewee 29 recognized that “[s]ometimes 
you can get [all your health needs] without problems but sometimes you may not 
have the money. So it all comes down to money, which also influences whether you’ll 
have peace of mind or not, which is important.”  
 
                                                 
53
 Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 198 
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Before further examining this issue, it must be mentioned that interviewees were not 
asked to disclose details about their incomes, for reasons already noted in Chapter 2 
(in note 17, pg 87). The analysis of income in this section of the thesis, however, is 
able to rely on interviewees’ responses which allude to their financial well-being and 
which arguably provide richer information based on a respondents’ personal analyses 
of a range of issues which pertain to their income and expenditure, but which also 
incorporates an evaluation their satisfaction or otherwise with the subsequent 
imbalance, and the ramifications this has on their ability to fulfil their health needs 
and realize their nominal rights to health.   
 
Respondents spoke of the assorted strategies for securing money to meet their 
healthcare needs, including help from family and friends (as seen earlier) or others.54 
Some like interviewee 29, cited above, tried to use their expertise as PLWHAs for 
money: “Even the work that I do to get some money is voluntary, done with outreach 
programmes- I go and talk to people and hope to get something small out of it. But 
there’s no guarantee I will get anything- sometimes I don’t. I also do some home-
based care so I can learn how to look after myself as well as others.”  
 
Many of the responses highlighted one thing: the desire for self-sufficiency. 
Interviewee 37, for instance, appeared distressed about having to seek help when she 
might otherwise have been able to provide for herself. She noted, “With the food, I 
have never gone to the MSF to plead for help. When I was better, I used to work and 
provide these things for myself. But now, I can’t even work with on a small business.” 
Interviewee 3, though he mentioned food and medicine as among his health needs, 
ranked a job, which may guarantee self-sufficiency, above these, firmly stating: “First 
of all I need employment, that’s the way I can get money.... If the government 
provides me with employment, indirectly they have provided me with all these other 
needs. So that will cover most of the things.”  
 
The role of the government in facilitating individual self-sufficiency also resonated 
with Interviewee 48, who was prepared to take responsibility for all her other 
                                                 
54
 For instance, interviewee 17 said, “I get both the food and ARVs but I struggle to get them because I 
don’t have job and really depend on donations.” 
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healthcare needs if the government could fulfil the main duty she accorded it: 
securing her employment: “[I]f the government gave me a job to do I would easily 
provide for my own needs without bothering other people. Because if you look at me, 
I’m strong, I’m not sick. I can work, I can do the same as other people. I don’t keep 
falling sick often, partly because of the medication I’m taking.” 
 
The circular link between health needs and the need for financial autonomy was 
succinctly captured by a number of respondents. “...[W]hen you have these two 
things [food and medicine], survival is much easier,” said interviewee 40, for instance. 
“For example, when I have eaten well and taken my medicine, I am normally able to 
work on my sewing business and I am able to support myself.” As interviewee 44 
briefly put it: “If I had a job and I was healthy, I would be able to provide for myself.” 
 
Yet unemployment remains endemic in Kenya, with some figures putting it at 40%.55 
In a survey, quoted earlier, 11% of respondents named employment as their most 
important priority for 2010.56  But some respondents like interviewee 11 drew 
attention to further PLWHA-specific problems: the complications of managing their 
illness made consistent presence at work difficult; employers were insensitive to, or 
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 Employment statistics are tricky to decipher, a fact not improved by lack of access to recent statistics 
from the Kenyan government, hence the use of this figure from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
World Factbook on Kenya, which gives this figure as the estimated rate of unemployment for both 
2001 and 2008. (CIA, ‘World Factbook,’ at  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ke.html, accessed 10/01/10). But just how the compilers of this report define 
unemployment is unclear, as it may not necessarily mean that a person is not involved in some form of 
economic activity. The 1998/99 Integrated Labour Force Survey (ILFS) , for example, notes: “The results 
show that there were 15.9 million persons aged 15-64 (the working population) of which 77.4 per cent 
reported to be economically active. Most of the active population was youth between 24-34 years of 
age. About 14.6 percent of the economically active were unemployed. Some 3.6 million persons 
reported to be economically inactive, representing 22.6 per cent of the population aged 15-64 years. 
Majority of the inactive population was full time students (47.3 per cent). Only 2.0 per cent of the 
inactive population reported they were out of the labour force because they were retired.” It then 
gives the figures for employed persons aged between 15-64 at 10.5 million, and thus employment 
rates of 85.4%: “The working population was largely made up of unpaid family workers (39.6 per cent), 
mostly working in the rural areas and paid employees, largely concentrated in urban areas (33.4 per 
cent). Self-employed persons constituted 23.8 per cent of the employed. Of the three sectors of the 
economy, small-scale farming and pastoralist activities engaged 42.1 per cent of workers. Informal 
sector and formal or modern sector absorbed 31.6 per cent and 26.3 per cent of the total workforce.”  
(KNBS, ‘Kenya: Facts and Figures, 2006,’ (n 11)) The KNBS gives the provisional figure for total number 
of employed in 2007 as 9,450,3000; this is less than the figures from 1998/9 given in the ILFS study 
above. (KNBS, ‘Employment Statistics,’ at http://www.knbs.or.ke/, accessed 10/02/10. 
56
 Reported in The Daily Nation, ‘New Law, Cheaper Food and Jobs, Top of 2010 List: Survey,’  (n 11). A 
report in the same paper from 2005 shows Kenyans’ gloomy outlook on job opportunities in the 
country despite promises by the then-new NARC government, with 60% expecting unemployment to 
increase that year. (The Daily Nation, ‘Most Kenyans “See Little Hope” for Employment,’ 2
nd
 June 2005)    
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impatient with, their health needs; and, even though the government has now 
enacted legislation explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of HIV status57, 
employers discriminated against them in the job market. The legislation itself may be 
open to unfavourable interpretation for PWHAs, as it prohibits discrimination  
 of PLWHAs from employment or promotion, unless an employer can prove that “the 
requirements of the employment in question are that a person be in a particular state 
of health or medical or clinical condition.” It is not inconceivable that this exception in 
Sec. 31(2) might be liberally interpreted, so that it may exclude employers who, 
deliberately or otherwise, misjudge or underrate a PLWHA’s capacity to fulfil the 
functions of her job, perhaps because they do not apprehend the impact of the illness 
on a specific individual and the various socio-economic factors- such as access to ART, 
proper nutrition, emotional support, etc- that determine good health. Moreover, with 
stigmatization of PLWHAs still present in society, legislation alone, though important, 
is insufficient to halt discrimination or hostility against PLWHAs in the workplace. The 
stress that a PLWHA might undergo due to fear or anxiety about having her status 
revealed, as will be seen in Chapter 6 when psychosocial needs of PWHAs are 
addressed, may be enough to force her to leave her job voluntarily with the 
disastrous consequences for her economic security that this chapter illustrates.58   
 
For instance, Interviewee 11 was critical of her employers’ attitude: “Well, had I been 
working, I would have supported myself and I thought my employer would have been 
reasonable and may be waited for me to come up again [for her health to improve] 
and go back to class and earn my money. But now I take the whole burden back to my 
parents.” Interviewee 2 called for similar understanding from potential employers:  
[W]ork ... is difficult to get, especially people like us, because, you go to work today 
[but] tomorrow you’re down... So organizations like maybe [WOFAK] can take us. 
Because they understand us a lot. But these others of individual people… it is very 
difficult to take people like us- they can’t stomach that today you’re there, tomorrow 
you’re not. 
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 Sec. 31 (‘Discrimination in the workplace’) of the 2006 HIV and AIDS Prevention and Control Act 
(Kenya Law Reports, ‘Laws of Kenya’, at www.kenyalaw.org, accessed 12/10/10 
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See also National AIDS Control Council (NACC), Public Sector Workplace Policy on HIV and AIDS, 2005, 
The Office of the President, Directorate of Personnel Management ,at  
http://www.nacc.or.ke/2007/images/downloads/hiv_aids_policy_at_work_place.pdf, accessed 
03/03/09,  which declares as a policy objective “establishing structures and promoting programmes to 
ensure non-discrimination and non-stigmatisation of the infected and affected.” (at xi)    
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Similarly, interviewee 2 cited the consequences of such lack of understanding: “[T]he 
problem is always money, which starts with lack of a job. You know when you get this 
illness, you are removed from your job, which is the biggest problem.”59 She added 
that the government (“because they are the ones governing the country”) should 
take responsibility: firstly, for the provision of drugs and, secondly, for the creation of 
jobs for PLWHAs “because not everybody who is living with HIV/AIDS cannot work, 
some of us are capable of working.” These views about the government’s role in job 
creation are further echoed by interviewee 38, who opines that the government can 
replicate its U-turn on ARVs and provide jobs, too, saying, “Yes, [the government] can 
help: for example, we have drugs that were not previously available. Maybe they can 
also give jobs to those affected, so that from there we can get money to buy food and 
medicine.” 
 
The inability to find employment and (re)gain financial independence appeared to be 
a cause for shame or embarrassment for some respondents. One, interviewee 2, cited 
above, was bitter at the perceived squandering of her expertise, having said earlier in 
her interview that she suspected she lost her job because of discrimination: 
“…[A]bove all, I’d be glad if I had gotten a place to work because I trained as a 
secretary, and my career- it is like I am just wasting it.” Her response reflects the 
sense of value and self-worth that many draw from work and the capacity to acquire 
a skill and, through it, gain employment. Not only does this contribute to a PLWHA’s 
economic security it also boosts an image of herself as a vital, useful member of her 
household and community.60 Her ability to contribute to her own needs and 
requirements through paid work enhances her sense of individual responsibility, 
which is so crucial to the concept of human dignity.61  
 
                                                 
59
 For efforts to eradicate the routine practice by employers to carry out pre-employment HIV 
screening, ostensibly for the purposes of medical insurance (incidentally, insurers are now also 
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60
 See Schweitzer, Ana-Maria; Mizwa, Michael B.; and Ross, Michael W., ‘Psychosocial Aspects of 
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Work, therefore, and the ability to find it, keep it, and gain from it, can play an 
important role in shaping a PLWHA’s subjectivity and in reaffirming her humanness, 
and could allow her to re-imagine her relationship to entities such as the State and 
reassess her entitlements. A number of respondents did indeed appear to base their 
notions of entitlement to healthcare from the government on the taxes levied on 
them as paid employees, with some hinting at claims to healthcare entitlements 
based on a relationship between the (employed) citizen and the State not unlike that 
between a customer and a service provider. But this raises questions about how 
individual and State responsibilities are to be delineated if the emphasis is on self-
sufficiency, which, after all, cannot be achieved by all.62    
 
Yet the socio-cultural environment still makes it hard particularly for women to be 
integrated within the employment market and to vie with men on an equal footing, 
largely because of their competing domestic obligations.63 Worse, this contribution is 
itself underrated, as Tamale points out:  
The fact that women's lives are defined by the ideology of domesticity, that their 
unwaged productive and reproductive labour in the domestic arena is 
unacknowledged, undervalued and invisible in economics statistics, largely explains 
their resource-less status and points to some radical ways of tackling the 
problem.64  
 
Work is also inevitably directed towards narrow goals for many women: for instance, 
where it might be a gateway to self-empowerment for women, such aims are often 
subordinated to their efforts to cater to family needs like healthcare and nutrition.65 
Nzomo notes that even where women demonstrate entrepreneurship, such as 
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 Tamale, Sylvia, ‘Gender Trauma in Africa: Enhancing Women’s Links to Resources,’  Journal of African 
Law, Vol. 48, No.1 (2004), pp. 50-61, at 51 
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interviewee 43 who was involved in a “[community-based] organization called Osilgi 
VCT, where we do some self-help work selling handicrafts,” the purpose of their 
efforts is often restricted to the family’s survival needs rather than “women's 
strategic gender needs”.66   
 
Women’s economic conditions in particular deteriorated in 1990s’ Kenya under the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)-inspired economic policies, just as the 
HIV/AIDS infection rates were peaking.67 Nzomo remarks on the fight by destitute 
urban women to preserve their source of livelihood: 
Poor urban women have defied government directives and threats against informal 
income-generating activities in non-designated urban areas. The hide-and-seek 
game between women hawkers and law enforcement agents has increased, and 
despite AIDS, female prostitution is on the increase; women beggars with their 
children and even elderly women are a common sight, especially in Nairobi.68 
 
The issue of female prostitution, a significant driver in Kenya’s HIV/AIDS epidemic, is 
especially noteworthy.69 Reduced employment opportunities mean that many female 
urban migrants have turned to offering sex in exchange for money or vital goods or 
services; the riskier the services offered the higher the fees.70 On the shores of Lake 
Victoria in Western Kenya, informal affiliations have evolved based on such 
exchanges: the “jaboya” relationships which involve male fishermen and the women 
dependent on them for their catch, boost local HIV infection rates. One fisherman 
interviewed for IRIN/PlusNews said he had many girlfriends, one of whom stated that 
her economic circumstances prevented her from leaving the relationship although 
she had a steady boyfriend. As for condoms, which neither respondent admitted 
                                                 
66
 ibid, at 82-3 
67
 ibid, at 81-2 
68
 ibid, at 91  
69
 An estimated 14% new HIV infections in Kenya are linked to sex work, that is, infections “among sex 
worker, their clients, or other sex partners.”(UNAIDS, Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS 
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70
 See Schwandt, Michael, et al, ‘Anal and dry sex in commercial sex work, and relation to risk for 
sexually transmitted infection and HIV in Meru, Kenya’, Sexually Transmitted Infections, 21
st
 June 2006, 
at http://sti.bmj.com/cgi/rapidpdf/sti.2006.019794v1, accessed 21/05/08, at 7 (This issue is addressed 
in the wider context of myths about African sexuality in the next chapter.) 
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using regularly, she said: "I know condoms are good, and I would want to use them if I 
had the power, but the power belongs to somebody else, not me."71  
 
Carolyn Baylies, et al, write of the commodification of sex in an urban neighbourhood 
in Zambia, where their interviews reveal that “the exchange of sexual favours is not 
just a ‘survival strategy’ but routinised as an accessory to other commercial 
transactions... .”72 Those women- and the many men, for this is perhaps even more 
applicable to them- who turn to commercial sex work as an income-earner of last 
resort may have a strong sense of guilt about this ‘choice’ because of the combination 
of moral or cultural norms that dictate sexual relations in society (Chapter 3). The 
stigma associated with commercial sex work or even the suspicion of it, coupled with 
that attached to HIV/AIDS, has a powerful effect on PLWHAs, as interviewees 
throughout this research reveal. These perceptions undoubtedly mould sex-workers’ 
subjectivities and appear also to shape their ideas about their entitlements to 
assistance from their families, communities, religious organizations, the State, NGOs 
and other actors that play a role in providing PLWHAs’ health needs. It is likely that 
they may be less compelled to seek help not just because of possible feelings of 
shame or embarrassment but because they may not think they deserve or are 
entitled to any assistance: they may believe that they have violated a strict moral or 
cultural code, one that they, too, share.  
 
All the above confirm the objections raised by Rugalema and others about the 
analysis of ‘coping strategies’ sometimes employed in studies into the effects of 
HIV/AIDS on households. The coping concept, which suggests that households and 
communities have plans (strategies) to enable them recover from the consequences 
of the epidemic and resume or even better their previous living standards, is 
questionable, even cynical.73 Rugalema suggests that households react to needs as 
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difficult situation so that, for example, after a disaster or other major setback, a household is able to 
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they reveal themselves, disposing of their much-needed assets as the requirements 
of illness or death demand.74 At the core of this concept is the market system (and 
the presumption of an individual, household or community’s ease of access to, and 
engagement with, it), rather than dependence on the State, and has its ideological 
roots in neo-liberal, free-market thinking.75 Paradoxically, so do theories of individual 
human rights; but while the coping concept envisions limited State involvement in 
providing basic needs for the poor, individual human rights theories entrench the 
State as the main partner in the human rights dynamic, clearly demarcating its 
obligations not only to protect the individual but, as countless human rights 
instruments now recognize, to provide socio-economic needs such as healthcare. The 
market’s disenfranchisement and impoverishment of the poor76  is also revealed 
more starkly by the current financial crisis.77 But as an exploration into access to 
Kenya’s most valuable resource now shows, significant facets of this 
disenfranchisement predate both the financial downturn and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
 
III. Land: Inequality of Access  
Access to resources, pivotal to bearing the costs of long-term, debilitating health 
concerns like AIDS, also influences the pattern of HIV infection. The interviewees’ 
responses on their nutritional and financial needs especially brought into sharp focus 
the issue of poverty, which is the difference between socio-economic rights as 
rhetoric and reality. And with land being Kenya’s primary resource, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that poverty issues featured highly in the responses given the 
representation among the interviewees of two key demographics with restricted 
access to it. The first is that of informal settlement dwellers, of the whom there were 
                                                                                                                                             
regain its former living standard, or even surpass it.” (at 538)  See also Barnett and Whiteside (n 9), at 
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Daily Nation, ‘Why the State’s Economic Stimulus Plan Must Work,’ 1
st
 January 2010 
 210 
 
a self-declared number from the Nairobi’s Kibera.78 In 2009, the Ministry of Land 
noted that “[t]he essence of ‘informal’ or ‘spontaneous’ or ‘squatter’ settlements is 
the absence of security of tenure and planning [which presents] a challenge for land 
planning and development.”79 The second demographic with restricted access to land 
is women80, who comprised most of the respondents. Residents of informal 
settlements are particularly marginalised, and destitution and food insecurity overlap 
here with the greatest devastation.81  
 
Women’s dependence on relationships with men for access to land will be recalled 
from Chapter 3. This accentuates the importance of marriage, divorce and inheritance 
rights.82 Although by State law daughters can inherit land from their fathers today, in 
practice women’s access continues to rely on their association with men, depriving 
many of the benefits enjoyed by their male counterparts.83 These limited rights 
equate to limited citizenship and lack of access to, or control over, resources remains 
“the single most important cause of gender inequality on the continent.”84 Citizenship 
entails the recognition of their right to access assets as individuals unmediated by 
men and to participate similarly in public life, and will be explored in more detail in 
coming chapters.   
 
The previous chapter previewed the consequences of the new colonial system of land 
tenure, which promoted individual titling and ownership. The advantages of the 
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process were promoted on the basis that it had “great advantages in giving the 
individual a sense of security in possession”; resolving the “present unsatisfactory 
fragmented usage of units of an economic size”; and unshackling culturally-
constrained Africans by providing them with new avenues for socio-economic 
“mobility and private initiative.”85 Okoth-Ogendo argues, however, that behind these 
publicized motives lay darker ones as the colonial government struggled in the mid-
1950s to hold back the mounting pressure for political, social and economic reform: 
for the “[i]ndividualisation of tenure was also.... a political instrument which could be 
used to blunt African demands for land redistribution.”86 Nevertheless, the land titling 
juggernaut progressed, and its effects soon became visible: social dislocation and the 
dissipation of community networks, and evidence, too, for the first time, of the depth 
of the landlessness problem among Africans.87  
 
Decades later, the latter outcome has continued and worsened as the process of 
individual titling has been sustained in the post-independence era. For one 
interviewee for this research, landlessness meant that a valuable possible source of 
income and sustenance was beyond her reach: “[I]f I was given a place to build some 
rooms and told I can rent them out and collect the rent at the end of every month- 
that’s what I would do. Or if I was given a plot to farm, I could help my children.” 
(Interviewee 37) 
 
Akinyi Nzioki estimated that two million people- approximately 400,000 families- 
were landless in 2002, noting a year-on-year increase of 1.5%.88 Individual land titling 
may account for part of this acceleration and further aggravate the positions of 
traditionally marginalized groups like women; Jean Davison, for instance, has argued 
that women under the land-titling regime farm significantly smaller parcels of land 
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than their mothers before them.89 Nzioki, moreover, quotes a study by Parker 
Shipton which indicates that the promise of ready cash from land sales convinces 
many poverty-stricken new title-holders to sell their assets.90 Yet Gray and Kevane 
note government efforts in a 1990 administrative directive to ameliorate the new 
titling regime’s inherent discrimination against women, which sought to limit men’s 
rights to selling land without their wives or children’s consent.91 Additionally, Thomas 
Pinckney and Peter Kimuyu, in their 1990s study of the agriculturally viable Murang’a 
District, also pointed out a shortage of land-secured credit and government policies 
designed to obstruct land sales that may trigger family disputes.92 Their statistics, they 
argued, offered no tangible evidence that purchase and sale of land enabled by the 
individualizing of titles was responsible for such inequality.93   
 
Yet there are often discrepancies between policy on paper, however well-meaning, 
and practice. Furthermore, while Pinckney and Kimuyu’s studies are insightful on a 
quantifiable activity in one specific region of Kenya at a specific time and the impact 
upon it- or otherwise- of land-titling, their analysis is arguably narrow: it does not 
contextualize the process of individualization of tenure or address its wider effects, 
particularly on traditionally disadvantaged groups like women. In this regard, there 
are a couple of noteworthy points, relevant to earlier discussions about deteriorating 
household food security, lack of economic autonomy for women and the accelerated 
urban migration94, all with consequences for the HIV/AIDS epidemic.95 Firstly, the 
land titling process, which consisted of three stages- adjudication, consolidation and 
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registration- was almost entirely dominated by men.96 This, as Nzioki observes, meant 
that women’s interests were largely unrepresented.97 Secondly, to facilitate the 
conversion of multi-layered, intersecting traditional rights into individually-held ones, 
families resorted to selecting one member in whom to invest these new ownership 
rights, almost always the male head of the household, either the husband or eldest 
son.98 So tenure is overwhelmingly male, leaving women with no source of collateral 
for loans through which they might invest in the improvement of crop production99 or 
seek to improve their economic positions.100 Gray and Kevane note Shipton’s 1988 
investigation of tenure reform in Western Kenya’s Nyanza Province, which found that 
seven years after its completion only 7% of the land parcels had women registered as 
sole or joint owners.101 The vast proportion of title-holders is male although 
individualization of title has benefitted some wealthier women who acquired land for 
themselves and could thus transfer it as they wish.102 And the production of modern 
property rights through individualization of title must be seen as synonymous with 
the production of power, be it socio-economic or political. 
 
As Kameri-Mbote stresses, this has further entrenched the notion of land-ownership 
as the sole domain of male family members and given them unprecedented rights in 
the land to the exclusion of certain family members. She highlights the lack of 
awareness among family members of the extensive privileges now held by those they 
had nominated for ownership rights, and the assumed expectation that customary 
rights of usage and access would automatically remain protected: but the Registered 
Land Act (1963) does not acknowledge women’s customary rights of use.103 
Consequently, they are dependent on the title-holder’s goodwill.104   
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Three things emerge: one, although registration of title can and did address some 
problems relating to security of tenure, outcomes were mixed.105 It has proved 
difficult to adapt the new system of tenure to a context of all-inclusive, intersecting 
land rights, a process which, to reiterate Shipton as quoted by Nzioki, “‘can never be 
free of disagreement, deceit, and difficult compromise, and... can sometimes tear 
families apart.’”106 In some cases, various classes of women- the unmarried, divorced 
or separated- lost the cultivation rights they enjoyed in their fathers, brothers or 
sons’ land under customary law.107 And yet there is a confluence in the objectives of 
the State and custom: recalling the discussion in Chapter 3 about the interconnecting 
themes of land and patriarchy, the State, appears to have assumed an even harder 
line than custom, and has arguably used its legislative machinery and processes to 
embed its disapproval of women whose attempts to elevate their social status are 
considered counter-normative. That the titling system should enhance the more 
sinister aspect of land as a divisive asset rather than the real and symbolic commodity 
on which familial and community bonds are based is worrying, especially in light of 
the significance of these links during crises like the AIDS epidemic.     
 
Secondly, Kameri-Mbote brings under scrutiny Kenya’s post-independent legal 
plurality108, which has its roots in the colonial era, where settler land was governed by 
English law and ‘African’ land was subject to African law, a legal dualism which though 
formal did not guarantee African property rights from incursions by the colonial State 
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as it set about furthering its project.109 Despite the primacy of the State’s legal 
framework (which the new Constitution would maintain to the extent of any 
discrepancy110), a customary regime co-exists within and alongside it. But such 
integration is not seamless and clear. Customary notions of land ownership have 
influenced and been influenced in their practice by the system of individual titling, 
with some observers arguing that their apparent defects stem from being left to 
informally adapt to the altered environment.111 The resulting confusion returns to 
Mamdani’s thesis of the unresolved bifurcated State and the blurred postcolonial line 
that separates the spheres governed by civil and customary law. Place and Migot-
Adholla observe that possession of a land title certificate rarely indicates the rights a 
farmer claims to the land, with some title-holders declaring they have no rights to sell 
while others with no such title nevertheless asserting such rights.112 It is noteworthy 
that many family members appear to continue to exercise their customary land rights 
even after the land has been registered under individual male household heads.113 
Interestingly, some have even forgone the acquisition of title altogether either 
because they perceive the costs of the process as outweighing the benefits114, or to 
minimize conflict and tensions.115  
 
This legal forum-shopping is perhaps the inevitable result of plurality and maybe the 
best outcome under the circumstances. Arguably, it allows litigants to choose which 
regime defines and addresses their conflict better and offers more favourable 
chances of reaching mutually acceptable outcomes. Indeed, the new Constitution 
asserts as an overarching principle of government land policy the “encouragement of 
communities to settle land disputes through recognized local community initiatives 
consistent with this Constitution.”116 This means that such initiatives must not have 
outcomes abhorrent to those principles which the government would be obligated to 
pursue in its land policy; these are enunciated in Chapter Five, Art. 60(1) and include: 
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ensuring “(a) equitable access to land”117; [and] “(b) security of land rights.”118 
Crucially, as seen in Chapter 3, it proscribes gender discrimination in State, customary 
or other policies associated with land or property in land.119 How these 
community/customary authorities would share their tasks with the National Land 
Commission (which the Constitution proposes to establish (Art. 67 (1)) and other 
relevant government agencies is unclear, although the National Land Policy of 2009 
asserts a desire to streamline land disputes institutions and mechanisms.120  To the 
majority of Kenyans, the former are likely to be the fastest and most accessible 
means of settling disputes; and yet they come with the baggage of structures and 
norms that entrench male power. However, both dispute resolution systems, in fact, 
can be rightfully accused of being male-dominated, as much of Kenyan public life is, 
and women’s participation will continue to be curtailed either way.121  
 
The new Constitution’s recognition of the need for gender equity in land distribution 
is, of course, significant: it would provide a legal basis for challenging State failure to 
redress gender inequality and enshrining these ideas in a national constitution rather 
than piecemeal legislation carries greater weight. However, realizing these policies 
presents a massive challenge: Nzomo and Kameri-Mbote, while lauding the efforts of 
an earlier, similar draft constitution in addressing gender equality and equity 
issues122, crucially observe that the law does not exist in a vacuum and the existing 
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social, economic and political environment hinder de facto change.123 So, too, the 
new Constitution and its gender-related programme: its commitment to a human 
rights-based approach must be accompanied by efforts to eliminate the numerous 
obstacles on the ground.124 
 
The friction between State and customary law feeds into discussions about responses 
to the modern State’s attempts to bring the population within its centralized domain, 
away from the customary. While the State and its power still often appears remote, 
particularly at the domestic level, the customary realm and its norms continue to 
loom large. The promulgation of the human rights enterprise at the grassroots 
significantly depends on the acceptance of State authority.  If significant numbers still 
defer to customary authorities and norms, especially in the domestic arena where 
many human rights violations begin- discrimination, violence against women, lack of 
access to healthcare, among others- then rights advocates must seriously consider 
the fundamental impediment that this entails for the inculcation of their paradigm of 
rights and its notions of entitlement. They must address the limited success of the 
postcolonial State in exerting its authority in key aspects of social, economic and 
cultural life and its failure to cultivate the moral authority that might earn it greater 
prominence in the collective imagination of its citizen-subjects.         
 
Thirdly, Kameri-Mbote’s observations about the unforeseen consequences of 
individualized land tenure underscore the difficulty in attempting to graft one idea, 
with its own internal logic and dynamics of rights and obligations, onto another 
where these terms entail altogether different things. There is an interesting paradox 
here, for example: the modern human rights enterprise, with the individual as its 
focal point, advocates precisely the kind of individualization of rights that absolute 
land titles bestow and which are intended to provide a bulwark against State or 
corporate encroachment. Yet here that same individualization of rights, propagated 
as it is within an already highly unequal context, further embeds the disparity. Men 
naturally benefit the most from a system of tenure which permits the establishment 
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of absolute individual claims to the land, unfettered by the obligations of custom.125 
In effect, they acquire a new set of rights backed by the State machinery. It is, as Gray 
and Kevane put it,  
…the right to go before the formal apparatus of the state and trump informal claims 
to land. Under formal titling women are dually condemned; land is no longer 
available through customary channels and women are severely restricted in their 
financial and social ability to gain land through government or market routes.
126  
 
Successive systems of land tenure have continuously abandoned women to the 
unpredictable and unsecured goodwill of their male kin and can be rightfully said to 
have helped establish a conducive environment for the country’s HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Widows are especially vulnerable.127 Some, Karanja writes, were not considered heirs 
on their husbands’ death and therefore risked losing their rights to land128; others, 
formerly custodians of the family land on behalf of their male children, saw it sold 
without their permission. Widows without male children were at even greater risk as 
the land would often revert to their husband’s relatives.129 Interviewee 5, who 
articulated at length her fears of losing her land should her husband, also a PLWHA, 
predecease her, felt that local government officials could intervene to educate 
opportunists, particularly in the rural areas: 
...You see, they are saying funny things especially in the countryside. You find that 
when you’re infected and your brother is there and he knows you’re infected, and 
this man is married, he has kids and they start planning how they will sell your 
shamba (piece of land). And these are things that the Chief and the DO can put a stop 
to and tell them, ‘My friend, even if your brother is weak, it doesn’t mean that you 
have you have to take all his land because your brother is dying.’ But you find that 
when such things are happening, the women, we’re the ones who suffer most. You 
end up now going back home (your place of birth) because you don’t even have a 
small shamba to cultivate. So that means that your husband has died and you don’t 
own anything...They should help because this problem starts from the grassroots. 
You’re told that ‘from today, no vegetables in this shamba for you. If you’re found 
here taking vegetables, you will see stars (be beaten)!’ That is after your husband has 
died. And if you go to that shamba and get even one green maize, you will even be 
beaten. So you find life in that homestead very difficult and you decide to leave. 
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But Karanja also points to some of the socio-cultural reasons why women and widows 
do not proactively seek to secure their land rights when opportunities arise to do so: 
these range from lack of awareness about these rights which meant, for instance, 
that widows seldom transferred land rights to themselves after their husbands’ 
deaths, “and indeed do regard themselves as trustees for their male children until 
those same male children grow up and kick them out!”130 Additionally, women who 
might be able to buy land sometimes abandoned the effort if it might threaten the 
husband’s status in the home and result in marital discord.131  
 
A point must be made, too, about the move towards cash crop production, one of the 
underlying reasons for land tenure reform in the colonial period in the first place. This 
shift increased the economic value of land, intensifying the erosion of women’s rights 
to land and further concentrating its economic benefits in male hands.132 Ironically, 
moreover, the agricultural labour burden onto women increased contemporaneously, 
effectively devaluing their contribution to the mode of production.133 The effects of 
increasing cash crop production are far-reaching: the transferral of household income 
from women to men affects the quality and quantity of household nutrition, normally 
a woman’s domain.134 Further, it accentuates farmers’ dependency on the 
unpredictable cash-crop market and therefore potentially affects their food and 
healthcare budgets, while also reducing the amount of land available for food 
production, which may also contribute to a wider rise in food prices, thus further 
aggravating food insecurity.135  
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The advent of land titling, thus, in consolidating parcels of land under mainly male 
title-holders, replicates the worst aspects of customary systems of tenure. It is this 
crucial point that Pinckney and Kimuyu’s findings do not capture; mere statistics on 
sales and purchases of land cannot tell the whole- or even, perhaps, significant part 
of- the story of land inequality. Replacing previously-held obligations to guarantee 
access with mere goodwill wrenches a crucial lever of power from the hands of 
women. Gray and Kevane also highlight the grave consequences for women, still 
reliant on their relationships with men to access land, in the face of population 
growth and corresponding land scarcity. They point to a development in Kisii, 
Western Kenya, which they say is not unique to this country, where a new category of 
landless women arose for whom bridal wealth was not paid due to shortage of land 
but who nevertheless entered into informal relationships with men or eloped with 
them. Such marriages had no legal status until the men agreed to pay the brideprice, 
which might happen over a long period of time, leaving the women vulnerable; as yet 
unintegrated into the patrilineal system of tenure which provided them and their 
offspring with access to land, they could arbitrarily be evicted from the home.136 The 
figures given for eloping women worryingly increased from 26% in the 1960s to 87% 
in the 1980s.137 Such dependency exacerbates the inequality of women’s resources 
and their stake within the wider system of power. Arguably, only the increase in other 
forms of property other than land such as cash can be said to most aid women’s 
economic empowerment. But, as noted above, in a mainly agriculture-based 
economy like Kenya’s even this is inevitably closely allied to land and, for the majority 
of rural-dwelling women in particular, access to land remains fundamental to income 
and livelihood. 
 
IV. Women, Resources and HIV/AIDS 
It is hard to overemphasize the interconnectedness of the themes of ownership and 
control of resources, gender disparity and HIV/AIDS. Despite Nzioki’s worthwhile 
caution not to treat women as a monolith138, they nevertheless traditionally relied on 
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their association with men to access resources, making marriage- and remaining in 
marriage- crucial to their economic security, even when the conditions are 
unfavourable and may even increase the risks of HIV infection.139 For instance, the 
preliminary report of the 2008-9 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys (KDHS) 
revealed that nearly 40% of married, divorced or separated female interviewees aged 
15-49 years reported physical or sexual abuse by husbands, although this was down 
5% from the 2003 study.140 (There was a correlation, too, between socio-economic 
background and the prevalence of physical violence.141) 15% of married women had 
been sexually abused, 2 percentage points up from 2003. The report further shows 
that among interviewees who reported having had sex in the previous 12 months, 
twice as many men (38% to 18% women) were likely to engage in higher–risk sex, 
defined as sex with non-marital, non-cohabiting partners.142  
 
The link between marriage and access to resources is of immense significance to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. Many female respondents interviewed for this research cited 
their husbands’ sexual infidelity as the source of their infection. Some of these 
responses have already been reviewed. Interviewee 30, for instance, noted in 
Chapter 2, detailed the friction wrought by the discovery of the infection and 
exemplified the tragic dependency of a wife upon her husband for hers and her 
children’s material survival and the sometimes grave consequences of pursuing the 
social respectability associated with marriage. It is noteworthy that the respondent 
was employed as a post-office messenger at the time of the interview, and that she 
made references to having held a job or jobs at various other points. Nevertheless, 
she also made references to the household’s financial difficulties saying, for instance 
‘We had nothing’ and ‘I had no money to make any milky tea or even make food for 
the children…’ So despite periodic employment, it would seem that she hardly earned 
enough to cater for hers and her children’s needs, which, alongside the social 
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pressure for a woman to remain within a marriage, may explain the interviewee’s 
reasons for maintaining the union as long as possible.  
 
The interview also exemplified the suspicions, rumours and accusations about 
HIV/AIDS which pit family members against one another and weaken some of the 
very kinship bonds that such families might increasingly rely on in times of financial 
and emotional needs. Parts of her response are worth recalling here: 
I used to be married. I lived with my husband but I could tell he was not trustworthy. I 
spoke to his parents. His mother insulted me. She said that I had insulted her and her 
son. When it comes to my sisters-in-law, I got the same kind of treatment. … He 
would give his money away, waste it on other women. Later, I noticed he was getting 
ill. Every time I suggested we should go to hospital, he would abuse me and say it was 
not necessary...[My sisters-in-law] would beat me up but [my husband] would say to 
them, ‘Leave this one alone. We will end up together in the same way we started 
together.’ I think he had already told them…. 
 
Later in the interview, she picks up the story again, shifting to a period after the 
events above, when she was no longer living with her husband and with the help of 
her brothers had found a new place to live with her children. She has also, sadly, 
tested positive for HIV:  
 I can swear that from the moment I got married, I have never been with anyone else 
other than my husband.  When I think about it I am so bitter, so bitter. Even in my 
area my family, my brothers, they support me because they know I am not the kind 
of person who moves around with men. Some people may laugh at you and asking 
how else then you got the disease… You see a man taking someone’s young 
daughter, the next time you see her she is in hospital and she is ill.  You ask, what is 
wrong with such a person? ….But my problem is that I was married by a man who 
likes to drink alcohol- he is here and there. No matter how much you tell him about 
this illness, he will not listen to you, until he gets ill then he will believe. (Interview 
30) 
 
This interview raises many issues that will continue to be analysed here and 
elsewhere. For now, it highlights the high price many women are still paying for 
remaining within marriages with sexually unfaithful partners. Grey and Kevane note 
that anything from divorce to a lack of male offspring might cost them their right to 
access land.143 This raises the further question about HIV prevention strategies that 
may be employed by women who remain in these unions so as to continue to access 
resources for themselves and any children but who suspect their husbands of sexual 
infidelity. This may involve refusing to have sex or using prophylactics such as 
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condoms. More will be said on preventative methods when access to information and 
advice is discussed in coming chapters. It is now important to touch briefly on sexual 
habits and attitudes. The arena of sexual interactions encompasses gender power 
relations and it is here that women’s social, economic, and cultural status and 
HIV/AIDS collide. Women who are dependent on husbands or partners for their 
wellbeing must balance two issues: the kind of sex they are prepared to have, why, 
when and with whom, and the risk of infection as well as the socio-economic benefits 
that may come with the relationship.  
 
The preliminary report of the 2008-9 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys 
(KDHS)144 revealed, among other things, that among respondents who had sex with 
two or more partners in the past 12 months (in relation to which there was an urban-
rural differential145), only 32% of women and 37% of men said they had used a 
condom during last sexual intercourse. Among respondents who had sexual 
intercourse in the previous 12 months with a person who was neither their spouse 
nor a cohabiting partner, 35% of women and 62% of men reported using a condom at 
last sexual intercourse with that person.146 Meanwhile, the detailed breakdown of a 
number of attitudinal indicators from the 2003 survey crucial to HIV/AIDS also 
revealed important, and perhaps inevitable, differentials between urban and rural 
populations. To start with, it noted that acceptance of women’s sexual autonomy was 
“rather high” in Kenya, with over 50% of women and 56% of men responding that a 
series of hypothetical situations were all justifiable grounds for a woman’s refusal to 
have sex with her husband.147 These included knowledge that a husband had a 
sexually transmitted illness (STI) and knowledge that he had sex with other women. 
As to the first of these scenarios, amongst the female respondents, 92.1% of the 
urbanites as opposed to 85.4% of their rural counterparts thought a wife was justified 
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in refusing sex; on the second scenario the urban/rural differential was 85.1% to 
76.7%.148 There was a smaller differential amongst male respondents: 94.3% of 
urbanite respondents and 92.3% of rural dwellers thought a woman justified in 
refusing to have sex with an STI-carrying husband; 80.8% of the urbanites and 76.6% 
of the rural dwellers felt the same if the wife had knowledge of her husband’s sexual 
infidelity with other women.149  
 
What is interesting, however, are what male respondents consider justified reactions 
to such wifely rebuffs. In the 2008-9 survey, 5% of urbanites and 10.7% of rural 
dwellers considered withholding money from the wife a valid reaction, both 
considerably fewer than in 2003150; the urban/rural disparity was 3.3% to 5.2% 
among those who thought use of force to obtain sex justifiable under those 
circumstances, and 7.4% to 9.9% who favoured sex with another woman as a 
response.151 The 2008-9 KDHS report also indicated that a substantial number of 
women, too, particularly older and rural-dwelling, believed that a husband was 
justified in using physical violence on a wife who refused to have sex with him.152 
When it came to attitudes towards condom use, an encouraging 81% of men and 75% 
of women aged 15-49 years, the most critically affected age-group in Kenya’s HIV 
epidemic, believed that condoms could help prevent HIV; the urban/rural differential 
was 81.4% to 72.4%.153 The 2003 survey recorded only a slightly lower percentage of 
men with knowledge of the preventive value of condoms (78%); however, it also 
showed that more than a quarter of them felt that a woman had no right to tell a 
man to wear a condom, with comparatively more urbanites so opining.154  
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The above statistics raise a number of issues: firstly, while attitudinal statistics are a 
helpful in gauging how opinions may alter over time, they come with health warnings: 
they may not reflect respondents’ actual behaviour. Secondly, the sometimes 
considerable urban/rural differentials are telling: for there may be perhaps a more 
nuanced explanation here than the fact, for instance, that there is greater availability 
of HIV prevention information in urban than rural areas, a fact borne out by several 
interviewees. It suggests that the argument made in Chapter 3 applies here, that 
these discrepancies can also be accounted for by looking at the different normative 
systems and authorities at play in these different spheres. This explanation is 
sustainable even if allowances are made for the fact that Kenyans today move fluidly 
between the physical and conceptual space of the urban and the rural. The cultural 
norms that so influence rural attitudes to sex and gender relations emanate from 
power structures based in these heartlands and it is here that they exert their 
greatest authority. As such, opinions here are understandably more likely to reflect 
the social and cultural conservatism that defines this domain.  
 
Thirdly, the KDHS figures reemphasize the potentially deadly dependence which the 
durable link between a woman’s access to resources and marriage often creates. The 
data confirms the hollowness of the old mantras urging faithfulness, condom use or 
rejection of unprotected sex within marriage. A significant number of men, who tend 
to decide whether condoms are used during sexual intercourse, do not consider it as 
a woman’s right to unilaterally demand their use and the figures for condom use 
reported by the study are woefully low for a country with Kenya’s HIV infection rates. 
Yet other respondents in the survey would find no justification in a wife’s refusal of 
sex even if the husband has an STI, and among the apparently justified reactions to 
such rejection are discontinuation of the recalcitrant wife’s source of money and the 
use of force. All this underlines the importance of strategies for HIV prevention that 
enhance women’s individual economic autonomy. But there are bright spots in the 
data, too, not least in that younger women appear to hold a sense of entitlement to 
sexual autonomy without the risk of physical violence. This positive generational 
change suggests that negative attitudes about justified violence against women may 
be on the wane and reinforces a key argument in this research about the mutability 
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of subjectivities and attitudes on which individual notions of entitlements and rights 
are founded.  
 
Analyzing the PLWHAs’ requirements of nutrition and resources, therefore, may help 
illuminate a number of the broader themes tackled in this research: the evolution of 
notions of entitlement, citizenship and the relationships between the individual, the 
community and the State. It also allows us to locate land, the common denominator 
that binds these two requirements, in the HIV/AIDS debate. The tension between 
State and customary approaches to land tenure exemplifies a fundamental friction 
between the anticipated rewards of membership to the community of the nation-
State versus those offered by membership to the community of the ethnic: the 
individual human rights that the State guarantees the citizen versus the privileges of 
kinship that the customary offers its subjects. Should the prevalent norms of the 
latter be allowed to limit the citizenship rights of the former? To which domain 
should the PLWHA pledge her allegiance to extract the most privileges: the State, 
which appears so remote from the individual at the point when she sits down to a 
plate of food, and yet assures her that she is entitled to certain basic needs?155 Or the 
customary, whose age-old social networks may have combined to provide that plate 
of food but which decrees that her ownership rights to the piece of land on which she 
might grow it herself are limited because she may be a woman, of low social standing, 
and so on?       
 
Land also appears to be implicated in the construction of subjectivity and the 
moulding of broader ideas about entitlements. The customary norms and processes 
by which it was- and still often is- acquired entrenches those norms. By virtue of its 
permanence and immovability, it becomes a potent symbol of the rootedness of 
custom and a conduit for the traditional ideas about the privileges and duties it 
entails. Some of these notions- obligations to guarantee certain land rights to kinship 
members, for instance- are beneficial. But the gender inequality and inequity that 
underlies them actively excludes a swathe of the population from enjoying the full 
rights of citizenship. Moreover, land, symbolically and practically, binds the interests 
                                                 
155
 The new Constitution of Kenya makes it the right of every Kenya “to be free from hunger and to 
adequate food of acceptable quality.” (Republic of Kenya, Laws of Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya, 
2010 (n 3), Art. 43(1)(c))  
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of every individual that is dependent on it in ever-widening networks, from the 
smallest household level, to the clan, the community, the ethnic group and the nation 
at large. It is a manifestation of the connectedness of these networks and a repository 
for their shared history. Few things, then, repudiate the notion of man as an 
autonomous entity more successfully than land, whose productivity not only 
necessitates community and cooperation but whose rituals of succession and 
inheritance emphasize the idea of the individual only as part of a dynamic, 
regenerating whole. Any association with land and its resulting processes is bound to 
impress this fact on the individual and contribute significantly to her sense of self, her 
subjectivity. This is a far cry from the concept of the unfettered individual at the heart 
of the human rights enterprise, with rights that may be claimed against both the State 
and her fellows. All of these ideas will be revisited in the coming chapters.         
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Chapter 6: Needs and Requirements II: Psychosocial and 
Medical Needs 
 
This chapter, which focuses on PLWHAs’ medical and psychosocial needs, continues 
the empirical analysis of their main self-identified health requirements. The 
discussion involves a number of interconnected strands: the first explores the 
confluence between the psychosocial aspects of AIDS and some of the principle 
debates addressed by this research. Of particular importance is the effect of AIDS-
related stigma. As the chapter shows, several interviewees for this research reported 
urban-rural differences in attitudes towards AIDS and PLWHAs. Yet PLWHAs, who 
often locate themselves in both domains, as seen in Chapter 4, must internalize and 
adapt to the conflicting value systems that their dual memberships and identities 
entail.  
 
Another strand in this chapter reinforces the thesis on the dislocation of subjectivities 
and morphed notions of entitlement that may be wrought by HIV infection, this time 
expounding on the role played by the mainly sexual mode of infection. It draws on a 
number of interviewees’ comments, that (alleged) violation of prevalent sexual norms 
may rightly disentitle individuals, including some fellow PLWHAs, from making claims 
against those with whom they share social and moral spaces.  
 
Yet as the second part of this chapter illustrates social bonds remain pivotal in the 
realization of PLWHAs’ health rights, often stepping in to fulfil the State’s obligations. 
In a strand which buttresses arguments raised in Chapter 5 about the costs of 
realizing healthcare, a spotlight is thrown on the hidden expenses still associated with 
accessing anti-retroviral treatment (ART) despite its improved availability and 
accessibility.  
 
This leads to another of this chapter’s main strands: the contribution, underscored by 
PLWHAs’ responses, of NGOs (the most visible embodiment of civil society 
organizations (CSOs)) and donor agencies in advocacy for, and provision of, cheaper 
or free ART. The interposition of CSOs in the State-citizen relationship and its 
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ramifications on the rights debate, a discussion addressed in more detail in Chapter 7, 
is already visible here. The clear role of NGOs in particular in offering PLWHAs 
alternative and positive narratives by which to (re)define their lived experiences, and 
a new vocabulary and paradigm in human rights by which to (re)conceive their 
identities and entitlements from the State, is of fundamental importance to this 
research. 
 
I. Psychosocial Needs 
Many interviewees underlined the fact that HIV affects the person at more than just 
the physical level: it encompasses a number of critical psychosocial elements already 
considered in earlier chapters. Studies have shown that problems surrounding mental 
health are more common among PLWHAs than the general public; yet this aspect of 
the epidemic and the support needs of PLWHAs remain little-investigated, 
particularly in poor countries where HIV infection rates are highest.1 Moreover, these 
issues may have epidemiological consequences: research suggests that 
“psychological, psychosocial and psychiatric factors play a significant role in how well 
people comply with antiretroviral treatment (ART)...” with depressed subjects, for 
instance, showing poor adherence to treatment.2  
 
Several respondents explicitly mentioned the need to remain stress-free as part of 
their key health requirements. For instance, interviewee 29 said she need a “Good 
diet, a good place to live, to ensure that the children are doing well, with their 
studies, and to live well without problems.” “I need a balanced diet, said interviewee 
47, “and to take my medicine, avoid alcohol and live positive! I should avoid stress 
and just be happy.” Meanwhile, interviewee 14 “...[tried]to avoid stressful situations; 
                                                 
1
 Kelly, Kevin; Freeman, Melvyn; Nkomo, Nkululeko; and Ntlabati, Pumla, The Vicious Circularity of 
Mental Health Effects of HIV/AIDS: Symptom and Cause of Poor Responses to the Epidemic, Centre for 
AIDS Development Research and Evaluation (CADRE),11
th
 July 2007, 
http://www.cadre.org.za/files/Mental%20Health%20Kelly%20et%20al.pdf, accessed 02/03/10; at 3-4. 
This study was conducted in South Africa. See also Collins, Pamela Y.; Holman, Alea R.; Freeman, 
Melvyn C.; and Patel, Vikram, ‘Relevance of Mental Health to HIV/AIDS Care: What are the Mental 
Health Consequences of HIV?’ AIDS, Vol. 20, No. 12 (2006): pp. 1571-1582, at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/542467_16, at Section 16, accessed 02/01/10. 
2
 Kelly, et al (n 1), at 10. And although it is not a focus of discussions in this thesis, underlying 
psychological problems are said to increase a person’s risk to HIV infection. (See Schweitzer, Ana-
Maria; Mizwa, Michael B.; and Ross, Michael W., ‘Psychosocial Aspects of HIV/AIDS: Adults,’ HIV 
Curriculum, Baylor International Pediatric AIDS Initiative (updated 28/01/10), at 
http://bayloraids.org/curriculum/files/25.pdf, accessed 01/03/10; at 334) 
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I take my ARVS; I attend to any medical problems- I go to hospital; [I try] to be 
happy.” Interviewee 49 noted: “So as to improve my immune system in need to eat 
well, not to get stressed and take drugs.”; while Interviewee 44  was aware “I also 
need not to be stressed, which happens a lot with this illness.” Interviewee 42 also 
worried also that pressures wrought by her illness might affect those closest to her: “I 
am not satisfied because I stress my mother, too. Won’t that affect her health too, 
which will also be an additional cost? And she doesn’t even make that much money.” 
She and interviewee 45 appeared to view health holistically, adopting in their 
definitions of healthcare aspects of mental as well the physical well-being.3 
 
Yet stress remains a common complaint among many PLWHAs, who have to cope 
with a number of situations, including the bereavement of spouses and children also 
as result of AIDS.4 Another primary stressor, mentioned by several interviewees and a 
recurring theme throughout this research, was the difficulty or inability to meet their 
health needs, as well as other basic requirements for themselves and their families: 
“We have a certain ill person who never leaves the bed, doesn’t know what he’ll eat 
or drink....  [I]t would be better that that person only have to worry about what they’ll 
eat and where they’ll sleep. If they have to worry also about where to get money for 
the drugs, that is too much.” (Interviewee 29). Other respondents highlighted similar 
issues: “If I can walk in and out of hospital knowing I [have medical insurance] cover, I 
know that I can live a less stressful life and have more money in my pocket.” 
(Interviewee 47); “Well, I’m not working so paying my house rent is a problem, 
getting a balanced diet is a problem; I need to be at peace, I should be able to 
manage my stress but I can’t because I’m not working, that is a problem- it’s stress in 
itself.” (Interviewee 1); “There’s a lot of stress. I am straining a lot because nobody 
wants to take the responsibility. You know apart from HIV/AIDS, you have other 
responsibilities- children, who are in school- that’s my responsibility. If I could be 
assisted then it would be better.” (Interviewee 25); “Shelter, even right now I have to 
                                                 
3
 “It means getting the drugs to prolong your life- they may not cure you but they extend your life so 
you’re able to take care of your children. You live longer and you’re not stressed.” (Interviewee 42) 
“[Healthcare] means that I must get medication and also have a relaxed mind because I have realized 
that if you’re worrying or disturbed, then even if you’re taking medication, it will not work.” 
(Interviewee 45) 
4
 See Sikkema, K. J. , Kalichman, S. C. , Hoffmann, R. , Koob, J. J. , Kelly, J. A. and Heckman, T. G., 'Coping 
Strategies and Emotional Wellbeing Among HIV-Infected Men and Women Experiencing AIDS-Related 
Bereavement', AIDS Care, Vol.12, No. 5 (2000), pp. 613- 624 
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look for a house and shift because I can’t afford to pay rent there any longer. So it has 
been stressing me a lot.” (Interviewee 5); “...[I]n the case of medication, it’s so 
expensive, you have to stress yourself because you can deny yourself something 
which you want like clothing or something like that so that you can get the money.” 
(Interviewee 27); “... I am short of money.... Like now, I am not working, so getting 
money, paying rent and whatnot is a problem to me. So if I can get ways of 
manoeuvring this, it can even reduce worry, because the child is still young, the 
mother is just there and I am the bread-winner.” (Interviewee 21). 
 
The circularity between higher incidences of mental health problems among PLWHAs 
and unemployment or poverty have been suggested, and, similarly, those with 
children are more likely to suffer due to the burden of care and concern for their 
dependants’ future welfare.5 While finding solutions that altogether eliminate or 
alleviate the socio-economic problems is ultimately the only real solution, Schweitzer, 
et al, outline ways in which professionals might help a PLWHA cope psychologically 
with the challenges these issues pose.6 
 
In addition, there was the psychological distress that resulted from the actual 
diagnosis itself, an experience that most PLWHAs aware of their status will likely have 
experienced, and which is captured below by interviewee 16.  Her response not only 
highlights the inadequacy of counselling services for PLWHAs but is a poignant 
reminder that for the many young people in her situation diagnosis often represents 
the curtailment of long-term dreams7: 
...I need counselling. We need to be counselled because it’s very easy to go crazy with this 
illness. For example, I was told when I was 22. There I was- I haven’t even finished my 
education, gotten married, have no children- it’s so stressful.  And I didn’t even know 
where to start. 
 
A PLWHA often undergoes significant psychological readjustment upon HIV diagnosis: 
this frequently involves an initial period of denial about the disease and its 
consequences, but may develop into secondary illnesses such as depression or other 
mental disorders due to failure to access treatment, stigma and the fear of 
                                                 
5
 Kelly, et al (n 1), at 4-5 
6
 Schweitzer, et al (n 2), at 341 
7
 Kelly, et al (n 1), at 8 
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ostracism.8 There may be a fundamental transformation in her notion of self and self-
worth, which may derail personal ambitions and expectations.9 Interviewee 6 
described this eloquently in his response relating to his efforts to earn a living: 
I’m trying to pick up because you see the work I was doing needed a lot of 
presentation and immediately I realized I suffered from this disease, it had finished 
me completely. Even when I came out I came out a very shrunk man. I lost all my 
personality; I could feel very inferior when I went to talk to a client. It affected me 
almost in all ways. So I had to lose all the clients I had. There are some who know my 
status, others I never bothered to tell- I just disappeared. So it is something I’m trying 
to pick up. I was trying to see if I can get some funds and I wanted to come out a new 
man. Even in dressing! I’ll go back into business soon- that’s what I believe! So about 
my income I cannot tell you that I am someone who can be employed. I can’t work 
under somebody- I am used to managing myself and being self-employed. 
 
His sentiments are germane to this research: they provide just one example of how a 
PLWHA’s sense of self may become altered, and how this in turn may shape her ideas 
about her entitlements and rights. As Schweitzer, et al, assert, “[r]edefining identity 
through the condition of HIV can be a big challenge because it can come in deep 
contradiction with life goals and plans.”10  
 
Whereas interviewee 6’s senses of identity and peace of mind appeared intimately 
linked to his profession, the connection for others lay with their spirituality or 
religious faith. This is not uncommon for sufferers of an illness that is often fatal, and 
spiritual relief may be just as vital to mental wellbeing as the more broadly 
recognized psychological and social aids.11 Interviewee 8 asserted:  
I think [PLWHAs] should have a peaceful and Godly mind. In the house you should be 
together. You have to accept this disease because you have it and you can live with it 
for the time that you can. Because, I have a child and I have to bring up to the stage 
where when you have to leave him, he is able to take care of himself. 
 
                                                 
8
 Schweitzer, et al (n 2), at 339 
9
 ibid, at 337-8. See also DeRoche Peter, and Citron, Kenneth, ‘Psychotherapy,’ in Citron, Kenneth; 
Brouillette, Marie-Josée; and Beckett, Alexandra (eds.), HIV and Psychiatry: A Training and Resource 
Manual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 166-7 
10
 Schweitzer, et al (n 2), at 335 
11
 ibid, at 347. Interviewee 8 said: “I think [PLWHAs] should have a peaceful and Godly mind. In the 
house you should be together. You have to accept this disease because you have it and you can live 
with it for the time that you can. Because, I have a child and I have to bring up to the stage where 
when you have to leave him, he is able to take care of himself.”; “...I also have to have moral support, 
and the acceptance plays a big role; there’s also spiritual nourishment and shelter.” (Interviewee 48); 
“First and foremost, I am a God-fearing person. I always focus on my God first. Secondly, I worry about 
my kids coz I’m a widow, being a widow, I don’t earn good salary, I’m just on a pension. (Interviewee 2) 
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Interviewee 48 “...[had] to have moral support, and the acceptance plays a big role; 
there’s also spiritual nourishment....” Interviewee 2 declared herself “{f}irst and 
foremost ... a God-fearing person. I always focus on my God first. Secondly, I worry 
about my kids coz I’m a widow, being a widow, I don’t earn good salary, I’m just on a 
pension.”  
 
Moreover, religion norms often form a significant part of the moral framework and 
language by which PLWHAs define their relationships with, obligations to and 
entitlements from others. Unsurprisingly, hence, some respondents, like interviewee 
8 qouted next, perceived a duty for faith organizations in providing assistance for this 
aspect of their health needs, an especially invaluable function where the kind of 
supports usually endorsed by the dominant biomedical paradigm are scarce:  
Even church leaders. They should pray for people, give them hope. With God, 
everything is possible. I know. I didn’t even have drugs, I was just left there, sick, with 
no food. Someone has run away from you, you have a child, you’re sleeping hungry, 
waking up hungry, you have no money. But I know through God, everything is 
possible for me- that’s why I’m alive now.  
 
Such organizations enjoy implicit public trust in many parts of the world. For instance, 
respondents like interviewee 2 felt that the proximity of religious leaders to people in 
the community gave them the kind of access that should enable them to fulfil this 
important function “...[because] in a church, that’s where you get many people. So 
church leaders can be able to know the needy amongst them.” They are suitably 
positioned to undertake the spiritual counselling and educative roles within the 
community which have become a proven gateway to the treatment and care of 
PLWHAs.12 Yet religious notions on sin and punishment have also often helped 
endorse and perpetuate rather than dispel the stigma and discrimination suffered by 
PLWHAs, encouraging the perception of AIDS as a penalty for counter-normative 
behaviour, a viewpoint which some PLWHAs may internalize.13 This feeds into the 
                                                 
12
 See for instance a UNAIDS case study on the intervention of a group of Buddhist monks in Thailand, 
which reported as one of it outcomes that, “[s]ince local people are accustomed to telling monks their 
difficulties, monks become a conduit for supporting many HIV-positive people who have not disclosed 
their status to others. Once disclosed to the monks, if they wish such people they can be referred to 
support groups and assistance programmes.” (UNAIDS, HIV-Related Stigma, Discrimination and Human 
Rights Violations: Case Studies of Successful Programmes, 2005, at 
http://data.unaids.org/publications/irc-pub06/JC999-HumRightsViol_en.pdf, accessed 21/03/10; at 24) 
13
 Helen Epstein writes, for instance, of the early response of the globally-influential, U.S.-based 
evangelical movement, which discouraged funding for AIDS because of pervasive negative attitudes 
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well-documented denial among some religious communities.14 Such apparent 
intolerance may alienate some PLWHAs, leading to disengagement with, and isolation 
from, what could be vital sources of psychosocial support.15  
 
But there are other avenues for psychosocial relief: for instance, voluntary 
counselling and testing centres (VCTs) may offer some basic counselling.16 However, 
counselling as a dedicated profession is still a relative novelty in sub-Saharan Africa, 
as Rachier, et al, observed as recently as 2004. They noted several recommendations 
from a conference by the Kenya Association of Professional Counsellors (KAPC) for 
scaling up access to, and improving the nature and quality of, services available for 
PLWHAs.17 The KAPC suggested even wider goals for the counselling process, 
proposing, for example, that counsellors address issues pertaining to gender 
inequality as part of their advice to female PLWHAs, helping them and their male 
counterparts to “explore the circumstances of their lives and to consider 
                                                                                                                                             
about the homosexual men who were among the earliest visible PLWHAs. (Epstein, Helen, The Invisible 
Cure: Africa, The West and the Fight Against AIDS (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007, at 
185). See UNAIDS, HIV-Related Stigma, Discrimination and Human Rights Violations: Case Studies of 
Successful Programmes (n 12), at 7. See also DeRoche and Citron (n 9), at 167. But Epstein’s 
complimentary views on the responses of religious organizations in Africa, where the mode of 
infection is primarily heterosexual intercourse, do not apply across the board and, they, too, have 
rightly been criticized for the slowness of their response. For a range of press articles reflecting varied 
opinions about the performance of these organizations in Kenya see: The Daily Nation, ‘AIDS a severe 
test for Faiths,’ 2
nd
 July 2005; The Daily Nation, ‘Muslims Slow in War on Aids, Laments Don,’ 20
th
 
October 2003; The Daily Nation, ‘Yes, we have HIV too, say four Clergymen’ 22
nd
 June 2005; The Daily 
Nation, ‘Stigma Based on Moral Values,’ 19
th
 August 2006; The Daily Nation, ‘Church Insistence on 
Abstinence Correct’ 29
th
 November 2006. See also Githongo, John, ‘Church Must Face Reality of 
Condom Use,’ The East African, 6
th
 December 1999. 
14
 For instance, in late 2003, the chairman of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Prof 
Abdulghafour El-Busaidy, is reported to have decried the unfortunate belief among his constituents 
that the HIV/AIDS epidemic was not an Islamic problem. (The Daily Nation, ‘Muslims Slow in War on 
Aids, Laments Don,’ (n 13)) 
15
 DeRoche and Citron (n 9), at 167 
16
 I personally experienced one such counselling in 2004, having attended a VCT in Nairobi, partly for 
personal as well as research purposes. The whole process took no more than a quarter of an hour, in 
which the nurse who conducted the HIV test asked a series of questions while she took a blood sample 
and as we waited for the results to show up. They included what had prompted my decision to get 
tested; what my expectations were of the test; what I would do if I found whether the test was positive 
and, similarly, what I would do if I found out that it was negative. For privacy reasons, she explained, 
and so, that others such as those waiting outside the room could not hear the results, she gave me a 
brief course on how to read the tests result for myself, and once the outcome was revealed confirmed 
that I understood the read. Afterwards, I informally inquired what advice was often offered when one 
returned a positive result and she said that she would often discuss treatment and counselling options 
with patients, suggesting support organizations with whom they might want to get in touch. 
17
 Rachier, C. O.; Gikundi, E.; Balmer, D. H.; Robson, M.; Hunt, K. F.; and Cohen, N., ‘The Meaning and 
Challenge of Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) for Counsellors- Report of the Kenya Association 
of Professional Counsellors (KAPC) Conference for Sub-Saharan Africa,’ Journal of Social Aspects of 
HIV/AIDS, Vol.1, No.3 (2004), at 176 and 177 
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alternatives.”18 (However, it has been argued that clinicians must avoid adopting a 
“power (i.e. lack of power) paradigm” in such discussions and adopt approaches that 
allow PLWHAs to re-imagine their reactions to infection in a manner that 
meaningfully helps them appreciate the strengths as well as the weaknesses of their 
life circumstances.19) Further, the Kenya National AIDS Strategic Plan 2009/10-
2012/13 also partly attributes the increase in costs to a proposed scaling up of 
counselling services.20 
 
But these proposals are likely to take years to realize and will come too late for many 
PLWHAs. This leaves a vacuum that is often filled by the kind of specialism, widely 
available and vastly more accessible in Africa, that does not fit comfortably within a 
biomedical framework and whose practice, effects and outcomes remain 
questionable, yet which seems to provide a measure of mental, spiritual or religious 
wellbeing of many PLWHAs.21 
 
A crucial component of such wellbeing is, of course, the understanding and 
acceptance of members of their immediate social network, and many respondents 
felt it helped them better cope with their diagnosis and the consequences of the 
epidemic. Interviewee 13 declared that his health needs included “moral support 
from my friends.” The experience or fear of rejection or ostracism by many 
respondents has been discussed throughout this research; for instance, it will be 
                                                 
18
 ibid, at 179 
19
 Sherr, Lorraine, ‘Women and HIV,’ in Citron, Brouillette and Beckett (eds.) (n 9), at 230. For instance, 
Sherr suggests reinterpreting studies which found that women were less likely to leave partner who 
became infected with HIV than vice versa as indicating commitment rather than powerlessness. She 
also proposes interpreting findings that women were more likely to attend for treatment later in the 
course of illness as self-sacrifice than powerlessness. (at 231)    
20
 National AIDS Control Council (NACC), Kenya National AIDS Strategic Plan 2009/10-2012/13 (KNASP 
III): Delivering on Universal Access to Services, November 2009, at 
http://www.nacc.or.ke/2007/images/downloads/knasp_iii_document.pdf, accessed 09/10/10, at xiv. 
The document proposes targeting “children and the physically challenged” for psycho-social 
counselling programmes. (at 15). One of the services included in the expanded list of new outpatient 
services that the reformed National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) proposes to offer is “specialised 
counselling”, although the content of this is unclear. (Kerich, Richard, ‘How New NHIF Package Will 
Benefit Members,’ The Daily Nation, 29
th
 August 2010) 
21
 Joseph Amon provides the anecdotal evidence of a 19 year old female PLWHA attending a religious 
gathering in Uganda where theCanadian faith healer Benny Hinn was preaching. Kicked out of her 
home by her parents when her HIV status was revealed, she”clearly longed for more than just the 
medical management of her condition. She said of Hinn: "He cured me of AIDS, I can feel it. I just 
know". (Amon, Joseph, Dangerous Medicines: Unproven AIDS Cures and Counterfeit Antiretroviral 
Drugs, Globalization and Health, 27
th
 February 2008, at 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/4/1/5, accessed 27/05/09) 
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recalled that interviewee 16 wondered whether her supportive parents might not 
decide that since “you put yourself in these boots and it’s up to you to know how 
you’re going to survive.” Yet the importance of such support to a PLWHA’s mental 
health has been widely acknowledged.22 As Schweitzer, et al, stress, 
Having HIV can affect other social relationships because infected adults need to make 
decisions regarding levels of HIV diagnosis disclosure... however, with the stigma 
associated with both AIDS and sexuality, [the developmental stages of HIV in 
adulthood] also contains aspects of adapting to, and protecting information about, a 
stigmatized identity.23 
 
Interviewee 34 reiterated the importance of social acceptance as part of his health 
requirements, talking of the need “to be open to people about my HIV status and the 
other is to be free, that is to be accepted.” Indeed, disclosure of HIV status opens up 
more avenues for emotional support, although Kelly, et al, note that it may not 
always forestall the onset of psychological problems.24 Moreover, openness about 
one’s status may have fatal consequences, as cases like the 1998 brutal murder of 
Gugu Dlamini in South Africa prove.25  
 
The role here of HIV/AIDS support organizations in fostering community among 
PLWHAs is pivotal, as respondents such as interviewee 3 attested: he declared as a 
health need “an organization which can [provide] support, let’s say in something like 
stress management. You can’t do it alone unless you’re in an organization like this 
one, WOFAK. People share ideas so you become at least… you live positive.... So the 
support from organizations, not really material support but the group support, [to 
assist with] management of the stress, you find people accepting you in a group- 
those [needs] I get....” Interviewee 19 also highlighted the freedom afforded by these 
kinds of organizations settings, where PLWHAs could be open with each other about 
their status and discuss mutual concerns: “You know the only place we meet is here 
[at the Mbagathi District Hospital HIV clinic]. Out there, you don’t know whether a 
person has the illness or not. So here is where you get to talk to people and we also 
have those meetings for people on ARVs. Everyone stands up and says what their 
                                                 
22
 Collins, et al (n 1), at Section 16 
23
 Schweitzer, et al (n 2), at 334-5 
24
 Kelly, et al (n 1), at 6 
25
 Gugu Dlamini, a South African AIDS counsellor, was stoned to death a few days after revealing her 
HIV-positive status on World AIDS Day in 1998. Her killers, local teenage boys, said in court that “they 
had done it to punish her for bringing ‘shame on the community.’” (Epstein (n 13), at 141) 
 237 
 
problems are and when you listen, people have so many problems.” One respondent 
from Kakamega, Western Kenya, alluded to the sanctuary they provided away from 
the suspicions and stigma encountered by PLWHAs in the more conservative, often 
less HIV-aware rural areas. Asked if she thought that PLWHA’s needs were being 
sufficiently met, she said:  
I’m telling you people in the countryside are in a worse situation: there is no one to 
tell you that you have to accept your status.... At least here in town, we have WOFAK, 
I can come for counselling and they can update me on what is going on. But in the 
country, people have a big problem.... for those people accepting has been hard.... 
They don’t know what is going on, apart from that... this disease it’s a bad disease 
and it’s going to kill you. People even keep away from you. Like if you get married to 
person from a big homestead and they discover you have the illness, what happens is 
that the man usually leaves you and comes to town and you are one your own with 
no help; all people would do was come around to ask, ‘Has she died?’... (Interviewee 
5)  
This safe environment enhances PLWHAs’ sense of belonging to a group as well as 
their sense of dignity- which is closely linked to openness and recognition- and value 
as human beings.26 The fear of stigma and discrimination that often nurtures secrecy 
about HIV status negates an individual’s worth and infringes her right to dignity and 
equality.27 And in this, too, respondents like interviewee 25, noted a rural/urban 
discrepancy. People “go public in towns,” she said. “[They] come from their homes ... 
to Nairobi to talk about their status but they cannot say it at home. But when you go 
public in your home area, people really stigmatize you. Unless you make them 
understand, they wonder ‘Why are you saying it? Why do you have to say it?’” 
 
This statement illustrates again the postcolonial citizen-subject duality and 
contradiction: on the one hand, the modern citizen, revealing her identity more fully, 
declaring, with growing confidence, ownership even of those aspects traditionally 
regarded as counter-normative and frowned upon. As seen in Chapter 4, she draws 
her privileges- which include the network of formal rights, such as equality, non-
discrimination and freedom of expression, as the media, education or human rights 
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CSOs or advocates will likely have informed her- from her membership to the State-
based national community. Owning her identity as a PLWHA within this public does 
not- or, rather, should not- ostracize her from it; she takes advantage of the new 
rights-based vocabulary and moral frame of reference promoted within this 
community, which allows her to claim a new set of rights. Her sense of privilege 
comes with the development of her subjectivity as a fully entitled Kenyan citizen. But 
she is also a subject of the customary, whose belief system and norms favour 
discretion and offer limited license for public discussion of subjects relating to sex and 
sexuality. Her continued membership to this traditional community, and especially 
her access to its privileges, is dependent on her conformity with, and adherence to, 
the customs that are its glue. The dexterity with which she balances these two 
identities dictates her success in maximizing on her dual- or multiple- identities.  
 
In her exploration of the dignity-health nexus, Marina Chilton sees a potential link 
between the violation of dignity and ill-health, noting that it places “overwhelming 
pressure on the psyche and the body.”28 Further, she highlights the negative health 
effects of the experience of shame, humiliation and discrimination, which many 
PLWHAs endure29; discrimination is the corollary of stigma, the action or treatment 
based on stigma and directed at the stigmatized.30 
 
Schweitzer, et al, have called stigma “the single most important factor in producing 
and extending the negative psychosocial effect of HIV and AIDS.”31 The classical Greek 
genesis of the word ‘stigma’ denoted outcasts whose status was permanently 
marked; today’s often vague definitions associate it with difference, deviance and 
disreputability and it has been applied to a variety of illnesses down the ages, from 
incontinence to leprosy to mental illness, and also to sexually transmitted infections 
like syphilis, particularly.32  Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside stress the underlying 
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1 (2002), pp. 1-18, at 4. See also UNAIDS, HIV-Related Stigma, Discrimination and Human Rights 
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issues behind stigmatization, calling it “a social process: a feature of social relations, 
reflecting the tension, conflict, silence, subterfuge and hypocrisy found in every 
human society and culture.”33 Stigma often replicates and reinforces existing social 
and normative patterns and inequalities; thus gender, racial, ethnic and sexual 
disparities can be seen repeated in AIDS-related stigma. For instance, women are 
more likely to be blamed and shunned as the source of infection despite the 
likelihood that they were infected by their husbands.34 HIV-positive men may face 
allegations of associating with sex-workers while women may be accused of 
promiscuity, as highlighted, say, by interviewee 11, cited in Chapter 2.35 The link 
between infection and immorality is one that she and a number of other female 
interviewees were keen to reject, declaring women “innocent” in incidents of 
infection arising out of sexual infidelity in marriage, arguably endorsing common- 
often valid- stereotypes about male and female sexuality.   
 
Maluwa, et al, distinguish between ‘felt’ and ‘enacted’ stigma: the former is the 
shame linked to a “potentially stigmatizing condition and the fear of being 
discriminated against.”36 ‘Felt’ stigma may be internalized by the PLWHA, who may 
express shame about her illness or self-stigmatize, as suggested in a number of 
interviewee’s response. It “can have a powerful psychological influence over how 
people with HIV see themselves and adjust to their status, making them vulnerable to 
blame, depression and self-imposed isolation.”37 Studies of similarly marginalized 
                                                                                                                                             
Violations: Case Studies of Successful Programmes (n 12), at 7; and Holzemer, W. L., and Uys, L. R., 
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groups which apply a domination analysis reveal how society reflects back demeaning 
images to them, confining them in a false, warped and reduced form of subjectivity.38 
This shame may discourage PLWHAs from disclosing their HIV status and seeking 
treatment; particularly if, like commercial sex workers, homosexual men or injecting 
drug users, they are already ostracized.39 All this reinforces the stigma and 
discrimination cycle and perpetuates negative stereotypes of PLWHAs as the weak, 
incapacitated and unproductive figures that many encounter only in the final stages 
of the illness.40 Indeed, it has been suggested that the mental (ill) health 
consequences of HIV infection owe more to PLWHAs’ perceptions about negative 
responses by the public to the HIV epidemic than the trauma of infection itself, 
further feeding the cycle of infection.41   
 
‘Enacted’ stigma involves experiences of actual discrimination.42 PLWHAs may be 
subjected to discrimination in many areas, violating their rights to employment, 
marriage, freedom of movement and freedom from inhuman and degrading 
treatment.43 Maluwa, et al, propose building up expertise within AIDS organizations 
and existing legal institutions to handle discrimination and HIV/AIDS-related rights 
issues in the community.44 The KAPC identified a front-line role for counsellors at 
VCTs, for instance, to protect PLWHAs’ right to privacy and confidentiality.45 Indeed, 
contact with human rights advocates, some located within their HIV service centres, 
was one channel through which the human rights consciousness of some PLWHAs 
was broadened. Such steps would bolster the system of monitoring and reporting of 
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incidents of stigma and discrimination, critical to enforcing those laws that have been 
instituted to counteract such actions.46  
 
But the effectiveness of legal sanctions relies on the social and cultural norms that 
the law wishes to engender and enforce gaining broad societal resonance and 
support; the underlying prejudices and social disparities that sustain stigma and 
discrimination must be confronted.47 And as a number of PLWHAs attested, these 
prejudices are not only to be found in the wider community but also, distressingly, 
much closer to home. For instance, interviewee 17 noted:  
... I’ve heard people complaining. Some people have been rejected by their family 
members and as a result some have even died. In my own family, there’s a sister who 
died because, you know, she got it in the 1980 or 90s, when people were really 
scared of it. She died of depression because we feared her and we kept off. But I have 
seen other cases, too.  
 
Similar views were highlighted by interviewee 11:  
I thank God for my family who’ve shown me great support- others won’t even share 
utensils. Even they don’t want to shake your hand. When they see you they say, ‘that 
one is immoral; she moves around with a lot of men.’ You really need to have strong 
character to get out of that kind of a state and stay positive. Also, about HIV victims 
who don’t want to talk about it because of the kind of society we have. I have 
preached in so many places myself but I had heard people say, ‘oh, this is a Christian. 
She used to preach to us but it seems she was also immoral.’ That’s the kind of thing I 
don’t want to face but I wish people are educated so that the HIV-positive can speak 
up. 
 
Yet the authority of the State rarely penetrates this domain.48 AIDS becomes a prism 
through which wider attitudes towards sex, gender, religion and power are refracted; 
its effects on a PLWHA’s subjectivity- on her sense of dignity and self-worth, and 
ultimately, on her notions of entitlement and rights- may be glimpsed in the 
articulation of her psychosocial needs. Unsurprisingly, thus, integrated within public 
awareness-raising campaigns is the concerted effort by AIDS and/or human rights 
organizations to reshape PLWHAs’ own notions about their needs, rights and 
entitlements, and providing them with the means to create an alternative narrative of 
their illness, using a new moral frame of reference and language. Advocates have long 
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promoted the use of terms such as ‘stigma’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘positive living’, 
which have widespread currency today, transporting the ideas of inequity and 
oppression suffered by PLWHAs into the public domain. But the language of rights 
and ‘empowerment’ has also had a transformative effect on individual PLWHAs, 
becoming a vital tool for those seeking to proactively (re)define their belief system 
and (re)organize their lived experiences and construct new and positive subjectivities, 
and re-present themselves to an often hostile public. Indeed, stigma and 
discrimination was among the best-known rights-related concepts among PLWHAs 
interviewed for this research. And as will soon be elucidated, the subtle process of 
constructing PLWHAs’ subjectivities is inherent, too, in the predominant biomedical 
framework that governs the (official) knowledge of, and provision for, their medical 
needs.  
 
II. Medical Needs 
Almost all the interviewees mentioned the need for medicines for opportunistic and 
other illnesses such as tuberculosis and malaria, and antiretrovirals (ARVs) as key 
requirements.49 A number elaborated on the broad issues pertaining to their medical 
needs, particularly the cost of healthcare. In Kenya, the government provides 
approximately 50% of the formal public healthcare services through its network of 
hospitals, clinics and dispensaries; of the remaining half, 40% are provided by an array 
of independent mission hospitals, supported by various religious denominations; the 
private sector provide the other 10%, almost exclusively reserved to urban centres.50  
But it is on the informal sector that most may Kenyans rely for their primary 
healthcare needs, like the majority of other Africans: here, traditional or alternative 
medicine is often the main- or even only- source of primary health care.51 The WHO 
estimates that up to 80% of people in Africa use traditional medicines for primary 
health care, with nearly three-quarters of South African PLWHAs, for instance, 
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utilizing them.52 In Kenya, between 70 and 80% of principally rural-dwellers, rely on 
traditional medicines for their essential healthcare, with little or no access to 
secondary or tertiary healthcare53; traditional healers outnumber modern ones by 
100 to 1, according to UNAIDS.54 No wonder, then, that the organization has urged 
the boosting of local responses to the AIDS epidemic, emphasizing the need to 
integrate the biomedical approach of modern medicine and that of traditional healers 
in order to harness the strengths of both these systems.55 The deeper issues 
underlying this fresh perspective will be reviewed later in the next chapter. 
 
From the late 1990s, the public and mission healthcare systems, which until then had 
ran largely subsidized, needs-based operations, joined the private healthcare system 
in imposing fees for the provision of their services, because of factors ranging from 
the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank), 
to a decrease of funds for missionary facilities. The only healthcare services not to 
charge were the (over one hundred) NGOs also in operation in Kenya and which cover 
certain key geographical areas or deal with public health concerns56;  Michael 
suggests that these now provide over half of the country’s healthcare services.57 Prior 
to this, for much of the two decades after independence during which Kenya enjoyed 
relatively healthy economic growth, Stephen Ndegwa argues that the country 
operated a “veritable welfare state,” with the State’s social and economic policies 
offering minimum guarantees in health, education, employment.58 The recent rise in 
healthcare costs was captured by one interviewee who complained about the costs 
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(from May 2004 when the interview was conducted) at the biggest public hospital, 
based in Nairobi: “… Even this Kenyatta [National Hospital], which is a public hospital, 
is very expensive. Being an in-patient there for one day will cost you Ksh. 450 (approx. 
GBP 3.00) and you’ll be paying for every drug. If this was reduced it would be more 
fair.”59 (Interviewee 42)60  
 
As such, a number of respondents mentioned medical insurance cover as a 
requirement, as well as the ability to see a doctor as and when necessary.61  
 
It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the NHIF, the State health insurance parastatal 
accused of mass corruption and misuse of public funds62, provides medical cover for 
its11million members63 or their dependants, with controversial plans underway to 
restructure its funding and services.64 But type and quality of in-patient services may 
still be determined by one’s economic power.65  
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Lack of medical information or knowledge about the requirements of HIV on the part 
of patients and even doctors was raised by one interviewee:  
Also I realize that some doctors aren’t very good. You have to be educated before 
you are put on ARVs so that you know this is for a lifetime. What is happening is that 
there are people who are put on 2 drugs instead of the 3, so you realize that there 
those who are given 2 of just one [type] and they take them. And because they don’t 
realize, in the long run they become resistant. So there’s a lot happening but it’s just 
that PLWHAs in Kenya are not talking. (Interviewee 48)
66  
 
Her comments highlight the authority accorded to biomedical experts despite 
possible gaps in their training, which some PLWHAs value over what they regard (in 
public, at least) as the quackery of traditional medicine. Indeed, the production of 
PLWHAs who can absorb biomedically-authenticated knowledge about HIV/AIDS, and 
question or reject alternative sources of knowledge, is often regarded by activists as 
key in the efforts to tackle the epidemic.67 Further, they draw attention to issues 
around patients’ right to information, which is recognized in paragraph 12(b) of the 
Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (CECSR) General Comment No. 
14 on The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) as pivotal in the 
actualization of the right to health.68 Nahid Toubia observes: 
In curative health care, most doctors and other health professionals are 
trained to believe that they know what is best for their patients. Patients' 
rights to full information and decision making power decrease in direct 
correlation with lowered social, economic or gender status. This is more 
dramatic in countries in which illiteracy is high, public health information is 
practically nonexistent, and the legal system is too weak to be utilized 
favourably.69 
                                                                                                                                             
access inpatient care. See Kang’aru (n 62). However, one issue he cites, of superior services being 
offered at private facilities for those who can afford it, is not, of course, confined to the Kenyan health 
system. 
66
 Some of her concerns are supported by Action Aid’s HIV coordinator for Western and Nyanza 
provinces, Ken Odumbe, in IRIN PlusNews, ‘Kenya: Treatment Literacy Lagging Behind ARV Rollout,’  8
th
 
October 2007, Nairobi, IRIN, http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74697, accessed 
13/05/09. 
67
 See Finn, Mark and Sarangi, Srikant, ‘Articulations of Knowing: NGOs and HIV-Positive Health in 
India,’ in Higgins, Christina and Norton, Bonny (eds.), Language and HIV/AIDS (Multilingual Matters: 
Bristol; Buffalo; Toronto, 2010) 
68
 “Information accessibility: accessibility includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas concerning health issues. However, accessibility of information should not impair the right to 
have personal health data treated with confidentiality…” (Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CECSR),  CECSR General Comment No. 14 on The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Health, Adopted by the 22
nd
 CESCR on 11 August 2000, at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf, accessed 08/05/09, Art. 12, Para. 12(b)). 
69
 Toubia, Nahid F., ‘Health and Human Rights: Where Do We Go From Here?’ Health and Human 
Rights: An International Journal, Vol.  1 No. 2 (1995), pp. 136-141, at 137 
 246 
 
 
Most of the interviewees who mentioned an aspect of medical care as a key 
requirement focused on the medication element, perhaps reflecting the notion that 
this dimension is likely to be the most obviously problematic in terms of availability 
and accessibility, more of which later. Additionally, it may be that other problems 
associated with the adequate delivery of medical services, such as the distance of 
medical facilities or unsatisfactory standards of care may be an issue that some 
respondents regarded as commonplace and therefore not worth pointing out. Also 
they may not have perceived such problems as resulting directly from their HIV status 
and uniquely affecting them as PLWHAs but as symptomatic of the general healthcare 
system. However, such issues were sometimes aired by interviewees, particularly the 
manner in which they disproportionately affected rural-dwellers. For example, 
interviewee 45, who had trained and worked as a nurse made the connection 
between people not being tested for HIV and the distant locations of hospital 
facilities in some rural areas:  
….Some people are not ready to come out and say that they are sick. They don’t go to 
the hospital for check-ups. So some of them like in my place, they come from very far 
in rural areas whereby the hospital is almost 100km away. So they are not aware of 
this HIV/AIDS- they’re not. 
 
The same interviewee expressed his frustration at the dearth of HIV/AIDS-specific 
services and facilities within easy reach of rural communities:  
Those who can get the support are those in the urban areas but in the rural ones they 
don’t know anything. Like now, I come from the rural areas in Nyamira District, about 
300-400km away [from Nairobi]. Someone in the rural areas doesn’t know that those 
drugs are not in the District hospital; VCTs are not there- they may be in the District 
Hospital but many people live very far away from these hospitals. The community 
health workers are not there to educate people that this is what you’re supposed to 
do. They can’t go there themselves because they feel they will be stigmatized- they’ll 
start to talk about me. So I can’t see that they are helping me. 
 
Such comments highlight the rural/urban separation discussed in earlier chapters and 
bring to life the perceptions of some interviewees of the rural as ‘the other’: an 
unknowable or incomprehensible space with its own internal logic and systems of 
knowledge to which they nevertheless retain a loyalty. But there is a damning sense 
of its abandonment by the State and other official actors.  
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Interviewee 3, whose views on what he deemed as sub-standard care at Kenyatta 
National Hospital were cited in Chapter 2 and are recounted here, was also vocal 
about how the government could remedy what he saw as the sub-standard care 
offered in some hospitals:  
The government I think can help. By improving the hospitals, by taking this thing as a 
serious issue… It can help a lot of people, to buy them drugs or to add more beds at 
Kenyatta [National Hospital]… If I am taken to Kenyatta I fear I won’t last a week. The 
nurses there haven’t the courtesy to handle people. It’s better I was taken to 
Mbagathi [District Hospital] where the nurses have respect. I once took my sister to 
Kenyatta and she had to share a bed. We went to see her around noon and they were 
serving lunch. They brought some for her and the other lady. Imagine the other lady 
had died in the night, no one had noticed and they were still [serving her] food, 
almost 6 hours later! 
 
Stigma and discrimination are again significant here, and healthcare workers are not 
immune from exhibiting society’s prejudicial attitudes.70 The respondent also raised 
the important question about the function of individual health workers in the 
realization of health rights. London suggests three ways in which their roles might be 
conceived within a human rights framework: firstly, employees of the State, the duty-
bearer in international law, might become proxies through which it violates health 
rights; secondly, in contexts like South Africa, certain human rights obligations, like 
the prohibition of discrimination, may apply horizontally among individuals; thirdly, 
and much less likely to be subject to legal action, observance of human rights may be 
a professional requirement.71 
 
But the issue of medication, particularly life-prolonging ARVs, exercised respondents 
most. ARVs, which were introduced in 199672, come in multiple formulations, 
designed to upset the highly mutable HIV virus- the retrovirus- and limit its effects at 
the various stages of its life-cycle. To be effective they must be taken for the rest of a 
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patient’s lifetime; discontinuation would reactivate the retrovirus.73 WHO confirms 
that “[h]uge reductions have been seen in rates of death and suffering when use is 
made of a potent ARV regimen.”74  
 
Evidence about the optimum time to start ART is inconclusive but most guidelines 
advise doing so only in the advanced phases of the HIV infection.75 This requires 
diagnostic tests which measure the CD4 protein in patients’ immune systems (the 
CD4 cell count) and the amount of HIV in the blood (the viral load test).76 A PLWHA is 
deemed eligible if her CD4 cell count is below 250.77 The 2007 national population-
based Kenya AIDS Indicator Survey (KAIS) found that 39% of those eligible for ARV 
treatment knew their HIV status and were on ARVs; 4% knew they were infected but 
were not on ARVs; 57% were unaware of their HIV status (that is, they had never 
previously tested for HIV or had self-reported as uninfected based on their last test) 
and were not on ARVs.78 Approximately 242,881 people received ARV therapy in 
December 2008, up from 177,000 (a 37% increase) in the same month the previous 
year.79 These figures suggest the steady and significant increase in access to ARVs 
which has been reported in Kenya over the last few years: a total of 172,000 in 2007 
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(a coverage of about 42% in 2007), to 236,881 in 2008 (about 55.3% of adult coverage 
and 26.4% for children) and 336,980 in 2009 (70.4% adult coverage and a significantly 
smaller 24.2% among children).80 However, AIDS activists fear that Kenya may not 
meet its ARV scale-up targets or even sustain current levels of progress following a 
funding application rejection by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (Global Fund).81 The Global Fund accounts for around a fifth of the total 
global funding for HIV/AIDS programmes.82 
 
Drugs to prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT), through which over 90% of 
infections in infants and young children occur, have also been crucial.83 9 out of the 
10 of the world’s 2.1 million HIV-positive children under 15 years of age live in sub-
Saharan Africa84, of whom between 98,000 and 260,000 are in Kenya.85 Interviewee 7 
was grateful to the foreign NGO that saved one of her children from such a fate when 
asked how such organizations might assist.86 The National AIDS Control Council 
(NACC) reported that in 2009 an estimated 72.3% of the 81,000 HIV-positive pregnant 
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Kenyans received ARVs to reduce the risk of MTCT; this figure is marginally lower than 
the previous year but overall a significant improvement on previous years.87 Of the 
estimated 81,000 children born to infected mother in 2009, 39,482- or 49%- were 
getting ARVs to prevent infection.88 Despite improvements in ART coverage generally, 
however, statistics show poorer results when it comes to paediatric treatment, with 
only about a quarter of children in need of ART being able to access it,  as the figures 
quoted earlier relay.89 Poor systems, which impede patient follow-up, are a major 
obstacle.90   Yet accessibility of ARVs may reduce the psychological effects of an HIV 
diagnosis, as seen earlier.91 Interviewee 35, for instance, was encouraged by 
outcomes of ART in other PLWHAs: “Yes, and many of them have even greater needs 
and requirements. I see some who come here to collect their ARVs and they look so 
healthy. They give me a lot of hope. They tell me not to worry, that I too will get back 
my health.” Indeed, many PLWHAs form ideas about what it means to be infected 
from popular notions about the epidemic as a death sentence, which continued lack 
of universal access to ART only enhances.92 
 
                                                 
87
NACC, UNGASS 2010: United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV and AIDS 
2010: Country Report- Kenya (n 26), at 3 and 12. This is an increase from 2006, when 
UNICEF/UNAIDS/WHO figures indicated that an estimated 77,799 women were in need of ARVs to 
prevent PMTCT, with only 37,130 receiving them, amounting to a coverage of about 48%. 
(UNAIDS/UNICEF/WHO, Children and AIDS: Second Stocktaking Report, 2008, at 
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/ChildrenAIDS_SecondStocktakingReport.pdf, accessed 
01/05/08; at 42.) The Kenya National AIDS Control Council (N.A.C.C.) states in the Kenya National AIDS 
Strategic Plan 2009/10-2012/13 (KNASP III) that by December 2006 nearly two-thirds of facilities were 
offering PMTCT to 60-70% of all pregnant HIV-positive women, and claimed to have achieved the 
target of its previous strategic plan (KNASP II, 2005/6-2009/10) to introduce to PMTCT to 80% of 
antenatal care health facilities. But the report also notes that less than a third of mothers tested are 
reached with Nevirapine. (NACC, Kenya National AIDS Strategic Plan 2009/10-2012/13 (KNASP III): 
Delivering on Universal Access to Services (n 20), at 11). It is unclear whether the facilities referred to in 
the statistic were only government facilities or all facilities across the board. 
88
 NACC, UNGASS 2010: United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV and AIDS 
2010: Country Report- Kenya (n 26), at 12 
89
 There is a discrepancy between these figures given in the UNGASS 2010 report (ibid) and those 
provided by the  Children and AIDS: Fourth Stocktaking Report, 2009. (UNICEF/UNAIDS/WHO/UNFPA, 
Children and AIDS: Fourth Stocktaking Report, 2009, at 
http://www.uniteforchildren.org/files/CA_FSR_LoRes_PDF_EN_USLetter_11062009.pdf, accessed 
05/05/10). These say that an estimated 49,000 Kenyan children were said to require ARV treatment in 
2008 but only about 42% getting them (at 44). However, it must be noted that the estimates provided 
here have a wide range, with low estimates placing the figure at 29% and the high estimate putting it 
at 83%. See also WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF, 2009, op. cit., at 89. See also IRIN PlusNews, ‘Africa: Uneven 
Progress in Paediatric ART Rollout Demands More Action,’ 1
st
 December 2009, at 
http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87278, accessed 02/05/10. 
90
 UNICEF/UNAIDS/WHO/UNFPA, Children and AIDS: Fourth Stocktaking Report, 2009 (n 89), at 11.  
91
 Schweitzer, et al (n 2), at 338 
92
 Kelly, et al (n 1), at 8-9 
 251 
 
The progressive scale-up of cheaper or free ARVs was not entirely smooth. This writer 
witnessed part of this process while conducting the fieldwork for this research. Over 
the seven or so weeks of interviewing, ARV costs at Mbagathi District Hospital (MDH) 
fell by 66%; thus the last respondents interviewed at the end of May 2004 were able 
to respond to questions about the implications of this. Also crucial to discussions here 
are the changes in the pricing of ARVs in public health institutions which have 
occurred in the subsequent years. Initially, ARV prices at MDH (and ostensibly at 
other government district hospital although, as interviewees revealed, this was not 
always the case) were Ksh. 1,500 (approx. GBP 10.07).93 In May 2004 it was 
announced that this would then be reduced to Ksh. 500 (approx. GBP 3.36). A further 
decrease to Ksh. 200 (approx. GBP 1.34) was reported in early May 2005, although 
this applied in only one hospital, MDH.94 In 2006 this was halved to Ksh100 (approx. 
GBP 0.67), before President Mwai Kibaki announced a complete fee-waiver.95  
 
Implementation hiccups aside, these announcements, had they occurred during the 
interviewing process, would undoubtedly have altered many responses and this 
should be borne in mind in the analysis of interviewees’ reactions to ART costs. 
Nevertheless, a number still give an idea of the kind of answers that might have been 
elicited, as some respondents were already receiving free ARVs from Médicins Sans 
Frontières (MSF). A facility known as the Comprehensive Care Centre, jointly ran by 
the Kenya Ministry of Health and MSF Belgium, was inaugurated in April 2005, by 
which time it was already serving 1,850 patients, with ARVs provided free but costs of 
about USD 5 levied for tests and other drugs.96 In addition, there were responses 
from PLWHAs who had been purchasing ARVs from the more expensive private 
health sector and others who were trying to switch from private to public healthcare 
who commented on the difficulties they encountered. Thus the range of interviews 
                                                 
93
 The government had announced in September 2003 that ARVs would be available at all District 
Hospitals by the end of that month. It was added that patients would have to pay for the drugs 
although the cost would be reduced; at the time the cheapest drugs cost Ksh 3,000 (approx. GBP 23). 
(The Daily Nation, ‘State accused of betrayal on Aids medicines,’ 17
th
 September 2003) 
94
 The Daily Nation, ‘Aids Infections on the Decline,’ (n 81) 
95
 IRIN PlusNews, ‘Kenya: ARVs Now Free in Public Hospitals,’ 2
nd
 June 2006, at 
http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=39654, accessed 03/01/08 
96
 IRIN PlusNews, ‘Kenya: Health Centre to Treat HIV/AIDS Patients Inaugurated,’ 28
th
 April
 
2005, at 
http://www.plusnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=38495, accessed 06/05/08 
 252 
 
offers a broad spectrum of opinions about the impact of the pricing differences on 
PLWAHs’ lives. 
 
The primary reasons cited for lack of universal access to ART in Kenya and elsewhere 
are, broadly speaking, the prohibitive cost of ARVs and the absence of a reliable 
healthcare infrastructure to adequately implement the necessary components of the 
treatment programmes.97 Even though several respondents felt the provision of 
health requirements was their personal responsibility, with ARVs as with nutrition the 
reality was that many were dependent on family members or their wider social 
network despite the perception by some that they had become or were becoming 
burdensome. Once again this reflects a major disconnect between the ideal often 
promoted by CSOs and donor agencies and assimilated by PLWHAs of the 
‘empowered’, self-reliant PLWHA able to exercise healthy options, and the real socio-
economic obstacles many encounter.98 Indeed, Gabriel Rugalema has noted the 
various levels of consultation that typify decision-making about the deployment of 
resources to tackle illness or death expenses: bolstering his critique of so-called 
‘coping strategies,’ he observes that these choices often leap from the realm of the 
individual or household and encompass the wider kinship group.  
Such decisions are therefore not always contained within the 'walls' of the 
household. In some situations, individuals (mostly males, including those sick from 
AIDS) may make decisions about what assets should be disposed of and what kind of 
treatment should be sought - regardless of the short or long-term costs to the rest of 
the household members. In others, husbands and wives may consult on the best 
course of action. In yet others, it is the wider [kinship-based] therapy managing group 
that manages the resource utilisation of the afflicted households, sometimes without 
even consulting household members.99 
 
This underscores the real corporate nature of the realization of healthcare for many- 
far from the rhetoric of the atomized individual imagined by human rights 
instruments- and exposes the complexities of decisions and actions at the lowest 
strata of the healthcare pyramid, far removed from the legislative guarantees of 
individual health rights from the State. The role and significance of kinship and other 
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social networks in bridging the gap between the ideals and reality of the State-
individual human rights compact is once again underlined.  
 
The government is perhaps conscious, however, that such ties cannot solely, 
infinitely, absorb the social welfare pressures wrought by the AIDS epidemic, for it 
recently initiated a scheme to provide cash transfers to enable orphans and 
vulnerable children in poor households to remain within these families. 12,500 
reportedly benefitted in 2007, with a target of 70,000 set for 2009; these efforts 
attracted funding from the World Bank worth $US50 million, to be scaled up to cover 
100,000 households by 2012.100    
    
But while the above-mentioned obstacles to universal access of ART do apply and 
were highlighted in interviews, as will be seen shortly, they also suggest of a more 
nuanced understanding of the underlying problems. Several respondents identified a 
lack of political will to meet PLWHAs’ healthcare needs. A number voiced doubts 
about the government’s capacity to handle the HIV/AIDS crisis altogether, suggesting 
it was symptomatic of its general attitude towards the welfare of ordinary citizens; 
some of these views were seen in Chapter 4. It is in these statements and opinions 
that the ongoing transaction between the State and its citizen-subjects and the 
ruptures that pervade this central relationship in the human rights dynamic can be 
seen. The interviews reflect the range of opinions about where the equilibrium in this 
relationship lies, where it ought to lie and how the ideal balance can be struck. They 
provide useful pointers to the nature of some the conversations that have been 
taking place in Kenya, and the fact that they are focussed on PLWHAs allows one to 
speculate legitimately about how the HIV/AIDS epidemic may be impacting on this 
conversation. This discussion will be explored in even greater detail in chapters 7 and 
8. 
 
For now, it is in the decision whether to start the life-prolonging ART that PLWHAs 
encounter the first critical impact of its cost. The process towards treatment is stalled 
early on due to the prohibitive cost of diagnostic tests.101 This point was cited by the 
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director of the N.A.C.C., Patrick Orege, who in 2005 stated that the $26 cost imposed 
by public health centres for the laboratory tests was a significant factor in hindering 
the uptake of ART.102 This was borne out by respondents 25 and 48: the former, 
offering her opinion on the September 2003 ARV subsidization announcement that 
promised to halve drug prices, noted: “There are very few hospitals with the drugs…. 
And they are not even free because you have to go and have your CD4 count done, 
which is very expensive.” Interviewee 48 said she had attended the event at which 
this announcement was made to the public:  
The way the government is treating PLWHAs who are supposed to be on ARVs, from 
the stories I hear from my colleagues, it’s not easy to access the treatment from the 
government. I hear it’s cost-sharing but all the same it’s not easy to even be recruited 
into that programme and then you know when you’re in the [government cost 
sharing] programme there are many things that have to be done: your CD4 count has 
to be tested, your viral load has to be tested, your liver has to be tested, they have to 
know whether you’re anaemic and so on. … unlike in MSF Belgium, where we get all 
these tests for free. … [T]hey should also be willing to do those CD4 counts for free 
and the viral test. You know it’s very expensive, for CD4 count you pay Ksh 7,000 
(approx. GB£47). Viral load you pay Ksh. 10,000 (approx. GB67). 
 
There is a huge discrepancy between the costs of the diagnostics tests (which are not 
specified here) as stated by the N.A.C.C. director and that given by interviewee 48 for 
both the CD4 count and viral load. Further, another different figure from early May 
2005 is mentioned in a newspaper article cited earlier, which also reports the 
lowering of CD4 test costs to Ksh. 200 (approx. USD 2.60), down from Ksh. 500 
(approx. USD 6.50).103 This highlights the elusiveness of objective costing and there is 
no way to account precisely for these differences. However, there may be a few 
possible explanations: the figures cited by the interviewee may be incorrect (she 
herself said that she was offered the tests free by MSF Belgium, and therefore the 
prices she quoted may be based on hearsay) or they may have been deliberately 
exaggerated. It is also possible that some of the charges mentioned by the 
interviewee were, in fact, accurate but for the private healthcare sector rather than 
the often-cheaper public.104 These inflated costs may also be, indeed, from a public 
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healthcare facility where there has been a documented decentralized and highly 
uneven pricing system.105 A 2007 report carried online by IRIN/PlusNews noted that 
while viral load tests were supposed to be free, hospitals outside Nairobi still charged 
USD 25 for them, adding that CD4 count tests were free but unavailable in rural 
areas.106 One respondent, interviewee 8, even stated that a relative had not gone for 
the HIV test itself because even a payment for this had been demanded:  
...My brother is sick. I left him completely unable to do anything. But I know the 
problem just by looking at him..... No [he has not yet been tested].He was told that it 
would cost Ksh250 at the VCT to get tested and yet he was not aware. When I spoke 
to him I told him that those people are not supposed to charge. But he is sick… he 
hasn’t gone back because of the money.  
 
The cost of diagnostic tests is one of the measures that the NHIF hopes to eliminate 
as part of its ambitious aims to provide universal comprehensive outpatient cover.107 
However, it is likely that the implementation of these changes will be slow and 
uneven, if government policy on subsidized (and then ostensibly-free) ARVs is any 
guide.   
 
Beyond diagnostic testing, many PLWHAs may still have apprehensions about 
commencing life-prolonging treatment because their use also means the start of a 
lifetime commitment to an expense that is beyond their reach. As one respondent 
put it:   
Now, if you take the drugs, you live. So what are you to do if you are unable to pay 
for the drugs? Isn’t that a problem? We have been told that once you start taking the 
drugs, you cannot stop. You have to take them for the life. So if you cannot afford 
them, what are you to do? (Interviewee 19) 
 
Such a start-stop approach to ART is detrimental to an individual’s health but also for 
the inroads that have been made so far in tackling the virus. Lack of adherence, that 
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is, failure to take drugs according to strict instructions, has been a documented cause 
of the rise in drug-resistant strains of the HIV virus.108 
 
For those still having to pay for their drugs whether in part or in full by the time the 
interviews were conducted, ART often accounted for their greatest, or one of the 
their greatest, expenses. The cost of ARVs given by interviewees varied widely from 
Ksh. 4,000 (approx. GBP 27) a month to Ksh. 60,000 (approx. GBP 403), which one 
respondent, interviewee 47, said she was paying when she first started receiving ART 
in 2000. Having exhausted her savings in the process, her usage was now irregular: 
I’ve been buying them ever since I knew I was sick. And even when I started buying in 
2000, they were very expensive. I used to [pay] Ksh. 60,000 a month from chemists in 
Kenya! I even have the receipts to prove it. I bought until I exhausted all my savings 
and just stopped taking them. So when I used to get some money I’d buy some more. 
I have not been consistent in taking them because they were not affordable.  
 
Because of competing expenses, a number of PLWHAs stated that they had often 
elected to prioritize their other needs, especially nutritional ones, as seen in the 
previous chapter, and forgo drugs: 
...[E]ven with the medication, sometimes I have to limit that so that I can be able to 
pay the school fees. Sometimes I even look at my payslip and think to myself, it is 
better to just stop taking this medication and die. You look at your bills and by the 2nd 
of every month it’s almost as if you didn’t get any salary at the end of the previous 
month. But then you feel ill and so you go and buy the drug. But because of that, you 
are unable to buy food; your child has told you that they don’t have books for school. 
So it’s difficult. (Interviewee 30) 
 
Indeed, interviewee 5 appeared to be suggesting that starting some PLWHAs on ARVs 
raised false hopes in those who would soon find themselves unable to continue with 
the treatment due to other pressing financial concerns. She declared: “You go for the 
ARVs, you don’t have enough food to eat, you cannot even afford to buy fruit, you 
have stress about house rent, and then somebody puts you on ARVs. It’s like it’s not 
helping you.” However, it is likely that she would have altered her views if she were 
later able to access free ART. Nevertheless, her views are a bitter testament to a 
situation that faces millions: available but inaccessible life-prolonging treatment.  
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Other hidden costs rendered accessing ART anything but free.109 A number 
decried the transport costs incurred just to get to hospital for their check-ups 
and medication: … [I]f you’re not working, not getting anything per day and living 
from hand to mouth,  even if ARVs are reduced to Ksh. 60 (approx. 40p) or 50 
(approx. 34p) per day... it’s still difficult. Because even if it’s free, the centre where he 
is going to collect the drugs- at the moment I’m telling you, we’ve been having 
appointments at Kenyatta [National Hospital], at Mbagathi, still someone misses, and 
the appointment maybe is free. This is because of the bus fare and you can’t even 
walk. So because of the additional costs, it still won’t work perfectly even if it is under 
cost-sharing. So as much as someone would like to come and collect ARVs if they are 
being offered for free, they can’t make it. So who do you blame- you blame [the 
PLWHA]. (Interviewee 3)  
 
Interviewee 25 reiterated these concerns: “Like now I’ve come all the way from 
Murang’a [nearly 90km away by road travel] to here. If they were available in 
Murang’a, it could be cheaper. But now you have to take transport to come here for 
treatment and that is quite expensive.”110 This issue also highlights the problems of a 
poor health infrastructure and the bias against rural areas in public service provision. 
Once again this underlines the urban focus of the central State and likely bolsters the 
view that it is remote and disconnected from the rural areas where the vast majority 
live. As will be seen later, the resulting gap has been filled by traditional medicine. 
This rural-urban imbalance sometimes produced perverse situations: the cost to one 
interviewee of her subsidized ARVs, for instance, which at the time was still Ksh. 
1,500 (approx. GBP 10), was only fractionally higher than her transport costs. She 
stated that she travelled from her home in a town in Western Kenya called Migori, 
which is over 300km away from Nairobi by road. The cost of her return journey was 
between Ksh. 1,000 and 1,100 (between approx. GBP 6.70 and 7.40).111  
 
Yet there seemed to be no criticism of the failure by providers, where the drugs were 
free, to factor these hidden costs into their programming and take steps to 
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compensate for them. The fact that they are a real and documented obstacle to 
successfully accessing ART and that several PLWHAs raised this without prompting 
points, as with proper nutrition, to the often narrow definitions applied by CSOs and 
governments to what constitutes the much-touted successful treatment 
programmes. But it may also suggest that for these and perhaps other PLWHAs their 
notions of what they might be entitled to did not include the additional costs of 
accessing the ART: true, they might recognize them as potentially- if not outright- 
prohibitive but their expectations of assistance do not extend to them. Given the 
sceptical views that emerged especially regarding the government’s provision for 
their healthcare needs, these PLWHAs may have simply adjusted their expectations 
downwards to only limited assistance from the State and other providers at best; 
anything more may be have been perceived as a bridge too far. The State’s historic 
inability or unwillingness to provide- its past record of performance- may therefore 
be seen as crucial in shaping future notions of entitlements among PLWHAs and the 
public in general.     
 
Interestingly, too, some PLWHAs were uneasy about the prospect of freely available 
medication despite the broad consensus in favour of free or affordable ART. One, 
who had contracted HIV after a sexual relationship while a student abroad, appeared 
to associate this viewpoint with the circumstances by which she had become 
infected, but also speculated about why medication for another infectious disease, 
TB, was offered free unlike ART. After stating that she was buying her ARVs for Ksh. 
1,500 (approx. GBP 10) at the time of the interview under the government’s cost-
sharing system, down from Ksh. 6,000 (approx. GBP 40), she said of the system: 
Since we were careless enough to fall in this mess, that’s why we’re wearing these boots- 
maybe we should pay a little money. But what about those people who genuinely can’t 
afford? There are so many people in the slums who can’t afford. So I think… like TB 
treatment- maybe it’s because TB is airborne, that’s why they give free medication! 
(Interviewee 16) 
 
This is revelatory about how attitudes, also held by some PLWHAs themselves, 
towards sex as the primary mode of HIV infection may intersect with the construction 
of notions of entitlements to healthcare. It will be recalled that interviewee 11, who 
became infected after a rape, spoke of not having got the virus “rightfully.” That 
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some PLWHAs might feel paying for ARVs is a punitive measure of sorts because of 
certain internalized feelings of shame and guilt is disquieting.  
 
Interviewee 30 believed that the cost attached to the management of the disease 
might deter those who might otherwise consider engaging in risky behaviour, 
declaring: “Even I agree that we should pay something small. Because if you provide 
humans with something for free, some people will start treating this illness as if it is a 
joke, a game. If you hear about the way some people contract this illness, they put 
themselves in risky situations.” Disclosing that she had contracted HIV from her 
unfaithful husband, she emphasized that he had been her only sexual partner since 
their marriage. Although she felt the government should reduce the amount they 
required patients to pay she warned interestingly that: 
[I]f [ARVs] are given out for free, those who get it for free will cause problems 
because the number who are ill are so many. Everyone will demand the medicine and 
they will use force if they have to. It is better that we pay something small for it, even 
those of us with very little money. And that will limit the numbers who contract the 
disease. 
 
The words “will cause problems” have been italicized here because the actual words 
she used directly translate from the Kiswahili in which the interview was conducted as 
“will cause a war.” She seemed to be suggesting that lack of universal access for all 
that need ARVs might result in conflict if they are free only to some. Her views may 
be attributable to the obscurity of the selection process by which eligibility for free 
ART is decided. Hence she may have perceived pricing as a leveller: payment as the 
criteria for exclusion may seem more transparent and fairer.  
 
Such notions might make sense in the Kenyan context where social or political capital 
is often used overtly or covertly to determine who gains access to social goods, 
particularly those that come from the State. But suspicion extends to other actors: 
indeed, during the patients’ group session I attended at Mbagathi Hospital (see 
Chapter 2), some patients claimed that some local PLWHA CSOs applied ethnicity as a 
criteria for membership, favouring co-ethnics and/or specifically excluding other 
groups. Yet the respondent above appeared unaware that even the ability to pay for 
the subsidized drugs is itself predicated on the same inequalities she hoped to see 
obviated, thereby perpetuating them and reinforcing the categorization of PLWHAs 
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into have-ARVs and have-nots. This undermines the notion of solidarity among 
PLWHAs: as interviewee 14 noted despite declaring herself satisfied with the way her 
own needs were being met: “I still feel there should be uniformity. Because there is a 
category that is getting the drugs for free, another has to buy them, another can’t 
access them....” There were further cleavages between those who, because their 
means permitted it, had previously been able to access ART privately before seeking 
to benefit from the vastly cheaper or free medication subsequently available in the 
public sector.112 Additionally, as noted elsewhere, lack of uniformity in the 
government roll-out of subsidized or free ARVs meant the scheme was available in 
some hospitals (often urban ones) and not others. Interviewee 1 attested to this 
erratic approach: he said that even though he had heard of the announcement of the 
scheme in September 2003 he had yet to hear of anyone who had actually been able 
to buy the drugs at the reduced rate by the time he was interviewed in April 2004: He 
noted,  
The people I know buy them at Ksh.4,000 a month (approx. GBP 27), and this is 
someone who is not working, they cannot even pay house rent. How can you pay for 
that drug? It’s a problem. … [The government] said that [that they would be paying 
for part of the ARV costs] but they are not doing that because we’ve lost so many 
patients. I know of relatives…. They didn’t have that money, they didn’t know of how 
to go about it. At least me I’m enlightened about how to take care of myself, but it 
reaches a point without those drugs I won’t be able to go on. So the government 
whatever they said they are not doing it. People are still suffering. … Well, it’s not 
right because all the fingers on my hand are not equal, that means, everyone is not 
equal financially; some people don’t have totally, others have.  
 
It is also worth mentioning attitudes about the government’s justification for its initial 
cost-sharing programme, which was, of course later amended to full subsidization of 
ARVs. Indeed, a number of those interviewees who supported it appeared to have 
genuinely absorbed the government’s rationalization, accepting that the cost levied 
on patients would help sustain the programme. Rather than have no drugs at all, they 
reasoned, it was a better to ask patients for a partial payment. For instance, 
interviewee 33 declared that “paying something small, as long as we keep getting the 
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drugs, is ok. It would be worse if we didn’t pay anything but stopped getting the drugs 
altogether.” Interviewee 25 too, said: “[Cost-sharing] is good because you have to pay 
a little to sustain the programme because they cannot keep up. There are so many 
people who are HIV-positive they can’t meet their needs. We have to cost-share. But 
at least they can reduce the amount.” Interviewee 26 stressed that he was able to 
buy his drugs only because of the contributions made by his family, and yet although 
he sometimes had to wait for the money to become available before he could buy the 
drugs, he still supported the idea of paying a fee for them, declaring, “[T]o make a 
small contribution is not a bad thing.”  
 
Other respondents of a similar opinion clearly displayed political allegiance to Mwai 
Kibaki’s then-new government (which had succeeded Daniel arap Moi’s in the 2001 
general election). Interviewee 16, noted earlier, gave “thanks to this new 
government” for slashing ARV prices to the “affordable” level of Ksh. 1,500. 
Interviewee 40 was especially emphatic and appeared to blame the previous regime’s 
infamous corruption and looting for the lack of progress in provision of ART. She, too, 
reflected a belief in the genuineness of the government’s reasons for subsidized 
rather than altogether-free ART: 
[Cost-sharing] is a good a thing so that the drugs will be available. If the government 
says that this is necessary to sustain the programme, then it must be so. You know, 
this government started off without money. You know the previous leader used to 
use the money for his own ends! So if they tell us to give something small, then we’ll 
do it, as long as the drugs will then be available. If we refuse and the drugs cease, 
how will we survive? Once you become used to them, it’s difficult to live without 
them. I was at a meeting at WOFAK recently and I saw people who had been on the 
drugs for 20 years, they were fit and strong. Some came to that meeting and I 
thought they were just visitors- they looked so healthy. I couldn’t believe it! The 
drugs are really important.  
 
And although interviewee 14 accepted the government’s justification for cost-sharing 
“for the moment,” she nevertheless felt “they should push for something better. This 
is a life-long thing and this aspect of it is what makes it difficult because if today I lose 
my job, I’ll die the next month.” 
 
The implicit trust displayed by some in declarations by the State and other institutions 
of authority has been discussed in Chapter 4; the examples cited above illustrate to 
how the State’s messages and policies may mould individual expectations and notions 
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about entitlements to rights. They also illustrate how these ideas may be modified 
and manipulated by a State which offers only partially or unevenly benefits it 
publically undertakes to provide more fully and universally, especially in conditions 
where the status quo is one of lack. To be sure, many PLWHAs did question the 
government’s trustworthiness, expressing dissatisfaction at how it had handled the 
AIDS epidemic. The provision of ARVs continues to be a particular focus for advocates 
and yet the narrative of access to ARVs- or lack thereof- embraces entities and 
discourses much further afield, which are even less wieldy for local actors like the 
PLWHAs interviewed for this research. It exemplifies the new dynamics of the health 
and human rights dialogue, no longer confined to the rights-holding individual and 
the duty-bearing State in which she claims citizenship. It also illustrates the multiple 
audiences to whom State actions- or inactions- are directed and the various 
platforms, local and international, on which it plays out the roles of statehood.  
 
III. Traditional Medicine, Healthcare and Construction of the Subject 
The difficulties of accessing biomedical treatment make it necessary to locate 
alternative medicine in the debate about the management of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Low-income countries such as Kenya and South Africa are still grappling with a poor 
health infrastructure. This, having already been undermined by such initiatives as 
SAPs two or three decades earlier113, is further weakened by the AIDS epidemic.114 
Nor do such countries appear to have benefited as much as expected from the surge 
in global public health funding for HIV/AIDS, as will be seen in the next chapter.115 
Even though the focus remains on improving the formal health sector, it is still 
unavailable or inaccessible to many. Thus alternative sources of healthcare cannot be 
taken lightly.  
 
Several interviewees, it will be recalled, lamented the paucity of healthcare facilities 
in rural areas and the financial strain of hidden costs incurred to access the mostly 
urban-centred health facilities, not to mention the impact of long commutes on 
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health. Undoubtedly countless many have no alternative but to resort to those 
resources most readily available to them. But the two regimes are not entirely 
incompatible: UNAIDS has documented case studies in East Africa where biomedical 
advances, modern scientific technical know-how and expertise in traditional herbal 
medicine were being used to promising effect.116 One study featured various projects 
undertaken by WOFAK, the local NGO some of whose clients were interviewed for 
this research (although not on this issue), who were fostering an evolving symbiotic, 
cross-referral relationship between traditional healers and nurses or doctors with 
biomedical expertise. Included in this matrix was the Kenya Forestry Research 
Institute (KEFRI), whose technical expertise and capacity to source and sample herbal 
raw materials was crucial in helping to validate age-old remedies for such AIDS-
related illnesses as herpes zoster.117  
 
While it is true that even here the standard of validation, the gateway to wider 
recognition and the possibility of greater investment, remains rooted in the Western 
understanding of biomedicine, it is worth noting the change in approach that their 
inclusion represents. This view is sustained despite the fact that the study indicated 
that traditional healers were being forced to adapt to particular Western methods 
and approaches in their work- such as greater transparency in their methods and 
operations- as well as submitting their remedies to scientific scrutiny in order to gain 
the endorsement that comes from participation in such projects. Far too often their 
role in the narrative of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has stalled on the image of healers as 
‘quacks’ and purveyors of crude, dangerous misinformation which at best rolls back 
progress on education about the epidemic and at worst encourages HIV infection.118 
Interviewee 5 appeared to suggest in one of her responses that part of the problem 
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lay in the lack of information about these alternative medicines, which, coupled with 
plausible reports of conmen selling miracle ‘cures’ for AIDS left PLWHAs even more 
suspicious of anything not endorsed by biomedicine119:  
We also need education because I’d like to be updated on these HIV information. Like 
herbal medicines: there are people claiming that they have cures and you really wish 
that you knew more so you can decide whether to go and get it. But we are not 
updated. And because there are conmen, you can be given anything. So we need to 
be educated. 
 
An unquestioning faith in anything that purports to being biomedically certified can, 
of course, be dangerous, as there is now a thriving market in counterfeit ARVs and 
other medical products.120 
 
There is also a greater appreciation of the role of traditional healers beyond the 
merely curative: they constitute the traditional locus of power that co-exists 
alongside the modern State and many occupy powerful positions of trust and 
authority within the community, of which States are sometimes wary, to the possible 
detriment of patients.121 But their status undoubtedly makes them good conduits for 
information on health and other social matters.122 Alexander Butchart identifies the 
mid-1970s as the period when this mutation in the power politics of the body took 
place, the suppression of traditional healers began to recede and a more favourable 
attitude began to gain currency.123 This situation is especially familiar in rural areas, 
the seat of the customary, even though, as the above-mentioned UNAIDS study in 
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Kenya observes, many healers have migrated to urban centres.124 Their status is 
historical, a residue of pre-colonial social organization. That they remain relevant 
today tells a more subtle tale than just one of poor penetration of formal health 
infrastructures in rural and remote areas: it demonstrates the enduring traditional 
social structures and power systems especially, but not exclusively, in rural settings.  
 
This holds true despite the fact that, in the age of globalization, official strategies on 
HIV/AIDS awareness-raising even in rural areas are framed wholly within a Western 
understanding of disease which is grounded in its science, with information about the 
pathology of the illness a key plank. As Altman has noted, “[g]lobal mobilization 
around the demands of a biomedical emergency meant the further entrenchment of 
Western concepts of disease, treatment and the body,” concepts which were quite 
removed from how many societies understood illness. 125 This may be diametrically 
opposed to the more obscure, sometimes mystical processes of alternative medicine, 
for which the UNAIDS study recommended transparency.  
 
Yet even as those PLWHAs with access to formal healthcare continue to absorb new 
information which constructs their illness and their subjectivities very much within 
the entrenched biomedical paradigm, as illustrated by interviewees’ awareness of the 
range of diagnostic tests and ARV brand names, many may well be complementing 
their visits to biomedical healthcare centres with trips to traditional healers. This 
possibility is acknowledged in a UNAIDS study.126 This may be because, firstly, certain 
aspects of biomedicine, as it developed in former colonies like Kenya, may prove 
unsatisfactory for PLWHAs. As Vaughn asserts:  
The ‘problem’ with biomedicine as it emerged at the end of the nineteenth century is 
seen to be its reliance on a process of objectification of the body, and a resulting 
sense of alienation on the part of the person whose body it is, and who is constructed 
as the ‘patient’. This scientific method, it is argued, has the effect of removing health 
and illness from the social context in which they are produced, and in which they 
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belong, to another level which is both internal to the individual but also outside her 
or his control. Not only does it cause those who are ill to feel powerless and alienated 
but, it is also argued, this way of viewing the production of disease is also 
inefficient.
127 
 
This sense of “alienation” and “powerlessness” can be seen in the interviewee earlier 
who decried the care offered in Kenyatta Hospital; yet patients may be fearful of 
challenging inadequate care from the often overworked and underpaid hospital staff, 
lest they are deprived of medical care in future.128 The personal service offered by 
traditional medicine may be preferable and such patients may often form long-term 
relationships with the healer.129 Traditional medicine, in its capacity to encompass the 
care of the physical body as well as the spiritual and psychological elements discussed 
earlier in the chapter, may conform more closely with many people’s perceptions of 
their illness as well as conceptions of their own subjectivities.130 As one of the UNAIDS 
studies quoted here notes, “[t]raditional healers form longterm innovative and 
participatory support groups, which have proven successful in prevention, care and 
support to HIV-infected and –affected people.”131  
 
And yet biomedicine’s preoccupation with the body as a discrete organism into which 
an informed, self-monitoring patient inputs the correct treatments and cures (witness 
responses regarding prescribed foods and medications) may in fact further facilitate 
the patient’s conceptualization of herself as the atomized entity at the heart of 
human rights.132 Indeed it has been argued that the combined health sciences actively 
sought to produce a very particular subject in the post-war period: a ‘knowing’, 
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rational and increasingly individualized subject who shared the same neoliberal roots 
as the subject of modern human rights theory.133 As Finn and Sarangi observe, 
“…central to behavior change models and health promotion discourse is the self-
managing individual who is exhorted to take responsibility for his or her own life 
satisfaction and well-being through making healthy lifestyle decisions and 
maintaining them.”134 And since the PLWHA must begin to perceive herself as a 
discrete, unfettered individual in order to entertain the notion of possessing health 
privileges that adhere to her simply by virtue of her individual identity as a human 
being, and which may be claimed against the State and other individuals, including 
those within her social network, biomedicine’s contribution in framing the human 
being or the human body is arguably crucial.  
 
Accessing medical help from two sources so opposed in their construction and 
treatment of the disease and the self appears contradictory: on the one hand, these 
actions indicate patients’ embracing of ‘modernity’, of which biomedical science is an 
icon. This is exemplified by the PLWHAs’ determination to observe instructions about 
medicine, diet and the rituals of biomedical care (hospital tests, appointments, etc), 
which are often only hampered by financial cost and lack of availability. Further, 
disparate value judgments are attached to the type of knowledge acquired and 
applied by PLWHAs: for biomedical knowledge is not just regarded by its adherents as 
accurate, it is ‘right’; its consumption is an essential tenet in the empowerment 
paradigm of health promotion exemplified especially in relation to HIV/AIDS.135 
 
Yet some patients’ actions may be characterized as a rejection of- or at least 
considerable scepticism about- that same ‘modernity’, a retreat, perhaps, into 
mystery and superstition, an informed choosing of the ‘wrong’ knowledge. This is 
arguably reflected in a patient’s submission to traditional medicine in all its aspects, 
some of which continue to eschew Western standards of proof and validation and 
involve more unquantifiable methods such as divination. Indeed, some 
commentators have argued that such “non-compliance” with official prescriptions is 
sometimes the last form of influence- of participation- asserted by the marginalized, 
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who use their “exit” choice as a form of protest or leverage against poor provision of 
services by powerful actors such as governments or corporations.136 The probability 
of multiple sourcing of healthcare by some of the PLWHAs interviewed for this 
research (though, regrettably, as noted in Chapter 2, this information was not sought) 
is not irreconcilable and should not surprise. They are no different in this sense from 
the South African mineworkers who Campbell noted traversed multiple health 
systems “without tension or a sense of contradiction, oscillating between 
representatives of Western biomedicine (hospitals, clinics pharmacies, private 
general practitioners) and traditional healers (diviners, herbalists and faith 
healers).”137  
 
These accommodations recall the complex subjectivity and fluid identity of 
Mamdani’s postcolonial citizen-subject. The modern citizen-subject is aware of the 
paramount authority in the fields of disease and modern medicine of the biomedical 
experts in the urban realm; many of the PLWHAs interviewed are shown to have 
largely submitted to this authority. They distinguish themselves from those among 
them who are perceived still to be in thrall to ‘backward’ notions about disease and 
the self. Witness interviewee 6 who advocated correcting the superstitions of ‘his 
people’ in the rural areas: “When someone comes to see you at hospital, tell them 
that you have the virus. But my people are very interesting. They ‘say so-and-so has 
been bewitched. He has grown so thin that he cannot even swallow saliva.’ And they 
stick to that.” 
 
The biomedical institutions that frame and produce the widely subscribed 
information and knowledge actively embed this construct of the enlightened patient. 
And every use of this knowledge by PLWHAs, health practitioners, CSOs involved in 
treatment and prevention advocacy, who have been so influential in the construction 
of PLWHAs’ subjectivities, further reproduces and ingrains this aspect of their 
identity. This is a chain of production of ‘truth’ in the Foucauldian sense and every 
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restatement of scientific orthodoxies not only authenticates them but the status of 
those who assert and apply them.138 
 
As such, the predominance of the biomedical paradigm- of any one paradigm- can be 
problematic, appearing to be divisive and exclusionary of those who still frame illness 
differently but are nevertheless infected or affected by it.139 The PLWHA who 
acquires and accepts biomedical categorizations of illness perceives herself, and is 
often perceived by the mainstream health fraternity, as “an ‘empowered’ individual, 
one who learns how to articulate and act on this embodied knowledge. Overtly 
contrasted with this enabling knowledge is ignorance and inactivity that allegedly 
lead to dependency, sickness and death.”140 These latter characteristics, seen often in 
this research, were often attributed by PLWHAs, who were thus self-identifying as 
among the enlightened or ‘empowered’, to (intellectually and culturally) distant 
‘others’, often resident in the rural areas, whose failure to consume the ‘correct’ or 
‘right’ knowledge they appeared to regard as an abdication of their responsibilities to 
personal wellbeing and to wider public health; indeed, to freedom.141  
 
Further, the suppression of non-biomedical notions of medicine and the body 
deprives the holders or adherents of such knowledge of an equal voice in 
representing their health concerns, fails to recognize them as valid producers of 
knowledge, and bars them from partaking in a debate in which they have an equal 
stake and whose outcomes affect their own health.142 This contracts the space within 
which they can contribute to the public discourse, and restricts their participation, 
that is, “‘the right and responsibility of people to make choices and therefore, to have 
power over decisions which affect their lives’”143 In effect, it limits their citizenship. 
This discussion is revisited in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
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And yet, as noted throughout, for all the primacy they might accord to biomedicine, 
PLWHAs remain rooted in the very realm which validates and sustains the authority 
of traditional medicine, its practitioners and its systems of knowledge: the customary. 
To disregard or discard the ways of knowing that prevail in this sphere, in favour of 
‘erudite’, ‘alien’ ones which are inaccessible to those whose traditional role it is to 
articulate and validate them, may be interpreted as undermining those roles or 
rejecting of the choices (often the sole or primary option) of other members of that 
community. This could be seen as a disruption of social order and stability. It may 
result in social dislocation from the very material and psychosocial resources that 
PLWHAs become increasingly reliant upon to cope with their illness. It would revoke 
the licence which many of them, already carrying a divisive, stigmatizing illness, 
require to invoke the age-old but diminishing matrix of privileges and obligations. And 
with the cost of ART and general care of PLWHAs already shown to strain finances 
and relationships within the immediate social network, these considerations cannot 
be ignored. Indeed, the next chapter now looks at the individual and collective 
relationships that PLWHAs have formed with entities further afield to provide for 
their medical needs, and how the complex emerging dynamics may yet again have 
redefined the contours of the wider debate on citizenship, entitlement and rights.  
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Chapter 7: AIDS, Civil Society Organizations and Donors: 
Redefining Citizenship and the Role of the State   
 
Having outlined in the previous chapter the role of civil society actors and donors in 
the AIDS narrative, this chapter now looks at how the epidemic and the divisive 
debate around access to treatment have broadened and entrenched these actors in 
the local and global delivery of healthcare.  
 
As this chapter illustrates, this intervention underlines how the human rights 
discourse, access to treatment campaign, and growth of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) have come to exemplify the globalization phenomenon, and how the 
involvement of CSOs have transfigured the individual-State dynamic and re-mapped 
the boundaries of citizenship. The chapter also demonstrates how the issue of access 
to ARVs revealed anew the potency of human rights as a modern rhetorical tool and 
as the moral framework of choice for a range of actors seeking broader validation and 
support for their positions. It also exemplified the malleability of human rights, as 
opposing sides co-opted favourable tenets as weapons.  
 
Both local and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs1) have emerged and 
thrived in this febrile environment and are the most visible embodiments of the 
phenomenon of ‘civil society’; as such, although this research defines the phrase ‘civil 
society’ more broadly, they tend to dominate this chapter’s analysis of the role of 
CSOs, not least because it is on NGOs specifically that interviewees for these research 
were asked comment. NGOs have been increasingly active in Kenya since the 1990s.2  
 
                                                 
1
 An NGO is defined very simply and broadly here as “an organization not belonging to a government 
and without a profit motive.” (Glasius, Marlies and Kaldor, Mary, ‘The State of Global Civil Society: 
Before and After September 11,’ in Glasius, Marlies; Kaldor, Mary; and Anheier, Helmut (eds.). Global 
Civil Society 2002, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 5.) The kind of NGOs discussed in this 
research in relation to HIV/AIDS may also be embraced in Sarah Michael more precise definition of 
NGOs as “independent development actors existing apart from governments and corporations, 
operating on a non-profit of not-for-profit basis with an emphasis on voluntarism, and pursuing a 
mandate of providing development services, undertaking communal development work or advocating 
on development issues.” (Michael, Sarah, Undermining Development: The Absence of Power Among 
Local NGOs in Africa (Oxford: James Currey; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) at 3). 
2
 See, for instance, Nyamu-Musembi, Celestine and Musyoki, Samuel, ‘Kenyan Civil Society 
Perspectives on Rights, Rights-Based Approaches to Development, and Participation,’ IDS Working 
Paper 236 (Institute of Development Studies (IDS): Brighton, Sussex, December, 2004), at 3-4  
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But as this chapter shows the globalization of the health and AIDS industries, and the 
expansion of CSOs’ and donor influence, are much more complicated than the 
interviewees for this research suggested. As will be seen, the PLWHAs often 
compared these actors’ performance in the delivery of healthcare with that of the 
State. Indeed, their involvement appeared to shape interviewees’ expectations about 
entitlements to healthcare as well as perceptions about the very legitimacy of the 
institution of the State. This chapter juxtaposes these discussions and contentious 
aspects of CSO and donor intervention with the largely positive reviews which these 
actors received from interviewees. As such, it provides an empirical context for an 
interrogation into how these actors, with their increased emphasis on rights-based 
approaches, have seemingly managed to annex the human rights project to reassert 
the individual’s rights to socio-economic goods and services and the State’s 
obligations to provide them.  
 
Yet, these actors have also appeared to fudge the nature of their own obligations to 
individuals: legal duties or mere acts of charity? The net outcome, it is argued here, is 
that they may have contributed to the production of notions of entitlement of a 
particular quality, and by extension particular ideas of citizenship and arguably a 
particular kind of State, too. 
 
I. Contextualizing Access to Treatment 
The Kenyan government, unlike neighbouring Uganda, had been slow in reacting to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic that had been sweeping through sub-Saharan Africa since 
1980s, the period when the “once relatively silent epidemic of HIV” began its 
transformation into “a visible epidemic of AIDS.”3 There were widespread reports of 
whole villages decimated by a mysterious disease in areas like Rakai in South-Western 
Uganda and others along the Tanzanian border.4 The fuller story of how the epidemic 
initially fanned out throughout the continent because of a combination of the chaos 
of armed conflict (primarily between Tanzanian and Idi Amin’s Ugandan forces), 
                                                 
3
 Ogden, Jessica, et al, ‘Expanding the care continuum for HIV/AIDS: bringing carers into focus,’ Health 
Policy and Planning, 2006 21(5): 333-342, at 336 
4
 See, for example, Shilts, Randy, ‘AIDS at 25: Fear of Epidemic in the Mud Huts’, The San Francisco 
Chronicle, 4
th
 June 2006, a reprint of his original article from 25
th
 October 1987, at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/06/04/MNAIDS04SHILTS3.DTL, accessed 
04/05/08 
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poverty and many other historical, cultural, social, economic and geographical 
factors, is well recounted by Alan Barnett and Tony Whiteside and others and cannot 
be done justice here.5 Unlike the patterns of infection in the West at the time, where 
the key groups affected by the illness were homosexuals, haemophiliacs and 
intravenous drug users, Africa’s HIV epidemic was spread largely through 
heterosexual intercourse and affected the general population; there is, however, 
evidence today of widening patterns of infection through injecting drug use and men 
who have sex with men.6 
 
While Uganda reacted by embarking on an awareness-raising campaign to deal with 
its growing public health crisis throughout the 1980s and 1990s, spurred on by a 
proactive approach from political, religious and civil society leaders, Kenya’s President 
Daniel arap Moi denounced reports of HIV/AIDS as a ploy to undermine the country’s 
tourism industry in 1986.7  It was not until 1999, 15 years after the first case of HIV 
was detected in the country and with Kenya’s adult infection rates at an estimated 
13.5% or 1.9 million people, that the president declared the disease a national 
emergency and heralded a significant policy shift in the government’s approach to 
HIV/AIDS.8 The president endorsed the use of condoms in HIV prevention, thereby 
breaking with the stance still adopted by the powerful religious lobby.9 However, 
many lamented the cost in lives due to the initial lack of leadership from the 
government, with stark comparisons being made with Uganda, where infection rates 
                                                 
5
Barnett, Tony and Whiteside, Alan, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). See also Epstein, Helen, The 
Invisible Cure: Africa, The West and the Fight Against AIDS (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2007).  
6
 In Kenya, there is evidence of this, especially in urban centres. See UNAIDS/WHO, 2007 Epidemic 
Update: Sub-Saharan Africa, UNAIDS, 2008, at 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/jc1526_epibriefs_ssafrica_en.pdf, accessed 04/05/08; at 13-
14. But social and religious stigmatization of behaviours that are often rejected as ‘unAfrican’ has often 
stymied prevention and treatment efforts among these groups. See, for instance, Kiama, Wanjira, 
‘Homosexuality and AIDS: A Double-edged Sword’, The Daily Nation, 26
th
 June 1998,  in which police 
authorities were reported to have accused an awareness-raising community organization of PLWHAs 
of “recruiting” homosexuals; homosexuality is an offence in Kenya. See also The Daily Nation, ‘Why HIV 
Spreads Faster Among Gays,’ 1
st
 December 2009, in which David Kuria, manager of the Gay and Lesbian 
Coalition of Kenya (GALK), outlines the dangers to HIV prevention and treatment efforts of the 
continued criminalization of homosexuality and the failure to include the gay community in HIV/AIDS 
strategies. 
7
 The Daily Nation, ‘Kenya@40’ series (n 7), 13
th
 November 2003 
8
 Githongo, John, ‘Church Must Face Reality of Condom Use,’ The East African, 6
th
 December 1999 
9
 Kimani, Dagi, ‘Kenya’s Aids Hype Fine, But too Late for 2m Victims,’ The Daily Nation, 20
th
 December 
1999 
 274 
 
had slowed down and even reversed.10 There were also contradictory messages from 
the Kenyan president: in a 2001 speech to the Kenya Pharmaceutical Society he 
revealed a continued resistance to importing condoms into the country saying “‘[a]s 
President I am shy that I am spending millions of shillings importing those things 
[emphasis added],’” and that Kenyans were better off refraining from sex, “‘even if it 
was only for two years,’” endorsing this as the best way to control the epidemic.11 
The effect on PLWHAs of the influential religious lobby’s initial response to the illness 
has been discussed, and the cross-section of religious leaders united in their 
denunciation of condom-use noted, with some of them even conducting condom-
burning exercises at a time when an estimated 110 people-a-day were dying from 
AIDS in Kenya.12 Meanwhile, the Catholic Church aggravated matters by claiming that 
condoms encouraged rather prevented the spread of HIV.13   
 
Consequently, Kenya was rather a late-comer into the debate about universal access 
to ARVs, whose politics entered the public sphere and became part of the 
conversation about the epidemic in Kenya. The decisive surge from 1996 onwards in 
efforts to increase access to ART followed evidence of remarkably reduced death 
rates and hospital admission due to AIDS complications in North America and 
Western Europe14; for though ART had been first introduced in 1986, it was not until 
a decade later that this evidence began to become available. For many PLWHAs living 
outside these relatively wealthy regions at the time, the drugs would have been 
primarily accessed through the private health sector and so available only to a tiny 
minority.  
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HIV/AIDS statistics were a powerful if sometimes controversial tool for advocates in 
their efforts to focus money and minds on treatment and prevention. James Chin has 
claimed that HIV prevalence figures were initially deliberately overestimated, either 
as a result of the “naïve” best intentions of AIDS advocates or the “political, social, 
economic or personal agendas” of “experts.”15 For example, following the 2003 Kenya 
Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) report, “…prevalence... was reduced from 2.3 
million to 1.2 million…[I]f we accept that the 1.2 million figure was the more accurate 
prevalence, then HIV prevalence in Kenya was overestimated by about 100 
percent.”16 Of the hike in the late-1990s of UNAIDS’s HIV prevalence figures for sub-
Saharan Africa, which was pegged at 9%, he adds: “I was told by a colleague involved 
with developing HIV prevalence estimates for UNAIDS that there was a clear 
administration decision made in 1997 to use the higher range of HIV estimates rather 
than the lower or mid-range that were used by GPA [Global Programme on AIDS, 
UNAIDS’s institutional predecessor]/WHO.”17 Elizabeth Pisani rejects Chin’s claims, 
differentiating “making up” figures and “beating [them] up”; but she also admits, and, 
indeed, stands by these actions, arguing it was a necessary and successful way of 
creating the urgency among governments that was woefully lacking at the time18:  
How would we convince rich countries to stump up cash for AIDS? By making them 
feel the heat of the epidemic as it blazed across one continent and flared in others, 
by painting a compelling picture of the devastation left behind, by infecting them 
with the same urgency that coursed through the corridors of the upstart UNAIDS.19 
 
Indeed, treatment (and prevention) campaigns in Kenya and other parts of sub-
Saharan Africa were amplified in the late 1990s and the new millennium. The 
acceleration of globalization played a key role, with momentum built by the “activism 
[that] was spilling over national borders and creating international links among 
various activist groups around the globe.”20 News spread within the emerging 
communities of PLWHA groups across the African continent about the AIDS policies of 
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governments elsewhere: as Altman and others have noted, it was not just the 
movement of workers, money and goods that was freed up and eased by the 
advancing globalization; governments found that in the age of the electronic media, 
ideas could no longer be contained. The same process that had aided the spread of 
the virus would now drive the campaign for its management.21 This is clear in one 
interview where the respondent based her claims of entitlement to healthcare from 
the government on her citizenship (although she was rather over-optimistic about 
public attitudes to PLWHAs in other countries):  
Well, I’m a Kenyan, and let’s say I’m not working and there’s a major thing like AIDS, 
they should take care of such people because we’ve heard of countries like Uganda, 
South Africa: they really take good care of people who are positive while here in 
Kenya it’s a problem. Stigmatization is still there…. (Interviewee 1) 
 
Local PLWHAs utilized information about how other governments were tackling their 
epidemic in their efforts to pressurize their own government’s inadequate responses. 
Moreover, the access to treatment movement was undoubtedly helped by the 
casting of big, wealthy pharmaceutical companies- ‘Big Pharma’- as the pantomime 
villains of the access to treatment campaign, which offered perhaps an even more 
potent rallying point than the characteristically immobile, impoverished African 
governments. The paradigm shift towards treatment from 1996, which came to 
dominate the global discourse on how to manage the HIV/AIDS epidemic and which 
some have criticized as sapping energy from the debate about, and funding for, 
prevention22, inevitably put the medical sector in the spotlight and led to calls for 
their greater responsibility.23 To critics, ‘Big Pharma’ represented the skewed 
economic might of the industrialized nations and, alongside other multinationals, had 
become prime targets for anti-globalization protesters.24 Reports abounded of the 
iniquitous ART pricing policies, from which Kenya was not exempt. 25 Elsewhere, in 
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2002 MSF reported that Roche, the Swiss pharmaceutical company, charged more for 
its ARVs in poor countries such as Guatemala and Ukraine than in industrialized 
Switzerland. The report also put the annual cost of Roche’s drugs to a PLWHA in 
Cameroon at over 7 times the per capita income.26 In another report, MSF accused 
pharmaceutical companies of exploiting an access to treatment forum to seek new 
markets in the Asia Pacific region.27 Treatment was not a choice for those who 
needed it, the NGO asserted elsewhere, declaring that “medicines are not Barbie 
dolls or CDs, but a matter of life and death.”28 Nevertheless, as Altman noted, a state 
was effectively emerging of two epidemics: one for the rich and another for the 
poor.29 This economic-based bifurcation of the epidemic had resulted in an equal 
bifurcation, deemed hypocritical by some commentators, of the strategies proposed 
and then applied to confront the epidemic in the rich and poor world; they argued it 
amounted to the simple formula: “drugs for us, condoms for you.”30 
 
The allegation that pharmaceutical companies prioritized profits over lives was 
captured by President Mbeki’s spokesman, although his comments have to be seen in 
the context Mbeki’s contentious views which also opposed the use ARVs. In 2000 he 
declared: 
Like the marauders of the military industrial complex who propagated fear to 
increase their profits, the profit-takers who are benefiting from the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS will disappear to the affluent beaches of the world to enjoy wealth 
accumulated from a humankind ravaged by a dreaded disease… Sure, the 
shareholders of Glaxo Wellcome [the company which makes (the AIDS drug) AZT] will 
rejoice to hear that the SA government has decided to supply AZT to pregnant 
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women who are HIV-positive. The source of their joy will not be concern for those 
people’s health, but about profits and shareholder value.31 
 
These sharp criticisms cannot be divorced from the broader controversial policies of 
the government in which Parks Mankahlana served, but the profit potential of 
pharmaceutical companies and the prioritization of certain communicable diseases by 
the donor countries in which many of these companies are based have been linked by 
others.32 But perhaps the most well-known figure in Mbeki’s inner circle to cast doubt 
on the use and effectiveness of ARVs was health Minister Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang. Her claims that South Africans were much better off eating beetroots and 
garlic to deal with HIV/AIDS rather than taking ARVs, which she considered a ‘poison,’ 
earned her nickname ‘Dr. Beetroot’.33 Such attempts to discredit ART were perhaps 
not merely an effort to justify the South African government’s inadequate 
commitment to HIV/AIDS treatment and inform the opinions of those as yet 
unpoliticized by vocal CSOs conducting AIDS-related activities, like Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC)34: it appeared to be the basis of HIV policy.35 Yet the traditional 
medicine, as will be discussed momentarily, must be located as complementary to, 
not necessarily instead of, biomedical interventions.  
 
Big Pharma’s main defence of their costing of ART was and is often related to the 
need to recoup research and development (R&D) expenses through the 
(international) protection of their patent rights. This they regarded as just 
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compensation for the risk entailed in embarking on the lengthy process of developing 
a drug that may never be approved for use. Without such incentives, it was argued, 
there would be little motivation for the industry to engage in the kind of research 
that underpinned the discoveries of new medicines; the loss would be everyone’s but 
particularly the very group that activists sought to represent. 
 
But some have argued that such calculations were based on some inaccuracies which 
were then applied across the board and repeated in subsequent reports. They mask 
such aspects as the substantial public subsidies from universities and government 
agencies for pre-clinical research that these corporations often enjoy.36 Petchesky 
also notes the two contradicting arguments made by ‘Big Pharma’: on the one hand 
the protection of international patents, without which it is suggested research 
incentives would dry up; on the other, that these corporations claim that poorer 
countries would also gain from such a system as it would bring opportunities for new 
technologies and investment and patent guarantees of their own. Yet almost all 
current patents are held by companies based in developed countries; similarly nearly 
all patents granted by the US in the two decades between 1977 and 1996 belonged to 
applicants from only ten industrialized countries. Consequently, an estimated $20 
billion dollars annually flows from South to North in fees for technology use.37  In 
Kenya, one newspaper editorial did not think the narrative of the villainous, 
opportunistic Western pharmaceutical company was the full story, though: it blamed 
part of the treatment crisis on the government’s pre-existing poor national healthcare 
policies which the HIV/AIDS epidemic had helped highlight rather than create.38 
 
Rights arguments interlaced the debate and expanded the site of struggle, and typical 
of the subject’s characteristic malleability, different groups emphasized certain rights 
over others.39 Those who could deploy the rights rhetoric most effectively to bolster 
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their arguments found they had one of the most compelling weapons on their side. 
As Tarantola notes, “[t]he rights to the highest available standard of health, to care, 
to the product of scientific progress, and to international solidarity have been invoked 
in efforts to make new therapies accessible to the majority of the world population 
living with HIV.”40 On this basis, AIDS activists advocated for the procurement of 
generic ARVs, which, devoid of R&D expenditures, could be cheaply mass-produced 
and sold at affordable prices to needy countries which lacked the capacity to produce 
them themselves, such as Kenya.41 India’s Cipla, for example, offered generic drugs at 
a fraction of the annual cost charged by Western pharmaceuticals.42 On the other 
hand, the rights of patent holders over their intellectual property, provided by TRIPs, 
the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, were 
highlighted. The agreement was reached under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO), one of the international organizations which came to 
symbolize what many perceived as the dark side of globalization and its 
entrenchment of global economic and political inequalities.43 Fundamental questions 
were raised about stratification and prioritization of rights: which trumped which?44 
To TAC and others health rights outranked the property rights of pharmaceutical 
companies.  
 
Petchesky asserts that “[i]n both its origins and its potential consequences, the TRIPs 
agreement ... favours the economic and technological hegemony of the North.”45 She 
contends that a radical remedy might be required to institute a more equitable 
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regime, suggesting that poorer countries may need to exit the system and “return to 
old-fashioned concepts of the public domain, or the common good, including 
essential medicines and health services as a ‘global public good.’”46 For one 
prominent Kenyan commentator, too, the notion of fair trade propounded by 
supporters of the WTO rules was a “hoax”, and the inequality and hypocrisy of the 
international trade system was captured perfectly by this legal regime, which, he 
argued, sought to preserve the status quo and perpetuate a kind of neo-colonialism.47 
It is a narrative which not only reveals the globalization of the HIV/AIDS treatment 
narrative, but which, as seen in Chapter 4, has often been linked with that of 
HIV/AIDS. TRIPs was due for ratification in the poorest countries by 2006 although the 
wisdom of doing so was questioned by many commentators.48 The question became 
to what extent developing-nation members of the WTO could set aside or bypass the 
requirements of TRIPs and similar agreements in order to respond to their public 
health emergencies without being threatened with retaliatory sanctions by 
industrialized nations, where ‘Big Pharma’ have constituted influential lobby groups.49  
 
In Kenya, the gradual process of enforcing patent laws had been taking place since 
the enactment of the Industrial Property Act in 1989. This legislation was reviewed a 
decade later to ensure compliance with Kenya’s TRIPs obligations, agreed by 
President Moi’s government. With the HIV/AIDS epidemic now a greater government 
priority than it had been in 1989, there were concerns that streamlining Kenya’s 
patent laws with TRIPs without including public health safeguards would be 
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detrimental to its belated HIV/AIDS treatment programme. The Minister for Medical 
Services at the time, Dr Amukowa Anagwe, is quoted as stating: “I think the 
Government’s mood is that of the Member of Parliament who asked, ‘How can we be 
denied access to drugs that prolong life when our people are dying?’”50  
 
Kenyan PLWHAs protested outside the Indian High Commission in Nairobi, anxious 
that the WTO rules that might curtail their supply of generic drugs from India, which, 
at USD 20-a-month were eminently cheaper than the USD 395-a-month that the 
patented version of the drugs commanded.51 In the end, local and international 
pressure groups, first in 2002 and again in 2006, convinced the Kenyan government 
to scrap the planned amendment to the 1989 Act that would reportedly have seen 
the cost of first-line ART rise by over 1000%.52 This outcome appears to support the 
argument by some commentators that TRIPs is not, in fact, an unyielding set of 
enforceable rules, unresponsive to political realities; that such considerations, more 
than the interpretation of lawyers, will ultimately determine the meaning and scope 
of the rules.53   
 
II. CSOs, Donors and ARVs 
The interviewees for this research who received partially- or fully-subsidized ARVs did 
so thanks to government schemes or programmes ran by NGOs such as MSF, all 
largely enabled by financial support from oversees. UNAIDS reports that there is no 
country ownership of the HIV/AIDS programme in Kenya because it is 98% foreign-
funded.54 Since the 1990s, NGOs have increasingly become the preferred conduit for 
the disbursal of resources from donor agencies, be they affiliated to national 
governments, multilateral agencies or charitable organizations.  This shift away from 
conducting funding through official or government channels to private or primarily 
CSO channels was prompted by concerns over poor governance in many recipient 
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States.55 Indeed, the PLWHAs on the MSF programme at MDH invariably praised the 
organization. It will be recalled that interviewee 19 emphasized in Chapter 3 (at the 
end of the paragraph containing note 68) the importance of MSF’s intervention, 
particularly following the death of her husband and desertion by her affinal kin. She 
added: “I am in Nairobi and I rely on one of my sisters who is abroad. But you know 
even that help, even though someone sends you something like Ksh3,000 (approx. 
GBP 20), that won’t take you very far. So I can say that without this place [MSF], I 
wouldn’t be able to survive.” She was not alone in attributing her survival to the 
organization. Another, interviewee 37, said: “People like MSF help a lot. I was in bed 
for 3 years, unable to get up, because doctors used to prescribe drugs for me that I 
couldn’t afford to buy.”  
 
The explosion of health-linked CSOs since HIV/AIDS became the pre-eminent concern 
in global public health has been one of the phenomena of the last decade, although 
development organizations’ involvement in Africa dates back to the pre-colonial 
era.56 Many interviewees’ appeared to be familiar with the acronym ‘NGO’, that 
embodiment of the CSO. A number voluntarily named many AIDS NGOs they knew of 
or had dealt with. Apart from WOFAK, which was naturally mentioned by at least the 
first batch of respondents, who were its clients, other local NGOs were listed, for 
example by interviewee 25: “The NGOs are really doing a good job for PLWHAs. There 
are now NGOs being ran by PLWHAs- we have KENWA, TAPWAK [The Association of 
People with AIDS in Kenya], WOFAK, NEPHAK [Network of People Living with 
HIV/AIDS in Kenya] and they are enlightening us. You go there and meet other 
PLWHAs, and at least you feel you’re not alone. They are really encouraging us.” The 
Kenya AIDS NGOs Consortium (KANCO) lists hundreds of member CSOs, including 
registered NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs)57, faith-based organizations 
                                                 
55
 ibid, at 6. Nevertheless, donor States continue to provide State budgetary support, with 
accountability remaining a key concern. (See Nyamu-Musembi, Celestine and Cornwall, Andrea, ‘What 
is the ‘Rights-Based Approach’ All About? Perspectives from International Development Agencies,’ IDS 
Working Paper 234 (Institute of Development Studies (IDS): Brighton, Sussex, November, 2004), at 11) 
56
 See Michael (n 1), at 8 
57
Sarah Michael applies the criteria of scope to distinguish CBOs fro NGOs: the former, she notes, are 
community founded and oriented and “tend to remain focussed very locally and to operate with little 
formalised structure, using the time and resources of community members to undertake their 
activities.” (Michael (n 1), at 3) 
 284 
 
(FBOs), PLWHA support groups and other public and private sector organizations.58 
The number of NGOs in general has sky-rocketed from just 100 in 1990 to 4,800 in 
2007; 4 in 10 are said to be based in Nairobi, substantiating complaints, voiced also by 
some respondents’, as will be seen shortly, of rural neglect.59  
 
The exponential rise in the number of actors and particularly CSOs involved in 
HIV/AIDS issues has heralded a massive increase in funds for HIV/AIDS projects, with 
some of the best-endowed and most visible donors being the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation60 and former US President Clinton’s Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI), 
which was instrumental in negotiating the lowering of ARV costs.61  There have also 
been numerous initiatives by individual or groups of wealthy nations to improve 
access to ART, such as the controversial former US President George W. Bush’s 
President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR; more of which later) and the 
G8’s programme aimed at achieving universal access to ARVs by 2010.62 Alongside 
this is the unique Global Fund, which disburses to various countries funds drawn 
largely from government and private philanthropic and corporate sources, although it 
operates independently of any government or the UN system.63 In addition there are 
numerous campaigns by intergovernmental agencies focussing on access to 
treatment, such as the WHO’s 2003 ‘3 by 5’ campaign, which sought- but woefully 
failed- to achieve access to ARVs for 3 million PLWHAs in low- to middle-income 
countries by 2005.64  
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Despite this increase in human and financial resources, some respondents feared that 
the explosion in numbers of AIDS NGOs and CBOs (from whom they are often 
indistinguishable65) in Kenya would exacerbate the kind of misuse and 
misappropriation of AIDS monies that has left over GBP 30 million from the Global 
Fund unaccounted since 2002.66 They raised the phenomenon of ‘briefcase’ NGOs or 
CBOs, fake organizations set up purely to profit from this windfall.67 Interviewee 47, 
for instance criticized NGOs, noting that they “can and should help, but you find that 
they are very greedy! They only want to make money and get rich. The foreign ones,” 
she suggested, “can do better than the local ones. Nowadays we even have 
‘briefcase’ NGOs! … Anyway, Kenya is just a corrupt place.”68 Such remarks reveal the 
same anxieties about the behaviour of CSOs that many Kenyans have regarding State 
actors.  
 
Interviewee 47’s last statement echoes a point made by John Githongo, former head 
of the Kenya national chapter of the global anti-corruption organization Transparency 
International. In 2000 he argued that Kenyans had a general awareness of corruption 
as a national problem and its negative effects on the country’s economic 
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development and its institutional structures.69 This may account for the above 
respondent’s notions that home-grown organizations, that is, those locally founded 
and largely staffed by locals70 were less trustworthy than foreign ones. This 
comparison was raised by other interviewees, with corruption and nepotism cited 
against local groups. For instance, interviewee 29 said:  
The overseas [NGOs] help a lot. But I have a problem with the local ones. Once 
people join these local NGOs, all they do is help themselves and their own families. 
And yet they did not form that organization with their family but when it is up and 
running, it now becomes theirs and their families. If when we started the 
organization it was you and me and not you and your brother and your mother, then 
it should not become your private possession once we start running.  
 
Interviewee 37 spoke of similar nepotistic tendencies: “Some [NGOs] help but others 
do not help everyone- they help according to those they know.  Like where I live, in 
Dagoretti [in Nairobi], I hear there are projects to help PLWHAs but I have never 
gotten help. When I have gone to ask about it I am told that the project is over. It’s 
very hard to come across information advertising these NGOs.” 
 
Such views may have been based on the respondents’ own experiences with NGOs 
but they were similarly likely to have been influenced by common perceptions and 
numerous press reports about the prevalence of such activities especially among 
some local CBOs, an issue which Githongo commended the Kenyan press for 
highlighting.71 But the distinction between local and foreign organizations is arguably 
unfair: the former’s practices are widely reported, and thus to an extent transparent 
and perhaps the familiar national narrative of corruption and mismanagement too 
easily appended to them. The internal workings of the latter, meanwhile, often 
remain obscure. Moreover, they are largely accountable to a different, foreign 
audience. Arguably such distinctions are also evidence of the enduring postcolonial 
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inferiority complex highlighted by Peter Ekeh.72 But they are also likely to have been 
influenced by the dearth of a robust public debate about the role of foreign actors in 
local development affairs. Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall point out a general 
accountability deficit among NGOs and bilateral agencies, and the former in 
particular, to aid recipients.73 They question the validity of donor organizations’ 
claims of having transformed local communities “from passive beneficiaries to rights-
holders.”74 
 
Yet the very local knowledge and experience of the maligned indigenous 
organizations means they are better positioned to identify local needs and formulate 
and implement strategies that are more sensitive to prevailing mores and customs, 
thus enhancing the sense of local ownership and inclusivity and long-term project 
success.75 
 
As earlier mentioned, some interviewees were also critical of NGOs’ urban bias, 
complaining of limited service coverage in rural areas. Interviewee 5’s opinions, seen 
in Chapter 5 (in the text following note 129), highlighted this. Another respondent, 
interviewee 32, from Kibwezi in Eastern Province said: “I can only add that I think that 
people in the rural areas are neglected a lot. A lot of NGOs and the government are 
concentrating on the urban areas. So many are dying in the rural areas.” Interviewee 
45 longed for a well-endowed NGO in his locality to provide the confidential VCT 
services that were currently unavailable, even offering to advertise its benefits: “In 
fact [NGOs] are the people we are looking for because especially in my area I know 
how people are suffering. We would like to get a NGO, even if it’s an international 
one, which can help. We have a small one which is equipped with some drugs for 
immunization and ante-natal clinics but if we can get someone who can come with a 
VCT, I can even be able to offer myself to help those in my home-area to tell them 
how good it is to go there and get tested because it’s confidential and no one will 
disclose it unless you do it yourself or someone else tells.” It was an issue that 
interviewee 25, a volunteer with a local branch of an international NGO, expanded 
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upon: her comments in Chapter 6 will be recalled (in the text following note 27), in 
which she noted the higher risk of stigma faced by those who went public with their 
HIV status in rural areas. Urban centres, she argued, offered safer environments for 
those wishing to live openly but increased NGO activity in rural areas might help 
change attitudes here:  
There is a lot to be done in the rural areas. As much as we talk about AIDS, for 
example, people still don’t know how to handle PLWHAs. There’s a lot of stigma.... 
And women are so much affected by HIV/AIDS, they don’t really know their rights. A 
husband may go anywhere and sleep with anybody and then come and infect you. 
You don’t want to leave because of the children. So I think for people in the rural 
areas, now is the time that NGOs should go into the villages because that is where 
the problem lies... And they should treat the symptoms first: like people are getting 
AIDS because of practices, ignorance, people don’t really care. When you tell people 
you are HIV-positive they don’t believe you. They say you have been given money to 
go and cheat them. If you talk about condoms they say ‘I can’t use them; why should I 
use them?’ We should be taught about preventive measures because many are 
getting infected in the villages because of ignorance or lack of good information. 
 
Some respondents, like interviewee 16 who complained about the extensive 
programme focus on slum-dwelling PLWHAs76, also expressed dissatisfaction with 
some NGOs’ presumptions in their mapping of needs. This is a criticism, perhaps, that 
programmes designed to suit foreign-based donor specifications may lack a full 
appreciation of the local context, a discussion addressed at length shortly. 
 
But perceptions about NGOs were overwhelmingly positive. Given the concerns 
voiced by many respondents about the cost of living with HIV/AIDS, the enthusiastic 
support of the range of services offered by CSOs in general was unsurprising. 
Interviewee 2, for instance, gave examples of the variety of interventions that NGOs 
were involved in: “Actually, local NGOs have really done good work, that much I must 
say. As it is, there are so many NGOs that are running these programmes of HIV and 
you can find they’re helping orphans, they’re helping widows, some of the people are 
getting drugs free… so I can say they’re doing a good thing.” Despite its own efforts in 
the reduction of ARV costs and other initiatives, the entity whose legitimacy seemed 
to suffer most from any comparison was the government. Its belated entry into the 
campaign against AIDS may partly account for this reaction but there may be other 
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reasons, not least cumulative perceptions about the State’s untrustworthiness and 
unreliability in addressing its citizens’ welfare concerns. One respondent, interviewee 
6, felt NGOs had helped validate the existence of PLWHAs by turning the spotlight 
onto their situation: 
…[W]ithout [NGOs] there wouldn’t be anything like AIDS programmes in existence. 
But since they’ve started their initiatives, that is their responsibility for now; because 
we have a problem and someone has said, ‘I’ll help them’. Helping us is coming out 
and saying, ‘I’ll give you medicine, you’ll talk to me.’ And you see that makes an HIV-
positive person feel so good- to see that you’re recognized and you feel there is 
hope. 
 
Another, citing the government’s reputed selectiveness in its distribution of social 
goods said, “I think [NGOs] have a better heart than the government- they don’t help 
according to who it is; they just help human beings!” (Interviewee 34). Interviewee 36 
attributed to NGOs a similarly saintly character: “When they say they’ll help, they 
really do. They have clean hearts.”  
 
The greater visibility and involvement of CSOs, often wealthy, foreign-based and 
funded, and ostensibly driven purely by altruism (as their sophisticated public 
relations machinery often maintains) has provided an alternative entity against which 
to evaluate the performance of the State, particularly in the delivery of social goods 
and development at national level. Positive interventions by CSOs burnish the 
reputations of individual organizations and the industry in general while highlighting 
the State’s deficiencies. Crucially, they also redefine citizens’ ideas about the role of 
the State and create certain expectations about what it should be doing; for in 
comparing NGO and State performance, interviewees were arguably also questioning 
the perceived absence of the State in what many thought was its rightful business of 
providing for their health needs, alluding to an abdication of its obligations. With 
effective circularity, such grievances can and have then been skilfully harnessed by 
advocacy groups and channelled towards pressuring governments worldwide to 
address PLWHAs’ needs. As such, CSOs’ activities have not only moulded the actions 
of governments but they also seem to have been instrumental in shaping individual 
and collective notions of entitlement and rights.  
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Crucially, however, more contentious narratives about CSOs and oversees donors 
appear either obscure or unimportant to many PLWHAs. For one, there are 
fundamental disparities of power between local and foreign organizations, in the 
capacity to determine and dictate the agenda for development assistance. The gap in 
financial clout may be the most obvious but Michael, in her investigation of NGOs, 
asserts that an NGO’s real power is defined by this capacity for agency and it is here 
that the real disparity lies. She argues that local NGOs lack the “ability... to exert 
[their] influence over others to further [their] ends, rather than [their] ability to 
accrue the resources necessary to force others to comply with [their] will.”77 For her, 
indigenous organizations may have influence within their local domains but will 
remain powerless until they can exert it at the international level over the foreign 
donors and governments on whom, in absence of local donors, they are almost 
entirely reliant.78 She is rightly distrustful of the idea of any meaningful ‘partnership’ 
between international NGOs and their local protégés, arguing that it only shrouds the 
inherent power relationship that governs them. The stream of resources and 
demands is often one-sided, with foreign NGOs little altering their approach at the 
behest of local ‘partners’, if at all.79 Ultimately, the marginalization of local CSOs 
mirrors the marginalization of their local constituents. These debates, evidence of 
which was absent in most interviewees responses, are fundamental for PLWHAs 
already facing socio-economic and political exclusion and for whom the addition of a 
new layer of actors in the health and rights fields should not represent yet another 
degree of separation between them and the power to make and effect choices.   
 
To be sure, at local if not supranational level Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki noted in 
2004 increased efforts by human rights organizations in Kenya to foster community 
participation and develop a more community-informed agenda. This shift, they 
argued, was prompted by an integration of socio-economic rights to their formerly 
exclusively civil and political rights focus. But they also cautioned that these trends 
were very much at their inception, stressing the need to transcend the dominance by 
professionals which currently characterized rights advocacy and embrace strategies 
that emphasize participation and building communities’ capacity to advocate for own 
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their rights.80 As Laura Turiano and Lanny Smith assert, this would help upgrade their 
status from merely that of “beneficiaries”, a position which embeds notions of 
dependency on, and deference to, supposedly magnanimous organizations and 
agencies.81 
 
These are precisely the kind of issues that the now-ubiquitous rights-based approach 
to the delivery of healthcare and development is concerned with.82 In contrast to a 
needs-based framework, which “focuses on securing additional resources for delivery 
of services to marginalised groups,” rights-based approaches overtly politicize the 
prevailing global inequalities in control of and access to resources, supporting claims 
to them from the marginalized.83 Yet the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development, which sought to map out specific obligations towards redressing 
North-South imbalance and impose a collective duty on all States, proved divisive and 
its provisions have been consistently stymied by wealthy Western governments, with 
many maintaining that development assistance should be voluntary.84 
 
This asymmetry is reflected in global public health priorities, which are almost 
entirely defined by oversees-based CSOs and subsequently percolate into, and are 
directly reflected by, national health policy. Ilona Kickbusch and Evelyne de Leeuw, 
for instance, have argued that the advent of international co-operation in the health 
field, a result of borderless international health crises like HIV/AIDS, produced two 
significant trends: the previously-noted burgeoning of actors in the global health 
arena and a “subtle but systematic erosion of internal sovereignty” in this field. The 
latter raises an interesting debate: for among the causes of this sovereignty deficit, 
they highlighted the actions of transnational corporations, healthcare reform 
strategies designed by the international financial institutions, the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the primacy accorded to bilateral aid 
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agencies’ priorities.85 Other commentators have also highlighted the prominent role 
of business today in shaping living standards and economic development, which they 
argue must not be obscured by the focus on State obligations.86 The battles between 
governments and pharmaceutical companies (over ARV accessibility), and insurance 
firms (over health cover for PLWHAs), are cases in point.  
 
Scrutinizing the wider processes by which changes in health policy are effected at 
supranational level and the role of prominent foreign-based CSOs in influencing 
donor behaviour is crucial. It must be clarified that it is not the intention here to 
criticize any efforts aimed at drumming up support for increased AIDS funding; nor is 
it suggested that HIV/AIDS is an undeserving target for attention. The aim is merely to 
highlight the broader factors that influence national health policy and budgetary 
priorities and underscore the not-so-benign role played by foreign State and extra-
State actors in this process, from the selection and sanctioning of these preferences, 
their local promotion and validation, and finally their implementation. For countries 
like Kenya are frequently compelled to give form to public health decisions 
articulated elsewhere, which may indeed align with national requirements, but which 
also may not.  
 
Shiffman outlines an analysis often used to explain donor behaviour in global public 
health funding, the influence of other actors.87 He writes:  
...[Donor] states like individuals, exist in an international society, where they are 
subject to socialization processes. They may not initially know what they want but 
come to hold particular preferences as a result of socialization by other state and 
non-state actors into commonly held norms. For instance, a state originally may not 
prioritize a health cause such as polio eradication, but come to adopt the cause 
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because domestic health officials learn at international health gatherings that other 
countries are pursuing this goal and they are likely to be left behind.88  
 
In this atmosphere, he adds, the agenda of individuals and organizations are vital; and 
it is this, the global policy framework, which he argues predominates once the other 
two- recipient need and provider interest- have moulded the donor’s initial choices.89 
The knock-on effects of increased donor funding may include an improvement 
throughout the recipient country’s health infrastructure, shoring up its capacity to 
cope with other health issues.90 In addition, as Shiffman also points out, spotlighting 
major public health issue like HIV/AIDS may help focus attention on the general 
health concerns of the poor.91  
 
Yet the surge in donor funding for the AIDS epidemic has had some negative 
consequences, as commentators like Garrett have pointed out. Better-funded 
HIV/AIDS programmes have not automatically meant a general improvement in a 
country’s public healthcare system as much of this money is spent on stand-alone 
projects, ensuring it remains firmly within this appointed niche.92 Moreover, these 
cash-rich international CSO-led programmes create direct competition in the local 
market for health goods and services. They suck crucial personnel away from the 
already-weak local health system as many governments are unable to match the 
remuneration packages they offer.93 In Kenya’s case, donors’ efforts to rebuild the 
country’s collapsing personnel numbers- an estimated 15% of its health workers 
between 1994 and 2001- appear to have been focused solely on HIV/AIDS-related 
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projects.94 A 2005 announcement reporting the recruitment by CHAI of 120 nurses in 
Kenya was proudly advertised as a “major boost to the war on AIDS”95; Garrett would 
argue it is a further depletion of a general healthcare system which in the last ten 
years has lost “1,670 physicians and 3,900 nurses to emigration, and thousands more 
nurses have retired...”96 Malawi is worse off, having lost “53% of its health 
administrators, 64% of its nurses, and 85% of is physicians- mostly to foreign NGOs, 
largely funded by the U.S. or the British government or the Gates Foundation…”97  
 
There is also scepticism about the very efficacy of some donor-inspired health 
programmes.  A prime example is PEPFAR’s abstinence-centred HIV prevention 
programme in Uganda, criticized by some as potentially retarding the country’s 
progress in combating the epidemic. Condom-use has been a highly effective 
prevention strategy but a reported condom shortage in the country (firmly denied by 
the Ugandan government) was attributed by Stephen Lewis, the UN Secretary 
General’s Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, to PEPFAR and “the extreme policies 
that the administration in the United States is now pursuing.”98 Jones and Norton, 
who analyze the debate in the context of contestations over the truth about the 
origins, spread and control of the epidemic, underline the role of the conservative, 
religious fundamentalist forces at the heart of sexual health discourse during the 
Bush administration. Advocates for a proven, comprehensive approach to prevention 
were pitted against the “global policy-makers, policy analysts, senior advisors and 
some researchers who rallied behind PEPFAR, [and] were often involved in PEPFAR 
policy and implementation”99 This starkly illustrates a dilemma often faced by 
funding-recipient countries: to reject or implement generously-funded programmes 
based on policies that may bear little or no relationship to the lived experiences of 
their local target audiences,  and accept the broader consequences of their choices. 
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The role of oversees CSOs and other actors in the development and implementation 
of global public health programmes, therefore, with its mixed outcomes for health 
systems at the national level, are worthy of far more cautious endorsement than that 
lavished by some of the respondents quoted above, and may even conflict with the 
interests of the locals among whom they work. 
 
Moreover, it is necessary to critique and publicize the legal and moral framework of 
the provision of international assistance and the power processes that “determine 
which issues that affect health get decided- and which issues are never brought to the 
table because they are systematically blocked.”100 While the primary duty-bearers 
envisaged by the key international human rights instruments on socio-economic 
rights are States, it must be recalled that their provisions came into being decades 
before the ascendancy of non-State actors in this field. Further, it must not be 
forgotten that these organizations have become vital vehicles for funnelling 
development assistance from the same wealthy donor States whose role Art. 2(1) of 
the legally-binding International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) seeks to delineate.101 Arguably, then, in such circumstances they act as 
extensions of the State. Unsurprisingly, given how ill-defined the obligations of Art. 
2(1) remain, the poor enforcement of the ICESCR and the geopolitical interests that 
largely dictate decisions about assistance102, wealthy donor States are often less 
inclined to highlight the legal obligations- rather than mere moral principles- that 
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underpin their interventions103, and the inadequacy of their efforts.104 Moreover, 
they may deliberately impede inquisitions into their own roles in sustaining global 
health inequalities, choosing instead to focus on the responsibilities and performance 
of the local government. Indeed a rights-awareness survey reviewed in the next 
chapter indicates that there is greater recognition of socio-economic rights at 
grassroots level in Kenya, suggesting, perhaps, awareness of the government’s legal 
obligations to fulfil its own citizens’ socio-economic rights such as health. Yet the 
respondents’ comments featured above suggested less familiarity with any 
obligations compelling other key actors to offer assistance, beyond perhaps moral 
ones, which as their principal cultural and/or religious belief systems may dictate, 
oblige the stronger/richer to assist the weaker/poorer.  
 
The status quo undoubtedly contributes to public perceptions that their healthcare 
needs are just that: needs, which can be satisfied by charitable interventions from 
foreign donors or CSOs, rather than rights, entitlements underwritten by law or at 
least by moral obligations founded on powerful notions of human dignity105; Maina 
Kiai,  then-head of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), 
highlighted this issue, arguing the government, too, had encouraged this 
misconception through its promotion of Harambee and its inference that community 
self-help can substitute the fulfilment by the State of its legal obligations.106 Further, 
that recipients should be grateful for these charitable interventions especially in light 
of the invariably inadequate performance of their own governments.107  
 
The development discourse acknowledges the inherent dysfunction within the 
donor/recipient relationship and there have been global-level attempts to get parties 
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to adhere to such precepts as ownership, alignment and mutual accountability.108 In 
the meantime, the status quo continues to undermine the long-term success of 
development projects and embed the exclusion of many marginalized peoples.109 And 
the latter is closely related to issues at the core of this research: citizenship and 
rights. It is to these linkages that the discussion now turns.  
 
III. AIDS, Civil Society and the State/Citizen-Subject Dialogue 
a) Defining ‘Civil Society’  
The debate about the delivery of healthcare raises a number of wider issues about 
the vertical relationship between a State and its citizens, as well as the horizontal 
relationships between the various extra-State actors who make up ‘civil society’.  
Though this phrase is referred to often here, it is not the task of this research to 
review the breadth of literature devoted to it or indeed to attempt to reconcile the 
various accounts of its origins or conceptual evolution. However, a preliminary 
definition, quoted in Chapter 1, can be provided by Charles Taylor. In this definition, 
civil society “stands in contrast to ‘the state’… a web of autonomous associations, 
independent of the state, which bound citizens together in matters of common 
concern, and by their mere existence or action could have an effect on public 
policy.”110 But despite this working definition, Taylor accepts in his exploration of the 
evolving relationship between society and the State that the concept of civil society is 
“more complex and many-faceted” than a mere distinction between the two.111 He 
regards as unsatisfactory and simplistic a unified notion of ‘civil society’ compellingly 
arguing that, as it has developed in the West, it transcends the simple ideas of “a 
general will or a politics-free sphere”.112  
 
Indeed, this complexity is appreciated by John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff and 
others in Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives, who 
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write of a concept that is impossible to pin down, incoherent even, which does not 
represent just one thing or one idea, and whose possibilities lie in its very 
elusiveness.113 
 
In this spirit, though the dominance of NGOs in the CSO landscape is rightly 
acknowledged, it is understood that this landscape is more amorphous, 
encompassing broader public domains or “arenas in which people and ideas come 
into public view, and from which people derive a sense of having a world in 
common.”114 Many of the interviewees for this research are part of this nebulous 
sphere. Explicit membership of, or association with, an CSO is not seen as a criteria 
for locating them within civil society; many self-identified as part of less formal 
associations, such as local self-help groups in which the specific health and human 
rights concerns linked with their illness were discussed, thus carving for themselves 
new public spaces where “secular social purpose could be articulated and carried 
out.”115 The processes by which they attempt to address these concerns, individually 
or collectively, have necessarily brought them into contact with the State in its 
various manifestations and oblige them to negotiate with it. As such, their responses 
are part of the broader conversation about the State’s changing role and provide 
clues into the fluid boundaries of this civic space. 
  
This broad definition of civil society rejects a few presumptions which potentially 
narrow the avenues of discussion: for instance, there is no presupposition that the 
interface between the State and civil society is necessarily hostile; nor that the latter 
necessarily seeks to depose the former. But the presumption of a distinct boundary 
between State and society is sustained though it has been criticized as a production 
of the State itself116, and Taylor rightly underlines the nuances involved in any notion 
of conceptualizing civil society as independent from the State, “because there are 
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different definitions of what this independence involves...”117 The primary 
contribution of PLWHAs’ responses is in highlighting how their (shifting) subjectivities 
have influenced the framing and articulation of health needs vis-à-vis other entities, 
in particularly the State. Also, their definitions of ideas commonly associated with a 
“civil” society- “moral being, citizenship, community and polity” 118, are of interest; 
these were not explicitly sought in the interviews but respondents often intimated at 
them. Ultimately, the interviews reveal how PLWHAs’ experiences, filtered through 
their multiple identities- based on sex, age, class, ethnicity, nationality, race and,  
most pertinently, perhaps, as PLWHAs- have moulded their subjectivities and 
understanding of these fundamental terms.   
 
b) Redefining the State and the Citizen-Subject  
The first point to note with reference to the triangular relationship between the 
State, non-State actors and the citizen-subject is that one must be cautious not to 
overplay the role of CSOs in the provision of social goods in Kenya. While they have 
been crucial to increasing availability and access to ART for PLWHAs, their reach is 
limited: many in need of the drugs still go without and many interviewees who 
accessed them did so through their own efforts or by calling upon their informal 
private networks. Moreover, as seen throughout, NGOs are unlikely to be providing 
PLWHAs’ myriad other needs such as nutrition. However, because the sector plays a 
vital part in the provision of healthcare, a function associated by many with the State, 
it is necessarily interpolated in the State and citizen-subject dynamic.  
 
Secondly, one of the consequences of the AIDS epidemic has been the production of 
a significant PLWHA community. Pioneers such as Jonathan Mann recognized early on 
that AIDS was more than a medical-clinical issue: it had significant social, political and 
economic dimensions; and yet the debate on interventions has been long dominated 
by the former.119 Decoupling AIDS from the strictly medicalized framework of the 
early part of the epidemic, which saw PLWHAs primarily as patients, and locating it 
within its socio-economic contexts has expanded the understanding of the disease.120 
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PLWHAs, whose involvement has been central to this transformation, have widened 
the civic space. Though commentators such as Pisani rightly warn against presuming 
community amongst PLWHAs and the notion that the commonality of their ailment 
necessarily means unanimity and cooperation on all matters (differentials like gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity, race, class, and nationality ensure plurality of voice121), the very 
fact that differences in opinions and ideas are being articulated proves the expansion 
of the dialogue space.  
 
Evidence of active engagement in the conversation can be seen in their responses. 
Their very particular vantage point as PLWHAs may colour their opinions but it 
nevertheless enriches the broader dialogue on these issues, a discussion that will 
dominate the last chapter. Some commentators have appeared to attach specific 
articulated goals and outcomes to definitions about who is to be classified as a 
member of civil society.122 But in-keeping with an unbounded definition of civil 
society, that is not the view here; it is the notion of a sphere where the legitimacy and 
limits of State power is discussed that promises the more robust debate.123 PLWHA 
groups as part of civil society have reclaimed the AIDS debate and used it to carve out 
a space in the public arena. They have transformed it into a vehicle for greater social 
and political participation, one through which pertinent issues such as the rights of 
PLWHAs have entered the public agenda. These spaces started out as- and many 
remain- “claimed” or “demanded” rather than “invited” spaces, that is, platforms that 
were “demanded, created, claimed, or chosen by communities or social movements 
themselves” rather than being under the effective control of government or another 
“authority.”124 But the PLWHA movement is now firmly established globally and is 
shaping individual and collective notions about PLWHAs, their needs, rights and 
entitlements in many countries.  
 
It must be cautioned, however, that many of its goals remain unfulfilled and there is a 
need for a constant renewal of impetus. Some of these problems may be inherent in 
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the processes of pluralizing the political space: as they bring within their influence 
greater numbers of the excluded, these strategies also exercise various forms of 
social control over them that ultimately inhibit dissent and blunt their radical edge. 
The discussion in Chapter 5 on the predominance of the biomedical paradigm is a 
good example. This actually shrinks the participatory space and may in fact enhance 
the marginalization of those affected.125 
 
Moreover, the PLWHA movement must resist the trap of morphing into a “solidarity 
of exclusion,” which, as Mann observed, develops among members of a group 
confronted with discrimination and brutality. “This inward thinking, while providing 
some psychological and practical benefits to members of the group, yields only short-
term relief, and is ultimately self-defeating.”126 Groups such as TAC in South Africa 
have been successful in attracting support from beyond the PLWHA community. But 
more than broadening networks with other groups, it may be increasingly beneficial 
for the movement to nurture strategies that expand its agenda, too, to include issues 
that transcend those faced by the group and embrace, for instance, the general 
health policy and infrastructural issues that affect Kenyans at large. Once again, TAC, 
whose campaigns now include efforts for the improvement of conditions for health 
workers, provides an example.127 
 
Thirdly, PLWHAs’ experiences and perceptions of NGOs were insightful about how 
horizontal interactions among non-State actors may influence the vertical ones 
between the citizen-subject and the State. Many respondents, interviewee 8, for 
instance, thought NGOs better than the State at providing medicines and healthcare 
services. She said: “You know, NGOs are better than government. They have the 
freedom to go to people’s homes. They are not like nurses who have no time to go to 
people’s homes.” Others, as has been seen, even thought that NGOs demonstrated 
more concern for citizens’ welfare. This suggests that some respondents were making 
direct comparisons between the two entities without possibly questioning the 
fundamental differences in their nature and mandate and its implications. At times 
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they appeared to view their roles as interchangeable, not merely advocates or 
interlocutors for PLWHAs but a tag-team of sorts at least with respect to the provision 
of ART, working in concert and/or substituting for each other when one actor was 
unable- or unwilling- to meet the needs of PLWHAs: Interviewee 11, for example, 
said, “NGOs can do a lot. Because they can help the government subsidise these 
drugs so that when the patient is asked to pay some money, it is not too much… They 
should help. If they team up with the government, plus everyone else, even well-
wishers, if they all give they can really make the country and better place for HIV 
patients.” Interviewee 39 said: “I think if they have funds they can help. They can 
subsidise funds for the drugs…. If they have funds, they should.” For these 
respondents, the notion appears to be that NGOs and other civil society actors can 
and should step into the breach on occasions where States are overwhelmed by 
citizenry demands. Meanwhile, Interviewee 3 expressed a desire to see the 
government take the lead in projects involving NGOs. However, illustrating the 
perceived lack of agency that several respondents exhibited in relation to the 
government, he suggested that NGOs might be wary of such partnerships because of 
the government’s poor record in governance and financial mismanagement:  
 
Interviewee 3: [NGOs] can help if they see the initiative the government is also taking.  
Additional question: 
Interviewer: So it has to start with the government?  
Interviewee: Yes. They should be able to say, ‘We have tried this much, gotten this 
far. Now, if you can help us with this bit, we can move up to this 
point.’ 
Interviewer: How do you think NGOs can help? 
Interviewee: If it were me organizing things, the NGOs would work together with 
the government, but most of them fear working with the government 
nowadays, like I was told at a certain NGO here, they want to do their 
project on their own, they want no involvement by the government. 
They said if they did it with the government, they won’t reach their 
target because once you start involving the government, you won’t 
run your accounts, so it’s difficult for them. And you won’t push the 
government! The problem is money. 
 
And yet while many thought that the State was obliged to provide for their health 
needs, either through its responsibility to its taxpayers or citizens, or on moral 
grounds (though a number, as will be seen in Chapter 8, were sceptical that these 
obligations could be enforced against a recalcitrant State) most saw NGOs’ 
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interventions as merely charitable, seemingly absolving them of any duty-bearing role 
and declaring these actors under no compulsion to offer it. Comments included: 
“They should [help], but voluntarily; it’s the government that should. Theirs [NGOs] 
should be voluntary.” (Interviewee 17); “Yes, they can help us if they want because 
they have been helping us [but] it should be voluntary.” (Interviewee 19); “They 
absolutely not should be compelled to help! They volunteer their help and the 
resources are not their own- they beg on behalf of those in need. So they should not 
be compelled, just requested.” (Interviewee 36); No, [NGOs] should not be 
compelled! They should just volunteer to help.” (Interviewee 49); “These 
[organizations] just volunteer to help so they shouldn’t be compelled. (Interviewee 
35); “They should not be compelled to [help]. If they feel it’s right to help, they 
should.” (Interviewee 22).  
 
Those who felt that NGOs should assist them in getting their health entitlements 
were adamant that where funds had been sought and given in the recipients’ 
(PLWHAs) name they must be put to their intended purpose. For instance, 
interviewee 44 said:  
Yes [NGOs should be compelled to assist] because the help they offer is because 
people have those human rights. They ask for donations and say that they need to 
help people so when they get the donations, they must use them to help people, 
because they have claimed it in my name. For example, people are starving in my 
birth-place in Ukambani [Eastern Kenya]. They are also dying because they’ve eaten 
contaminated grains. If an NGO goes abroad and says they want funds from donors 
to go and help these people dig boreholes for water so that they may be able to grow 
their own crops, they should then be compelled to help us because they have 
acquired those funds in our name and for our use. So any NGO that gets funding 
specifically to help PLWHAs, they should be then compelled to help.  
 
Other responses included: “They should [be compelled to help]. I hear they get 
money to help but sometimes they use the money for themselves or they help those 
they want to help but not others. (Interviewee 37); “Yes, [NGOs] should be compelled 
to help. They should be followed up, even if it’s by the government, because if they 
volunteered to help people then they should.” (Interviewee 23); Yes, they should be 
compelled assist [because] we should help those we pledged to help when the 
organization was founded.” (Interviewee 29).  
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Perversely, then, the preferred agent of the delivery of healthcare entitlements for 
many was also the one that most did not consider obligated to act; the implication of 
their preference would be to reduce the foundation of their claims to healthcare from 
an entitlement in law to mere goodwill.  
 
Fourthly, in a relatively recent development, CSOs have been keen to emphasize an 
important component of citizenship: participation. The right to participate has been 
dubbed “the right of rights” as it is seen as instrumental to achieving other rights.128 
Its role is anticipated by the principle international human rights covenants129; as Ely 
Yamin puts it, “participation goes to our most fundamental understanding of being 
human and to the purpose of rights.”130 In global health, the rhetoric, if not always 
the practice, of participation has been part of the discourse for some decades now, 
with various models of community-centred alternatives to State-led public health and 
development paradigms emerging in the 1970s.131 In the intervening decades the 
concept of community participation waned “as it came to be perceived as a 
convenient means to compensate for the failure of states to make significant 
improvements related to primary health care.”132 In Kenya the power to organize any 
grassroots movements that fostered citizen participation was greatly stifled by 
repressive governments. This only changed with the local and international political 
convulsions of the late 1980s and 1990s. It took even longer- the late 1990s- for the 
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development sector to adopt participation as a key element in the delivery of its 
services, a shift that Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki attribute to the impetus on the 
local scene for constitutional change which the sector could no longer ignore, and the 
influence of major international development players who began to integrate 
advocacy and rights-based approaches into their work.133 As a result, organizations 
like Oxfam and ActionAid have sought to build the capacity of various groups and 
marginalized communities in Kenya to engage with State institutions as a 
fundamental aspect of a rights-based approach, in order to make government more 
accountable.134 Indeed, Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki illustrated the transformative 
effect of grounding the practice of participatory development, observing that some 
communities had started to extend their demands for accountability beyond the 
State to other actors, including the organizations they worked with.135 The renewed 
emphasis on participation can undoubtedly be linked to the globalization of CSO 
activities, for in acquiring an international character as part of their multi-level 
restructuring, which many CSOs have done, they have been forced to become more 
conscious of their wide-reaching impact and more explicitly account for the “different 
cultural, political, and economic settings, [which come with] often with very different 
problems and organizational tasks”136     
 
It is therefore worth interrogating how CSOs may be re-shaping the boundaries of 
citizenship. To start with, the global character of many of those involved in HIV/AIDS 
and/or human rights activities, and their role in cultivating transnational “social and 
economic communities”, has contributed to the expansion of “the institution of 
citizenship” from its conventional single dimension, so that now it has diverse aspects 
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“only some of which might be inextricably linked to the national state.”137 Drawing on 
the work of other commentators, Saskia Sassen concludes: “Whether it is the 
organization of formal status, the protection of human rights, citizenship practices, or 
the experience of collective identities and solidarities, the nation state is not the 
exclusive site for their enactment. It remains by far the most important site, but the 
transformations in its exclusivity signal a possibly important new dynamic.”138 It is an 
assertion borne out in this research by the interviewees’ comments which reveal their 
enthusiasm for the pathways now presented by CSOs for activism on behalf of 
PLWHAs’ access to treatment and other rights.   
  
It is also worth investigating how CSOs impact on existing patterns of exclusion which 
bar large numbers from participation, and thus citizenship. Do they in fact replicate 
these patterns when so many PLWHAs, for instance, appear to hope- even expect- 
they will neutralize them? For the contours of the civic space in which they operate 
are socially-produced, the result of the power matrices that have been analyzed 
throughout this research.139 Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki note a greater demand 
for participation at grassroots level in Kenya and underscore that struggles here 
“emphasise that rights are not simply about attaining tangible desired outcomes 
(such as piped water and a garbage collection system) but that rights are also about 
taking part in the processes that shape and achieve those desired outcomes: a right 
to active and meaningful participation in the process of shaping the realisation of 
rights, so to speak.”140 Their anecdotal evidence of community advocacy initiatives 
illustrated that sustaining grassroots human rights campaigns requires genuine 
participation, be it the right to meet freely and discuss grievances, to take part in 
decision-making whose outcomes affect them, to information, or to transparency 
from relevant governmental or non-governmental bodies implementing such 
decisions.141 
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Yet persistent structural barriers to participation and citizenship, many with pre-
colonial foundations, exclude those with limited social, economic and political capital, 
such as women and the poor, from fully taking part in public life. Such exclusion not 
only determines access to social goods but the extent to which one can contribute to 
the dialogue about their provision and distribution. CSOs within the AIDS sector have 
already been successful in providing ART to a vast numbers of poor for whom such 
treatment would be otherwise inaccessible. By focusing on women, children and 
orphans, local groups like WOFAK help redress their historical marginalization. 
Through such efforts, CSOs have helped open up platforms upon which PLWHAs may 
advocate their positions, thus extending the frontiers of the civic space to include a 
previously excluded group.  
 
On the other hand, however, CSOs can be rightly accused of preserving rather than 
reversing some patterns of exclusion established by State actors. For instance, their 
invariably urban-based nerve centres deepen the geographic, social, economic and 
political isolation of rural and remote communities. Elsewhere, local organizations 
may be especially susceptible to the charge of maintaining that contentious 
exclusionary factor of ethnicity, as seen in some interviews. Some faith-based 
organizations, too, may hold forth adherence to a particular set of values as a barrier 
to accessing their services. These examples underline how the process of expanding 
access to socio-economic goods like health may itself be a vehicle for entrenching 
existing inequalities and prevailing norms. As Lynn Freedman asserts, while public 
health and human rights may be “powerful, modern  approaches to defining and 
advancing human well-being,” they have also “at times been powerful tools for 
maintaining the status quo, reinforcing hierarchies of power and domination based 
on race, gender, and class.”142  
 
Nor must it be forgotten that CSOs’ ties to powerful financial benefactors, though 
crucial to their survival, may in fact hinder meaningful participation and citizenship at 
grassroots level: for they may restrict their ability to fully effect a rights framework 
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which, as Ely Yamin underlines, addresses the concern that, “the power to decide 
what gets decided can be a greater constraint on the choices of others than the 
ability to overcome opposition. Therefore, it is important to consider not just who 
gets their way within policy debates or participatory forums, but how the agenda and 
the boundaries of participation are set.”143 
 
Fifthly, commentators like Mamdani dispute the extent of civil society’s impact in 
postcolonial Africa, arguing that it remains an urban phenomenon which fails to take 
into account the regime of the customary through which the majority rural 
population- the ethnic public- is incorporated and ruled.144 They challenge the view 
that Africa’s crises are rooted in the ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘weak’ civil society.145 
Karlström criticizes the off-handed dismissal and scant analysis of African forms of 
association, such as kinship groups, as potential and effective interlocutors in the 
State’s dialogue with the citizen-subject.146 The power structures of the rural sphere 
explored in Chapter 3 undoubtedly represent a locus of power whose fundamental 
values are at times diametrically opposed to those which CSOs ostensibly promote. As 
Mamdani observes, these authorities have not shied away from denying rights in the 
name of preserving custom.147 How CSOs go about claiming this sphere is of great 
interest, with the centralizing power of the ethnic, which sometimes exerts a greater 
influence than the State, inhibiting the growth of some of the contingents of civil 
society in the rural sphere. For instance, Taylor underlines the significance in the 
evolution of the idée of civil society of “voluntary associations...[which] give us the 
taste and habit of self-rule.”148 Such associations were highly restricted in Kenya’s 
colonial period especially, and were less prevalent particularly in the rural sphere. But 
they have also been restricted in the numerous post- independence power struggles. 
And yet they are “essential for political purposes. But if they are to be real loci of self-
rule, they have to be nongigantic and numerous, and exist at many levels of the 
polity. This itself should be decentralized, so that self-government can be practiced 
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also at the local and not just the national level.”149 The stagnation of this aspect of the 
evolution of civil society has thus arguably held back the mobilization of ethnic public.  
 
And yet this public and its realm cannot entirely remain impervious to the influence 
of civil society, not least due to the fluidity with which numerous Kenyans navigate 
between the urban and rural sphere. Many values endorsed by civil society, such as 
human rights principles, are increasingly familiar to Kenyans, as human rights 
awareness surveys suggest, and thus have space to flourish in the rural sphere. Yet 
problems remain: some of the messages at the core of public health campaigns 
against HIV/AIDS, for instance, such as those which seek to eradicate risky practices 
and the underlying values they promote- female circumcision, wife inheritance, child 
marriages are prime examples- are often fiercely opposed in those communities 
where such customs are common.150 These objections are often ciphers for 
something deeper: resistance to interference with the social configuration of this 
realm. The contestation of a particular public health policy or human rights campaign 
reveals the power struggle between the authorities in these rural communities and 
the independent locus of power represented by CSOs who advocate these positions. 
This underlines the importance of Mamdani’s bifurcation thesis; the differently-
configured urban sphere creates an easier environment for various elements of civil 
society to promulgate norms and ideas that may be deemed controversial, if not 
downright unpalatable, elsewhere. 
 
It is partly in recognition of these underlying conflicts that CSOs and other health 
actors now accept that they must actively seek to co-opt local community-members 
into their operations, as the WOFAK/UNAIDS project on the integration of traditional 
medicine in AIDS care, reviewed in Chapter 5, noted:  
Without the involvement of community stakeholders in the implementation and 
follow-up of collaborative initiatives, collaborations may fail to achieve their intended 
far-ranging goal, beyond immediate project participants, thus they may not last 
and/or truly benefit the community. Involving community leaders and project 
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beneficiaries from the inception of activities allows for community ownership, 
interest in sustainability, and increased collaboration at all levels.151 
 
As seen earlier, the capacity of these local stakeholders to articulate priorities and 
really dictate change at a policy level is questionable.152 But this concession may also 
indicate some recognition of the essential fallacy of the notion of the atomized 
individual, and power of the community as the main site of individuals’ sexual and 
social experiences and of the formation of their identities and subjectivities, as 
Campbell underscores.153 But this interaction between rural communities and CSOs 
has surely been mutually transformative: the injection of a rights discourse into the 
examination of cultural practices like female circumcision and wife inheritance 
spotlights the individual: the tangible consequences and costs to individual well-being 
of intangible social, cultural, economic and political forces. The subsequent vigorous 
public debate has also allowed Kenyans, many of whom have at least one foot in the 
rural sphere, to probe the nature and limits of customary power and the values it 
endorses.  
 
Yet a fundamental quandary of citizenship remains which problematizes the gradual 
erosion of the customary through the denigration of the normative framework which 
underpins it. Does this process disregard too readily the legitimate desire by all 
societies, be they rural- or urban-based, for an identity and a sense of cohesion? As 
Mamdani has noted, those in the urban-based civil sphere may be able to draw on 
their membership or citizenship within the Nation for a sense of identity154; thus 
seeking to undermine that which serves a similar function for the ethnic public- 
custom- arguably diminishes that which gives them a similar sense of belonging, 
association, participation. And yet equally, if not more, undesirable would be the kind 
of compromises that would accept the perpetuation of suffering often justified in the 
name of preserving religious or cultural norms.155  
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Finally, as mentioned earlier, it has been argued by Kickbusch and de Leeuw and 
others that CSOs and donors may undermine State sovereignty and legitimacy, 
particularly its authority in setting the national health agenda. Agatre Okuonzi and 
Joanna MacRae, writing on Uganda’s national health policy but who could just as 
easily be commenting on Kenya, similarly assert:  
Donor influence in policy development raises a number of questions concerned less 
with the technical merit of alternative policy options for such issues as health 
financing strategies and the composition of essential drugs lists, than with issues of 
accountability, sovereignty, information, sustainability and appropriateness in the 
health policy domain.156 
 
The place of the citizen-subject in this dynamic is crucial to the debate about the 
pursuit of a right to health, as the last chapter will further elaborate. Some 
commentators see a broader erosion of State sovereignty, an undermining of the 
nation State itself and its replacement with structures that have no clear lines of 
accountability.157 And yet others argue that some of the programmes adopted in the 
prevention and management of the AIDS epidemic, especially those which seek to 
encourage safer sex, actually extend the State’s reach in the private sphere, even 
though they may be conveyed through the auspices of CSOs.158 According to this 
view, the epidemic has enabled the State to entrench the theatre of sexual 
interaction as a legitimate space for its involvement in the name of preventing a 
sexually transmitted illness with no cure. The effect of this incursion may be that the 
State’s values, which in Kenya remain rooted in conservatism and paternalism, are 
imparted more freely and enforced through programmes and policy messages, 
disadvantaging those who fall outside the parameters of propriety. The impact on 
traditionally-marginalized groups such as women, or much more recently-prominent 
groups such as men who have sex with men, may be their further isolation. 
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The impact of eroded State sovereignty is more complicated in the bifurcated State if 
indeed, “in some parts of the world NGOs and international agencies provide the only 
effective governmental structure,” as Altman argues.159 Those incorporated within 
the urban-based national public may utilize existing avenues for participation and 
citizenship which enable a political dialogue with the State about, say, the provision 
and distribution of social, economic or political goods.  To be sure, this may have 
produced only limited success and perhaps only to a limited few; nevertheless 
(nominal) legally-guaranteed paths of participation such as the right to vote remain. 
But as CSOs and international agencies have evolved into a focal point of power 
themselves, with only a limited number of Kenyans able to piggy-back on them as a 
vehicle to the articulation and realization of their own goals, the field of engagement 
has been reconfigured, participation reduced and much of the power to affect change 
concentrated elsewhere, that is, as Chandhoke, Garland and others bluntly state, 
abroad. Even for those with a stronger allegiance to the national public, the levers of 
power which control these new set of actors may prove more inaccessible than those 
of the historically unwieldy Kenyan State. This constriction of the participatory space, 
as Ely Yamin argues, has a colossal bearing on the dignity and well-being of the 
marginalized.160 The apparent magnanimity of the oversees actors does not 
camouflage the fact that “[i]f health is a matter of rights, it cannot be considered a 
handout, and the people who receive services are not objects of charity from their 
own governments or from the G-20; they are agents who have a role to play in the 
definition of programs and policies that structure the possibilities for their own well-
being.”161 
 
At the other end, the ethnic public, rooted in a sphere whose conservative, rigid 
systems of power render it less vulnerable to incursions by civil society, may draw 
more people to it because of the relative certainties and continuity of the customary, 
particularly in times of socio-economic and political turmoil. This may further 
strengthen allegiance to localized customary authorities in their on-going power 
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contest with the national State: for the opportunities that the customary realm offers 
for participation, association- citizenship- may be perceived as more feasible.  The 
price that the powerbrokers in this domain may exact for membership- allegiance to 
prevailing authority, reinforcement of exclusion based on ethnicity, gender and 
factors intrinsic to this sphere, indeed, the enforcement of practices and values that 
are abhorrent to human rights norms- may once again redraw the citizen-subject 
boundaries, adding new layers to the subjectivities of PLWHAs and Kenyans at large 
and recalibrating notions about entitlements and rights. Just how embedded such 
notions are will be one of the issues addressed in the last chapter.  
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Chapter 8: Deconstructing Subjectivity and Constructing 
Notions of Entitlement and Human Rights in Kenya 
 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of PLWHAs’ responses in relation to rights 
and locates them in the broader, globalized human rights discourse.  
 
By analyzing the interviewees’ general human rights awareness and comparing and 
contrasting it with a more widespread survey on similar issues conducted by the 
Kenya Human Rights Commission, this chapter is able to illuminate discrepancies that 
may be accountable to their identity as PLWHAs. Further, the interviews are 
employed to identify and interrogate three key themes which emerge from 
respondents’ conceptualization of rights: humanness, dignity and citizenship.  
 
As the chapter illustrates, many interviewees often appeared to define these three 
fundamental concepts from their unique perspective as PLWHAs, giving weight to the 
suggestion that HIV/AIDS is significant to their subjectivity and their imagination of 
entitlements and rights. To start with, there is evidence of how a stigmatizing illness 
may affect PLWHAs’ notions of what it means to be a human being with a certain 
worth and entitlements accruing. The chapter then highlights the tensions between 
conceptions of dignity within the human rights paradigm and within cultural or 
religious frameworks that dominate the lives of PLWHAs. This further establishes the 
significance of HIV infection to the construction of subjectivity but also underlines the 
conflict and plurality, addressed in previous chapters, of the moral frameworks by 
which respondents regulate their lives. Finally, in the analysis of PLWHAs’ claims of 
membership to multiple, sometimes competing publics, this chapter argues the 
significant role that appears to be played by the exigencies of HIV infection to 
PLWHAs’ understanding of the idea of citizenship and its attendant obligations, 
entitlements and rights.  
 
The interviews thus provide an empirical context for which to underline the 
importance of subjectivity in legal research. They help rationalize and validate the 
assertions of theorists like Jacques Lacan of the seamless continuity between inner 
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aspects, like identity and desire, and outer ones like society and law, in the 
construction of the legal subject. Lacan’s theories are briefly outlined towards the 
end of this chapter and help locate the idea of each PLWHA as a unique legal subject 
and agent, and to contextualize the multifaceted and sometimes contradictory nature 
of subjectivity that this research has often revealed.  
 
This thesis is buttressed in the chapter’s concluding analysis, which looks at how the 
varied subjects and subjectivities at the heart of this research, the products of the 
dynamic and complex environment discussed in previous chapters, also entertain 
varied notions about their health entitlements. Further, they are shown to have 
multiple ideas about the rights of the individual and the obligations of the State and 
other actors.  
 
Ultimately, the chapter underlines the fact that despite its globalization, the human 
rights paradigm and its norms about the (health) entitlements of the individual are 
not ‘taken-for-granted’: for while the human rights enterprise has made strides in 
promoting its values, major challenges persist, primarily in the grassroots, which are 
dominated by alternative languages and frameworks by which to conceptualize and 
articulate entitlement and rights. Here in this key constituency, this research 
suggests, the multitudes remain unconverted.  
  
I. Rights Awareness 
The analysis about PLWHAs’ knowledge of rights was greatly aided by the more 
comprehensive 2006 Haki Index (Chapter 1), which provides a countrywide context 
about human rights awareness. This research’s own inquiry avoided making 
presumptions about interviewees’ knowledge, and started by asking the basic 
question: had respondents heard of the phrase ‘human rights’ or its Kiswahili 
equivalent, haki za ki-binadamu. Indeed, the vast majority of respondents said they 
had. An attempt was made to find any common characteristics among the five who 
had not, which may be significant to rights awareness. A Zimbabwean human rights 
awareness study from the early-1990s, for instance, indicated that ‘professionals’ 
knew more about rights than any other groups in the survey; however, it suggested 
that “lack of human rights knowledge [seemed] mainly to be caused by lack of 
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education than a total absence of education.”1 Among the five, interviewees 23 and 
12 had not attained secondary-level education, with the former, a driver before his 
illness, leaving primary school after about seven years, while the latter only had three 
years before she was forced to drop out in 1967 when an illness in the family left her 
in charge of the household. Interviewee 19 completed two years of high school and 
was unemployed at the time of the interview; interviewee 38 completed four years of 
high school of was working as a teacher in a kindergarten; interviewee 49 went had 
one year of high school education and at the time of the interviews sold second-hand 
clothes. The information given, therefore, did not suggest any obvious commonalities 
crucial to human rights awareness. 
 
The Haki Index survey did not break down its findings according to these two 
important factors, considering instead the gender and living standards of its 
respondents. These crucial factors will, of course, be referenced here where relevant. 
In the absence of any obvious patterns, one may speculate about why the five 
respondents had not heard of the phrase ‘human rights’. The issue of the language in 
which interviews were conducted is important, as seen in Chapter 2. Some Kiswahili 
language interviewees appeared better acquainted with the English phrase ‘human 
rights’ than its Kiswahili equivalent. English is Kenya’s official language and the one by 
which local and foreign rights experts are most likely to communicate. The language 
that such professionals chose to express and disperse what William Conklin calls 
‘magic terms’, known only to human rights experts2, is vital. The apparently greater 
currency of the English phrase suggests their partiality to this tongue and the 
exclusivity already inherent in this choice may further substantiate some 
commentators’ charge that human rights experts have not done enough to cultivate a 
popular rights movement in Africa, alienating a large percentage of the population 
and ensuring the discourse remains largely within their circle.   
 
                                                 
1
 d’Engelbronner-Kolff, Marina, The Provision of Non-formal Education for Human Rights in Zimbabwe 
(Harare: Southern Africa Printing & Publishing House/SAPES Trust, 1998) at 8. The study involved over 
800 interviewees, grouped as school pupils, students at institutions of higher learning, professionals 
(“lawyers, magistrates, teachers, lecturers, doctors, police officers and other government officials”) 
and adults (“women and men, workers, consumers, religious groups”). They were carefully selected in 
order to be as representative of the Zimbabwean population as possible. (at 5) 
2
 Conklin, William E., ‘Human Rights, Language and Law: A Survey of Semiotics and Phenomenology,’ 
Ottawa Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1995-1996), pp. 129-174, at 134-5 and 145 
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One effect is the poor percolation, knowledge and use of rights terms among the 
general public, starkly evidenced, perhaps, by the fact that many ethnic African 
languages- Kenya has dozens- have no equivalent of the phrase ‘human rights’.3 As 
seen in previous chapters, these terms have been useful for PLWHAs seeking to 
redefine positively their lived experiences and actively, rather than passively, engage 
in the (re)construction of their identity and subjectivity and the narrative of their 
illness. Arguably, the suggestion of poor permeation of rights language stands despite 
the high number of respondents in the Haki Index (77%)4  who showed a spontaneous 
awareness of rights, that is, mentioned without prompting some “aspect of human 
rights.”5 This is because the survey’s inherent presumption of prior knowledge makes 
it harder for respondents to correct such a presumption, whether out of 
embarrassment or deference to the interviewer. Interviewee 33 for this research 
exemplifies this, although it will be recalled that there the apparent embarrassment 
came from the respondent’s younger interpreter, apparently unwilling to accept the 
respondent’s unfamiliarity with such an apparently popular phrase. This may even 
account for the significant number of respondents in the Haki Index subsequently 
unable to offer any definition of the term, discussed presently.  
 
Of course, lack of familiarity with human rights terms or the existence of vernacular 
equivalents, as will become clear, did not appear to preclude respondents holding 
ideas about notions such as obligations and entitlements, which will be familiar to 
human rights scholars. As William A. Edmundson notes, “[t]he presence or absence of 
a word or concise phrase or locution in another language, with which to translate a 
word we use is hardly conclusive as to the availability of an idea to speakers of 
another language.”6  
 
                                                 
3
 Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm, ‘Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language,’ Human Rights 
Dialogue, Series 2, No. 1 (1999), Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, at 
http://www.cceia.org/resources/publications/dialogue/2_01/articles/602.html, accessed 20/05/09. 
4
 Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), The 2006 Haki Index: Measuring Public Perceptions on the 
State of Human Rights in Kenya and the Case of the Devolved Public Funds, KHRC, 2006, at 
http://www.khrc.or.ke/documents/2006%20Haki%20Index.pdf, accessed 20/05/09); at 20 
5
 ibid, at 129 
6
 Edmundson, William A., An Introduction to Rights,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2004), at 
5 
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The high numbers of interviewees for this research who claimed to have heard of the 
phrase ‘human rights,’ bore out the Haki Index survey and suggests that the 
respondents’ identity as PLWHAs may have further contributed to the high rates of 
rights awareness. This is particularly exemplified by the widespread use, without the 
interviewer’s prompting, of terms like ‘stigma’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘equality’, which 
are firmly part of the human right vocabulary and discourse, discussed later. 
Arguably, being personally affected by HIV/AIDS not only increases the likelihood of a 
PLWHA’s contact with human rights-related information on these issues, through the 
media, support groups or advocacy organizations, but it also makes PLWHAs more 
attuned to rights-related matters. This might explain why interviewee 23, who said he 
had only discovered he was HIV positive two weeks prior to the interview, may not 
have heard of the term. He also said he had not initially heard of the government ARV 
cost-sharing scheme that had been announced about 6 months before, explaining 
tellingly that:  
....my mind was not focussed on issues about HIV. I used to hear that this thing exists 
but I had never taken a test and been found out to have it. So now is the time that I 
am listening and paying attention to news about HIV so that I can know what is 
happening.  
 
It is a view reiterated by another respondent, interviewee 40: although she later 
conceded she could not name any specific examples of human rights, she said, “When 
I got this problem with this illness, I started to hear things about rights from the radio 
and also from the support groups here [at Mbagathi District Hospital]. Like, I met a 
woman here who then told me about WOFAK so I went there. But I have never been 
to any human rights organizations to seek help.”.  
 
The Haki Index appears further to corroborate the linkage between rights awareness 
and marginality, recording a higher rate of spontaneous awareness of a number of 
rights among people in Kenya’s North-Eastern Province (NEP) in comparison to other 
provinces. “This,” it is suggested, “could be because they are more likely to face 
violations of them. For example, 90% of the sample in NEP was able to mention, 
spontaneously, the right to education. The right to nationality or citizenship also 
stands out in NEP. This can be attributed to the geographical location of the area: it 
borders Somalia and Ethiopia, and a significant proportion of the population in this 
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province are ‘perceived’ not to belong to Kenya, rather being seen as refugees from 
the bordering countries.”7 
 
This supports the view in Chapter 6 that voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) sites 
and medical centres where HIV testing and diagnosis is conducted may be ideally 
positioned to provide information on, and promote rights related to, HIV/AIDS. 
National guidelines for HIV testing in Kenya state that part of the minimum services 
expected in a pre-HIV test session is information on the requirement of consent for 
HIV tests. Additionally, information on “referral to support, care and treatment” and 
on the “importance of disclosure to partners and other family members” may be 
offered.8 While these issues are linked to rights and the document stresses respect 
for the relevant rights, there is no apparent explicit mandate to discuss the client’s 
rights.  
 
A possible reason may be that healthcare officials conducting the test may 
themselves be unfamiliar with the human rights involved.9 Further, it may be 
inappropriate to address such issues at this precise stage, particularly when if a 
patient has just received a positive test result; the immediate medical needs- referral 
and follow-up care- are likely to be the paramount concern. However, it may be 
worth availing written information (such as pamphlets and posters) to people 
undergoing tests or directing them to relevant organizations as part of the support 
available (although some interviewees rightly questioned the benefits of knowledge 
about rights which cannot be realized). Indeed, it will be recalled that Leslie London 
argues that healthcare officials must ensure they do not become tools of the State’s 
violation of its health rights obligations, suggesting that informing patients of the 
government’s legislative, financial and administrative failures in providing adequate 
treatment and preventive services “may help to spur a patient rights advocacy 
                                                 
7
 KHRC The 2006 Haki Index: Measuring Public Perceptions on the State of Human Rights in Kenya and 
the Case of the Devolved Public Funds (n 4), at 22 
8
 National AIDS and STI Control Programme (NASCOP) and Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS), 
Kenya, National Guidelines for HIV Testing and Counselling in Kenya (Nairobi: NASCOP, 2008), at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/vct/policy/KenyaGuidelines_Final2009.pdf, accessed 20/05/09; at 16  
9
 Gostin, Lawrence and Mann, Jonathan, ‘Towards the Development of a Human Rights Impact 
Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation of Health Policies,’ Health and Human  Rights: An 
International Journal, Vol.1, No.1 (1994) pp.59-81, at 59 
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movement.”10 However, she points out the systemic problems that may obstruct the 
provision of adequate healthcare to patients and warns against situations which 
foment “fruitless antagonism between the aggrieved rights holder and the 
disempowered duty bearer without recognizing the structural constraints imposed by 
a health system poorly geared to respond to a human rights demand.”11 
Nevertheless, she argues that rights language can provide a platform on which both 
parties can build a consensus and challenge the State to be accountable for its 
obligations to provide adequate healthcare.12  
 
a)  Sources of Human Rights Information 
The media- radio, television, newspapers or magazines- emerged as the main source 
of information on human rights cited by PLWHAs interviewed for this research. 
Indeed, The Daily Nation quoted polls conducted prior to the August 2010 
constitution referendum that identified the media as “the most trusted and reliable 
source of information on the new constitution”13, a significant aspect of which, of 
course, concerned citizens’ rights. The Haki Index surveyed its respondents’ access to 
media in the seven days prior to interview: radio access was highest (89%), then 
television (47%), telephone (40%), newspaper (38%), magazines (15%) and the 
internet (5%).14  
 
                                                 
10
 London, Leslie, ‘What is a Human Rights-Based Approach to Health and Does it Matter?,’ Health and 
Human  Rights: An International Journal, Vol.10, No.1 (2008), pp.65-80, at 69.  Laura Turiano and Lanny 
Smith provide examples of just such an approach by health rights advocates participating in the ‘Tents 
of Life’ campaign in Paraguay. The report that, “[i]nside the tents, health facility users are presented 
with information on the services that should be available by law. Paraguay’s constitution guarantees 
the right to health and health care, but facilities often lack equipment, fail to provide key services, and 
are not clean. Furthermore, basic services are supposed to be free, but charges are frequently levied 
that prevent access.” (Turiano, Laura and Smith, Lanny, ‘The Catalytic Synergy of Health and Human 
Rights: The People’s Health Movement and the Rights to Health and Health Care Campaign,’ Health 
and Human  Rights: An International Journal, Vol.10, No.1 (2008), pp. 137-147, at 140)  
11
 London (n 10), at 72 
12
 ibid, at 73 
13
 The Daily Nation, ‘Survey Faults Media Over Referendum Coverage,’ (n 13) 24
th
 August 2010 
14
 KHRC, The 2006 Haki Index: Measuring Public Perceptions on the State of Human Rights in Kenya and 
the Case of the Devolved Public Funds (n 4), at 117. However, the usage and social, economic and 
political significance of some of these media, particularly telephones and the internet, is likely to have 
risen since the survey, not least due to the increase in mobile phone subscriptions. See, for instance, 
The Economist, ‘How a Luxury Item Became a Tool of Global Development,’ 24
th
 September 2009; 
McGregor, Sarah, ‘Safaricom of Kenya Money-Transfer Users Rise to 61% in July from a Year Ago,’ 
Bloomberg News, 13
th
 August 2010, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-13/safaricom-of-
kenya-money-transfer-users-rise-to-61-in-july-from-year-ago.html, accessed 30/08/10 
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The Vice-President lauded the media’s role in enabling the public debate over 
constitutional reform over the years culminating in the August 2010 referendum, 
urging them to “moderate the peoples’ thinking” during the transitional period.15 
However, the media was also criticized for, among other things, biased and/or 
sensationalist reporting, misinformation, lack of professionalism and susceptibility to 
“the political propaganda campaigns peddled by politicians,”16 suggesting that some 
of the issues cited in 2004 by Maina Kiai, then head of the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR),  have not been addressed. He firmly asserted 
that media legitimacy in these matters had declined over the years due to their 
preoccupation with political personalities rather than issues of substance.17 
 
The media’s influence in cultivating human rights consciousness is well illustrated by 
the example of domestic violence cited by respondents such as interviewees 5, who 
when asked for a sample of a human right she knew laughed and said, “The famous 
wife-beating!”, citing the media as her source of information. Similarly, in a response 
in which the interviewee almost appeared to perceive human rights as animate 
rather than inanimate things (discussed shortly), interviewee 42 said:“[I heard about 
human rights] from the TV, where someone has been caught and punished for 
nothing so human rights intervene. Sometimes a wife is beaten by her husband and 
there’s a tussle for the children. Again here the human rights come in.”  
 
These responses may be explained by the much-publicized coverage in the local 
media at the end of 2003 of domestic violence issues and wives’ rights within 
marriage, which followed allegations of assault by an MP’s spouse. The wife then 
sought the help of a women’s rights organization, Federation of Women Lawyers of 
Kenya (Fida Kenya).18 This was part of a wider debate covered by papers like the 
popular The Daily Nation.19 Some of the coverage accused the MP of being 
                                                 
15
 The Daily Nation, ‘VP Lauds Media Role in Constitution Making,’ 25
th
 August 2010 
16
 The Daily Nation, ‘Survey Faults Media Over Referendum Coverage,’ (n 13) 
17
 Interview with Maina Kiai, 26
th
 May 2004 
18
 See The Daily Nation, ‘Of Fred Gumo and his Stone Axe,’ 6
th
 November 2003  
19
 The Haki Index indicates that “[a]lthough newspaper reading is substantially lower than radio 
listening and television viewing, a majority of readers (89%) had read The Nation in the past seven 
days.” (KHRC The 2006 Haki Index: Measuring Public Perceptions on the State of Human Rights in Kenya 
and the Case of the Devolved Public Funds (n 4), at  118) 
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“primitive”20; some female MPs called upon his supporter and fellow MP, Mr. Gumo, 
to resign21; others alleged that Fida Kenya itself discriminated against male victims of 
domestic violence22, while others lauded its efforts and decried the lack of support for 
victims.23 Interviewee 47, asked about her source on rights information said, “I’ve 
only heard about when these women go on hunger-strikes!”Although unable to find 
any media reports of such an event in the twelve months preceding this interview, 
such strategies by human rights activists are not unknown in Kenya’s recent political 
history; it is noteworthy, therefore, that this respondent associated such public acts 
of protest or defiance with human rights. Further, as these actions are often widely 
reported in the press, it underlines the importance of media coverage of protests or 
demonstrations which are explicitly linked to human rights in engendering and 
crystallizing a national consciousness about the kind of issues that human rights are 
concerned with. This demonstrates the potency of judicial action coupled with an 
effective media campaign, which would aid the kind of social mobilization required 
for a greater and lasting impact. Another respondent, interviewee 48, went on to give 
this answer when asked to list examples of rights she has heard about: “I keep 
hearing about them, especially when the story of torture at Nyayo House came out 
and then also there’s something that happened recently that they had gone to 
intervene. You remember when [the opposition political party] KANU MPs were 
stopped from attending a meeting recently… so I have been hearing about it but I 
haven’t been keen. So mainly through the media.” Indeed, the previous month a local 
newspaper had carried an article in which “Nyayo House torture survivors… urged 
local well wishers and the international community to steer clear of retired President 
Moi's peace institute. ...[T]he torture survivors said it was an ‘open lie’ for the former 
president to claim that he never knew of torture at the infamous Nyayo chambers.”24 
 
                                                 
20
 Oywaya, Gathoni, ‘Violence Primitive,’ The Daily Nation 7
th
 November 2003. 
21
 The Daily Nation, ‘Women MPs demand Gumo’s Resignation,’ 8
th
 November 2003. 
22
 Mutua, Joseph, ‘Fida Should Say Why it Didn’t Help Battered Man,’ The Daily Nation,11
th 
November 
2003. 
23
 Oriang’, Lucy, ‘Fida Lawyers Not To Blame, Gumo,’ The Daily Nation, 7
th
 November 2003)  
24
 The Daily Nation ‘Snub Moi Foundation, Say Activists,’ 1
st
 April 2004. Further, the interviewee may 
also be referring to the fundraising meeting by MPs of the opposition KANU political party, disbanded 
by police on 14
th
 May 2004 amidst protests by the local area MP that he had the right to address his 
constituents. (See The Daily Nation¸ ‘Police Break up Kenyatta Meeting,’ 15
th
 May 2004) 
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Educational institutions such as universities were another source of human rights 
information for PLWHAs. Indeed, one interviewee appeared to rank rights awareness 
alongside formal education as a signifier of advancement: “I heard about it through 
education. Like me, I am educated. You have to know your human rights although 
we’re not being taught. Through counselling, for example, about ARVs, you can know 
your human rights.” (Interviewee 8, who was attending a computer college at the 
time of the interview.) It was a view reminiscent of the discussion in Chapter 6, in 
which some respondents associated biomedical knowledge with modernity and the 
lack of it with backwardness. 
 
Having recognized the importance of schools as an avenue for transmitting human 
rights information, the KHRC established a schools outreach programme in 2001.25 In 
2002, human rights were introduced into the Kenyan school curriculum, with the 
KHRC working with teachers- the so-called ‘Friends of KHRC’- to develop the relevant 
materials.26  
 
Another important source of human rights information for the PLWHAs were 
conferences and seminars or contact with, or membership of, AIDS support groups, as 
previous chapters have highlighted. Interviewee 11, asked if she had heard about 
links between the issues of human rights and HIV/AIDS said, “I really don’t know what 
I’ve heard but there was a time there was a meeting at Kasarani for women and they 
were talking about that. But I didn’t really follow it up- I was really ill.” She was 
referring to a conference, also mentioned by other interviewees , on women and 
HIV/AIDS held in early 2004, which later was later cited as an example of government 
resource wastage after it closed abruptly a day earlier than advertised at a cost of 
Ksh. 30 million (approx. GBP230,000) to the taxpayer.  (On informing her about the 
reported amount spent at the meeting, she said, “I wish they had bought the ARVs 
instead.”) 27 Interviewee 41, who received her free ARVs in the MSF programme at 
                                                 
25
 See KHRC website at http://www.khrc.or.ke/subsubsection.asp?ID=11, accessed 20/05/09. 
26
 Nyamu-Musembi, Celestine and Musyoki, Samuel, ‘Kenyan Civil Society Perspectives on Rights, 
Rights-Based Approaches to Development, and Participation,’ IDS Working Paper 236 (Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS): Brighton, Sussex, December, 2004), at 16 
27
 On the Kasarani debacle, see The Daily Nation, ‘Abrupt End to Aids Meeting,’ 23
rd
 February 2004. 
See also The Daily Nation, ‘Uproar Over Kibaki Role at Aids Meet,’ 23
rd
 February 2004. In his article, 
Muriithi Muriuki reported: “An MP caused an uproar when he sought to know why President Kibaki 
was allowed to preside over a conference in which Ksh30 million of the taxpayers' money was spent in 
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MDH, also said she had heard about human rights from that organization. In fact, so 
closely did some PLWHAs appear to associate rights with organizations and groups, a 
number of them, such as interviewee 42, cited earlier (in the paragraph following n 
17), seemed to define human rights as the people or groups normally associated with 
rights, perhaps finding this a more concrete way of capturing a concept that seemed 
otherwise intangible. For instance, in outlining why she thought HIV/AIDS and human 
rights interconnected, interviewee 48 appeared to equate rights with the 
organizations that specialized in them, declaring they were not helping PLWHAs: 
But what are they doing for us? I have not heard them speaking out on our behalf…. 
The human rights [emphasis added] are supposed to stand [up] for PLWHAs where 
people are being discriminated against, denied jobs, where people can’t even get 
drugs, or get shelter, the very basic things. So I think that’s the connection. 
 
Indeed, the work of the International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group 
(IRRRAG) on reproductive rights illustrates the transformative effects of contact 
between affected communities and local NGOs. Rosalind Petchesky observes that in 
many of the countries where IRRRAG ran its project, respondents’ connections with 
local organizations, unions or community groups “seemed to make the difference 
between an implicit sense of entitlement, expressed mainly through actions, and one 
that is expressly articulated in terms of rights.”28 Interviewee 48 for this research, for 
example, who spontaneously used advocacy terminology such as ‘access’ when 
talking about her health needs and those of other PLWHAs, may well have first 
acquired them from her regular contact with such groups. She described her role 
thus: “I’m a volunteer... I’m a public educator, I go for seminars, I educate people and 
I’m paid.” Speaking of the inadequacy with which she felt PLWHAs’ needs were being 
catered for she said, “There’s also lack of information in Kenya. I keep saying that 
knowledge is power because if people knew their rights, they would not be taken for 
a ride. You heard what is happening at Nyumbani Children’s Home, kids being tested 
without their consent and the tests being taken to other countries.”29 Many of 
                                                                                                                                             
questionable manner. Mr Raphael Wanjala (Budalangi, Narc) said the conference was aimed at 
enriching some individuals.” 
28
 Petchesky, Rosalind, ‘Cross-country Comparisons and Political Visions,’ in Petchesky, Rosalind and 
Judd, Karen (eds.), Negotiating Reproductive Rights: Women’s Perspectives Across Countries and 
Cultures (London: Zed Books, 1998), at 309 
29
 However, she appears to be mistaken as to the children’s right of consent; she assumes that the they 
would automatically have it, which is unlikely to be the case especially if they are minors; issues 
regarding permissions and ethical checks would be appear to be a matter for the government and the 
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interviewee 25’s responses, cited in previous chapters (such as Chapter 2, in the 
paragraph after the text containing n 41; and in Chapter 7, in the quotation that 
follows note 55) also reflected her awareness of, and involvement with, local NGOs. 
She highlighted in some of her responses key advocacy issues, such as the plight of 
AIDS orphans, stigma, the dearth of services in rural areas for PLWHAs and misuse of 
HIV/AIDS funds. That organizations themselves might come to embody human rights 
for such an interviewee is therefore perhaps unsurprising: after identifying the right 
to inheritance as an example of human rights, she was asked how she had heard of it: 
“I even know their offices! I know Catherine Mumma, I know Maina Kiai30 It’s the 
NSSF Building, 9th floor.” Further, she revealed that she had sought and received their 
help following a dispute related to her HIV status, with the response underlining the 
role of the media in raising awareness about the work of human rights organizations:  
Interviewer: How do you know about them, or is it just a personal interest?  
Interviewee 25: No. I had a problem with my in-laws and they were stigmatising me 
and trying to disinherit me after my husband died. So someone 
directed me to Human Rights-I went to a lawyer who told me first I 
should go to them. I went and met Catherine and we really talked. I 
wanted to know more about my rights.  
Interviewer: Was it your first contact with a human rights organization?  
Interviewee 25:  No. I had been reading about them in the papers, I’ve been so eager 
to read about them because I really wanted to…especially after I 
went public [about my HIV-positive status] and I had been attending 
seminars. I’d been meeting Catherine in seminars- she’d always been 
invited in seminars for PLWHAs to talk to us about our rights. 
 
Another instance of identifying organizations with the definition of rights can be seen 
from interviewee 5, who, it will be recalled, mentioned wife-beating as human rights 
issue (in the text following note 17, above), and thus may well have had the 
organization Fida Kenya in mind when she described human rights thus: “These are 
people who give us a green-light on what our rights as human beings in Africa are. 
You see, there are people who are very inhuman to others- they do funny things and 
you don’t know that if this guy did this to me, that is inhuman. So, at least, they have 
been giving us a green-light on our rights as human beings.” Interviewee 6 was even 
more explicit in his association of rights with the organizations that champion them. 
He declared, “I’ve heard about human rights, when they are making noise to the 
                                                                                                                                             
children’s home’s board of directors, the latter of whom claimed (in the second of the reports above) 
not to have “consented to any Aids research on children under its care.” 
30
 Both Catherine Mumma and Maina Kiai worked at the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
at the time, with Kiai serving as director.  
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police. So I know if I were to be arrested, I will call the human rights! If there is any 
other job they have to do, I’m sorry but that I do not know.” I asked him a further 
question for clarification:  
Interviewer: So when you think about human rights, what is the first idea that 
comes to your mind?  
Interviewee 5: It is like I’ve said- that when I am arrested without fault and taken to 
a police station, I have to call the human rights people. Because that 
is the area where I’ve been hearing them making noise and assisting. 
 
In retrospect, of course, the very fact that his definition was linked to rights 
organization was telling, as is argued here. Interviewee 40, asked to mention 
examples of human rights said: “Like WOFAK, aren’t they like human rights? I don’t 
know.” Interviewee 48, discussed above, also defined human rights by saying, “They 
are supposed to fight for our rights.” When asked to explain who ‘they’ are she said: 
“The human rights people.” Here again it seems that media publicity helps cement 
these organizations’ identity in the mind of some respondents as human rights made 
flesh.  
 
It may be that meanings of human rights have become fused with the groups and 
people that are seen to represent them, and Upendra Baxi points out that, “more 
often than not, we think of human rights praxis in terms of social movements.”31 The 
respondents’ comments above may be a further reflection of the dominance of 
human rights organizations and professionals in the public debate about rights, so 
that its concepts and ideas become associated with those who are perceived to own 
the discourse. As such, they might be seen as the outcome of a failure to fully 
inculcate a more participatory approach to human rights advocacy that focuses on 
capacity-building for communities, to enable them to conduct these functions 
themselves. And, as noted by one official for the organization Centre for Governance 
and Development (CDG), interviewed by Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki for their 
study on RBAs, this amplifies the potential for creating dependency on these 
organizations.32  
 
b) Conceptions about the Meaning of Rights: A Preliminary Overview 
                                                 
31
 Baxi, Upendra, ‘Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights,’ Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol.8, No. 2 (1998), pp.125-169, at 155 
32
 Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki (n 25), at 15 
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Despite the dearth of ‘text book’ definitions of human rights, as noted in Chapter 1, 
PLWHAs nevertheless communicated ideas of legal or moral obligations owed to the 
individual. These were broadly based on two notions familiar to students of human 
rights: firstly, that certain obligations were owed to them by a range of actors 
because they (PLWHAs) were human; secondly, that the State owed them certain 
obligations because they were citizens. A deeper theoretical analysis of these and a 
third theme, dignity, to which they are closely allied, will come shortly. For now it is 
useful to review how interviewees appeared to weave these ideas into their 
definition and examples of rights, as well as their perceptions about the nexus 
between HIV/AIDS, health and entitlements. 
 
For some respondents, the concept of human rights and what it means to be a human 
being was broad, bound up with ideas about needs or wants, and crucially, equality. 
They defined human rights variously as, “anything about your life, anything that falls 
under that;”33 and “something which involves law... What you can demand: literally, 
the right of somebody.”34 Some explicitly cited the government as part of the rights 
equation, hinting at an underlying antagonism between individual and State: “It 
means that everyone has their rights and it is for the government to listen to the 
rights of a person.”35 This association of the phrase with the mechanisms of State may 
alienate many people, who as Petchesky notes,  
consistently experience the authorities charged with enforcing rights (police, 
government officials, hospital and clinic personnel) as oppressive, corrupt and 
routinely ready to disregard national laws and international principles, or even 
common decency. As a result, they view formally constituted rights as inapplicable to 
them, particularly if they are poor and female.36  
 
Indeed, the name of the disgraced former head of the National AIDS Control Council 
(NACC), Margaret Gachara, came up in a number of interviews: for instance, 
interviewee 30 was alluding to her when responding to the question of whether the 
government might be able to provide for healthcare needs: “I don’t know. I think 
human beings are not trustworthy. Like that lady who was put in prison recently who 
has eaten millions that have been given by donors from abroad.” 
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This mistrust of State agents or institutions may also explain the views of interviewee 
28, who declared that though it was familiar, the phrase human rights, “means 
nothing, because I found out about my illness and I depend on myself to keep myself 
healthy and on praying to God to help me.”37 Another respondent saw rights as a 
buffer, perhaps against excesses by the State, defining them as, “….what is really 
yours, or what you are supposed to have… or the type of protection you’re supposed 
to get, or the security.”38 Yet there is a fascinating paradox in this: the very human 
rights from which she claims protection from the State also establish and entrench 
the power of State, declaring it sovereign and with a will as free as that of the subject 
it brings to life.39  
 
For one respondent, “[human rights] means that for [us] humans there are some 
rights which are supposed to be given to us.”40 Interestingly, her starting point, it 
seemed, was of lacking rights, then getting them possibly by means of a struggle, thus 
anticipating Douzinas’s comment that “[g]overnments are the enemy against whom 
human rights were conceived as a defence.”41 Yet, as Turiano and Smith emphasize, 
the concepts of claim-holders and duty-bearers in human rights theory were designed 
precisely to eradicate the notion of people with an inferior status asking others with a 
more superior one to grant them things.42 Critically, this interviewee appears to have 
based her claims of entitlement on the fact that she is a human being. Another 
separated the term ‘human rights’ into its two component words to arrive at an 
answer: “‘Human’- that means a person, and ‘rights’ is… I think it means the needs of 
a human being.”43 The issue of needs was emphasized elsewhere: “[Human rights] 
take care of our needs, don’t they?”44, while another respondent stressed the issue of 
human compassion in her definition: “Human rights is like being concerned about 
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others….”45 However, some commentators advocate a move beyond the notion of 
compassion, asserting that it is “notoriously unstable and, historically, reliance on it 
has ill-served the interests of the oppressed” particularly during economic downturns, 
urging instead the creation of obligations based on something more substantial such 
as clearly articulated law.46  
 
As seen in Chapter 1’s discussion on a conceptualization of rights, several 
respondents appeared to be influenced by religious norms in the construction of their 
moral frameworks by linking notions of entitlements and rights with religion, thus 
echoing ideas by natural law theorists. Interview 16, for instance, integrated within 
her response an impressive array of examples of rights saying, “Well, it’s basically… 
like God has commandments, so you don’t break those commandments. We have 
rights- like, a child within a family has rights, they should have rights to food, 
medication, they shouldn’t be exposed to child labour- that kind of thing.” As seen in 
Chapter 1, the references to deism as the moral foundation for human rights may be 
unfashionable today, and, indeed, by the time the UDHR came into being “secular 
humanism” this staple of 18th Century legal thinking had been supplanted. However, 
commentators like Sir Hersch Lauterpacht draw attention to the continued influence 
of natural law on modern international law47, while others like Douzinas problematize 
the gutting of the moral imagination from the legal jurisprudence of human rights.48 
Away from the theoretical realm and in the real world, moreover, Michael J. Perry 
emphasizes that the moral, religious and metaphysical remain intimately 
connected.49 Thus the linkages made by the interviewees’ who compared human 
rights and religious norms are understandable, especially in a society like Kenya’s 
where religion and cultural tradition dominate social life and are the primary moral 
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languages by which people envision matters of duty and entitlement.50 The 
multitudes who profess these beliefs might view them as the most obvious, perhaps 
trustworthy, least corruptible standards for moderating human behaviour and 
relationships, and there is, conceivably, an unarticulated aspiration in these 
comparisons that even in a country where the State is notorious for violating the rule 
of law with impunity, manmade norms- and the (State) institutions on which they are 
founded- may yet attain the unimpeachable standards attributed to religious ones. 
However, Baxi rightly questions the effectiveness of the moral language of rights to 
fulfil such aspirations, noting a number of issues already raised by other 
commentators cited in this research: these include, the limited participatory 
opportunities for those at the grassroots, the exclusivity of human rights practice and 
the contestations of power that underlie rights and their social movements. These, he 
argues, inhibit their “their potential for reflexive ethical action,” and mean that more 
established normative systems, with their own attendant problems, will remain 
relevant.51 
 
For one respondent, ‘human rights’ meant “that every human being should be given 
his right.”52 Another thought perceived them as “the right of human beings, the way a 
human being deserves to be treated, whoever they may be.”53 Interviewee 21 
attached to his definition a proprietary notion of rights and underlined this in an 
example: “[Rights are what] I deserve. Like this walking stick of mine, I have the right 
to pick it up from where I have placed it, you see? Because it’s mine.” This strong 
sense of entitlement was echoed elsewhere: “For me it means that what I am entitled 
to have I should have and I should not be denied.”54  Yet another interviewee pre-
empted the unease which became clearer in later questions about the extent to 
which individuals may make claims against the spectre of the State: for him, the 
individual did not appear inherently bestowed with human rights; rather “they are 
the rights that someone should to be given.”55   
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A number of respondents also appeared to link their definitions of rights with the 
notion that their status as PLWHAs did not negate their claims of entitlement, 
explicitly mentioning issues like stigma and discrimination in access to social goods 
and underlining the notion of equality with other human beings. Interviewee 31, for 
instance averred: “I believe everyone has a right to live, whether you are positive or 
negative, you have your rights to live and be free in the world,” listing as examples of 
rights “equal opportunities in employment, health.” For interviewee 46, “Someone 
who is sick has the right to live like others; if it is going to job, he has to go.” For 
interviewee 9, human rights were “my rights. For example, I have the right to get free 
medication…” Meanwhile, interviewee 29 announced that, “‘Human rights’ means 
that... we can have our own rights so that we can speak up for ourselves; for example, 
if it is trying to get these drugs, we should not have our path blocked just because we 
are HIV-positive. You know, even HIV-positive people have their rights.” Interviewee 
20 used an example of a right as part of her definition: “It means the way one person 
might live free of stigma. Like I was stigmatized at my workplace- it is not good to 
have someone stigmatize you because you’re a PLWHA. It’s good for people to care 
for PLWHAs and not stigmatize them. Stigma and discrimination are not human 
rights.”  
 
All the ideas raised by PLWHAs above are reflected in the Haki Index, which 
categorized the definition of human rights offered by 26% of its respondents (the 
greatest proportion) as pertaining to things “that a human being is entitled to.” 
Another 6% of respondents thought of human rights as “human needs and 
fulfilments,”; 4% defined them as “the things deserved for a better life,”; another 4% 
related the meaning to “equality between human beings,”; “anything I need is readily 
available,” (2%); and finally, “the thing you would like to be done to you,” (1%).56 
 
The second key idea which PLWHAs seemed to link to human rights and their 
entitlements was citizenship. It also featured in the Haki Index where the link 
between marginality and rights awareness was reaffirmed: 31% of respondents in 
NEP, with its large number of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
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spontaneously listed nationality or citizenship as a right. This was more than twice the 
next highest figure.57 Among the respondents for this research, interviewee 14 said 
the phrase human rights meant “[J]ust what I feel is my right, my justified right as a 
citizen,” adding elsewhere that “I think every citizen has a right to healthcare.” 
Another respondent offered examples of rights he knew and qualified his entitlement 
to them by his claim to citizenship: “… [R]ight to work, right to move wherever I want, 
so long as I am a Kenyan citizen.”58 Some respondents, like interviewee 18, explicitly 
based their healthcare claims on the government on their Kenyan citizenship, 
perceiving the State/citizen, parent/child relationships as analogous:  
[T]hat is the responsibility of the government. It should look into that. We are citizens 
and they cannot just discard us, just like a parent would not discard their own child. 
They should look into the plight of those who cannot afford to pay for the drugs 
because it is not their wish to have this disease.  
 
This view has been mentioned elsewhere in Chapter 6 and was echoed by other 
respondents: “I think after my parents, the other person I expect to help me is my 
government,” said interviewee 6. “This is another parent of mine, parent [number] 
two.” It is not unusual given Kenya’s prevailing paternalistic culture but it raises 
interesting questions about the power of resistance implied by such a notion if and 
when that protection by “parent number two” mutates into oppression. These issues 
will be addressed shortly.  
 
For others, the government had a duty to meet the health needs of all its citizens, but 
particularly if they were poor:  
It is [the government’s] responsibility to take care of all its citizens regardless of 
whether they’re rich or poor. If they can’t take care of themselves, the government 
should. I don’t have to strive to look after my health or my security. It should be the 
government which should ensure that all these services are met. (Interviewee 13).  
  
Another respondent, interviewee 25, looked to human rights to equalize the benefits 
of citizenship: linking HIV/AIDS to human rights she said, “Before this issue of 
HIV/AIDS became an open secret, people were being sacked from their jobs, being 
stigmatised, being disinherited. But when human rights come in, regardless of your 
status, they say you have a right. I think human rights are very helpful to us PLWHAs 
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because we have been treated like 2nd class citizens but when human rights came in, 
we came to know that we have equal rights.”  
 
c) Examples of Rights 
When asked to provide examples of rights, most interviewees revealed an awareness 
of what human rights text books broadly define as civil and political rights, the so-
called ‘negative’ or “first generation or ‘blue’ rights”59, which at the inception of the 
rights movement were imagined to require only the State’s restraint from interfering 
with the rights of its citizens60, and were linked with the liberal ideals of individual 
freedom.61 These rights were considered “‘absolute’ and ‘immediate’”62 whereas 
economic, social and cultural (ESC), “second generation or ‘red’” rights63 were 
“programmatic, to be realized gradually, and therefore not a matter of rights.”64 As 
noted elsewhere, the examples cited by PLWHAs were particularly concerned with 
issues of stigma and discrimination and equality. Non-discrimination is central to the 
health rights laid out in the WHO Constitution and is re-emphasized in numerous 
human rights instruments, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD, Article 5(e)(iv)), and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, Article  
11(1)(f)).65 Interviewee 18, for instance, felt it was “the right of every human being to 
be treated equally,” and said she had heard it from the Kenyan president. The Haki 
Index reinforces the view that respondents’ identity as PLWHAs influenced awareness 
of certain rights: it notes with dismay the low ranking accorded to the “right against 
discrimination for people living with HIV/AIDS regardless of the campaigns that have 
                                                 
59
 Douzinas (n 39), at 115 
60
 Steiner, Henry J. and Alston, Philip, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2
nd
 
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 181 
61
 Douzinas (n 39), at 115 
62
 Eide, Asbjørn, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights,’ in Eide, Asbjørn; Krause, 
Catarina and Rosas, Allan (eds.), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2
nd
 Revised Ed., 
Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), at 10 
63
 Douzinas (n 39), at 115 
64
 Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights,’ (n 62), at 10. For a summary of the 
history of ESC rights and the right to health in particular, see Kirby, Michael, ‘The Rights to Health Fifty 
Years On: Still Sceptical?,’ Health and Human  Rights: An International Journal, Vol.4, No. 1(1999), pp. 
6-25 
65
 Leary, Virginia, ‘The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law,’ Health and Human  Rights: 
An International Journal, Vol.1, No. 1, 24-56, at 33 
 334 
 
been carried out in the country on this issue.”66 When they are asked to rank the list 
of rights provided, only 1% of the Haki survey respondents thought this right as the 
first, second or third most-important.67 
 
There were other examples of human rights from the respondents of this research: 
some linked them with “torture, when people are arrested, such basic things.”68 
Indeed, protection from torture was mentioned spontaneously by 7% of the Haki 
Index respondents. Allegations of this violation were widely reported in the media- to 
be sure, interviewee 39 above explicitly cited it as his source- particularly during the 
latter days and aftermath of the Moi regime.69 Interviewee 11 meanwhile associated 
rights with issues around child abuse and women’s rights.  
 
Some respondents’ catalogue of rights consisted almost entirely of ESC rights: “The 
right to education, right to healthcare, right to clothing, right to eat!”70 Others 
included a right to inheritance71; free medication72; and rights for the disabled.73 
Interviewee 29 stressed that she had rights pertaining to sexual interactions with her 
husband:  
For example, it is a woman’s right to insist that her husband uses a condom. If he 
doesn’t want to then he should leave me alone. Some of them refuse and threaten to 
beat up their wives or chase them away from the home. A lot of women I speak to 
complain about this. This is not right and there should be a law to stop this so that 
women can be protected. 
 
Interviewee 41, meanwhile, had heard of “the right to get treatment” after attending 
a human rights workshop. Her response and that of interviewee 13 are particularly 
interesting: as will be seen later, rarely did interviewees spontaneously mention an 
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actual right to health or healthcare as examples, although when questioned about the 
links between health and rights nearly half would later claim to have heard of such a 
right. 
 
ESC rights were widely regarded as ‘positive’ rights obliging affirmative action from 
the State.74 It is perhaps unhelpful to sustain the Cold War-inspired dichotomy of civil 
and political versus ESC rights75, especially given the emphasis on the indivisibility of 
rights.76 Many commentators acknowledge the dominance of this classification but 
denounce such categories as superficial and indiscrete.77 Indeed, health is one the 
areas where both these species of rights heavily intersect.78 The interviewees were 
unaware of, or made no such distinctions, listing a range of needs and requirements 
such as water, sanitation and shelter, all health determinants that straddle these 
categories. Nevertheless, this dichotomy serves a purpose in the analysis of 
interviewees’ responses, because it suggests that issues often associated with the 
first category receive wider media coverage, the interviewees’ primary source of 
rights information. Because, and perhaps as a result of this they attract the most 
attention from campaigners and activists. Indeed, Kiai suggested that lack of 
understanding about ECS rights by local and international media may have led them 
to overlook or underplay this dimension during their reporting of certain events and 
campaigns, thus denying these rights much-needed publicity. 
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In Kenya the imbalance may also be a consequence of the much publicized political 
turmoil of the early 1990s, and even today reports of the ongoing debate about 
possible war crimes committed during the post-election violence of 2007/8 and the 
role of the  International Criminal Court will be similarly influential in further 
informing people about these issues.79 Yet the fact that these events occur against 
the background of a long and unbroken history of socio-economic problems has 
arguably failed to promote ESC rights awareness in the same way, although the Haki 
Index suggests things may be changing.80 In his interview with this author, Kiai, who 
co-founded and headed the KHRC during the turbulent early 1990s, argued that it was 
unfair to categorize the organization’s work as purely focused on civil and political 
rights and insisted that the organization could gain little legitimacy by adopting such 
an approach. He noted the cross-cutting elements of their early programme, citing 
their campaigns on land rights for those disenfranchised by the ethnic clashes of that 
period and famine relief (in association with the Catholic Church) in drought-stricken 
northern Kenya. But he also admitted early capacity deficiencies, noting that with civil 
and political rights issues being its main competence, the organization, inevitably, 
tended to “do what they [knew] best.”81  
 
It should indeed be a cause for concern for human rights organizations that despite 
clearly articulating many ESC-related needs, few respondents were aware that most 
are covered by rights guaranteed under international law.82 Few national human 
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rights institutions, for instance, are involved in ESC rights work, even fewer on 
health83, and CSOs have generally have been accused of a reluctance to develop 
strategies to promote ESC rights.84 One reason for this may be that the most 
influential human rights organizations which might spearhead the fight are based in, 
and rely on funding from,  the wealthier global North85, where the agenda may 
prioritize civil and political over ESC rights.86  Some commentators highlight a 
geopolitical divide in the emphasis and promotion of ESC rights, with a Northern 
emphasis on civil and political rights while the poorer South stresses the importance 
of ESC ones.87 Per this critique, the globalization of the human rights enterprise and 
CSO activism on its behalf has not translated to a similarly geopolitically transcendent 
agenda. Further, the integration of ESC rights has been criticised by some as diluting 
the UDHR and “considerably [reducing] the impact of Western ideals by securing 
approval for some fundamental postulates of the Marxist ideology”, and condemned 
as “a letter to Santa Claus”.88 But the idea that developed countries denigrate ESC 
rights has been dismissed elsewhere as a myth.89 It is pointed out that the original 
drafters from these countries recognized that the UDHR needed to address the socio-
economic deprivations which had significantly contributed to the rise of totalitarian 
regimes in the interwar period.90 Nevertheless, the philosophical debates persists 
about the validity of ESC and other categories of rights91, namely, the “third 
generation or ‘green’ rights” that guarantee self-determination, group and (recently) 
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environmental rights92, leading to questions about the slippage from needs to rights 
characteristic of post-War period and the possible ‘overproduction’ of rights.93 The 
right to development, too, has proved contentious94, even as others argue that it 
might provide the appropriate framework in which to address the multiple aspects of 
health.95 Kenneth Roth sidesteps the philosophical quandaries about whether ESC 
rights are rights at all and hangs the legitimacy of his (Human Rights Watch) and 
similar organizations’ work on the hook of positive law.96 And, as Steiner and Alston 
underline, rights are dynamic, their content expanding or contracting over time.97 
This is reflected in the increased advocacy that ESC  rights now attracts from 
organizations like Amnesty International, whose work has previously focused on the 
promotion of civil and political rights.98 Rubenstein argues that at a minimum such 
groups should use their credibility to find innovative ways to promote the acceptance 
of ESC issues such as healthcare as matters of right.99  
 
d) Perceptions about Links Between HIV, Health and Human Rights 
Most interviewees had heard of, or appeared to see  a connection between HIV/AIDS 
and human rights. Interviewee 17 observed simply: “Because even though I’m HIV-
positive, I’m still a human being, so I also have my rights. I think that’s the link.” It is 
hard not to hear in this echoes of Seckinelgin’s observation on the globalization of 
HIV/AIDS activism “spilling over national borders”, quoted in Chapter 7 (quote 
preceding note 20). For many, this nexus was founded on concerns about stigma and 
discrimination, one of the primary reasons behind the WHO’s integration of human 
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rights into its original Global Strategy.100 For interviewee 3, the connection lay in the 
fact that anyone could contract HIV and so suffer discrimination. He said:  
Like me, I’m HIV-positive. That doesn’t mean I should be denied unemployment 
because I’m [HIV-] positive. I should not be discarded from the community because 
I’m HIV-positive. I should not be discriminated against. I have the right to be 
respected, to be offered help because of my being HIV-positive, because even I 
myself would not mean to be HIV-positive. It’s accidental and it’s a disease. It can 
happen to anybody. So if someone is still negative, don’t think that there are some 
specific people who are supposed to be positive and there’s a group who are 
supposed to be negative. So the human rights still have to be maintained. 
  
Other respondents highlighted the issue of stigma at home or in the local community: 
Interviewees 20 and 5 are an example here, but they had different experiences to 
share. The former reported a positive experience after revealing her sero-status to 
her children: “I think PLWHAs are just like anyone else and so it’s not good to 
stigmatize or discriminate against them. ... I’m a mother of 3. My children know my 
status and love me still and call me mother.” However, interviewee 5’s was less so 
and she was weary of the how the children of known PLWHAs might suffer. She said:  
HIV and human rights... are connected, because like this idea of stigma and 
discrimination: you see, the human rights people want every human to have his 
rights, without discrimination and without stigma. And you find that most of us who 
are positive what usually happens, like may be if you’re sharing a toilet in the plot, 
people start saying, ‘you’ll give us this disease’, ‘you’ll infect us’- sometimes they 
don’t even want to see your children- they discriminate. You see such like things. You 
see if they had kids, they were playing together and now they say, ‘don’t go and play 
with so-and-so; you’ll be infected’. So there’s a lot of stigma and discrimination. And 
you see I think those are some of the things that the human rights is against so they 
have to be connected so that they teach people that you’re supposed to stay like this, 
whether you’re infected or you’re not infected. 
 
Several also raised concerns about employment discrimination or prejudice in the 
workplace. Linking HIV/AIDS to human rights, interviewee 21 said: “They should not 
discriminate, for example, that if you have the virus you cannot get employment for 
the job that you able to do. Or if people are in a meeting, you are put separately from 
them, or when it comes to eating during celebrations, you are put separately from 
                                                 
100
 Tarantola, Daniel, ‘The Shifting HIV/AIDS Paradigm: Twenty Years and Counting,’ Health and Human  
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other people.” Links were also made between HIV and rights in relation to the care of 
AIDS orphans.101  
 
But one respondent, despite her unease about discrimination and ill-treatment of 
PLWHAs, confessed that she did not concern herself much with human rights issues, 
perhaps because of her declared scepticism about the usefulness of purely nominal 
rights which could not be realized:  
Somehow I don’t really bother [about rights] but sometimes I have heard things like, 
[PLWHAs]are denied jobs, sometimes they are fired, I don’t know if it’s still 
happening- this kind of discrimination everywhere. Like the other time some kids 
were being discriminated in a school and I felt very pained. Now there’s this 
insurance thing- there’s discrimination. It’s like once you are HIV-positive your life is 
cut out and at the same time they are telling us to live positively and move on. So 
where do we belong? That’s what I have heard about human rights and AIDS. So I 
think there’s a relationship. With the scourge of AIDS, there’s that relationship that 
the AIDS victims are being denied some of their rights and they really have to fight.” 
(Interviewee 14)102  
 
Discriminatory practices by medical insurers and the banking industry were also 
highlighted elsewhere. Interviewee 16, for instance, raised both these matters: of the 
latter she said:  
Well, when we go for post-test therapy- like this weekend- we were arguing about 
the HIV people who want to get a loan from the bank who are told they can’t take so 
much money because they don’t know if you’re going to die before you pay off the 
amount of money. So that’s discrimination. And in any case, who says those who are 
negative have a guarantee that they won’t be hit by a bus immediately after they’re 
given the money, you know? I have accepted my status and I am planning to go into 
high-schools and educate people who are HIV negative about this so they remain 
negative. I don’t want them to be in my shoes because these shoes are very tight!  
                                                 
101
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For interviewee 47, the benefits of a right to healthcare involved equal treatment for 
PLWHAs by health insurance firms. She complained:“[T]hese medical cover 
companies, like AAR, they never cover us....The practical benefit would be like letting 
people like these medical cover firms know we’re all human beings and just like other 
diseases like diabetes, we also need cover. We also need proper treatment.”  
 
But for interviewee 13, for whom HIV/AIDS and human rights were “inseparable”, 
there was a deeper link: exemplifying the connections discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 
between rights language, subjectivity and participation, he asserted: “Human rights 
give us the right to speak, it offers us a platform to express ourselves.” Another 
respondent had other linkages in mind, too, referring to the protection of women 
from their sexually-promiscuous partners: “You know, like us women, we can be 
faithful, but men are not. So that is our right: men should be responsible.” 
(Interviewee 9). This view was echoed by another respondent, whose denotation of 
women as “very, very, very, very innocent” and men as sexually-errant was quoted in 
Chapter 3 (in the last of the sequence of quotations before note 99), but whose 
response was also interesting because she appeared to suggest that the pertinence of 
human rights to AIDS stemmed from the magnitude of the epidemic rather than 
being inherently linked to it: “The way it has hit the country so hard, there should be 
some human right on this. But the problem is that there are some people whom if 
they hear you are HIV-positive you’re just someone who was a loose person, and it is 
not that way.” (Interviewee 10).  
 
Stigmatization of PLWHAs based on presumptions of immorality provided the link 
between HIV/AIDS and rights for one respondent, quoted in Chapter 6. As noted, 
there was some irony in her comments because, having been raped, she had spoken 
of not “getting the disease rightfully.”103 
 
For another, interviewee 2, the nexus lay in the principles of human compassion and 
solidarity: “[T]o me, people should care about each other. Because when God created 
us, we’re brothers and sisters. Your needs are my needs. So, if I have a problem I 
think it shouldn’t only be my own problem- it should go to the society, the 
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government and so on.” In a similar vein, interviewee 18 felt that human rights meant 
that Kenyans, like nationals of other countries, should have access to life-saving 
medicines: “For example, we used to hear that there were ARVs out there in other 
countries and now we have them here in this country- we can access them. That is 
the right of a human being.”  
 
As seen in Chapter 1, most respondents had not heard of or thought of a link 
between health and human rights, with only a handful claiming to have heard of a 
right to healthcare. It will be recalled that of these, a number were sceptical about 
the government’s efforts towards realizing this right and stressed the worthlessness 
of a formal right to healthcare that could not be realized.  
 
Another issue to emerge, which further elucidates the foundations of notions of 
entitlement, was that of socio-economic goods as a privilege and entitlement of 
taxpayers.104 Others identified poor governance- or poor management by 
government- as the obstacle to enjoying that privilege. This posits a particular idea of 
the State-citizen relationship, the entitlement to healthcare provision from the State 
in exchange for the citizen’s fulfilment of her duty to pay taxes; in this scenario, the 
tax system underwrites a kind of social contract between the parties and thus 
establishes a tangible, explicit reciprocal relationship. Yet the nagging notion persists 
of the individual as more consumer than rights-holder. This is due, not least, to the 
implication that this relationship is predicated on the individual’s capacity to access 
the health market either through the government health insurance fund (restricted to 
employees) or through private means (restricted to those with private resources). 
Either way, many Kenyans would be, and are, excluded from such citizenship. Indeed, 
the distinction in status between a consumer and rights-holder has not always been 
clear, with even the frameworks and policy articulations of organizations and 
agencies claiming to champion rights-based approaches to health betraying the easy 
slippage from rights language to markets language.105 It recalls Baxi’s dreaded 
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scenario of an emergent market-friendly human rights paradigm in which the 
interests of global capital predominate and the exclusion of the poor and 
marginalized from access to basic needs is rationalized and normalized in the name of 
“progress” or “development”.106   
 
The intersection of access to information issues with health and rights was also raised 
by a few respondents, as already seen in the previous chapter. Interviewee 18, for 
instance, reaffirming that now-familiar rural/urban delineation, thought the link 
between health and human rights involved tackling misconceptions about HIV/AIDS in 
rural areas: “I have heard about these things. Firstly, this rubbish in the villages is one 
of the things that is responsible for spreading diseases. If you’re already sick, your 
illness is doubled by this rubbish. The government should look into this, and after the 
welfare of people in villages.” This crucial point recalls the Committee for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment 14 on The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12).107 It emphasizes the centrality of access to 
information to the right to health, along with non-discrimination, physical 
accessibility, acceptability and quality of health goods and services. Individuals have 
the right to seek, receive and impart this information.108 Yet guaranteeing this right is 
an empty gesture if people lack the agency that would allow them to utilize 
information to actualize their rights.109  
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Finally, with the issue of access to ARVs established as a central concern, many 
respondents alluded to links between rights and healthcare in the context of the 
Kenyan government’s ability to provide treatment for PLWHAs. Although one 
respondent acknowledged that some people may require assistance to pay for 
healthcare services, she nevertheless believed that government could not as yet 
afford the cost and thus people should be prepared to pay: “I have heard [about the 
right to healthcare] but this is the thing: about these ARVs, we must pay something. 
Now, a lot of people go empty-handed. How will you be helped, and yet our 
government is new? It has nothing. So if you’re asked to pay a certain amount, pay it. 
The day that the government gets richer it will lower the prices.” (Interviewee 18). 
This belief came up again elsewhere: “[I]t’s not easy, as an African country, especially 
Kenya… we’re still a developing country. They’re trying, but I know it’s not easy to 
reach out to meet needs for everybody; it’s not easy, because we’re also over-
populated.” (Interviewee 2). But it was also rejected outright by a number of 
respondents, like interviewee 34 who said: “[The government] can because it has the 
right machinery. I think saying we’re a poor country is a poor excuse. We can’t be 
poor when we are able to do some other things yet when it comes to healthcare they 
say they can’t.” 
 
Perceiving a limitation in resources for healthcare provision, some interviewees 
inevitably saw the prioritization of PLWHAs and the least well-off as a vital aspect of 
health and human rights concerns: “Myself and those who are ill, but the poor should 
honestly be put first. At least those who can afford to buy the medicine can be put 
aside for a while but those who cannot afford should be prioritised.” (Interviewee 35) 
Interviewee 30 also thought PLWHAs should be the primary beneficiaries of the right 
to healthcare although he did not trust authorities to meet those needs. But others 
sought to be more inclusive, suggesting beneficiaries of a right to healthcare beyond 
the PLWHAs’ circle.110  
 
Prioritization is unavoidable and some commentators contend that government use 
of resources to actualize first the rights of the most affected in society should not be 
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automatically criticized by human rights organizations as arbitrary.111 Even then, the 
demand is most likely to outstrip supply, and in a society such as Kenya’s, where the 
perception of public sector corruption is high112, those at the back of the queue may 
view this as a replication of the patterns of bias they sense in general public life.113  
 
II. Emerging Themes: 
 
a) Being Human 
A number of issues can be seen from the above responses: firstly, in attempting to 
define ‘human rights’ many interviewees also sought to define what it means to be 
human, thus revealing how their particular subjectivities were constituted. Many 
attached certain qualities such as inherent worth, value or dignity (discussed 
presently) to ‘humanness’, which entitles them to a particular kind of treatment. Such 
ideas, which elevate the status of the human being above that of other creatures and 
organisms, are a fundamental facet of the cultural and religious normative structures 
within which most PLWHAs will have lived, and it is arguably these paradigms which 
(most) inspired these responses. But these notions are also cornerstones of modern 
human rights, with various rights instruments restating the human being’s special 
status. The landmark UDHR, for instance, attributes many qualities to the human 
being114, and although it owes much to the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of 
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brotherhood.” (United Nations (UN), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, at 
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Man and Citizen, it opts for the vaguer ‘human’ rather than the former’s more precise 
‘man’, for reasons discussed presently.115  
 
What it means to be ‘human’ or a ‘person’ and therefore to be a subject of (human 
rights) law bears more scrutiny, for the concept has been accorded various cultural 
and political interpretations, some of which, as seen in Chapter 3, exclude or 
marginalize groups such as women (the majority of interviewees) and PLWHAs.116 
These manifold ideas pose various other theoretical challenges, like the idea of 
universal standards in a setting where the central figure presupposed by the rights 
dynamic can be many things and have many different, sometimes irreconcilable 
political claims, all seeking acknowledgement and resolution within a common system 
of human rights. Winfried Brugger, acknowledging this tension, tries to reconcile it 
through a conceptual discussion of the ‘image of the person’ applied by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court.117 For him reference to an “image” humanizes the 
concept of human rights and provides a holistic perspective of the human rights 
enterprise.118 But as Brugger himself concedes it also entails the creation of a cipher 
imbued with a society’s highest ideals; any attempt to make these the compulsory 
goals of universal human rights would hinder their general acceptance.119  
 
This already hints at concerns about the exclusion of certain values considered 
undesirable or insignificant, which would inevitably mean that even within specific 
cultures some individuals may be deemed as falling outside the image of the human 
person. Those traditionally regarded as failing to embody society’s most valued 
ideals, for example women, would find themselves excluded from having their claims 
represented and accorded the exulted status of human rights: in effect, they would 
not be considered to fit the ‘image of the person’. So, too, other marginalised 
categories such PLWHAs and sexual minorities.   
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Brugger eventually arrives at a formula which he argues is a common denominator of 
the universal ideals to which the human rights project aspires for the human being: a 
“self-determinate, meaningful, and responsible way of leading one’s life”.120 This 
formula, he argues, identifies some fundamental elements of human existence, a 
“universal core” that might transcend the cultural differences of the disparate 
addressees of human rights and takes into account the human being’s existence both 
as an individual and as part of a society.121  
 
The discussion about the qualities of the human being predates the attempts of 
Brugger and others, of course. The ‘man’ at the heart of the French Declaration, for 
example, was widely criticized by thinkers of both the political right and left: for 
Burke on the right, this ‘man’ imbued with all manner of privileges was so abstract as 
to be a metaphysical apparition without practical meaning. Douzinas quotes Burke’s 
incisive question that is especially pertinent to this research: “What is the use of 
discussing a man’s abstract right to food or medicine? The question is upon the 
method of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall always 
advise to call in the aid of the farmer and the physician, rather than the professor of 
metaphysics.”122 Burke appears to place the practicability of the aspirations of the 
human rights project at the heart of its legitimacy; he rightfully questions the value of 
articulating a privilege, however high an ideal it may embody, that might not be 
realized. Similar doubts are echoed by some respondents for this research: Asked if 
she thought there was a practical benefit to having a right to healthcare interviewee 
29, for instance, laughed and said, “Well, it is all very well to inform me that I have a 
right, but you have to tell me what I can do with this right!” To the same question, 
interviewee 39 responded, “If you just told me [I have a right to healthcare] and then 
you don’t give, then there’s no help. If you give me the healthcare then I will benefit.” 
 
For Marx on the left, the problem is that ‘man’ is not abstract, after all, but rather too 
specific to be universal; for he is actually a white, propertied, bourgeois male whose 
property rights the human rights enterprise is engineered to protect.123 Exclusion, as 
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Baxi asserts, is a predominant feature of the concept of human rights at this point in 
its narrative.124 The idea of privileges claimed for all but which only a chosen few are 
able to take full advantage of is once again echoed by interviewee 3, who, as he left 
his interview, declared that human rights were a luxury for rich people alone and few 
could afford to have lawyers to defend their rights.  
 
The interviewees cited above allude to the gulf between the conceptual ‘human’ of 
human rights theory and text, endowed with various rights, and the real human of 
their everyday experiences, whose circumstances and environment prevent the 
realization of these rights. Essentially, the basis of PLWHA advocates’ claims is that 
they, too, fit the image of the human person endowed by various instruments with 
special privileges. In some of the responses that dealt specifically with the right to 
healthcare, respondents may even be suggesting that they, more than other people, 
best represented that image. For instance, asked who should benefit from the right to 
healthcare, interviewee 44 replied, “Those who cannot afford to pay.” When 
interviewee 30 was asked if he had heard it claimed that there was a right to 
healthcare, he answered with a question: “For those with HIV?” 
Interviewer: No, that everyone has a right. 
Interviewee 30:  How can that be? How is it possible for everyone to get health care? I 
don’t think it is. Those with HIV are the ones with problems because 
they’re the ones with an incurable illness and who will need 
treatment for the rest of their lives. 
 
Perhaps they perceived rights as designed especially for those with grievances or 
those most in need and therefore saw such people- among whom they self-identified- 
as the main, maybe the sole- intended beneficiaries of these privileges. They seemed 
to be asserting the primacy of their (health) claims over those of the general public. 
This is significant: as a discussion already seen in Chapter 6 made clear, questions 
persist about the prioritization of HIV/AIDS in countries with manifold health 
problems, some of which claim more lives than this illness. In a country with 
insufficient resource allocation for health this is a politically combustive issue 
worsened by the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS. The right to health, as with all other 
rights, is exposed as a locus for struggle but not a substitute for it.125 
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Women’s struggle for recognition as human beings with equal rights, too, the topic of 
much writing, is also relevant to the analysis here, not least because it provides vital 
insights into a group’s efforts to reconstruct, claim or affirm their subjectivity. The 
rollback of women’s rights in Afghanistan under the Taleban, for instance, prompts 
Arvonne Fraser to map the development of women’s rights down the centuries and 
the process by which they became equal subjects of the law.126 Highlighting the 
importance of education, of recording the women’s struggle, and of the contribution, 
too, of male leaders she provides the perfect analytical context which is effectively 
about the unmaking of women’s subjectivity under the Taleban.127 Recalling issues 
raised in Chapter 3, she describes how women have been systematically demeaned as 
individuals and their contribution to society denied recognition, and observes “the 
great irony… that women have been charged with- and have often found security in- 
maintaining customs and tradition, thus, institutionalizing the discrimination against 
them through the education and socialization of children.”128  
 
Yet it may be a measure of the extent to which the female interviewees for this 
research automatically constituted themselves as human beings, if only in the 
simplest sense, that there seemed to be no doubts about this aspect of their identity 
although it was not raised explicitly in the questionnaire. This may suggest that 
despite the conceptual challenges articulated by Burke and Marx many groups and 
individuals do nevertheless see their images reflected in the ideals of human rights. 
Even more likely is that their cultural and/or religious frames of reference 
superficially obscure the subtleties of such questions: for as several interviewees 
illustrated, many of the significant hardships they encountered were directly or 
indirectly linked to their identity as women, which their additional identity as PLWHAs 
seemed to compound. Each interviewee’s identity and subjectivity is further 
contoured by ethnicity, class, age and so on. What seems to emerge is the 
heterogeneity of subjectivity even among respondents united by an iconic illness, as 
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the plurality of views about entitlements and duty-bearers appears to indicate. These 
will be reviewed at the end of the chapter.  
 
b) Having Dignity, Taking Dignity 
The second issue revealed by the responses was that many interviewees attached a 
sense of dignity to humanness and saw this as an essential aspect of their subjectivity. 
Their notions of this concept, a mainstay of human rights129, were sometimes 
complex but this is typical of a concept that is nowhere defined in any of the major 
national and international instruments that cite it, and whose precise core content is 
still unclear.130  Yet rights claims not yet crystallized into law can sometimes be 
legitimately founded on ethical rather than legal obligations where there is a solid 
basis in human dignity.131 Schachter argues that the relationship between human 
rights and human dignity is philosophical rather than historical.132 Recalling Kant, for 
whom human dignity was elevated to a “noumenal realm,”133 he suggests that 
respect for every person’s intrinsic dignity might mean that she should be treated as 
an end in herself and not a means.134 For Kant the onus was on society to recognize 
the dignity of others.135 But, as will be seen presently, in reality this does not happen 
automatically, with society often choosing whether to accord or deny an individual 
her dignity based on her conformity with its most valued ideals. An implication of this, 
he argues, is the supreme- though not absolute- importance that should be accorded 
to individual choice, and that all things social, political and legal should be organized 
to facilitate this; on a political level, this would mean curbing government’s 
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sometimes coercive involvement in matters that fundamentally belong in the private 
sphere.136 This touches on several pertinent issues for PLWHAs, who find themselves 
at the heart of a public health crisis, as they interact with the State: they include the 
debate about involuntary testing, disclosure of HIV test results to sexual partners, and 
their right, especially for women, to choose if, when and how to have sexual 
intercourse.  
 
But the bifurcated state theory is also relevant here: a basis may exist upon which to 
challenge the national State, the locus of civil power, should it violate human rights 
norms such as respect for individual dignity137, not least because it alone is the 
recognised duty-bearer in the international human rights dynamic. However, it is 
harder to contest the deprivation of individual dignity in a customary sphere which 
prioritizes other norms, privileges group solidarity over individual entitlement, and 
applies different interpretations of dignity. It is therefore imperative to unpack this 
concept in the cultural context within which most respondents will likely have been 
referencing it as a basis for their entitlement claims. 
 
Commentators like Makau Mutua contend that dignity is a concept intrinsic to 
societies worldwide including African ones138, although Rhoda Howard and Jack 
Donnelly argue that just because a society’s norms historically recognize human 
dignity does not necessarily mean it possesses a human rights culture.139 The analysis 
here is concerned with the constitution of subjectivities and the development of 
notions about duties and entitlements and thus less interested in the Mutua/Howard-
Donnelly debate about the Eurocentricity or not of human rights.140 Howard and 
                                                 
136
 Schachter (n 130), at  849-50 
137
 Indeed, commentators such as Mariana Chilton argue that dignity should be views a right in itself, 
and not simply as being about reaffirming the self-worth of the individual. (Chilton, Mariana, 
‘Developing a Measure of Dignity for Stress-related Health Outcomes,’ Health and Human  Rights: An 
International Journal,  Vol.9, No.2 (2006), at 216) 
138
 Mutua, Makau,  Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 2002), at 81. See also Freedman, Lynn P., ‘Reflections on Emerging Frameworks of 
Health and Human Rights,’ Health and Human  Rights: An International Journal,  Vol. 1, No.4, 315-348, 
at 337. Freedman argues that the basic values at the root of human rights “- human dignity and social 
justice- …have historical and contemporary roots in cultures throughout the world,” 
139
 Howard, Rhoda E. and Donnelly, Jack, ‘Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes,’ The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 3 (1986), pp. 801-817, at 801 
140
 See Makau Mutua’s summary of this debate in Mutua (n 138), at 79-81. It will be recalled, too, that 
Baxi persuasively points out the limitations of the notion of human rights as exclusively rooted in the 
West, suggesting that a covert agenda that underlies its perpetuation. (Baxi (n 31), at 148) 
 352 
 
Donnelly’s definition of dignity captures its social function and would be familiar to 
Kenyans, particularly- but not exclusively- those in the customary domain. They 
explain that “[c]onceptions of human dignity, in their social and political aspects, 
express particular understandings of the inner (moral) nature and worth of the 
human person and his or her proper (political) relations with society,” while human 
rights are “equal and inalienable” and owed to individuals simply by virtue of their 
being human.141 Dignity is bestowed upon an individual by her community to reflect 
her position within it, or is earned over time by adherents of the community’s values, 
whatever their restrictions.142 But if reserved only for those deemed ‘respectable’ it 
becomes a mechanism for the reinforcement of the status quo and the 
marginalization of those regarded as deviant. This is the ‘real’ world, the opposite of 
that of theorists like Kant, whose ideal ‘Kingdom of Ends’ is populated by rational, 
autonomous individuals who regard each other and are regarded as ends in 
themselves.143 Even Schachter acknowledges that the individual is more than just an 
atomized figure: she is also part of a community whose links may be weakened in the 
assertion of individual will and choice; the notion of human dignity must account for 
the individual’s freedom as well as her obligations.144   
 
This idea of dignity as socially bestowed will be familiar to PLWHAs, for whom it has 
significant implications, facing as they do immense challenges with stigma and 
discrimination. Indeed, interviewees often spoke of a public perception that their 
illness resulted from sexual deviance. As noted in earlier chapters, this discouraged 
many from disclosing their HIV status for fear of rejection or ostracism, with some 
even displaying personal or group self-stigmatization. That they seemed to adjudge 
themselves or others guilty of violating their communities’ norms and so rightfully 
bereft of any claims to dignity, appears to reinforce the suggestion here that their 
overarching conception of dignity was founded in the moral universe and language of 
culture, not rights.  
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Take interviewees 5 and 30, noted also in Chapter 3 (in the first two quotes of the 
sequence before note 99): the former asserted a claim on the government for health 
entitlements, distinguishing herself, a married, sexually-faithful but nevertheless HIV-
infected woman from others who may be infected but lacking these other qualities:  
It’s the government’s duty because [AIDS] is a natural disaster. It’s not the way 
people put it that those who are infected are harlots, prostitutes and so on. It’s not 
like that. Some of us, since we were born, maybe you have only had 2 boyfriends, 
maybe even one, in all your life. Some of us, since you got married, you settled, but 
this thing just got into your house.  
 
The latter, too, stressed her constant sexual fidelity to her husband and expressed 
bitterness at aspersions regarding her chastity when it was he who had infected her. 
She said that fear of being suspected of immorality, of being one of “these ... 
prostitutes who carry out their business in secret,” discouraged her going public with 
her illness, as healthcare officials advised.  Both respondents (and others elsewhere) 
were at pains to separate themselves from other women who violated society’s 
marital and sexual codes, based on cultural or religious norms they appeared to 
accept and defend.  In doing so they were claiming as part of their identity 
membership- citizenship- to a community, imaginary or experiential, which professes, 
if not practices, these values; they felt bound by a moral obligation towards this 
‘primordial public’.145 They condemned these ‘others’ as ‘prostitutes,’ not worthy of 
dignity or respect, even while acknowledging that they themselves might be 
(mistakenly) victimized as such because of their illness. In their view, PLWHAs like 
them who became infected through no fault of their own were worthy of dignity; 
others who became infected through their own risky, transgressive behaviour, and 
who further may have contributed to the spread of the virus to the innocent ones 
(recall interviewee 10’s comments about ‘very innocent’ women) by tempting their 
unfaithful husbands, were not.  
 
Self-stigmatization also seems to corroborate Howard’s view of dignity as objectively 
attained. Yet within it, too, lies clear proof of the subjective dimension of dignity, 
which supports the dynamic definition adopted by Mann, who was so influential in 
laying out many of the key ideas in the health, rights and HIV discourse. He concluded 
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that dignity seems to have two fluid elements: “[O]ne internal (how I see myself) and 
the other external (how others see me). The common denominator is the fact of 
being seen and the perceived nature, or quality of this interaction.”146 This is 
reiterated by Chilton, whose definition acknowledges both these objective and 
subjective elements, adding that they are “socially and politically mediated.”147 
Indeed, many of the same self-stigmatizing respondents simultaneously appeared to 
have internalized advocacy messages that challenge such attitudes and stigma and 
discrimination. Their answers reflected a strong sense about dignity as intrinsically 
adhering to all them as humans and not negated by their illness or the circumstances 
in which they supposedly became infected. Further, they did not wait to be given 
dignity but asserted their claim to it even if those around them appeared to deny it to 
them; they claimed it “‘in advance’ of the fight”.148  
 
It is argued here that such contradictions are manifestations of the tensions between 
deep-rooted cultural frameworks and the new human rights one within which 
respondents were attempting to understand and perhaps reconcile norms such as 
dignity. When expressed as part of advocacy messages about stigma and 
discrimination, words which several PLWHAs employed, the denial of dignity because 
of respondents’ sero-status is itself classified as wrong, transgressive. The new 
language of rights gives form to the PLWHAs’ new subjectivities. In the terms of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, discussed later, the subject retreats into a linguistic system 
that helps give voice to her desires and facilitates her progress through the legal (and, 
indeed, other) discourse.149 Language virtually brings a new world into being, creates 
an alternative reality, “[producing] existence by producing the collectively recognized, 
and thus realized, representation of existence.”150 The injection of human rights 
language into the HIV/AIDS discourse gives PLWHAs a new moral universe with a new 
moral language and a new set of norms by which to operate. According to these 
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norms, they are not undesirable sexual deviants and/or social outcasts, unworthy of 
dignity, but human beings living within particular circumstances and dealing with 
particular challenges, which they are entitled to have recognized. A human rights 
framework challenges a definition of dignity that is purely objective and externally 
acquired: it demands the recognition of its subjective element and the contested self-
assertion of dignity by marginalized groups like women, sexual minorities, and now 
PLWHAs.  
 
This highlights the complexity surrounding dignity: in a human rights context, perhaps 
in any context, it is in claiming it that it is realized151; yet even this action anticipates a 
role for the ‘other’: for in staking her claim, the PLWHA’s actualization of dignity may 
still rely on those to whom she reveals her sero-status as she makes that claim. She 
must emerge from the private into the public arena where competing, often 
conflicting conceptions of dignity may reign (witness the Gugu Dlamini murder, 
discussed in Chapter 6)152, to reclaim this aspect of her individual, multi-faceted 
identity. Writing about South Africa’s apartheid victims and the telling of their stories 
in that country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, Coundouriotis 
pertinently notes that, “[w]hen the victim’s response [such as accepting the 
opportunity to testify at the hearings] is the issue, then the burden of actualizing 
dignity falls on the audience to that response. Testimony, in particular, seems to 
leave the victims vulnerable. Retaining some control over the meaning of one’s 
testimony seems crucial.”153  
 
The refusal to recognize her- to “see” her- or seeing her only as part of a group, 
violates her dignity under human rights.154 The challenges highlighted here, of 
exposure and rejection (indeed, many PLWHAs object to the idea of making their 
sero-status a mark of their identity155), are relevant to PLWHAs’ decisions about 
which moral framework or language to prioritize as they attempt to imagine, express 
and defend their claims to dignity, where and when. This seems to give credence to 
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the conclusions of commentators like Alan Gewirth that dignity is thus ‘empirical’ and 
cannot be equally possessed by all.156 For those like the PWLHAs who must oscillate 
between multiple spaces with varying norms perhaps the more appropriate 
qualification is: not everywhere and not always.   
 
This casts doubt on the cohesive capacity of human rights norms. To be sure, the 
human rights paradigm, in creating rights and responsibilities for the individual, 
presupposes the existence of others.157 As Douzinas puts it, “a right is a particular way 
of being in common. A demand for recognition of an aspect of the claimant’s identity 
couched in rights terms is always addressed at another and is validated through the 
other’s acknowledgement.”158 But at the heart of this Hegelian idea of legal 
recognition is the reciprocal acknowledgment of the rights of other members of the 
community, an affirmation of the autonomy of each individual member and the 
respect due them.159  Community is the context as well as the consequence of legal 
recognition.160 But the responses above exemplify, beyond the logic and rhetoric of 
rights, the ongoing contestations in practice about the content of its core principles 
and whether the agreed rights will be owed to all equally, all the time. They suggest a 
strategic approach to the adoption of human rights norms rather than a wholesale 
one. The long-standing frameworks and values which legitimize discriminatory 
behaviour and which the new normative system of rights promises to expunge often 
prove durable.161 Thus the contours and nature of a burgeoning community of rights 
is undecided. This implies, then, that even within the special sub-community of 
PLWHAs, arguably more sensitized to certain human rights issues, it may be 
premature to talk without condition of a community bound together by human rights. 
Its success may depend on how well it fits in with the existing supra-communities to 
which Kenyans belong. These, particularly the ethnic or customary, are founded on 
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systems and norms that are more established in this environment than those of 
human rights.   
 
To be sure, members of any such new human rights-based community may 
nevertheless feel compelled to retain the seemingly contradictory views featured 
above in order to maintain membership in other spheres. IRRRAG’s findings on the 
AIDS-linked issues of sexual and reproductive rights provide some insights: for the 
PLWHAs’ responses may be seen as exemplifying the “accommodation-resistance 
nexus” that Petchesky and the IRRRAG team observed in their fieldwork.162 She notes 
that women seldom adopted strategies of outright compliance with, or outright 
resistance to, the prevailing norms. Instead, their approaches were more nuanced, 
aimed at achieving a level of sexual and reproductive autonomy without threatening 
their position in the community.163 It underscores an instrumental approach to the 
adoption of human rights norms and the continuing importance of cohesion within 
the community, still the primary framework within which people have their lived 
experiences.164 
 
c) (Multiple) Citizenship 
This multiplicity of identities and subjectivities raises a third issue: citizenship. By 
basing entitlement claims on national citizenship, the interviewees who did so 
reflected a perceived relationship with the State and an awareness of the political 
rights that issue from this affiliation, which enhances their legal identity as human 
beings.165 This consciousness may be located in the same relatively fresh landscape as 
the human rights system. It forms part of the ongoing conversation between the 
State and the individual, as does the State’s reaffirmation of the individual’s 
humanity, for, as Douzinas argues, it is less the case that humans have rights and 
more that rights make human.166 Becoming a legal subject elevates the individual 
from the universal ‘man’ of the French Declaration into a citizen of the State and a 
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person of substance; her subjection to the law, unlike the alien, makes her law’s 
subject.167  
 
But citizenship for many Africans is a more complicated experience and so 
respondents’ reference to it reasserts the overarching importance of the postcolonial 
citizen-subject theories of Mamdani, Ekeh, Ndegwa and others, which spotlight, too, 
the long-standing but ever-present alternative publics to which PLWHAs belong and 
also simultaneously claim citizenship. In this sense, even this third basis for PLWHAs’ 
claims to healthcare and other entitlements is not impervious to notions whose 
frame of reference is external to human rights.  
 
Said Adejumobi makes the point that the African nation-state is a collection of 
nationalities and that citizenship and multiple identities are complementary; loyalty 
to the latter need not negate the former but if the privileges and benefits of 
citizenship exist in name only pluralism may be seen as competing, challenging or 
threatening to the State.168 The exception may be in States which are dominated by 
members of one’s community.169  This idea of citizenship, these commentators assert, 
is far removed from the essentially Western notion of a singular political 
community170, although as Halisi, Kaiser and Ndegwa remind us, citizenship is a 
perpetually fluid concept forever being shaped and redefined by new conditions.171 
Early, European meanings of citizenship have evolved, they add, so that today they 
encompass ideas pertinent to nation-building such as social equality.172 Indeed, there 
new attempts to reframe citizenship as more participatory, ‘practiced’ rather than ‘a 
given’, partly reclaiming the space that separates citizen from State.173 
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And PLWHAs’ notions of citizenship were often linked to this, centring on issues of 
nationality and national community, and attached to ideas like equal treatment of all 
nationals. To be sure, citizenship was among the salient issues during the national 
constitutional debate and an entire section of the new instrument is devoted to 
outlining the rights and privileges of the citizen.174 For many respondents their 
identity as Kenyan citizens was an important aspect of their subjectivity and by 
overtly claiming membership of the wider national political community they were 
distinguishing themselves from non-citizens, whose claims to privileges such as 
healthcare they were, consciously or otherwise, therefore rejecting. Though this 
appears at odds with the idea of equality which some PLWHAs simultaneously raised, 
the human rights enterprise often appears to be a conspiracy between the State and 
the citizen to exclude ‘the other’- the alien.175 As Douzinas notes, they “are subjected 
to the law but they are not law’s subjects.”176 And yet some commentators challenge 
the notion a monolith rights-possessing African citizenry in cahoots with a State from 
which it may claim equal privileges while the acceptably-excluded alien looks on 
enviously. Adejumobi, reiterating arguments raised in Chapter 4, asserts that “[t]he 
construction and nature of the state in Africa which is rooted in the colonial pedigree, 
tend toward the institutionalization of ethnic entitlements, rights, and privileges, 
which create differentiated and unequal status of citizenship.” 177 Indeed, many 
interviewees mentioned several examples of perceived State inefficiency and 
selective dispersal of public resources: Interviewee 3, for instance, said he knew the 
government could afford to meet its obligations under the right to healthcare “if they 
use their funds well. If we forget about the political side of things they can afford it if 
they are properly governed.” Interviewee 29 concurred: “If they plan well, the 
government can afford to help. But you hear all the time, ‘the money was eaten by 
so-and-so’, ‘it was eaten by Goldenberg [a multi-million dollar fraud, committed in 
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the 1990s but criminal charges for which were only brought in 2006, with senior 
members of the ruling elite implicated178]’. Then you hear someone is getting paid 
[Ksh.] 2 or 3 million in salary, then there will be nothing left for other projects like 
treating people. There should be a law to ensure the money goes where it is meant to 
go- to those who are ill.”; “[The government] can help if it wants but people are 
short-sighted. There are those who feel that they are there to satisfy themselves and 
it will take the government a long time to give a hand to those in need.”(Interviewee 
45)  
 
This breeds and compounds a sense of moral illegitimacy about the very entity 
around which a national community is intended to cohere, impeding social 
integration and, ultimately, the enhancement of a shared sense of citizenship.179 A 
diminished sense of belonging to such a community thus becomes yet another aspect 
of many PLWHAs’ subjectivities.  
 
One forum where members of that community might seek redress for the violations 
of State, and so reaffirm their relationship to it, is in a court of law. And much has 
been made about the possibility of holding States accountable for their obligations 
under the ICESCR or national legislation through judicial activism, now a distinct 
possibility under the new Kenyan constitution. Roth, for instance, argues that 
litigation or adoption of legislation that would make ESC rights justiciable would also 
promote these rights180, and health is one of the key areas where this strategy is 
being tested. In South America litigation is increasingly used to secure State 
accountability for its health rights obligations.181 States and private health providers 
there face increasing challenges from organizations (in public interest cases) and 
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private individuals.182 The recognition of the role of extra-State actors in the 
fulfilment or violation of individuals’ health rights is crucial, as reviewed in the 
previous chapter. As Nahid Toubia writes, 
The human rights field operates in such a way as to protect the individual from the 
vicissitudes of power that impact his or her life. In the field of health, this power may 
be the state; international policies and programs; multinational and local drug 
companies; the medical establishment; and finally, the family and community.183  
 
It challenges the rigid focus on States as primary duty-bearers  as conceived under 
international law, suggesting that this perspective does not reflect power relations 
today, as the effect of the policies and actions of donors, Northern NGOs and 
multilateral organizations like the World Bank on national health systems, discussed 
in Chapter 7, have shown.184 Some have even argued that this multiplicity of 
responsible actors, which makes the identity of ESC rights violators more uncertain 
(some have even blamed the victims themselves185), is partly responsible for the 
obscurity of ESC rights in comparison to civil and political ones. The HIV/AIDS crisis 
has especially exposed the limited capacity of States like Kenya in the provision of 
social goods and services for its own citizens, further weakening the ties that bind the 
individual to it. Yet the greater involvement of other actors does not displace the 
obligations of government, whose responsibility it remains to provide adequate 
health systems nationwide.186  
 
Kenya’s new constitution, with its robust Bill of Rights, aims to incorporate into 
domestic law an aspect of Art. 2(1) ICESCR.187 More importantly, it aims to provide a 
                                                 
182
Victor Abramovich and Laura Pautassi give an account of this development in Argentina, in 
Abramovich, Victor and Pautassi, Laura, ‘Judicial Activism in the Argentine Health System: Recent 
Trends,’ Health and Human  Rights: An International Journal, Vol.10, No. 2 (2008), pp. 53-65, at 54 
183
 Toubia, Nahid F., ‘Health and Human Rights: Where Do We Go From Here?’, Health and Human  
Rights: An International Journal, Vol.  1 No. 2 (1995), pp. 136-141, at 138 
184
 See Ely Yamin, ‘Will We Take Suffering Seriously? Reflections on What Applying a Human Rights 
Framework to Health Means and Why We Should Care,’ (n 98), at 54 
185
 Leckie, Scott, ‘Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,’ Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.20, No.1 (1998), pp. 81-124, at 82  
186
 London (n 10), at 68 
187
 This requires States to undertake steps to realize ECS rights through “all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), 1966, at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm, accessed 14/03/09). Further, 
individual petitions will be allowed should the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR be adopted. See Ely 
Yamin, ‘Beyond Compassion: The Central Role of Accountability in Applying a Human Rights 
Framework to Health,’ (n 46), at 5. As of 20
th
 November 2009, the Optional Protocol of the ICESCR, 
adopted on the 10
th
 December 2008, had only 30 signatories, of which Kenya was not one  (UN, 
 362 
 
legal framework that not only (nominally) guarantees a right to “the highest 
attainable standard of health” but also includes enforcement mechanisms through 
which, say, individuals can bring claims of violations before courts or tribunals.188 The 
contribution of this development to the fulfilment of ESC rights is arguable: there are 
plausible arguments that instituting a normative framework founded on international 
legal instruments encourages different perceptions not only by States but other 
actors such as development agencies.189 Further, enabling legislation and court 
actions explicitly compel States to meet their human rights obligations under 
international and domestic law and provide a direct route for individuals to challenge 
State violations.190 Moreover, litigation itself can provide an effective platform for 
raising awareness and mass mobilization on issues like HIV/AIDS and rights where the 
process is linked with media coverage and public campaigns. However, care must be 
taken in the formulation of legislation so that its results do not prove 
counterproductive, actually entrenching rather than alleviating human rights 
violations against PLWHAs: for instance, Sec. 26 of Kenya’s 2006 Sexual Offences Act 
looks to use the criminal law ostensibly to curb the intentional HIV infection.191 
Campaigners argue that this could have negative effects for the treatment and 
prevention efforts, such as, among other things, disproportionately targeting 
marginalized groups such as sex-workers, drug-users and men who have sex with 
men; discouraging from HIV testing individuals who might look to negate the basis of 
the criminal offence which is founded on knowledge of one’s sero-status; moreover, 
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such laws could also punish those who may not have disclosed their status because of 
the prejudice and even possibility of violence that PLWHAs face.192 The legal tussle 
between the South African government and pharmaceutical companies is a good 
example of this.193  Indeed, it has been noted that litigation has often been a political 
rather than a legal tool.194 Closer to home, the examples of rights provided by 
interviewees, inspired by well-publicized court cases such as the domestic abuse suit 
brought against an MP, underline the promotional potential of such processes.  
 
But there are valid criticisms, too: that as legal processes benefit those most likely to 
use them, which does not often include the poor and marginalized, they succeed 
largely in reproducing existing inequalities195; further, it has been contended that 
favourable court decisions which affirm an individual’s health rights claims may 
strengthen the rights of some who are thus doubly rewarded for having the 
wherewithal to access the legal system196, but weaken the collective right to health 
by undermining long-term national health policy-setting. The effect of an additional 
workload on an overworked legal system is also questioned, as might be the 
judiciary’s competence in dealing with tricky technical and politically-charged issues 
such as the government’s allocation of resources.197  
 
A proactive judiciary willing to engage with difficult public health policy issues seems 
crucial to the success of the litigation strategy.198 Yet South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court, for instance, has been criticized for deference to the executive and legislative: 
Karin Lehmann argues this may be seen, first, in its silence over whether individual 
applicants have a prima facie right to the socio-economic good in question  (the court 
looks instead at the vague issue of whether the relevant policy is reasonable), and, 
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secondly, in failing to assert a monitoring role, thus appearing to trust the 
government to amend its policies where ordered to.199 These arguments are 
reminiscent of a point highlighted Kiai, one that is worth remembering even in the 
light of Kenya’s improved Bill of Rights: referring in 2004 to the unprecedented, quasi-
judicial powers, constitutionally guaranteed, of his own organization, the KNCHR, he 
cautioned that it was far better that such powers were not exercised than that they 
were abused or exercised badly, thus creating poor precedent.200 The issue is 
particularly pertinent in an area of law still in its infancy and where decisions in one 
jurisdiction are likely to influence those in another.  
 
Lehmann also doubts whether jurisprudentially the decisions of South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court really protect the individual’s rights, questioning the utilitarian 
principles at the heart of their key decisions.201 She notes the utilitarian ideals 
articulated in a famous decision in which the claimant was denied his dialysis 
treatment after the expense of prolonging his life was weighed against, and 
ultimately defeated by, other broader health choices.202 She highlights, too, that in 
another case, this time a successful claim brought by the organization TAC, the 
individual rights of the pregnant women denied Nevirapine (which helps prevent 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV) and that of their children happened to coincide 
with utilitarian interests of preventing the spread of HIV to the general public; as such 
the government was ordered to make the medicine available, amongst other 
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orders.203 This is an important point, for these decisions appear blind to the individual 
at the heart of these claims for socio-economic goods, for whom “pain, illness, and 
death are individual events.”204 
 
And even with robust legislation and an effective, proactive judicial process, the 
realization of socio-economic rights may remain a mirage: London notes that the 
community at the heart of the landmark South African Grootboom case, for instance, 
which established socio-economic rights (in this case regarding housing) as justiciable 
under that constitution, still awaited the remedy that drove them to court in the first 
place; nor has the decision altered housing policy in any fundamental way.205 
Litigation, unless its decisions are implemented and herald wholesale changes in 
health systems and policies, may only be a limited way of asserting health rights.206 
Justiciability, after all, as Ghai rightly points out, is a last resort, deployed when all 
else fails, and so the role of courts in ensuring States meet their ESC obligations may 
lie in settling the question of the core entitlements of these rights.207And as Charles 
Ngwena points out, if fundamental problems remain, as they do in South Africa 
despite its constitutional and judicial pioneering, of “disease and trauma, extreme 
disparities in income, and general poverty,” the adoption of a new legislative 
instrument may do little to alleviate the real socio-economic problems of most.208 
With it goes another opportunity for the State to prove its effectiveness and 
legitimacy and foster a sense of equal citizenship and membership to a national 
community, and through this specific arm of its machinery engage in a positive 
exercise of nation-building. But in Kenya the idea of courts as avenues for redressing 
rights violations has long been fraught with problems, dogged for decades, like the 
other arms of State, by accusations of lack of impartiality and corruption.209 
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The use of legal processes to address socio-economic rights may also hold other 
problems for the individual who can access its mechanism, inherent in the language 
applied by the law: she may find inadequate the existing confines of the language by 
which she is bound to express the fullness of her grievances. As Conklin writes, “in 
terms of the words of human rights enactments, the [claimant’s] circumstances are 
transformed into a network of terms which sanitize the pain which citizens incur 
during the events leading to the prosecution of a human rights violation.”210 The 
language employed by experts takes in the individual’s pain and suffering and 
regurgitates it, “re-presenting [it] through signifiers which experts alone can 
‘know.’”211 This results in the further isolation of the victims. Conklin argues that legal 
language, in hock to ‘reason’, drains the victim’s claims of all colour and texture: by 
neatly packaging her grievances, it conceals her particular experience and the depth 
and complexity of her suffering, and the underlying processes by which she has 
become disenfranchised. Unless her claims can be presented in such a language, she 
has no claims because the “written texts of statutes, regulations, and judges’ ‘reasons 
for judgement’ are believed to constitute the closest approximation to the will and 
voice of authority.”212 Language and the meaning of language therefore become yet 
another hurdle to claiming socio-economic goods: the victim’s reality is only validated 
once it has been transformed, through language, into the law(yer)’s reality.213 
 
For Ndegwa, all these are elements of the vibrant debate that has been taking place 
in Kenya since the late transformative 1990s, particularly in the urban-based civic 
realm where competing visions of citizenship rights were being articulated. One 
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faction sought “to retain only minimal citizen’s right (i.e. subject status)”; the other, 
led especially by NGOs who since 1997 had embarked on a nationwide campaign for 
constitutional change, posited that individuals had certain intrinsic rights which were 
not gifts to be dispensed and withdrawn  by the State on a whim.214 Many 
interviewees for this research clearly appeared to espouse either idea but there was 
sometimes evidence of contradiction where an interviewee simultaneously affirmed a 
belief in her entitlement as a human being or citizen, while apparently basing any 
expectations of their fulfilment not on a rightful obligation on the State but on its 
magnanimous intervention. Reflecting the power dynamics between themselves and 
the State, many respondents felt that it should not or cannot be compelled to fulfil its 
obligations: Interviewee 9, for example, when asked whether the government should 
they be made to help PLWHAs meet their health needs said, “No, they shouldn’t be 
forced but it is their job.” Interviewee 19, asked if the government could help meet 
her healthcare needs said: “Yes they can. Like these drugs we are taking for free, isn’t 
that the government’s work? And if they want they can ensure this continues.” 
Further questions were deemed useful: 
Interviewer: But the free drugs you’re getting are from MSF. I don’t know whether 
the government has had a role in it.  
Interviewee 19: Well, if they wanted to get involved they could do it-nothing is 
beyond their abilities.  
Interviewer: Ok. But should they be compelled? 
Interviewee 19: Well, they should be approached and spoken to gently! (Laughs.) 
Interviewer: So they shouldn’t be ‘compelled’?  
Interviewee 19: No, they shouldn’t.   
 
One even called for divine intervention as far as State action is concerned: “The 
government can and should help, and we’re still praying for the government, 
especially the Ministry of Health, to continue fighting hard so that they can continue 
reducing the price of these drugs because even [with] the Ksh 1,500 there are people 
who are still paying Ksh 3,500 for them. We’re lucky we get them for Ksh 1,500 here. 
So we hope the government continues fighting for us.” (Interviewee 10) 
Another, while cognisant of how the State could help, did not feel entitled to demand 
its assistance because, she said, it had not been responsible for getting her infected: 
If they know my problem, then maybe they can help. But even with the reduction of 
the prices of ARVs, isn’t that help that they have offered? So, I see that they can.” But 
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when asked if they should be compelled to she said, “What if they are compelled and 
then refuse? I think they should help of their own accord. Can you force someone to 
help you yet they didn’t send you out there to go and get the virus?! But they do 
help. The reduced ARV prices are a huge help. (Interviewee 40) 
 
Although far more respondents were uncomfortable with, or uncertain of, the notion 
of compelling the government to act, there were those for whom even the more 
precise Kiswahili question about compelling the government to act was not too stern 
a proposition. Interviewee 18, for instance, was adamant: “Even the government 
should get in the middle of this [crisis]. Because it is the head. They should look after 
me in every way if I am struggling, for example in giving money for the drugs.... Yes, 
they should be compelled to help the citizen.” The trend, however, indicated 
perceptions of disempowerment: many respondents appeared resigned about the 
conduct of the State and felt unable to effect change in its behaviour despite the 
implied automatic privileges of citizenship. And according to Ekeh, it can only 
encourage further alienation of the individual from the State and her retreat to that 
other public: the customary or primordial.  As noted elsewhere, many interviewees 
revealed claims of membership, however transcendental or lapsed, to sub-national, 
rural communities, although a considerable number were likely to be urban migrants, 
resident in a sphere where notions of membership to a wider national community 
have more traction.215 Alluding to a community and place with phrases like ‘back 
home’, respondents claimed certain entitlements based on membership to age-old 
ethnic, land-based societies.216 They claimed assistance with their healthcare needs, 
psychological comfort, indeed, communion and fraternity.  
 
The experiences of residents of the Kibera informal settlement in Nairobi, among 
whom numbered some interviewees for this research, provides useful insights into 
the lengths urbanites often go to in order to preserve their primordial ties in the 
ethnic sphere, and the struggles of establishing and sustaining new ones in the urban 
environment. Sarah Jenkins observes that many residents continue to travel back to 
their rural villages for cultural events, and even after death bodies are often 
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repatriated back to these villages for burial, for “no matter how long you have lived 
outside the land of your ancestors, it remains the place where you belong.” 217 She 
notes that this practice of repatriation went on despite the dangers posed by the 
post-election violence of 2007, in which Kibera was a major flashpoint.218  
 
Yet these urban migrants also actively seek ways to gain a foothold in their new 
environment in order to claim citizenship in it and in the wider national public. 
Paradoxically, burial again provides an opportunity: Jenkins writes of members of the 
Luo ethnic group in Kibera, whose claims of entitlement to the land here the Kenyan 
government has consistently denied, burying their dead within the informal 
settlement, for “[i]n the absence of title deeds the practice of burying the dead within 
Kibera is frequently invoked to substantiate claims of belonging.”219  
 
There is intense competition for limited resources in these marginalized spaces and 
multiple intractable socio-economic challenges such as inadequate- yet expensive- 
shelter.220 The ethnic enclaves that have developed here thrive in defiance of the 
multi-ethnic urban setting.221 The notion that access to favours or benefits may be 
contingent on ethnic identity creates hostility and bitterness that only galvanize 
kinship and filial ties to the family, clan and ethnic group.222 As such, it neatly and 
perfectly exemplifies the citizen-subject tensions Mamdani and others describe, and 
provides a theatre upon which their sometimes violent manifestations are played out. 
This is what happened in 2007/8. As one Kibera resident informed a BBC reporter in 
the violent aftermath of the 2007 national elections, “unless President Kibaki [the 
Gikuyu incumbent whose contested re-election had sparked the violence] and Mr 
Odinga [his Luo rival for the presidency] can solve their differences, the ethnic 
tensions are here to stay. ‘In some parts of Kibera and Nairobi, you have to be sure of 
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the crowd you are talking to, to avoid being on the wrong side of the ethnic 
divide.’"223  
 
Adejumobi might have been writing about Kenya and not Nigeria when he highlighted 
the role of ethnic rather than national citizenship identity in political life, and the 
extent to which it determines access to social and economic benefits, all of which 
undermine the notion of equal citizenship.224 Indeed, Ekeh might conclude that some 
respondents’ despondent feelings about State inaction exposed the underlying lack of 
the moral imperative which he asserts might otherwise bind individuals more 
effectively to the civic public.225 The postcolonial State, he argues, despite the few 
interviewees who imputed to it the esteemed parental status, is at fault for failing to 
nurture the trust of the individual. Many Africans generously tend their links with the 
primordial public even though they might extract little economic benefit from it.226 
But the privileges they draw from citizenship in the primordial public should not 
simply be reduced to economic terms, which fail to capture the vital, though 
intangible “identity or psychological security” they also extract.227 They feel a moral 
duty to contribute to and maintain their primordial publics but de-emphasize 
obligations over rights with the civic public, to whom they do not feel morally bound 
and from whom they look only for material gain.228 
 
The utility of these multiple citizenship claims to PLWHAs is obvious: as discussions 
throughout this research have shown, their experience has often been one of 
stigmatization and rejection- ejection- from various levels of community. Any new 
avenues for association and community thus present considerable advantages, 
despite the fact that they may be founded on excluding others, who might equally 
deserve assistance, simply because they do not share a particular ethnic identity. It is 
precisely this exclusion that was alleged by a number of respondents during the 
Mbagathi District Hospital group session I attended: they claimed to have been 
denied membership to some local HIV/AIDS NGOs and support groups because they 
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and the organizations’ key leadership were not co-ethnics. A couple of organizations 
were mentioned and matched to their favoured ethnic group, with widespread 
concurrence by session participants.229  
 
And Ndegwa points to another underlying danger: the rights that can be claimed in 
the customary or primordial sphere are narrowly defined. Comparing national and 
ethnic citizenship he asserts, “[I]n the ethnic community, citizenship can be best 
characterized as illiberal and republican. Whereas liberalism is centred on the 
individual, ethnic groups are centred on the community, and a person cannot claim 
rights that would jeopardize group claims.”230 This tension revealed itself often in the 
interviews and was evident, for instance, in the responses where PLWHAs claimed 
dignity for themselves while appearing to deny it to those counterparts they 
considered in violation of prevailing sexual norms. There may also be more sinister 
consequences where unequal national citizenship rights lure the individual closer to 
her sub-national identity group, which, when coupled with the high-stakes, zero-sum 
game of Kenyan presidential elections, can result in the kind explosive violence of late 
2007/early 2008.231 For while ethnicity, as Ghai observes, may offer a platform for 
challenging State oppression, it also “dulls the consciousness of rights... [Whereas] 
human rights seek to bring groups within a broader unity, emphasizing our common 
humanity, ethnicity fragments.” Indeed infringing the rights of others seems to be 
condoned and may in fact be welcomed.232 
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Yet alongside the examples of the apparent mistrust of the government, there was 
still evidence of acceptance of the State’s presence if not legitimacy, not least in the 
presumption, manifest in all responses, of at least some relationship with it, and even 
a readiness by some respondents to explicitly knit themselves closer to it. As noted, 
some even went as far as comparing it to a protector or parent, perhaps only to 
strengthen their claims to its benefits, perhaps trusting it as a “neutral [arbiter] of 
injury” and overlooking its capacity to inflict it.233 In appearing to base their health 
and other socio-economic entitlements on their Kenyan citizenship, such respondents 
were arguably actively entrenching a role for the State in their own identity.234 They 
showed a consciousness of modern individual-State relations, through which this 
entity accords a civil identity to its nationals, binding them to it.235 This in itself is 
interesting: for as Ndegwa points out, in Kenya, as in many postcolonial African 
countries, the State alone defined and then conferred citizenship rights rather than 
the population negotiating, through a struggle, the parameters of such privileges.236 
But the attitudes expressed by a number of respondents above suggested a 
willingness to articulate thoughts on the nature of citizenship and how its benefits 
should be apportioned. It appears to provide grounds for the earlier-noted emphasis 
on the social, inclusive, and participatory aspects of a recast concept of citizenship: as 
Ely Yamin asserts, for its proponents, “such notions ‘suggest a more active notion of 
citizenship- one that recognizes the agency of citizens as ‘makers and shapers’ rather 
than as ‘users and choosers’ of policies, programs, or interventions.”237 It also 
supports the point raised in the previous chapter, of an increasingly politically 
assertive electorate readier to probe and influence its relationship with the State, no 
doubt inspired by greater civil society activism.  
 
This, however, has coincided in Kenya with an increased failure by the State to meet 
its socio-economic duties.238 Civil society organizations (CSOs), especially in the age of 
globalization, continue to contest the monopoly of professional politicians to 
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represent citizens in the public sphere.239 This phenomenon is exemplified by the 
rapid increase of PLWHA rights advocacy groups and health NGOs, the latter of whom 
it will be recalled were perceived by some interviewees as more equitable than, and 
preferable to, the government in the provision of their other medical needs. Such 
groups have thus become hugely influential in the way PLWHAs and other Kenyans 
view their relationship with State and how they constitute themselves as subjects, 
playing a vital role in the effort to transcend the merely formal rights of citizenship 
that nationality accords them and raise them to fully-fledged rights-holding citizens. 
The trend towards using judicial action to enforce socio-economic rights offers 
further avenues of influence for CSOs. Petchesky cites the amicus curiae or ‘friend of 
the court’ intervention (now also provided for in Kenya’s new constitution240) by the 
TAC in the lawsuit filed by pharmaceutical companies against the South African 
government as an example of successful campaigning which targets both the court 
and wider public opinion.241  
 
Alice Miller’s analysis of the challenges facing victims of violence against women in 
their citizenship claims also offers useful parallels for PLWHAs. She writes of the 
evolutionary journey that the narrowly-defined victims of sexual harm have to make 
from “suffering [female] bodies in need of protection by the law and the state [to] 
bodies and minds in need not only of protection, but participation and equality.”242 
Such a construction, embedded by human rights organizations themselves, ultimately 
diverts attention away from the national and transnational systems that create the 
conditions for the violation of these rights. Further, this evolution is inhibited by the 
cementing of a paradigm which casts the victim ideally as a chaste, reticent woman. 
Only if she conforms to this image is she recognized as a human person who is law’s 
subject and can rightfully claim its protection.243 Meanwhile, trafficked women, sex-
workers and others whose sexualities are deemed questionable find less protection, if 
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any, under the law, as they do not fit the accepted image of a rape victim.244 This is 
especially the case if they display any sexual agency. When advocates move their 
campaign beyond the focus on sexual harm against sympathetic victims and into 
other areas such as sexual health or equality, they find themselves silenced and 
attacked as lesbians or prostitutes.245  
 
There are insights for PLWHAs’ advocacy campaigns here: they, too, have travelled – 
and continue to travel- a considerable distance to be recognized as full rights-holders. 
Miller’s meaning of ‘distance’ is adopted here, of “barriers placed (sometimes in law) 
by social stereotypes around gender, sexuality, age, race or ethnicity, for example.”246 
From the earlier popular images of PLWHAs as gay, promiscuous men or helpless, 
body-wasted Africans in remote villages, one can see the challenges PLWHAs have 
faced down the decades to establish themselves as human beings, let alone citizens. 
The State has routinely regarded these groups with hostility and/or indifference. 
These images discourage the notion that these groups, too, have equal and valid 
claims to the law’s protection from discrimination, and to health and other social and 
economic goods; that their lifestyles, choices or circumstances are to be recognized 
and accepted, not pitied or ignored at best, criticized or punished at worst. Popular 
perceptions of moral transgression and lack of innocence associated with sexual 
agency come into play, despite the irony that it is precisely a lack of agency that 
makes women, in particular, vulnerable to HIV infection. Further, PLWHAs are 
afflicted by an illness which in its final stages physically transforms them in a manner 
even more removed from many people’s notion of what a human person looks like, 
prompting several PLWHAs to withdraw from public life.  
 
The continued recognition of PLWHAs’ rights claims owes much to the vigorous 
efforts by local and global advocacy groups to challenge such stereotypes and to re-
present the image of the PLWHA as everyman/woman: for even more socially 
sympathetic victims such as heterosexuals, and particularly heterosexual men, 
nationals of developed countries, members of higher socio-economic classes, children 
and so on can be afflicted. Hence the promotion of high profile HIV sufferers and calls 
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for politicians and other well-known personalities to take HIV tests and publicize their 
results.247 If they can be infected, the message goes, so can we all; if they can be the 
image of a PLWHA, so can we. 
  
Yet even as the rights of PLWHAs become more widely recognized there is still 
resistance even within the PLWHA community itself, as evinced by those earlier-
noted interviews, to the claims of tricky subjects of the law such as drug users, men 
who have sex with men and sex-workers. It is another reminder that the journey to 
becoming a rights-holder is not equal for all within the PLWHA body itself and that 
here, too, multiple sub-strata of identities exist.  It also suggests that a 
psychoanalytical discussion of law, seen shortly, may be a useful tool for examining 
how the law might deal with the complex and varied notions of self that the 
interviewees revealed. 
 
The decision to go public is an important process in the PLWHA’s claim for citizenship 
and may be seen even in the simple decision to be interviewed and have one’s 
experiences recorded. Miller re-emphasizes this, writing of the campaigning 
strategies of breaking the silence and intimate story-telling that were used to draw 
attention to women’s right to protection against sexual harm.248 They raise the profile 
of this human rights violation and explode myths on issues like marital rape and 
normalization of rape in war.249 These strategies have benefitted PLWHA rights 
campaigns and the interview process itself may be seen as a modest extension of this: 
in revealing her sero-positive status, circumstances of infection and claims for 
assistance on family, friends or the State, the interviewee is asserting her humanity 
and asking the interviewer to recognize her claims.  
 
In speaking for herself, the PLWHA stakes her claim in the public sphere and further 
asserts her citizenship though the process might be, as it often is in reality, periodic 
and in degrees. For as Fraser notes with specific reference to the women’s struggle- 
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and this is especially relevant to the female respondents of this research- this allows a 
woman to publicly narrate her own experiences unmediated by men and is critical to 
asserting her identity as an individual human being.250 The same applies to all the 
PLWHAs, including those interviewees who spoke but chose to retain their 
anonymity: their tentative steps onto the public arena should be seen in the light of 
their understandable need for privacy and the sometimes disastrous consequences 
that have accompanied disclosure of HIV status, and their choice by no means 
devalues their claims for individual recognition. Such exposure gives the PLWHA an 
identity or presence in a sphere through which she can negotiate with the State and 
each interviewee arguably claims a right to this very space whenever she references 
the State and articulates the experiences of her interaction with it. But staking a claim 
in the public sphere makes her much more than just a subject on the national arena, 
for as Buergenthal points out, the individual is now recognized as a subject of 
international law in her own right to the extent that she is the rights-bearer of 
international human rights law.251  
 
III. Psychoanalysis, Subjectivities, and Notions of Entitlement 
Throughout this research, the plurality PLWHAs’ senses of self have been manifest 
despite their shared identity-defining illness and (likely) Kenyan nationality. These 
varying subjectivities fundamentally influences how they interact with each other and 
with those who play a role in helping or hindering their efforts to meet their health 
needs, from family and community members to State and extra-State entities. 
PLWHAs’ perceptions about their place within this complex social, economic and 
political grid and their notions about its system of entitlements and obligations 
moulds the choices and strategies they adopt to meet their health needs. Subjectivity 
therefore becomes central to a debate on entitlements to health and the realization 
of health rights, and the theory of psychoanalysis, which is particularly concerned 
with subjectivity, is thus a worthwhile lens through which to further analyze the 
concept.  
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Psychoanalysis draws on the work of philosophers like Jacques Lacan, whose 
reputedly dense writings I make no attempt to discuss directly here.252 But his 
theories anticipate the multiple aspects of the Kenyan legal subject as revealed by the 
interviews: Lacan’s subject has “no inside (e.g., psyche) and outside (e.g., culture)… so 
everything - identities, desire, language, society, law - seems to be involved in the 
constitution of the subject.”253 The interviews reveal subjects whose identities are 
sometimes diametrically opposed to the legal subject as conceived in various human 
rights instruments, which see her as a “conscious, sovereign individual subject- the 
conventional liberal subject.”254 Psychoanalysis adopts a more robust perspective, 
proposing instead that a subject’s unconscious life is instrumental and shapes her 
according to her view of herself and those around her.255 The subject is not a 
predefined or complete entity but “reflectively and intersubjectively constituted.”256  
 
Psychoanalysis therefore poses a fascinating conundrum for the law: the law does 
not- perhaps cannot- presuppose the subject as a moving target, a changeable 
creature, or it must alter its precepts. Instead legal theorists attempt to pin down a 
singular subject who encompasses the ‘essential self,’ an exercise which still 
preoccupies some today, as seen in Brugger’s attempts to bridge the universalist-
versus-cultural relativist divide. This abstract creation may provide the preferred 
template that “allows theorists to discuss liberty, property, and rights in the 
aspirational mode of liberalism with no connection to what those concepts mean in 
real people’s lives.”257Yet there is no such thing as an ‘essential self’.258 The reality 
instead is of “multiple and contradictory selves,” an idea perhaps well illustrated by 
the dignity-claiming interviewees who rebuked other PLWHAs as prostitutes, and 
                                                 
252
 Lacan’s writing has been criticized for taking “the art of obfuscation to new height, making 
straightforward ideas unnecessarily opaque and complex,” and the suggestion made that “he could 
have used a good freshman writing course.” (Richard E. Redding, reviewing Caudill, David S., Lacan and 
the Subject of Law: Toward a Psychoanalytic Critical Legal Theory (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities 
Press, 1997), in ‘Does Law Need an Analyst? Prospects for Lacanian Psychoanalysis in Law,’ Washington 
and Lee Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 3, (1997), pp. 1119-1146, at 1122 and 1123 
253
 Caudill (n 252), at 73. 
254
 Schlag, Pierre, ‘The Problem of the Subject,’ Texas Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 6 (1990-1991), pp. 
1627-1743, at 1730 
255
 Stacy (n 149), at 277 
256
 Douzinas (n 39), at 323  
257
 Matsuda, Mari J., ‘When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method: A 
Talk Presented at the Yale Law School Conference on Women of Color and the Law, April 16 1988,’ 
Women’s Rights Law Reporter, Vol. 11 (1989), pp.7-10, 9  
258
 Stacy (n 149), at 286 
 378 
 
indeed of no self at all at the outset.259 But when the law speaks- through, for 
example, human rights instruments- who does it speak for and to whom is it 
addressed? Or rather, which notion of the subject and political interests does it 
represent?  
 
Some feminist theorists argue that women’s unique role as child-bearers and as 
primary child-rearers means that their selves are fundamentally different from the 
male.260 For them the presumption appears to be of a single notion of self that is 
bifurcated only at the point of sex but that is otherwise the same for all women, as all 
men, regardless of their other identities of race, class or sexuality.261 But critics of this 
notion of essentialism contend that the presumption that all women prioritize the 
gender aspect of their subjectivity as opposed to, say, their race, betrays a preference 
for recognizing the experiences of white over black women.262 This is a particular 
argument among postcolonial feminist theorists, who critique the usurpation of the 
right of women in less geopolitically dominant environments even to define their 
experiences. Ratna Kapur, for instance, problematizes the notion of a ‘global 
sisterhood’ as an expression and extension of the hegemonic status quo by means of 
the universalization of women’s experiences.263  Yet others might suggest any of the 
identities mentioned above, and more, as the most central to their notion of self. 
These are important issues here because they not only help illuminate the hidden 
values and preferences of the law but also provide a context for some of the 
seemingly contradictory values revealed in some respondents’ answers. It should not 
be automatically assumed they are necessarily blind to these contradictions- claiming 
dignity while denying it to others, for example, the capacity to be the oppressors as 
well as the oppressed.264 The responses may be a confident assertion of their multiple 
identities and a claim of their right to a split selfhood.265  
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Understanding the complexity and multiple consciousness of the individual at the 
heart of the human rights project may facilitate a re-evaluation of her aspirations and 
expectations with regards to her health needs, and provide insights into how she 
internalizes and strategically prioritizes certain human rights norms for adaptation at 
the grassroots level. For while legal theory flattens the individual’s identity into an 
abstract shape, offering no accommodation for the irregular contours of her 
subjectivity, a psychoanalytical perspective may help health and human rights policy-
makers and advocates reclaim her and provide perspectives that may help bridge the 
gap between possessing rights in theory and realizing them. Psychoanalytical theory 
illuminates the coexisting and sometimes contradictory interests that are represented 
in the health entitlements claims made or not made by PLWHAs. And because 
subjectivities are fluid, influenced, as seen, by such factors as contact with CSOs, 
human rights and development advocacy strategists will be more successful if they 
abandon entirely the convenient notion of a ready-made, self-aware, autonomous 
subject and focus on how to shape the subjectivities of their audience and help 
nurture a sense of entitlement to health. This would help to better engender a human 
rights culture that has roots in the local communities in which it operates and which 
can flourish long after the activists have gone.  As Petchesky notes, “political action 
can be effective only if [those affected] believe in and own their rights.”266  
 
IV. Shaping Notions of Entitlement, Rooting Human Rights 
As a result of the varying subjectivities and normative paradigms which ground claims 
to health entitlements, a range of perceived duty-bearers emerged among the 
PLWHAs, as well as rationales for thus locating these obligations.  They are responses 
that rights campaigners and others would do well to take note of: the majority, such 
as interviewee 25, expressed certain entitlement claims from more than one actor:  
I think everyone must take part with HIV. Like now I have gone public so it has 
become a responsibility of all my family, now that I have disclosed [my seropositive 
status]. Whenever I have a problem, they take responsibility. It becomes a problem 
when you’ve not told them because they won’t know whether you’re sick. But 
personally I think it’s my responsibility and also the government must also chip in to 
assist us especially on ARVs. Like now I’ve come all the way from Murang’a to here. If 
they were available in Murang’a, it could be cheaper. But now you have to take 
transport to come here for treatment and that is quite expensive.  
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Only about a quarter perceived the government as the exclusive or primary duty-
bearer, as human rights frameworks dictate and advocates would have them 
understand. As well as the respondents reviewed in Chapter 5 who argued that the 
government’s main responsibility was to provide them with employment to facilitate 
their self-sufficiency interviewee 3 noted: “Like the ARVs nowadays: the government 
is supposed to give these because I hear that there are some donors giving out 
money....Yes, it’s the government [that should provide] because donors have come 
out to help- at least we read in the papers that such and such a country has given this 
towards this project and so on, and nothing has been done.” Petchesky rightly argues 
that a sense of entitlement to rights may be easier to form and claims less difficult to 
express where more remote figures or decision-making authorities are concerned; it 
is much harder against actors closer to home (such as the sexually unfaithful partners 
mentioned in some interviews who refused to use condoms, or relations reluctant to 
assist in meeting the healthcare needs of PLWHAs they deem undeserving) although 
this is the site of many human rights violations.267 One respondent, interviewee 14, 
pointed out the government’s vested interest in preserving PLWHAs’ health to avoid 
exacerbating other problems with socio-economic implications like the large orphan 
population: “Well, I still feel that because this is a life-long thing, the government 
should do more than it has done because parting with this money every month [for 
ARVs] and we’re family people who have to take care of these children, it’s a bit 
difficult…[W]e just bank on the government because relatives are never there most of 
the times… [A]t the end of the day, if I die, the government has the burden of taking 
care of the orphans and so on. It will be a burden on the society so if they can make 
the drugs more affordable to everyone, so that we can live and help in nation-
building it will ease the government’s burden.” For another, the government had a 
duty to assist the many affected poor: “I think because this is a situation that is 
affecting so many people and many of those affected happen to be living below the 
poverty line so I think the government should try and do something with the diet, the 
medication, so many people cannot afford these medicines.” (Interviewee 31) 
 
Perhaps Petchesky’s observation merely reaffirms the primacy of alternative frames 
of reference in the location and articulation of entitlements and obligations, for other 
                                                 
267
 Petchesky, ‘Introduction,’ (n 36), at 11 
 381 
 
interviewees made claims against those with whom they had blood or marriage ties; 
for many of them, the possibility of rejection was a constant and present concern. 
Interviewee 20, for example, volunteered ‘family’ should have been included in my 
questionnaire’s list of actors who might assist PLWHAs, but added, “[F]or me, no one 
has helped me pay for my daughter’s school fees. Most of them stigmatize people.” 
The particular responsibility of male spouses to meet their wives’ healthcare needs 
was highlighted by several female interviewees, which is unsurprising in the context 
of the social and cultural structures outlined in Chapter 3. Interviewee 43, for 
instance, said, “It’s my husband’s duty because if he had a good job, he would be the 
one providing for me, but he does not.” Meanwhile, for interviewee 7 the situation 
was clear: “I am married and I have no job, so it is my husband’s duty to provide for 
me.” Lack of a husband meant the absence of the principle automatic duty-bearer for 
one respondent, interviewee 40: “It’s my duty [to meet my health needs]. Who else 
will do it? I’m not married, the child I have is not employed, so who else? But God 
loves me and I get along, and the stronger I get the money strength I have to do my 
small business.”  
 
Other interviewees’ claims on their sexual partners were based on their beliefs that 
they were responsible for infecting them: 
It’s my husband’s if possible, because I am a married person. He was supposed to be 
responsible but he is irresponsible in providing for me so the in-laws are doing it… [It 
is his responsibility] because we’re together. When I came from my home I was not 
having that disease. I gave birth the first time and the kid was ok- it did not have that 
disease. We got it because this is someone who is a drunkard, out of carelessness.” 
(Interviewee 8) 
 
It should be the one who gave me this disease- he should be responsible for providing 
for my needs. But he left his work and it is as if he now wants me to take care of him 
as well. And with the children there, too, you see, it becomes a burden. [He should 
provide] because he gave me the illness. To be honest in my whole life, I have never 
slept around. He is the only man I knew. So it is very painful. I thought he would go 
on with his work so that we can look after our children. But he didn’t. (Interviewee 9) 
 
For interviewee 18, her husband was still responsible even in death: “It should have 
been my husband’s duty were he alive but I he isn’t, and I have children... [B]ecause 
this is his household. I couldn’t have taken our problems anywhere else.” For another, 
interviewee 35, the task was shared between her husband and NGOs, with the latter 
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shouldering the greater obligation. Her comments will be recalled from Chapter 2 (in 
the text immediately following note 31) , as she thought I was an NGO representative:  
It’s the responsibility of people like you! So I am very glad that I met you! You can 
help me! You and my husband combined can help me! Because I think that these 
organizations especially, more than even my husband, are the ones with the ability to 
help me. My husband can then help a little.  
 
Interviewee 41 exemplified the aforementioned notion of ever changing 
subjectivities, illustrating how HIV had altered her perceived role within the family 
dynamic, and, arguably, crucially, her perspective on entitlement claims: “I think it’s 
my duty and also my husband’s for each of us to take care of our needs… because we 
must both try and do something to survive. This is not a time to say that the husband 
should work while the wife stays at home. Everyone must make a contribution.” For 
interviewee 33, the responsibility reverted to her children, as it traditionally would: 
“[It’s] my daughter’s [responsibility]!” she replied, “because she herself brought her 
husband and we all agreed that she would look after me.”  
 
A few respondents even saw religious institutions and officials as having an obligation 
to assist particularly with their psychosocial needs, as seen in Chapter 6, despite the 
fears explored there of condemnation and rejection for perceived sexual trespasses 
and doubts about confidentiality: 
They can help by using the money they collect in their churches to alleviate the needs 
of some of their congregation, even if it’s just 5 or 10 people, because every church 
has its own PLWHAs. For example if you are a Catholic, your church should help you- 
but I should not put the Catholic Church down, they have really helped. But the 
problem is that the moment you volunteer information that you’re a PLWHA, the 
gossip starts. So many people just keep quiet and die in silence in their homes. 
(Interviewee 37) 
 
Even church leaders. They should pray for people, give them hope. With God, 
everything is possible. I know. I didn’t even have drugs, I was just left there, sick, with 
no food. Someone has run away from you, you have a child, you’re sleeping hungry, 
waking up hungry, you have no money. But I know through God, everything is 
possible for me- that’s why I’m alive now. (Interviewee 8) 
 
But interestingly the majority of respondents saw the obligation to maintain their 
health burden as wholly or primarily their own, which may have been inspired by 
different ideas from the varied norms and moral frames of reference. On the one 
hand, attributing the obligation to oneself may be influenced by a sense, articulated 
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by some, of the injustice of shifting the onerous task of providing for PLWHAs onto 
others who may unable to bear it:  
I think it is my own because no one else is able to help me. [A]ll the others in my 
family have they own responsibilities and only small means just like myself, and they 
have their own families. You know, when a parent gives birth to you they feel they 
must help you, even if it’s by something small such as buying you a bar of soap or leso 
[wrapper]. And with an illness like this, if you tell your parents about it, it will kill 
them even before their time is due. (Interviewee 30) 
 
Interviewee 6, though mentioning the role played by NGOs, opined: “It is mostly my 
duty to provide for myself...to make sure I’m living, eating, sleeping… I think it is 
nobody’s responsibility. …When it comes to assistance I cannot blame anybody, even 
my parents I don’t have to blame them, or my brothers and sisters. It is none of their 
responsibility.” After all, it is important to remember that perceived duty-bearers are 
often also rights-bearers whose own rights are not being fulfilled. There may also 
have been considerations of a human rights-related notion of personal dignity, for “at 
the core of human dignity lies the ability to be an affective agent in guiding the course 
of one’s own life.”268 Moreover, recalling Mann’s first and second type of dignity 
violation- refusal to ‘see’ the individual and her subsumption into a group identity- 
PLWHAs who declared that they should provide for their own needs (whether or not 
they in fact could) may have been contesting the refusal to see them as (potentially) 
productive individuals and any notion that homogenizes and characterizes them all as 
helpless victims unable to work, reliant on- or sponging off- the charity of family, 
friends, society and government. This is evident from the many respondents who 
desired only that the government create economic conditions which would enable 
them to find work to meet their own needs. The opinions of interviewee 16, who 
identified herself as the main duty-bearer for meeting her health needs because she 
alone had assumed the risks of infection (sexual intercourse while a student), have 
been mentioned in other chapters. They are echoed by interviewee 35, who while 
dismissing the idea of compelling the government to assist and regarding its 
commitments as charitable appeared to be influenced in her limited sense of 
entitlement to make claims from the government because of the mode of infection: 
“Yes, [the government] can help by meeting and talking about this issue and if there 
is some money left over they can use to do something useful [but] how can you 
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compel the government as if it is the one that gave you this illness! It should be by 
their own free will.” 
 
But it was the need for self-sufficiency, undoubtedly encouraged by the lack of State 
welfare provisions, that may have prompted many to identify themselves as the main 
duty-bearers in the provision for their health needs. Some notions of self-reliance 
were linked to customary as well as modern ideas about adult or parental 
responsibilities. For interviewee 14, “It is my duty because I am an adult and so need 
to provide for myself.”; for interviewee 10, “It is just me. If I don’t and I have my 
children to look after, it is me who will go down. I must struggle the much I can.”; 
likewise, interviewee 42 said: “It is my responsibility… because I should be the one 
looking after myself and my child just like my mother did for me. And but for my 
health, I would, too.”  
 
Others notions of duty-bearing were bound up with traditional cultural and religious 
perceptions of gender roles, with some male respondents illustrating how these 
frameworks and norms continued to shape individual subjectivity and consequently 
notions of duty and entitlement amidst increasingly-weakened traditional social 
bonds and systems of obligations. Interviewee 24 felt:  
It’s my duty…[b]ecause… when you rely on someone else all the time you don’t enjoy 
it. But if you have your own money, you like it better because you’re in control. You 
don’t have to go to someone and say, ‘I don’t have any meat’- you find some might 
even get angry. And that anger is not good for your health. 
 
Interviewee 32 said it was his responsibility because he was “supposed” to take care 
of himself. Outside help, even from family was also a last resort for interviewees 44 
and 39: the former said, “I can explain it to someone and ask for help but at the end 
of the day, the responsibility is mine. If I had a job and I was healthy, I would be able 
to provide for myself.” The latter asserted, “It should be myself, but because I can’t 
afford, that’s why my immediate family helps. …[I]f I was working, I would be doing it 
by myself. I would not go seeking help from others. Also I think the government 
should try giving free ARVs.”  
 
Finally, these responses may be influenced by the empowerment paradigm in the 
development and health promotion sectors. Its emphasis on self-sufficiency and ‘self-
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determination’, as espoused by some key development organizations in Kenya  may 
be pragmatic given the State’s shortcomings in providing socio-economic goods but it 
raises questions about its position on holding the State accountable for what are 
often failures to fulfil its human rights obligations.269 The success of the 
empowerment model might also be seen as an aspect of Baxi’s bleak market-led 
human rights paradigm, with its credo that “in the absence of economic 
development, human rights have no future at all.”270 Yet individual economic 
empowerment and the fulfilment of State human rights obligations are, of course, 
not mutually exclusive. Indeed the role of the individual in meeting her socio-
economic needs through her own resources has been anticipated in such documents 
as the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development271, the source 
of such ferocious opposition from donor countries, as seen in the introductory 
chapter.272  
 
Where, then, does all this leave the human rights project? Its paradigm arguably 
resembles the biomedical one described in Chapter 6: the official ‘right’ framework 
for addressing socio-economic and other problems for those who aspire to, and (self-) 
identify with, ‘modernity’. And while few would question its underlying values- 
equity, equality, dignity of the human being, and so on-, not only do many experience 
the significant gaps between the lofty ideals of its texts and rhetoric and the daily 
struggles of reality, but they have other belief systems, values and vocabularies by 
which to conceive and articulate grievances, entitlements and rights. 
 
Human rights theorists and practitioners make certain presumptions about people’s 
perceptions: about their relationships primarily with the State, their duties and 
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 Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki note of CARE’s interpretation of rights-based approaches in its work: 
“Like Oxfam, CARE Kenya does not programme its work around rights campaigns. Rather, CARE Kenya 
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household level – in the sense of enabling people to make decisions on their own well-being, through 
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entitlements and their notions about the nature and value of human rights norms. 
Yet discrepancies, frequently noted in this research, often exist between identifying 
(socio-economic/health) needs and conceptualizing them as entitlements, and, yet 
further, human rights. There are also some gaps in the envisaged assignation of 
responsibility for the fulfilment of these officially-recognized human rights.  
 
Some of these discrepancies may indeed be bridged by education about, or 
popularization of, the human rights project and its values, whose importance has 
been widely noted here. As Halabi asserts, “Citizens armed with knowledge of human 
rights are better equipped to demand action from [government] and hold it 
accountable.” 273 But this is only part of the story, for deeper issues relating to the 
backgrounds, moral frames of reference and lived experiences of the PLWHAs apply. 
These appear to mould their perceptions of themselves as individuals and their places 
in the social, economic, cultural and political grid. Their subjectivities also seem to be 
significant to defining their understanding of concepts such humanness, dignity, 
citizenship, and their ideas of entitlement. 
 
Yet it should be remembered that subjectivities are constructed, and can therefore be 
deconstructed and reconstructed, and herein lies the (crowded) space in which 
human rights can- and must- compete for attention, along with the other value 
systems and moral languages of cultural tradition and religion, and the market.  
 
And there is every reason to believe that they can be successful: Kenyans are, indeed, 
increasingly more familiar with the human rights enterprise and its goals. The 
interviews also suggest a broad absorption of, and willingness to, accept certain 
fundamental human rights notions and norms although this process was sometimes 
contradictory, often uneven and largely strategic. Values were often incorporated 
into a PLWHA’s subjectivity, personal moral language and outlook when they enabled 
her to (re)construct a more positive sense of self, or facilitated or improved her 
claims to privileges from the State and other actors. Indeed, this is a positive 
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networks around health and human rights to provide information to those most marginalized to effect 
the changes needed to reduce their vulnerability.” (London (n 10), at 73) 
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development, suggesting an agency that is often denied laypeople in the human 
rights discourse. Her stake in the human rights agenda can thus be better understood 
in this light, and it is erroneous, unrealistic and unhelpful to assume that she will 
endorse any such agenda and its values wholesale without any critical consideration 
of its benefits to her, irrespective of whether she manifests such an analysis actively 
or passively, privately or publicly.  
 
For proponents and advocates of human rights to look beyond the above-mentioned 
presumptions and understand how individual and collective notions of entitlements 
and rights are constructed, they must start by putting these very laypeople and their 
varied subjectivities at the heart of the human rights project. Nyamu-Musembi and 
Musyoki noted an encouraging- though embryonic- recognition of this in 2004 by the 
governance organization, CGD, which was working in Kenya at the time: 
The notion that a rights-based approach is about telling people about rights is 
mistaken. It’s more effective to start from letting people identify and analyse their 
problems and then come up with their solutions. It’s about figuring out who is 
responsible for what. Sometimes they realise that they themselves are responsible 
for some of the things [. . .] The important thing is to facilitate people’s own 
understanding of their entitlements; helping to remove what constrains their 
potential. It’s about facilitating a discovery of the root causes, and then facilitating 
the search for solutions. The biggest challenge is to avoid creating another type of 
dependency, where people begin to view you as the ‘rights giver’ since you are the 
one telling them about their rights.274 
 
Ultimately, if the human rights framework, its norms and their practice are to be 
rooted at the grassroots and their ideals transformed into reality, communities must 
be accepted as participants in the shaping and development of the agenda and in the 
effort to actualize it. They must feel to those expected to practice and promote it on 
the ground as inherent and internalized, in the apt allusion by the WOFAK official, like 
religion.275 They must not feel like a set of detached, alien notions parachuted in by 
people or organizations with little or no perceived history, familiarity or long-term 
interest in the local communities expected to espouse them and the individuals 
expected to live them.  
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Conclusion 
 
HIV infection has profound health implications for PLWHAs. But it also arguably 
impacts on their subjectivities, notions about their location in the wider socio-
economic grid, and consequently their perceptions about their health entitlements 
and rights. This research laid out in detail the events, processes and actors that 
converge to produce these subjectivities, with PLWHAs’ responses providing 
empirical evidence for the analysis. Further, the research established the 
fundamental role of HIV infection in the construction of PLWHAs’ subjectivities. As 
was stressed in the introduction, only by outlining the exterior landscape, the site on 
which individuals’ prevailing moral frames of reference are formed and subjectivities 
produced, can one hope to illuminate the often unseen hinterland in which the 
individual, per Hicks1, first encounters the law. And only by adding flesh to the 
individual ‘human’ of human rights and understanding how she synthesizes her lived 
experiences with its norms can one hope to understand how she imagines her 
entitlements, human rights in general and a right to health in particular.  
 
In Chapter 1, the ideas and arguments which frame this research were outlined. And 
as this chapter explained, before any analysis of laypeople’s conceptions of health 
entitlements and a human right to health can begin, a researcher must contend with 
the contestations that surround the key terms of reference among the experts 
themselves. The definition of ‘health’ for the purposes of human rights, for instance, 
inspires much debate. The Introduction showed that the term is sometimes used to 
refer to the wellbeing of the corporeal body only, whereas other definitions 
encompass mental wellbeing, too. Yet other definitions apply a broader 
conceptualization of health beyond the prevailing preoccupation with the individual’s 
biological wellbeing. Such definitions emphasize the social environment in which her 
health is produced.  Indeed, Chapter 1 highlighted biomedicine’s role in the formation 
of subjectivities of patients like the PLWHAs. Its underlying ethos promotes the idea 
of the patient as a rational, autonomous agent in the production of her own health. 
                                                 
1
 Hicks, Stephen, ‘Law and Being in Law as Way of Being,’ in Panou, S.; Bozonis, G.; Georgas, D.; and 
Trappe, P., (eds.), Human Being and the Cultural Values: 12
th
 World Congress, Athens, 1985 (Stuttgart: 
F. Steiner Verlag Weisbaden, 1988) 
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However, in places like Kenya, this obscures the structural obstacles and limited 
choices individuals experience in reality. Meanwhile, as the introduction also 
highlighted, the concept and content of human rights are also much contested, with a 
number of the ideas associated with them- such as humanness, dignity and 
citizenship- being variously defined. These contestations were echoed in the PLWHAs’ 
responses about the meaning of health and human rights explored in Chapter 1, thus 
establishing the template for this research.  
 
Disputes of meaning and ideas recurred in Chapter 2. This was an analysis of the 
methodological approach of this research, which also illustrated how interviewing a 
subject who suffers from a socially stigmatizing illness affects the interaction between 
respondent and interviewer, and thus the strategies used to obtain information and 
the nature of that information. Crucially, too, the chapter explored the challenges of 
communicating in, and translating to, different languages and contexts key human 
rights terms whose definitions are alterable, nuances liable to blunting. This 
exemplified a fundamental argument in this research: those who engage with and 
internalize terms like entitlement, duty and rights inevitably give them meanings in 
accordance with their own contexts and normative frameworks. Further, they reflect 
one’s perception of location within a wider socio-economic matrix and the 
relationships and balances of power between the actors in this matrix. These are the 
complex dynamics which produce and are reflected in individual subjectivity, and 
which make the interpretation of these concepts bespoke. And it is the key thesis in 
this research that HIV/AIDS adds yet another layer to those dynamics and is a vital 
component of the subjectivity of PLWHAs, playing a principle role in how they 
interpret human rights concepts and norms. It was a fact that the detailed analysis of 
the 49 interviews at the heart of this research consistently highlighted.  
 
In Chapter 3 the task began of systematically mapping the broader social, cultural, 
economic and political landscape that has produced PLWHAs’ subjectivities in Kenya. 
It argued that this process must necessarily begin as far back as the pre-colony, and 
by pinpointing three key themes which determined the distribution of power in Kenya 
during this era, the chapter was able to illustrate the continuities that appear to 
mould many interviewees’ responses about their entitlements to health and rights. 
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The analyses of systems of land ownership, kinship and patriarchy and the bonds of 
privileges and duties which regulated them revealed how power was organized in 
pre-colonial Kenya and the ancient roots of some contemporary notions of 
entitlements. More than that, the chapter contextualized the normative frameworks 
within which many interviewees for this research lived. These frameworks nurtured 
their customs and norms about individual autonomy, social responsibility, gender, 
sex, as so on, all of which shaped interviewees’ understanding about the stigma 
surrounding HIV/AIDS and their own contentious identity as PLWHAs. As the chapter 
showed, these deep-rooted paradigms are not easily supplanted by newer ones like 
human rights, and it falls on individuals like the interviewees for this research to 
reconcile or accommodate the inevitable conflicts between models that would 
promote community cohesion and obligations and those which privilege individual 
autonomy and rights. 
 
Chapter 4 explored how the colonial experience transformed local power structures, 
making race the definitive determinant of legal and political identity. It is a theme 
which ensured parallels between the colonial and the AIDS narratives, as the chapter 
showed, shaping the debate on attitudes about African sexuality, the power 
imbalance between donor and recipient nations, the legal and/or moral the 
obligations of the former and the rights of the latter in relation to affordable AIDS 
treatments. This chapter also analyzed the development under colonialism of the 
State as a separate locus of power from the customary and charted the construction 
of the African legal subject, a distinct entity from the settler citizen. While the former 
resided in, and drew her entitlements from her membership of, the customary, the 
latter was a fully-fledged citizen with rights from the State, which protected her from 
its excesses. This bifurcation, as Mamdani and others argue, transcended the 
deracialization that came with independence. This chapter located and grounded the 
importance of Mamdani’s bifurcated State theory in this research, using the PLWHAs’ 
interviews to exemplify the citizen-subject duality. For while many interviewees 
revealed a sense of belonging to a wider national pubic with the State at its heart, 
they also expressed membership to a more exclusive customary-based ethnic public, 
with its emphasis on community cohesion. Yet their responses also problematized 
this dual allegiance and the challenges of internalizing conflicting normative 
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paradigms, as exemplified by the contrasting attitudes in the civic and customary 
spheres towards AIDS and PLWHAs. The chapter revealed mixed perceptions about 
the role and legitimacy of the State, with interviewees’ responses interrogating its 
status as a unifying, inclusive, alternative sphere of power to the customary domain, 
despite the latter’s rigid limitations on individual autonomy. All of these elements, it 
was underlined, arguably contributed to the construction of PLWHAs’ subjectivities 
and notions about entitlement to health and rights as accruing from the State.  
 
Chapter 5, the first of the empirical chapters, was an illustration of just how these 
very notions are the products of the aggregated factors discussed in preceding 
chapters. The interviewees’ responses not only underlined the importance of, and 
challenges to, realizing nutritional and income needs, but they also revealed how 
PLWHAs assign the duty to meet these health needs. This chapter especially 
emphasized the role played by HIV infection in the construction of PLWHAs’ 
subjectivities, revealing how some interviewees’ magnified sense of their identity as 
PLWHAs seemed to shape their ideas of their health entitlements. It suggested that 
some PLWHAs interpreted the real or imagined infringement of prevailing sexual 
norms as justifiably disentitling contraveners to privileges such as healthcare 
assistance, which may otherwise be guaranteed by the networks of entitlements and 
obligations which bound traditional socio-economic matrices. However, some 
interviews suggested that these bonds are significantly diluted today and that 
infection with a stigmatizing illness weakens them even further. This was exemplified 
by the numerous responses from PLWHAs which prioritized financial self-sufficiency 
over the sometimes unreliable promises of assistance from their traditional social 
networks. And yet, as Chapter 5 illustrated, the possibility of economic autonomy and 
actualization of socio-economic rights was still often determined by the systems of 
land tenure, kinship and patriarchy discussed in previous chapters, which continued 
to define the nature of entitlements, limiting those of marginalized groups like 
women.  
 
Chapter 6 further galvanized the thesis that HIV infection appears pivotal to the 
construction of PLWHAs’ subjectivities and thus their notions about their health 
entitlements and rights. By analyzing interviewees’ self-identified psychosocial and 
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medical needs, the chapter was able to look more closely at how the stigma 
surrounding AIDS, the dearth of conventional psychosocial therapies, and 
inaccessibility of treatment compounds stigma and breeds self-stigma in sufferers. 
Rigid customary and religious norms about sexual behaviour, which produce and 
perpetuate the stigmatization of PLWHAs, isolate sufferers from what are usually 
their only avenues for psychosocial care: the social and religious networks on which 
many rely for moral and emotional support. The idealization of sexual submissiveness 
in women was shown to be particularly pernicious, often imposing a double penalty 
on female PLWHAs who, like several interviewees for this research, become infected 
as a result of conferring the unrestricted sexual access to (promiscuous) husbands 
that these very norms dictate. As this chapter revealed, the cumulative negative self-
image may have resulted in narrowed perceptions in some PLWHAs about their range 
of health entitlements, especially costly ones like medical care. Several interviewees 
testified that hidden expenses make such care unattainable despite greater 
availability of subsidized or even free ARVs. Consequently, PLWHAs may opt for, or be 
compelled to supplement modern biomedical therapies with, contentious traditional 
therapies. As this chapter contended, this is a different dimension to a familiar 
conflict highlighted by this research: that between normative frameworks. 
Biomedicine is often accused of conceptualizing patients like PLWHAs as unfettered 
autonomous beings, much like the subjects of the human rights paradigm. For 
traditional medicine, meanwhile, the patient is more than just a body alienated from 
the socio-economic context which produces her health. It seeks to treat the whole 
person, physical as well as spiritual. Yet, as this chapter argued, the biomedical-
versus-traditional therapies debate also highlighted the pivotal accommodation 
identified in this research: the citizen-subject duality. 
 
The perception by some PLWHAs of increasingly unreliable claims against traditional 
social or kinship networks was juxtaposed in Chapter 6 with the accentuated 
importance of other actors in delivery of healthcare. These were the Kenyan State, 
NGOs and donors, in reference to whom many interviewees were shown to have 
formed various notions of entitlement. Their crucial role in the delivery of ART for 
PLWLHAs was examined in detail in Chapter 7. This research found largely favourable 
views about NGOs and donors, as PLWHAs compared their performance in the 
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delivery of healthcare with that of the State. The contrasting negative reviews of the 
Kenyan State not only testified to the expectations of healthcare assistance that many 
PLWHAs now espoused to it but also suggested doubts about its legitimacy. It was 
argued in this chapter that donors and NGOs, the most visible embodiments of the 
civil society phenomenon, were now so ensconced in the fields of health and 
development that they were redefining the concepts of the State and the citizen-
subject. The chapter was careful to put their actual reach into perspective, noting 
that civil society’s reach in Africa was uneven: familiar in the civic sphere, that is, 
urban centres, but rare in seat of the customary sphere, the rural areas where most 
Kenyans live. The PLWHA interviews again provided empirical examples of these 
arguments which were raised by Mamdani and others. Nevertheless, the chapter 
showed that NGOs as a part of a broadly defined civil society had opened up new 
arenas for public participation for marginalized groups like the PLWHA community. 
But the chapter also spotlighted some of the more contentious aspects of civil 
society/donor involvement: it raised concerns that NGOs may sometimes reproduce 
and entrench the same patterns of inequality and marginalization that they sought to 
challenge. It also problematized their financial dependence on, and ultimate 
accountability to, their often overseas-based donors, which limits local recipients’ 
agency. Finally, the chapter highlighted arguments that NGOs and donors’ 
involvement in the delivery of health may undermine State sovereignty and 
legitimacy. As this research explained, this has complex implications for the balance 
of power and influence in the bifurcated State, where the State’s reach may extend to 
the national public in the civic sphere but is already more muted among the ethnic 
public in the customary.  
 
Finally, Chapter 8 expounded on the human rights concepts and theories raised 
throughout the research and located them in the foundations of interviewees’ claims 
to health entitlements, and their attribution of obligation to fulfil these entitlements. 
It analyzed the PLWHAs’ human rights awareness, comparing a number of emerging 
issues, such as their particular familiarity with what are categorized as civil and 
political rights, with findings from more general surveys conducted by the Kenya 
Human Rights Commission. Crucially, this research also highlighted differences that 
may be accounted for by the PLWHAs’ particular identity. Once again, this chapter 
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developed the thesis about the role HIV infection may be playing in moulding 
PLWHAs’ subjectivities and thus their conceptualization of entitlements and rights. In 
particular, it illustrated how three fundamental human rights ideas which emerged 
from the interviews, namely, humanness, dignity and citizenship, were often 
interpreted by the respondents through an HIV/AIDS lens. Moreover, this chapter 
exemplified the contradictions inherent in PLWHAs’ attempts to understand and 
define these concepts from conflicting perspectives: that of human rights, as 
popularized by PLWHA rights campaigners, and that of the religion and/or culture 
that dominates their lived experiences. This research argued that while the former 
defined humanness, dignity and citizenship inclusively, which appealed to the often-
marginalized PLWHAs, the latter paradigm often defined these terms to exclude 
those like PLWHAs who were suspected of violating its norms and undermining social 
cohesion. By exploring such contradictions, the research was able to provide a 
context against which to investigate theories that link psychoanalysis and the law. 
This discussion interwove Jacques Lacan’s concept of the seamlessness of the internal 
and external aspects which constitute the subject of law with the empirical example 
of PLWHAs’ complex subjectivities and their influence on their imaginations of law 
and human rights. And although the interviewees for this research were selected on 
the basis of one crucial common factor, infection with HIV, Chapter 8 underscored 
how the other factors discussed throughout this research may also play a role in 
producing PLWHAs’ subjectivities and coloured individual understanding of health 
entitlements and rights. For it outlined the range of actors to whom the PLWHAs 
attributed the duty to meet their health needs, each a reflection of the individual’s 
aggregated subjectivity and her conception of her place in the wider socio-economic 
grid. As the chapter concluded, subjectivity remained dynamic and malleable. But 
while the modern human rights paradigm may yet supplant or at least provide a 
credible viable alternative to the predominant exclusive moral frameworks, it cannot 
yet claim to provide the reflexive frame of reference or vocabulary by which 
laypeople imagine themselves, their grievances and their entitlements.  
 
Human rights advocates would do well to acknowledge this. For although the human 
rights paradigm has been increasingly mainstreamed in the latter part of the 20th 
Century, there is often a disconnect between the way human rights experts and 
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laypeople conceptualize and articulate claims to entitlements like health. This 
challenges the efficacy of the human rights framework itself to address these 
concerns. Indeed, William Conklin has highlighted the counterproductive effect of 
using a medium that is hidden from, or unknown to, those in whose aid it is 
apparently deployed, decrying the fate of “the pained individual ... overwhelmed by 
the distant language of experts.”2 Yet the PLWHAs’ interviews analyzed throughout 
this research offer glimpses of the opportunities and possibilities for popularizing the 
human rights project and promoting its framework to complement or even supersede 
alternative cultural or religious paradigms. For PLWHAs’ belief systems were seen to 
be elastic, dynamic, fluctuating between the socio-cultural spaces they inhabit. This 
allowed them to make strategic choices about when and where to espouse and enact 
certain norms, despite the inherent contradictions this sometimes entailed, in order 
to facilitate their complex existence in often hostile environments and to maximize 
the potential (health) benefits of membership to various communities and sub-
communities.  
 
As this research illuminated, the human rights framework holds certain attractions for 
marginalized groups like PLWHAs, for it has in its key concepts the power to highlight 
the suffering of individuals and provide alternative narratives for their lived 
experiences. Further, its dynamic language may help them (re)create positive 
identities for themselves that empower them to re-conceive their entitlements and 
rights. These often exceed the limited privileges afforded by traditional customary 
systems and by providing individuals with the tools to re-imagine their subjectivities, 
the international human rights paradigm enables them to renegotiate their broader 
relationships and to make claims against actors beyond their own narrow ethnic and 
national publics. Indeed, embracing it promises membership to a powerful globalized 
community, both real and ideational, which can mobilize the language of rights, the 
lingua franca of any modern powerbroker with claims to legitimacy, to address 
concerns like the lack of access to ART for the poor. The overwhelming, though as yet 
incomplete, success of this latter campaign has become a blueprint for how to deploy 
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 Conklin, William E.; ‘Human Rights, Language and Law: A Survey of Semiotics and Phenomenology,’ 
Ottawa Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1995-1996), pp. 129-174, at 137. 
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rights to alleviate specific socio-economic problems while highlighting the breadth 
and interconnectedness of the issues which underpin them. 
 
But the human rights framework is not perfect and it is assailed by a range of 
theoretical and practical problems. To highlight just a couple, its preoccupation with a 
generic, ideal individual can sometimes appear to de-emphasize the highly variable 
social and structural settings within which she experiences the fulfilment or violation 
of her rights. Moreover, while its soaring rhetoric may inspire, it can also be a 
weakness. In poor countries like Kenya, where the realization of its promises seems 
ever more distant its ideals can appear hollow and feed perceptions about the 
bankruptcy of the project. This is especially the case as the promotion of the human 
rights model occurs contemporaneously with the reluctance by some of its most vocal 
proponents to address the long-standing asymmetries that define local and global 
power relations and determine the actualization- or not- of rights.  
 
And yet its potency is undeniable: its rhetoric, language and values encouraged many 
of the PLWHAs interviewed for this research to publically acknowledge their illness 
and relate their experiences of living with HIV/AIDS. This allowed them to claim a 
space in the public arena which many had often been denied, and provided them 
with a platform from which they could challenge stigma, discrimination and 
inadequate healthcare services. Further, their individual and collective voices have 
been influential in popularizing certain human rights terms and issues which relate 
specifically to the epidemic but are linked to public health more generally. As 
Upendra Baxi and others have highlighted, despite the many valid criticisms of the 
human rights enterprise, it has an immense potential to give greater visibility to 
victims of human rights violations and, when properly applied, a rights-based 
framework can help illuminate the underlying causes and patterns of their suffering. 
It is therefore eminently worthwhile to engage with the challenges of rooting its ideas 
and norms among laypeople.  
 
To be sure, there appears to be a wide grassroots awareness of certain human rights-
related concepts and norms:  as this research showed, many respondents seemed to 
espouse the notion of human dignity and equality, even though they might have 
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come to them from different moral frames of references. The Haki Index also attested 
to the broad awareness over the last few years of human rights issues in general. 
Contemporary events in Kenya like general elections, constitutional referenda and 
the recent post-election violence enquiry have provided opportunities and platforms 
to inform the public and engage them in debates about the aims of the human rights 
project, and to popularize its language and values. But there remains a considerable 
discrepancy between the eloquence with which the interviewees represented their 
health needs and their awareness of any legal claims to entitlements to which they 
might be connected. This missing link is crucial to the organization of the kind of mass 
movements and campaigns that groups like TAC in South Africa have so successfully 
orchestrated.   
 
Human rights organizations and experts will be instrumental in bridging this gap if the 
full potential of Kenya’s new Constitution, with its enforceable Bill of Rights, is to be 
harnessed. And yet some commentators have remarked on their lack of leadership 
and insufficient engagement with laypeople. Their failure to mobilize the grassroots 
means that human rights largely remain their preserve. It is a charge arguably borne 
out in this research by the predominance of alternative frames of reference in the 
PLWHAs’ conceptualization and expression of their health and other entitlement 
claims, almost seven decades after the UDHR,  nearly five after the ICESCR and close 
to a quarter of a century since the epochal early-1990s which heralded a human 
rights revival.  
 
In order to be best positioned to cultivate the human rights paradigm into the 
privileged frame of reference for conceptualizing and articulating suffering, its agents 
will have to discard what often seems little more than a superficial interest in 
understanding its audience. They must recognize and respect laypeople’s self-
identified concerns and priorities, the social relations and events that shape their 
diverse subjectivities and how on this basis they formulate their particular ideas 
about rights. Some of these ideas may be challenging, perhaps even odious to 
conventional human rights norms but that is no reason to exclude them from the 
debate. Indeed the intrinsic promise in the process of constituting subjectivities and 
belief systems lies in its fluidity: the self-appointed guardians of the human rights 
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project can choose what part, if any, they would like to play in this process. Their 
conspicuous absence from the daily struggles of ordinary people only alienates and 
removes from the armoury of the suffering one of the most potent weapons of the 
last half-century for effecting social change.  
 
The human rights movement must not look back at the this period when the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic was at its peak as a lost opportunity: for the issues such as those 
affecting PLWHAs are a chance to firmly implant the issue of rights in the national 
conscious and invite to join the dialogue entire sections of the population that have 
been locked out of it. To be fair, this has already happened to some extent but the 
connections between basic needs and legal entitlements must be made more often 
and more explicitly if they are to catch on. If human rights organizations do not take 
up the challenge such opportunities will pass altogether. In Odinkalu words:  
[p]eople will struggle for their rights whether or not the language of human rights is 
accessible to them. But they will not build their struggle around the notion of human 
rights unless that language and those who wish to popularize it speak directly to their 
aspirations and survival.3  
                                                 
3
 Odinkalu, Chidi Anselm, ‘Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language,’ Human Rights 
Dialogue, Series 2, No. 1 (1999), Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, at 
http://www.cceia.org/resources/publications/dialogue/2_01/articles/602.html, accessed 20/05/09. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Questions: English Version 
 
 
Briefly, the purpose of my research here is:  
 
 To find out directly from PLWHAs what they consider to be their most 
important needs/requirements as people living with HIV or AIDS, and  
 What they personally know about the issue of human rights generally, if 
anything, and about socio-economic rights in particular. 
 
QUESTIONS: 
 
Questions aimed at facts: 
 
1. Name:  
 
2. Sex:  
 
3. HIV/AIDS status:  
 
When did you find out that you were HIV positive? 
 
Have you developed AIDS? 
 
 
Questions aimed at beliefs or attitudes (subjective): 
 
 
4. What are your basic health needs, that is, what do you require to keep you 
strong and healthy from day to day?  
 
Alternative Question: as a person with HIV/AIDS, tell me 5 of the most 
important things you personally take/need every day to maintain your health 
and strength.) 
 
 
5. Do you usually get all these requirements- if not, what do you usually get and 
what do you usually not get? 
 
 
6. Who is currently providing you with what you require, that is, who is paying for 
your requirements?  
 
 
7. Whose duty is it, in your view, to provide your requirements? 
 400 
 
 
 
8. Why? 
 
 
9. Generally, are you personally satisfied or dissatisfied that your 
requirements/needs for these 5 important things as a person living with 
HIV/AIDS are being adequately met?   
 
 
10. If ‘yes’, why? 
 
 
11. If ‘no’, why? 
 
 
12. The government IN September 2003 announced that ARVs would be available 
at all District Hospitals by the end of September 2003. It was added that 
patients would have to pay for the drugs although the cost would be reduced.1 
Did you hear about this? 
 
 
13. If ‘no’, NOTE that the interviewee was not aware of this 
development BUT continue questioning. Just remind the 
interviewee about it and the justification given by the government 
(SEE footnote below and proceed with the interview. 
 
14. If yes, do you recall the justification given by the government for this cost-
sharing system?  
 
(Continue questions even f the interviewee does not remember the reason given 
by the government. Just inform them of the reason, below.) 
(Answer: It was stated that this was aimed at making the programme 
sustainable.2)  
                                                 
1
 The Daily Nation, ‘State accused of betrayal on Aids medicines’, 17
th
 September  2003: “On Monday, 
Health assistant minister Gideon Konchellah said although all district hospitals would be stocked with 
anti-retrovirals by the end of the month, patients would have to pay for treatment under the cost-
sharing system. Currently, the cheapest anti-retroviral treatment costs Sh3,000 a month. Mr 
Konchellah clarified that only a selected number would get free anti-retroviral treatment under the 
Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission programme. The others would have to pay for their 
treatment though the cost would be reduced, the assistant minister added.”  
2
 The Daily Nation, ‘Move to sell Aids drugs explained’, 18
th
 September 2003: “Plans to ask Aids 
patients to pay for drugs at public hospitals is aimed at making the programme sustainable, the 
Government said yesterday. The move to sell the life-prolonging drugs commonly known as anti-
retrovirals, would remove stigma from HIV treatment, the National Aids and Sexually Transmitted 
Infections director, Dr Kenneth Chebet said. Dr Chebet said in Nairobi: ‘Anti-retrovirals are just like any 
other essential drugs…Due to the existing cost-sharing system in public hospitals, respective district 
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What do you think about this? 
 
 
15. What do you think are the most important things that PLWHAs generally need 
to stay healthy and strong (if they are different from the ones you mentioned 
for yourself?) 
 
 
16. Do you think that the needs of PLWHAs generally are being adequately met? 
 
 
17. If yes, what informs your answer? 
 
 
18. If no, what informs your answer? 
 
 
 
Human Rights: 
 
By way of introducing the topic of rights: “As I mentioned earlier, I would also like to 
ask you about your thoughts on the issue of human rights.  
 
19. Firstly, may I ask what you understand by the words “human rights”? 
 
 
20. What are some of the Human Rights you’ve heard of or you know? 
 
 
21. How or from whom did you hear about these Human Rights? 
 
 
A filter question: 
 
Recently, we have been hearing people talk human rights in relation to HIV/AIDS.   
 
 
22. Have you thought much about this issue or have you not heard much about it?  
 
NOTE THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTIONS AS IT BECOMES 
IMPORTANT IN QUESTION 23 
 
                                                                                                                                             
health management boards will determine a very nominal fee they will charge to ensure anti-retroviral 
therapy is not stigmatized…’ He said the boards would ensure that those who were unable to pay for 
the drugs would be able to access them since every hospital had a waiver system. On Tuesday, the 
Kenya Network of Women with Aids executive director, Ms Asunta Wagura, said the government move 
would deny the majority of more than 200,000 people living with Aids access to life-prolonging drugs.” 
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 If ‘no’, TRY ANOTHER APPROACH, below.  
 
 If ‘yes’, proceed with this question anyway. 
 
Do you think that  
a) local authorities like chiefs, or D.O.s, or provincial administrator, and people in 
such positions or  
b)  GOVERNMENT or  
c)  LOCAL or FOREIGN NGOs or  
 
can or should do to help you and your family deal with your being ill? 
 
If so, how can they help? 
 
d) Are there other people/groups I have not mentioned that you think can and/or 
should help? And if so, how? 
 
 If ‘yes’ to Question 22, that the interviewee has heard about and 
thought about recent talk on human rights in relation to HIV/AIDS:   
 
 
23. Do you think the issue of HIV/AIDS is related to human rights?  
 
 
24. If yes, how? 
 
 
 
Health and Human Rights: 
 
FILTER question: 
 
25. Some people have stated there is a link between the issue of health generally 
and that of human rights.  
 
Have you thought much about this issue or have you not heard much about it? 
 
 If ‘yes’, proceed with the interview.  
 
 If ‘no’, go to questions at the end of the questionnaire:  Question 41 
 
26. Do you agree with this view?  
 
□ If ‘yes’, in your opinion what is this link? 
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□ If ‘no’, why? 
 
 Another FILTER question: 
27. It has also been stated by some people that there is a human right to 
healthcare- have you ever heard about a human right to healthcare?  
 
 If ‘yes’, proceed with the interview. 
 
 If ‘no’, go to questions at the end of the questionnaire: Question 41 
 
 
28. Where and/or from whom did you hear about it? 
 
 
29. In your own words, what does a human right to healthcare mean to you?  
 
 
30. In your opinion, are there any practical benefits of having a right to 
healthcare?  
 
 
31. In your opinion, do you think you would benefit practically from having a right 
to healthcare?  
 
 
32. If yes, how? 
 
 
33. If no, why? 
 
 
34. Who, in your opinion, is meant/should benefit (is the beneficiary) of the right 
to healthcare?  
 
35. Who, in your opinion, is meant/should provide these benefits? 
 
 
36. Why do you think that this (or these) group(s) should be the ones to provide 
these benefits? 
 
 
37. In your opinion, can the government help in providing the benefits of a right to 
healthcare? If so, how?  
 
 
38. Do you think the government can afford to do these things (that you just 
listed)? 
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39. If ‘yes’, how? 
 
 
40. If ‘no’, why? 
 
 
 
Age: 
41. What year were you born?  
 
 
Education: 
42. Have you ever had any formal education?  
 
 
43. How many years of primary school did you complete?  
 
 
44. How many years of high-school did you complete?  
 
 
45. How many of University or College did you complete?  
 
 
Occupation: 
46. Do you have an occupation? 
 
 
47. If ‘yes’, what is it? 
 
 
Finally: 
 
48. Anything to add? 
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Interviews 
 
1. Preliminary Inquiry with Mbagathi District Hospital Administration Officer, 3rd March 2004 
2. Informal exploratory discussion with WOFAK Program Officer, 22nd March 2004 
3. Interview with Maina Kiai, Director, National Commission on Human Rights 26th May 2004 
4. PLWHA interviews: 
 Interviews 1-7: 6th April 2004 
 Interviews 8-12: 30th April 2004   
 Interviews 13-15: 7th May 2004 
 Interviews 16-22: 11th May 2004 
 Interviews 23-26: 14th May 2004 
 Interviews 27-29: 18th May 2004 
 Interviews 30- 37: 21st May 2004 
 Interviews 38-44: 25th May 2004 
 Interviews 45- 49: 28th May 2004 
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